


















National Institute of Advanced Studies
Indian Institute of Science Campus 
Bangalore 560 012, India
©  N ational Institute o f  A dvanced Studies 2 0 0 2
Published by
National Institute o f Advanced Studies 
Indian Institute of Science Campus 
Bangalore 560 012
Cover Page Photo and Design by 
Sangeetha Menon
P rice : Rs. 500/- 
US$ 30
ISBN 81-87663-27-8
Copies o f  this report can be ordered from  :
The Controller
National Institute o f Advanced Studies 
Indian Institute o f Science Campus 
Bangalore 560 012 
Phone:080-3604351/3606594 
E-m ail: mgp@nias.iisc.emet.in
This is Special Publication 10-02
Typeset & Printed b y :
Verba N etw ork Services
139, Cozy Apts., 8th M ain, 12th Cross
M alleswaram
B angalroc 560 003




1. Myth, metaphysics and science 3
□  D P  C h attop a d h y ay n
2. Physics, body-mind and the beyond 18
□  D P  C h a tto p a d h y a y a
3. Challenges to philosophy and religion from
development in life-sciences 51
a  N  S S  R a m a n
4. Human consciousness in metaphysical and
scientific perspectives 61
□  B h u v a n  C h a n d e l
Section 2
5. Why a "neural correlate of consciousness"
is not just a metaphor 81
□  I ly a  F a r b e r
6. Why consciousness cannot be deconstructed:
Towards a positive theory of consciousness 98
□  R C P rad lian
7. Genetics, first-person methodologies, and
the "hard" and "easy" problems of consciousness 107
□ Jonathan Shear
8. Consciousness expanded 125
□ Wesley J Wildman
9. From experiences to consciousness 142
□ H N Shankar
10. Consciousness by any other name - Some outstanding
problems in the life of the mind 148
□ Purusholtama Bilimoria
11. Beside the 'intentor' and the 'integrator'; Looking
at two 'faces' of consciousness 164
□  Sangeetha Menon
Section 3_____________________________________________________
12. Consciousness and rebirth in classical Yoga 181
□ T K Anantharaman
13. Science, religion and spirituality 200
□ Swami Harshananda
14. Kashmiri Sufism, Islam and Hinduism 208
□  Sultan Shahin
15. Towards an integral epistemology of consciousness:
A radical proposal based on Sri Aurobindo's work 225
□ Matthijs Cornelissen
16. A metaphysics of living systems, reductionism and
emergentism in the Yoga Vasistha 245
□  Roddam Narasimha
Contents v
Section 4
17. The elusive self in the spatio-temporal net 259
□ Shobini L Rao
18. Neural plasticity and yoga 275
□ Shirley Telles
19. Neuro-endocrinology and consciousness 282
□  N  Kochupillai
20. Genes and brain circuits 295
□  Obaid Siddiqi
21. Consciousness-elusive or can one grasp it? 302
□  B Ramamurthi
Section 5___________________________________________________
22. Genes and social behaviour 333
□ Vidyamnd Nanjundiah
23. The biology of laughter 349
□  Renee M  Borges
24. What is it like to be a monkey? Attribution and
intentionahty in wild bonnet macaques 356
□ Anindya Sinha
25. Becoming self-conscious : A psychological perspective 375
□  R L Kapur
Section 6
26. Neuroscience, consciousness and emergence:
A supervenience theory of mind 387
□  Philip Clayton
T7. Transcendences in physics and their implications
to consciousness 403
a  B V  Sreekantan
28. Speculations on a unified theory of matter and mind 415
□ Manoj K Samal
Panel Discussions
A. Metaphysical Implications of Modern Science
Extracts and Summary 437
□ MG Narasimhan
1. Self-consciousness: The first-person singularity 447
□ N Kumar
2. Consciousness of passage of time in humans
under prolonged social isolation 452
□ M fC Omndrashekaran
3. Metaphysical implications of modern science:
How and why they arise 455
□  Srinivasa Rao
B. Science and Religion
Extracts and Summary 459
□ B V Subbarayappa
1. Science and religion 471
□ Paul K Wason
List of Contributors 476
Editors' Note
The notion that science and n:\etaphysics are two different themes 
which cannot have issues of common concern has changed with 
the new and different ways of looking at science, technology, 
philosophy and spiritual traditions. A dialogue between scientific 
and metaphysical traditions has become not only relevant but also 
imperative in the modern context, where we are often confronted 
with dilemmas in defining values whether they be scientific and 
technological developments and innovations, societal and 
communal health, or moral and spiritual explorations. Research on 
genetic signatures and genome mapping, neural and biochemical 
aspects of brain activities, psychological, philosophical and 
spiritual understanding of the human mind and consciousness has 
enlarged the picture and many interfaces for dialogue and 
multidisciplinary understanding have developed.
At the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) in Bangalore, 
we have a small group working in the area of cognitive science and 
consciousness. We organised the first national conference on 
consciousness in February 1999 on the theme "Scientific and 
philosophical studies on consciousness" and the proceedings of 
this meeting were published as a special publication by NIAS the 
same year (NIAS Special Publication 5-99,1999). This event made 
us aware of the considerable interest in this field in India. We felt 
that it would be appropriate to organise an international seminar 
that would provide an opportunity to review the new 
developments that are taking place in this field and also to present 
our own work in this area. We were considerably encouraged 
when the Sir John Templeton Foundation, USA, supported this
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idea and agreed to collaborate or\ such a meeting. We also received 
ready support from the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 
(ICPR) and Centre for Studies in Civilisations (CSC).
On the one hand, a rich literature exists on the philosophical 
understanding of the complexity of consciousness, especially in 
the Indian wisdom traditions. On the other, scientists are excited 
about the emergence of new insights into many outstanding issues 
in the life sciences. In particular, molecular genetics has caused 
waves through the Human Genome Project and raised, rightly or 
wrongly, great hopes as well as great fears. Thanks to the new 
generation of non-invasive instrumental techniques including 
CAT-scan, fNMR, PET, LASER, electric and magnetic 
encephalography and microelectrodes, there have been far 
reaching developments in the neurosciences, and the 
spatiotemporal events in the brain and its accessories are being 
mapped out in detail. And scientists feel that we should not be far 
from answering the crucial question -  are the electro-physico- 
chemical activities of the neurons and the synapses responsible for 
consciousness? Or is it the other way round -  does consciousness 
drive these circuits?
These proceedings of the international seminar on "Science and 
metaphysics: a discussion on consciousness and genetics" held at 
NIAS from 24-27 June 2001, consist of the individual presentations 
at various sessions and the panel discussions. The papers in this 
volume have been generally arranged according to their themes. 
Some papers remain unrepresented in this volume since we did not 
receive them at all. The editors of this volume have taken the liberty 
of making essential editorial changes in order to follow a uniform 
format in the listing of references and notes at the end of each 
paper. The diacritical marks for sanskrit words are denoted as per 
the styles followed by the authors. We thank the authors for 
sending in their papers on time and also extend our due apologies 
for any inadvertent errors or omissions in the final versions of these 
papers.
Regarding the panel discussions, some of the panelists have sent us 
manuscripts of their contributions which we have fully 
reproduced in the volume. Not to lose out on the flavour of the 
contributions from others, extracts and summaries prepared by the 
panel coordinators, making use of the tape recordings, have been
included. The editors are grateful to the coordinators. 
Prof B V Subbarayappa and Dr M G Narasimhan for undertaking 
this arduous task.
The seminar was jointly organised by the National Institute of 
Advanced Studies and the Sir John Templeton Foundation, USA. 
We extend our thanks to the Foundation for their support and 
interest. We also thank the Indian Council of Philosophical 
Research and Centre for Studies in Civilisations, New Delhi, for co- 
sponsoring  this sem inar. We thank H er E xcellen cy  
Smt V S Ramadevi, the Governor of Karnataka, for her presidential 
address. Prof D P Chattopadhyaya for the inaugural address and 
Dr P N Tandon for delivering the valedictory address for the 
seminar. Our thanks are also due to Prof R Narasimha, Director, 
NIAS, for his encouragement, and Dr Raja Ramarma, NIAS, for 
many discussions. Our thanks are also for Ms V B Mariyammal and 
Ms K R Suchitra for helping us to organise the papers, and 
Ms K Shashikala, Indian Academy of Sciences, for copy-editing the 
text of this volume. Finally, we thank all our colleagues in NIAS for 
helping us to organise this conference and in the preparation of this 
volume.
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Myth, metaphysics and science*
D P CHATTOPADHYAYA 
Centre for Studies in Civilizations 
Calcutta and New Delhi, India
1. Remarks on philological routes to protoscience 
and science
The meaning of our thought and of the ideas contained in it 
depends much upon the language in and through which we are 
expressing ourselves. The English word “myth” is traceable to 
the Greek word m uthos which stands for speech, word, tale, 
legend and their cognates. Its exact etymology is doubtful. But 
the word Purana has its definite meaning in Sanskrit and 
Sanskrit-rooted languages. Purana has been said to be an 
element of Itihasa, which literally means what really happened, 
referring to both events and ideas of the past. In this sense, 
myth as Purana, contrary to popular belief, does not stand for 
what is fictitious or necessarily supernatural. For example, when 
one speaks of “the myth of deluge” , it has an underpinning of 
the palaeo-anthropology of North West Asia, from the legend
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of Noah to India’s Visnupurana and beyond, extended to the 
corroborative and similar myths in the Mid-Pacific and South 
Pacific islands. Further, when one speaks of the myth of Cupid 
and Psyche, one can easily discover its allegorical implicatons.
When we enter the realm of myths following the Sanskritic 
routes, we are on firmer ground. Here Purana means what 
belongs to ancient or olden times. Purana is referred to in 
different Vedas. It is the name of a class of sacred works 
attributed to Vyasa. The three main groups of Puranas are 
classified under (i) Rajasa exalting Brahma (e.g., the Brahmanda 
P u ran a , B rah m av a iv arta  P u ran a, B b av isy a  P u ran a . . . ) ,
(ii) Sattvika  exhalting V/snu (e .g ., the Vist)u Purana, the 
Bhagavata Purana, Garuda Purana...) and (iii) Tamas exalting 
^iva (the ^iva, Lihga, Agni....). There are other types of grouping 
of the Puranas. But the interesting point to be noted in this 
connection is that the seemingly fanciful concepts have their 
proto-cosmological, if not clearly cosmological, implications. 
Like the V ed as, the P uranas  have in them their hidden 
cosmological concepts, for example, of fire, water, air, etc. To 
Aghamarsana  and Prajapati Paramesthin  is attributed the view 
that the visible world is due to the action of Warmth, Creative 
Fervour (^apas) in the primitive substance called Water. Warmth 
{tapas) and Night (tamas) are the successive forces of the time 
princip le called  Year (S arh v atsara). Like the H ellenic 
philosopher, Thales (624-546 BC), who asserted that Water is 
the first principle of creation, we have in India Prajapati 
Paramesthin proffering the principle of Salila as the fundamental 
cosmological principle of creation. Another cosmological 
principle of creation. Air or Vayu, is also found both in the 
Hellenic and the Indie traditions. In the Rgveda  (X. 168.3) as 
well as in the Atharva Veda, we find reference to Anila or Vayu, 
as Rtava, the principle of things and beings. This reminds us of 
another H ellenic thinker, Anaximenes (570-500 BC), who 
asserted that Air (Greek aer), possessing inherent capacity for 
motion, is the first principle of creation.
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Two arguments should be kept in view about why myths should 
not be taken as purely fictitious and that, positively speaking, 
why the same should be recognized as having some factual, if 
not proscientific, implications in them. First, in many such major 
civihzations as Indie, Sinic, Semitic and Hellenic, the basic 
elements of Nature as recognized by modern science had also 
been recognized in a pre-experimental or intuitive manner. 
Second, in the recognition of Earth (Ksiti), Water (Ap), Fire or 
Energy {T ejas  or T apa), Air (M arut) and Sky (V yom ) as 
fundamental natural elements, the ancients might have been 
influenced both environmentally and intuitively. Myths retain 
their understanding in symbolic and metaphorical languages. It 
is instructive to note that most of the natural forces have been 
deified by them and given the names of Gods and Goddesses. 
It is not surprising that many insightful proscientific modern 
philosophers, particularly the metaphysicians, regard myths as 
chaff or husks having grains or seeds hidden in them. 
Distinctions between the mythical and the metaphysical and 
between the mythical and the scientific can best be understood 
through patient and perceptive linguistic analysis based on the 
principles of philology and etymology.
2. Anthropologists and sociologists on ttie passage 
from myth to reality
While many cultural anthropologists and sociologists highlight 
the differences in the pro-scientific characters of myths, many 
others highlight the differences from fairy tales, folk lore and 
narratives about sacred beings and semi-divine heroes. Since 
the unsubstantial aspect of myths has received much, at times 
even unduly negative, attention, I would concentrate on those 
views, which have tried to d iscov er  the reality-addressed 
character of myths.
Several p h ilosop hically  oriented  an throp olog ists and 
sociologists like Durkheim, Marcel, Levy-Bruhl and Levi-Strauss
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are of the view that myths are “collective representations” , a 
vague reference to race-memory, - mystical, anti-causal, pre- 
logical and non-testable. Given these characteristics, it is clear 
that myths as such cannot be accorded the dignity of scientific 
view s. It must be added here that social p o sitiv ists ’ 
disappointment with the alleged mystical, anti-causal and pre- 
logical nature of myths is due to their exclusive commitment to 
the paradigm of physical science. In fairness to structuralists 
like Levi-Strauss, it may be stated that they have their own 
universal and rational account of myth-logic.
Among the famous social anthropologists who have specially 
emphasized the non-fantastic or non-fictitious aspect of myths, one 
must recall the names of Borislav Malinowski and Mircea Eliade. 
Myth to Malinowski, “is not m erely a story .... but a reality lived” 
(my emphasis). By “reality” he means that “myths are characters 
of extant social institution”. Even the seemingly fictitious details, 
he claims, reveal, on scrutiny, their realistic moorings. Eliade 
ascribed “sacred reality” as distinguished from “profane reality” , 
to the mythical world. Myths embody a supematiu'al, but not unreal, 
level of existence. Myths present a sacred history.
While Eliade’ s account of myth is mystical, that of Malinowski 
is cultural, C G Jung offers a psycholog ica l theory of myths. 
According to him, myths are not mere allegories of physical 
processes. These have viYa7 meaning. The primitive mind, says 
he, “does not invent myths, it experiences them” . Myths are 
expressions of “ psychological universals” , “archetypal” or 
“ prim ordial” , not cu lture-specific and language-bound. 
Interestingly enough, Jung, from the psychological standpoint, 
and Levi-Strauss, from the structuralist standpoint, come to the 
same conclusion that the meaningful hidden substratum of myths 
is universal. It may be recalled here that both Levi-Strauss and 
Chomsky have derived their structural universalism from their 
common mentor, Roman Jakobson, who first developed this kind 
of theory of language.
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3. Language and myth : Argument extended
In the Indian tradition one also notices a very ancient linguistic 
turn to so-called  m ythical gods and goddesses. In this 
connection, reference must be made to the god Agni (Fire), 
whose name is derived etymologically from agre (forward), agre 
also  means the first-created and forward-moving. Visibly the 
flame of fire is ahead of both fire itself and its causal locus. 
A nother god, In d ra ,  said to be the king of god head s, 
etymologically means “kindler” . Because he kindles vital airs, 
bodily sense-organs (indriyas) and uses thunder (vajra) as his 
main weapon against the forces of darkness (symbolized by 
black clouds). It is instructive to note that both Agni and Indra 
are fire-, light-, and energy-symbolising powers.
In the Indo-European family of languages, this particular word 
A gni has its w idespread synonym s (w hich  are both 
phonologically and contentwise related), viz., Latin ignis, 
Lithuanian ugnis and Russian ogon. From India to Bulgaria, 
Macedonia and Serbia, with few interruptions, agni is available 
in the same form, only when it crosses the Adriatic it becomes 
ignis  (Latin) and ignition  (English). Vedic cosmology and 
cosmogns may be largely reconstructed from the fire-, light-, and 
sun-related vedic myths. For example, the finite visible world, 
diti, is said to be derived from aditi (infinite). It is well known 
that the relation between the finite (diti) visible and spatial-world- 
being and the boundless infinitive-being is central to the 
emergence of the world of sense and science. These metaphysical 
concepts are found meaningfully entangled into several mythical 
trappings, involving several godheads, male and female.
This symbolic view of myth has been profitably and intensively 
utilised and interpreted by thinkers like ^am kara  and Sri 
Aurobindo. Both of them unhesitatingly recognize the mystical 
but constructive, not p ejorative, im plications of myth. 
Mythological knowledge is constructive because it stands for
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immediacy and transparency of intuitive knowledge, skipping over 
the intermediate levels of sense-information and conceptualisation 
found in common sense and scientific knowledge. Mythic 
knowledge is logical in its own, i.e. symbolic way.
To make the point clear, Maya or the so-called magic is the 
principle of individuation, actualization and materialization, partly 
suppressive or avarani and partly expressive or viksepani. The 
root word of Maya is “ma” , indicative of “measure” as evident 
from the Sanskrit words ''man”, “pariman" and ‘‘praman". The 
defenders of the mythological mode of knowing, as distinguished 
from the discursive one, point out that while scientific knowledge 
pre-supposes a pragmatic distinction or a separation between the 
subject and the object of knowledge, the upholders of the mythic 
and symbolic mode of knowing highlight the essenfaa/identity of 
the knower and the known in the primordial consciousness, the 
matrix of all forms of knowings and beings. Knowledge by 
identity and knowledge by difference are the two main 
recognized modes of knowledge.
The fact that myths, metaphors, analogies and other figures of 
speech cannot be dispensed with even in rigorous scientific and 
mathematical discourses, suggest that the mythic-symbolic 
underpinning of all forms of knowledge has to be properly 
understood, both in the context o f  d iscovery  and also in the 
context o f  validation.
Sri Aurobindo persuasively argues in the Secret o f  the Veda that 
both in India and the Hellenic world scientific knowledge was 
born out of mythic knowledge, intuitions which are symbolically 
embodied in myths. In the ancient wisdom, secrecy, mystery 
and symbols played very penetrating and illuminating roles. Sri 
Aurobindo writes :
“ [I]n ancient Europe the schools of intellectual philosophy were 
preceded by the secret doctrines of the mystics; Orphic and
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Eleusinian mysteries prepared the rich soil of mentality out of 
which sprang Pythagoras and Plato. A similar starting-point is 
at least probable for the later march of thought in India. Much 
indeed of the forms and symbols of thought which we find in 
the Upanisads, much of the substance of the Brahmanas 
supposes a period in India in which thought took the form or 
the veil of secret teachings such as those of the Greek mysteries” . 
[Sri Aurobindo, The Secret o f  the Veda, Birth Centenary Library, 
Pondicherry, 1971, p. 4].
Not only Sri Aurobindo (1872-1950) but also some other 
European thinkers like Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) and A F Losev 
(1893-1988) engaged themselves in deciphering and bringing 
out of the hidden truths of myths and have succeeded in 
convincing us that the world of symbols and myths is not 
separated from that of metaphysics or even that of science. 
Symbolic truths are available in intuition; the metaphysical 
truths are explored by intuitively informed conceptual intellect; 
and scientific truths, though d iscov ered by  speculative intellect 
in the forms of hypothesis, are validated by  experience and/or 
experiment.
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4. From myth, through metaphysics, to science
Among the philosophers who brought out the scientific 
implication of myth and metaphysics very clearly, I think 
Cassirer and Popper, both intim ately familiar with their 
contemporary science, deserve special mention. It is difficult to 
believe today that Cassirer, who wrote so extensively and 
incisively on myths and symbols, was- among the first few 
philosophers who immediately after the publication of Einstein’s 
famous three papers on New Physics in 1905 could professionally 
write on the fundamental philosophical significance of special 
Relativity. In Substance and Function  (1910) he highlights the 
importance of the functional character of scientific concepts.
His functionalism  paved the way of subsequent rise of 
operationalism (P W Bridgman) and verificationalism (Vienna 
Circle).
It is true that all myths are not homogenous, either in origin or 
in in tent, (i) that some may be primarily theoretical or 
explanatory, (ii) that some may be mainly poetic and spiritual,
(iii) that a few may be ordinarily practical or functional, and
(iv) that a few may be for rationalizing or legitim izing 
purpose(s). Philologists and anthropologists like Max Muller, 
Boas and Bidney have drawn our attention to these different 
aspects or orientations of myths. At the same time it has been 
pointed out by thinkers like Cassirer and Susanne Langer, that 
all types of myths have a definite generic affinity, a common 
thread which holds them meaningfully together. And that thread 
is language, the paradigm of symbols. Cassirer writes: “myth, 
religion, art, language, even science, are ... so many variations 
on a common theme (language)” (Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on  
M an, Yale U niversity  P ress, New H aven, 1944). 
Notwithstanding, or because of, the clear Neo-Kantian streak 
in his thought Cassirer would significantly draw upon the 
insights of Nietzsche, William James and Bergson and this fact 
substantially explains his success in assimilating non-intellectual 
cognitive capacities in his unified theory of language and myth. 
The heart of language is the symbol and in the formation of 
symbols humans are more or less freely creative, imaginative 
and intuitive, not necessarily guided by regimented or discursive 
intellection.
Besides Cassirer, another philospher, a junior contemporary of 
Cassirer and a lesser known Russian philosopher in the Euro- 
Amercian world, who deeply studied the relationship between 
myth and symbol, is Aleksi Fedorovich Losev. His areas of study 
were religion, Greek thought and culture, with special interest 
in language and symbolism. According to him, language is the 
expression of God’s essence-energy. In his view, essence is to
10 DP Chattopadhyaya
be equated with Plato’s e id os , Idea or Form. Idea is manifested 
in myth, myth in symbol and symbol in the human person. He 
was influenced both by Platonic formalism and Husserlian 
phenomenology. The world, in general, and the hum an  world, 
in particular, are vibrant because of the energy that is gradually, 
phenomenologically and dialectically disclosed in and through 
them. He was familiar with Cassirer’ s work and was very much 
influenced by the latter’ s view on myth and mythical time. But 
he misunderstands Cassirer when he says that he does not share 
Cassirer’ s theory that mythical truth and scientific truth are 
altogether different. As we have seen, Cassirer’s was a unified  
view. He insists that mythical consciousness informs all cultures, 
is present in all of cultural forms, including the scientific culture. 
In this respect he echoes Sri Aurobindo’s view of the sovereignty,
i.e., all-pervasive nature, of consciousness, marked by expressive 
Force or ^akti (“The Life and Thought of Aleksei Federovich 
Losev” , (1996), Russian Studies in Philosophy, 35:3-91).
Karl Popper, like Cassirer, was deeply influenced by Kant and 
Einstein. In spite of his professional scientific passion. Popper 
never fails to speak of the relevance of myth to science. What 
is more, he clearly perceives the presence of mythical intuition 
both in metaphysical speculation and scientific exploration. He 
emphatically asserts that “science must begin with myth and 
with a criticism  of myth” (Karl Popper C on jec tu res  an d  
R efutations (C&R), Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963, 
p.50). Popper’ s accents on criticism are intended to emphasize 
the role of analysis in bringing out the hidden import of myths.
He traces the origin of European science to the speculative 
theories of Thales (624-546 BC), Democritus (470-380 BC) and 
Plato (427-347 BC). To him, scientific conjectures and mythical 
symbols are cognates and roots of cognitive enterprise. The 
essential scientific spirit is infused with the conviction that the 
visible world has to be explained by some invisible principles 
of truth. In the vedic language it was said that the world of Finite
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things and beings {Diti) has to be explained in terms of the 
principle of boundless Infinite (Aditi). In a very related context. 
Popper recalls G alileo’ s “unbounded admiration for the 
greatness of mind of astronomers like Aristarchus (320-250 BC) 
and Copernicus (1473-1543 AD) who conceived the (heliocentric) 
system and held it to be true in violent opposition to the evidence 
of their own senses. This shows Galilean appreciation of the 
basic principle of scientific method that the known has to be 
explained by the unknown. By endorsing the same principle. 
Popper is obliged to recognize the contribution of myth and 
metaphysics in the development of science. According to him, 
myth represents a first-order enquiry carried out in terms of 
symbols and metaphysical speculation, while science carries out 
a second-order enquiry in terms of argumentative attitude and 
functional concepts. While metaphysical concepts are inexact, 
scientific ones are exact.
To buttress the above point both historically and conceptually, 
it may be recalled here that in his revolutionary helio-centric 
world-view, Copernicus, a Pohsh priest-scholar from Cracow, 
was deeply influenced by his Platonist teacher, Novara, at the 
University of Bologna in Italy. Popper traces the origin of his 
heliocentric hypothesis to the sixth book of Plato’s Republic 
where he says that the sun plays the same role in the realm of 
visible things as does the Idea of Good, the highest Idea, in the 
realm of Ideas. Following the Platonic myth, Copernicus ascribes 
the visibility or intelligibility, vitality and growth of visible things 
to the sun which gives it the central position in the heavenly 
sphere. Similar myths are available in the vedic tradition 
centering round the myths of Aditi, Agni and Surya.
Sri Aurobindo interprets the Rgvedic themes of Siirya or Light 
as the primordial symbol and source of truth and knowledge, 
both transcendental and empirical. The supposed antinomy and 
real interplay between the forces of Light and Darkness, partly 
enclose and partly disclose numberless faces of truth, the Infinite
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or Aditi. It is the symbol of power-consciousness. It is the mother 
of all things and gives birth to D aksa , the symbol of the 
discerning and individuative mind of the Divine. Aditi is advaya 
or unitary form of all things and beings. The world of multiplicity 
is due to Diti, the dualizing force. Aditi is hymned also as the 
wife of all pervading Visnu, who has been represented as the 
younger brother of Indra. Indra gives Light to Surya, the Light 
of the truth which dispels the darkness and falsehood of our 
limited empirical vision. In the hierarchy of knowledge, Aditi, 
at the instrumentation of Indra, is brought down to the level of 
earthly forms of knowledge, philosophic and scientific.
Unless one deciphers the Vedic symbols and images, its hymns 
may appear as a confusing mythical and metaphysical mass. But 
when the symbols are properly interpreted, their implications 
are patiently brought out, the discerning mind finds a cosmic 
picture in which science and metaphysics, truths of parardha  
and aparard/ia, are harmoniously blended (Sri Aurobindo, The 
Secret o f  the Veda, Birth Centenary Library, Pondicherry, 1971, 
Vol. 10, pp. 421-429).
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5. Logic, experience and intuition in science
It is common place in scientific conclaves to debunk mysticism 
and dism iss intuitionism  lightly. Only a few scien tists, 
philosophers and spiritualists of interdisciplinary gifts have 
cared to look into the matter very closely and carefully. 
Interestingly enough, most of them have drawn heavily on their 
own search for truth in their chosen areas and engaged in 
tackling problems and difficulties. Their accounts show one very 
general and basic truth. The passage from intuition, captured 
in symbols and myths, to metaphysical concepts and testable 
scientific hypotheses, though not easily ascertainable, can after 
all be traced, provided due pains are taken. The words of great 
scientists like Einstein (Albert Einstein, The Origin o f  the Genera]
Theory o f  Relativity, Jackson, Wylie & Co., Glassgow, 1933), 
Charles Darwin (F Darwin, Life and Letters o f  C Darwin, John 
Murray, London, 1888), Hadamard (Jacques Hadamard, The 
P sycho logy  o f  Invention  in the M athem atical F ield , Oxford 
University Press, London, 1945), Max Planck (Max Planck, 
W here is Science Going-? Transl. by James Murphy, George Allen 
& Unwin, London 1933) and Poincare (H Poincare, Science and  
M eth od , Transl. by F Maitland, Thomas Nelsons & Sons, 
London, 1914) indicate several related steps leading to great 
philosophical and scientific ideas, viz., (i) intensely living with 
the problem or preparation, (ii) chance or luck, (iii) speculation 
of imagination, (iv) intuition, (v) conjecture or hypothesis- 
framing, (vi) reason and reasoning, and (vii) strategic methods.
It is interesting to recall the emphasis which Einstein laid on intuition 
for discovery  of fundametal laws of science. To quote him on the 
point : “ There is no logical way to the discovery of .... element 
feeling for the order lies behind the appearance” . He writes these 
lines in his preface to Max Planck’s book. Where is Science Going?
Darwin himself did not develop any clearly articulated view on 
scientific discovery. The methodological elements to which he 
attached much importance are: (a) keen observation of objects of 
scientific interest, (b) ability to group or colligate the observed facts 
together meaningfully, (c) perseverance or doggedness, sMhana, 
and (d) taking due notice of exceptional findings. His son writes 
about him [Charles Darwin] “there was one quality of mind which 
seems to be of special and extreme advantage in leading him to 
make discoveries. It was a power of never letting exceptions passing 
unnoticed”. This implies that he was aware of the subtler laws in 
operation which run counter to the known and accepted laws. 
“Exceptions” are disclosive or indicative of the Secrets o f  Nature. 
H adam ard, the fam ous m athem atician, attached  much 
importance to the identification and elimination of errors in the 
quest of scientific truth. He seems to endorse the eliminative 
method, via negativa, or neti marga, in the context of discovery.
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But when he approvingly refers to an oth er fam ous 
mathematician’ s. Gauss’ s, observation, “l (Gauss) succeeded 
... like the sudden flash of lightning the riddle happened to be 
solved” , it is clear that he was a believer in the role of intuition 
in scientific discovery. An insight into, or intuition of, what is 
true provides one the light to identify what is erroneous and 
therefore to be eliminated.
Similar experiences are autobiographically referred to, as 
indicated earlier, both by Max Planck and Einstein. Planck, while 
accepting his Nobel Prize, observed. “Looking back ... over the 
long and labyrinthine path which finally led (m e) to the 
discovery (of the Quantum Theory) and vividly reminded of 
Goethe’ s saying that men will always be making mistakes as 
long as they are striving after something” . The trained sceintist’s 
problem of conscious striving after or search for truth is always 
guided by an intuition of the map indicating the path to truth.
In similar vein, Einstein referring to his discovery of the General 
Theory of Relativity writes, “there were errors in thinking which 
caused me two years of hard work before at least in 1915, I 
recognized them as such ...” This recognition was based on an 
intuition. His anti-inductive pronouncements are also strongly 
supportive of his commitment to intuition in the context of 
scientific discovery. He writes, “there is no inductive method 
which could lead to the fundamental concepts of physics” . Not 
through the path of sense-experience, but through love of, or 
empathy (Einfulung) of the objects of experience, that a scientist 
gets to his solicited truth. In other words, Einfulung ot the  objects 
of experience has a deep subjective  underpinning which takes 
experience beyond the realm of objects, to the light-like truth.
Poincare is very emphatic in his support for intuition in the 
matter of scientific discovery. He said, “Logic has very little to 
do with d iscovery or in ven tion ” . He refers to several 
autobiographical events of how with utter suddenness a solution
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came to his mind when he failed to hit it by intensive thought. 
He writes, “One day, as I was walking on the cliff the idea came 
to me, again with the same characteristics of conciseness, 
suddenness and im m ediate certainty, that arithm etical 
transform ations of indefinite ternary quadratic forms are 
identical with those of non-Euclidian geometry” .
Sri Aurobindo has his own way of vindicating the essential role 
of intuition in all types of knowledge, mythical, metaphysical 
and scientific. He goes further and tries to show that intuition 
also sustains in other forms of knowledge like philosophy 
(darsana  j  and religion (dharm a). His basic point is both simple 
and all comprehensive. Spirit is both knower and known. 
Intuition is the spiritual form of knowing, knowing by identity. 
Since spiritual identity, according to Sri Aurobindo, recognizes 
m ultip licity  in it as an in tegral to ta lity , the know ing 
consciousness and forms of consciousness of the known are 
identical at the bottom.
Spirit articulates itself in different forms (rupa) and under 
different names (nam ajbut its own nature {svarupa)is  ineffable 
or unspeakable. Mythical knowledge, as said before, is both 
symbolic and mystical. When it is criticized on the ground that 
it is unprovable, it is conveniently forgotten that proof or 
provability itself is dependent upon a consistent set of actions 
which itself is arbitarily chosen. The primitives of a system are 
not provable within the system. Second, the spiritualist argues 
that spiritual experience is testable in a su igeneris  fashion. 
Spiritual truth can neither be discovered nor validated by non­
spiritual, i.e., empirical or logical methods. Spiritual peace and 
poetic genius are states of consciousness which do not lend 
themselves to external tests. However, the same are almost 
universally recognized as real (Sri Aurobindo, Letters on Yoga, 
Birth Centenary Library, Pondicherry, 1970, pp. 185—195).
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Though the highest forms of truth are available only by intuition, 
this position must not be understood to mean that philosophy, 
religion and science give us no valuable forms of knowledge. 
In fact, all these disciplines embody different but convergent 
approaches to the ultimate reality. Sat, existence. While the task 
of philosophy is to present logically the eternal modes of 
Existence, that of religion is to organize practically the personal 
relations of what Exists with human beings, their thinking, 
feeling and willing. Science is said to be engaged in arranging 
the particular forms and movements of Existence, on the basis 
of observation, experience and experimentation (Sri Aurobindo, 
The H our o f  G od, Birth Centenary Library, Pondicherry, 1972, 
pp. 166-171).
Further, it may be pointed out that all these disciplines, 
philosophy or metaphysics, religion or dharma and science, on 
analysis, are found to have two different levels in them , 
intellectual and intuitive or spiritual. In its intellectual level, 
philosophy is abstract and ratiocinative; in its spiritual level it 
is insightful, vibrant and extremely persuasive. Comparable 
religion may be theoretical and argumentative, it may also be 
saturated with spiritual realization and engaged in trying to 
express the inexpressible, the spiritual, in terms of myths, 
symbols, metaphors and allegories. Science also exhibits two 
levels. In the context of discovery it may be intuitive but in the 
context of validation it is subject to some sort of test. But in the 
highest forms of spiritual experience, which also clarifies itself 
to be called science, it is itself self-validated. First principles of 
any domain of knowledge, which must be recognized, are self- 
evident and self-validated. Denial of this position lands every 
form of science, physical or spiritual to the fallacy of Infinite 
regress {an avastbadosa). Careful and critical scrutiny of all 
axiomatic systems brings out this inescapable truth.
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Abstract
The paper aims to show  that Physics, Body-Mind and the Beyond 
form  a continuum and are to be understood in terms o f  upward 
causation and downward causation. Matter, Ufe, mind and the 
abstract durable entities constructed by the mind are causally 
in terrela ted . For the understandin g  o f  the sa id  tw o-w ay  
causation, Uttarana and Avatarana, the first advisable route to 
b e  taken is linguistic. Comparative philology and the associate 
developm ent o f  ideas in different cultures are o f  profound help  
to my study. H ow the em ergence o f  Life and Mind has been  
sh ap ed  by geophysical forces o f  Nature needs to be closely  
lo o k e d  into. Fragm ents o f  Indian Naturalism. R eferen ce to 
H ellenic Naturalism. Transition from Naturalism to Spiritualism 
via Vitalism. A footn ote on Spiritualism. Fragments o f  European 
Naturalism and its physical, social, psychological and biological 
fallouts in the concerned disciplines. Naturalism to Mechanism.
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Naturalism to Newtonian and post-Newtonian Mechanism. Anti­
mechanist voices and arguments. Anomalous M echanism o f  Kant 
and Kantians. Evolution, new  Physics, Biology and Psychology. 
Contributions o f  Darwin, Marx, Freud and Einstein critically 
reca lled . From an om alou s N aturalism  and M echan ism  to 
Quantum Complementarity. R eference to J. C. Bose, Bohr and 
Schrodinger. N ew biology  o f  Sherrington, Adrian and Eccles. 
Ascent (Uttarana) and D escent (Avatararia) in and through 
Matter, L ife and Mind. Abstract mental products, their nature 
an d  im p lica tion s . The q u est ion  o f  B ey on d  an d  s e l f ­
transcendence. Primacy o f  Consciousness, Body and Mind are 
o f  the Self and not the other way round. The secular implications 
o f  the Beyond.
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1. Prefator
The main three terms of existence {sat), Matter, Life and Mind, 
are practically recognised by all, from the layman to the scientist 
and the philosopher of science. However, regarding the intrinsic 
natures of the being designated by the terms, their ontological 
primacy claim and mutual relationships, the informed scientist 
and the reflective philosopher are not unanimous. While 
materialists like Carvaka, Democritus and Marx accord primacy 
to material existence, vitalists like Bergson and Morgan maintain 
that life or the vital flow is the ultimate reality. In contrast, many 
classical and modem philosophers-cum-scientists like the Vedic 
seers, Samkara, Hegel and Sri Aurobindo are emphatic in 
proclaiming the supremacy of consciousness.
The problem with which I am mainly concerned here is why 
the representatives of each group of thinkers on existence, 
under pressing practical reasons, are obliged to offer their 
accounts about the other two grades of existence. Are these 
three grades exhaustive and exclusive? Is there no other grade 
or grades beyond the mentioned three? Do the said grades
form a series? Or do they fall apart? Do all grades have only 
finite or infinite number of sub-grades within them? These 
are some of the basic questions which have been tackled time 
and again in different ways by scientists and philosophers, 
both ancient and modern.
I will try to argue that after all types of the most insightful and 
critical scrutiny, i.e., linguistic, theoretical and experimental, 
our findings strongly suggest the prim acy o f  consciousness and 
th e continu ity  b e tw een  d ifferen t g rad es  an d  su b-grades. 
Notwithstanding the quantum and the discrete features of some 
physical, biological and psychological phenomena it can be 
persuasively established that there is mutual, complementary 
and /or hidden continuous relations between the grades. What 
is more, I would affirm, on the basis of both scientific discovery 
and philosophical arguments, that there is a promise of the 
beyond, i.e., some existential development is yet to be unfolded.
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2. Linguistic routes to reality
Let me first briefly indicate the semantic and ontological 
implications of the first term of existence (sat), which is matter. 
Some Sanskrit meanings of the term Matter are {vastu , 
anatm adravya, bhutM mkavastu, ghanavastu, sarira and mUrti) 
(Monier-Williams 1999). The discerning philologist with a 
scientific sense to his credit is bound to be intrigued by 
expressions like ghanavastu  or dense Matter, sarira which 
because of it very nature gets dissolved or destroyed, and 
murti, which is expressive of something beyond itself. If the 
Matter, in spite of its physical density, can be validly said to 
be expressive of something else like life, light or lighter, it 
can be safely asserted by anvikski, i.e., the logician and the 
metaphysician, that material existence is not self-contained or 
self-explained, and it needs a higher principle for its 
explanation.
Let me try to explain the point a bit. In Sanskrit, we have two 
very well-known expressions anna (one of the meanings of 
which is earth  or earthly matter) and annannaya ko sa ,  which 
means encoded Matter. Rightly understood, Matter, like a cell, 
is a code enfolding many dynamic properties. It is enclosed 
with various potentialities, positive and negative, which, to 
start with, are not visible to, and perceptible by, the ordinary 
senses, laukik pratyaksa K osa  is a storage or sheath which 
holds something within it. In the Rgveda, a cloud has been 
described as a kosa  of water.
Matter has also been said to be jadavastu. Jadavastu  is poorly 
energized, cold, slow, bewildered or enveloped, and, not 
surprisingly, a person of jad abu d d h i  is incapable of acquiring 
the wisdom of Veda. Yet ja d a v a s tu  is claim ed to be 
foundational and prom issory.
The second term of ex isten ce , LIFE or p r a n a ,  is also 
philosophically very significant. It may be recalled that it is 
both bhutatm a, the Spirit of Matter and, at the same time, 
interestingly enough, kavyatm a, the Spirit of Poetry. It is the 
enlivening force. As vayu or wind, it is (i) prana  at heart, 
(ii) apana  in the rectal-urinal tract {mQlM har), (iii) sam an  at 
the navel centre, (iv) udan  in the throat area, and (v) vyan 
all-pervasive in the body.
In the different Indo-European family of languages, life  and 
its cognate expressions like living, alive, z o o s  (Greek), vevere  
(Latin), Gyvas (Lithunian), zil' and zivaj (Russian), jlv -  and 
jiva- (Aestan) exhibit some interesting semantic characteristics. 
In some languages the verb “live” is expressed by “is living” , 
“alive” (Buck 1949, 1988). There are few languages in which 
it cannot be so expressed. But the preferred expressions of the 
concept in different languages indicate noticeable difference. 
Besides words like “/i/e” and “/iVe” one comes across also the 
words like “remain” and “ be” . Needless to add, that within
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the Sanskrit words “jiva” , '"jivana” , “j lv a n t” and '"jivita” , 
the difference of sense is considerable. The sem antic, 
phonological and particularly, conceptual affinity between the 
Sanskrit words “;Tv” “//va-”, “;jvana-” , “’jivant", and “jivita” , 
and their Indo-European counterparts is striking and 
instructive. Jiva is embodied consciousness  of different degrees 
of expression and organization. The root of all these words is 
Ji or J i  which stands for “life” , “ living” and has in it a 
nourishmental implication.
The very names of the disciplines dealing with life-related 
phenomena, viz, Jivavidya  (zoology <Greek z o o s /z o o m ) ,  
Pranividya =  (biology <Greek bios, course of life) and Udvid- 
vidya =  (Botany <Greek botan ikos)  include that these are all 
concerned with consciousness marked by different degrees of 
clarity and obscurity. It is interesting to note that the words 
like plan t are used by the botanist to cover the whole vegetable 
vs. the animal kingdom. Several of the Indo-European words 
for plant carry the connotation of growth and, at times, even 
of decay. For example, the Sanskrit word O sadhi has not only 
medicinal but also degenerative implications. The vegetable 
world, in Vedic literature, is divided between Osadhi or Virudh 
plants and Vana or vrkska  (trees) (Macdonnel and Keith 1982). 
O sad h ih as  healing power {rogajatam  nasayati, Nirukta) while 
Virudh is used as g en er ic  terms comprising both minor 
vegetable growths and also those plants without medicinal 
properties.
More evolved and complex than the life-related phenomena 
are the mind-related ones. Where exactly life ends and mind 
begins cannot be precisely indicated. It has been found that 
due to evolutionary  developm ent som e pre-hum an 
anthropoids in their behaviour exhibit, at least in some cases, 
mind-like dispositions as well as actions, including the ability 
to symbolise and even to measure and calculate. The English 
concept of mind has found different expressions in the Sanskrit
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language, viz., m anas, bu ddhi, b od h ah , dhi, citta, cetana, 
m edha, prajna, bodbasaktih  and cicchakatih  (Monier-Williams 
1986). Acts and exercises of the application of mind are 
captured in the words like m an oyogah , m an on ibesah , an d  
m anovyaparah.
One way of understanding the meanings of the Indo-European 
words for “Mind” , “Soul” , and “Spirit” is this. The words 
under “Soul” and “Spirit” , e.g., anim a  (Latin), g ast  (Old 
English), geist  (Old and New High German), urvan- (Avestan), 
and atm an  (Sanskrit), are intended to denote the seat of 
emotion, whereas “Mind” denotes the seat of intelligence. 
But this rule does not appear to be hard and fast. The semantic 
source of the most of the words for “Soul” and “Spirit” is 
“breath” . But in some cases the source turns out to be mental 
or even physical agitation. Words like m anas (Sanskrit), nous  
(Greek) and m anah  (Avestan) are used to denote mental states 
in the w idest sense, including feelings and thoughts, 
understanding and knowing. The Sanskrit word citta, properly 
speaking, stands for thought and observation, and cit for 
perception, understanding and reflection.
Let me add a few words on the nature of consciousness. It is 
self-revealing and also reveals all other things and beings. It 
also stands for knowledge, feeling and even the absolute. This 
consciousness as such is indivisible and all-pervasive. But 
because of the difference in adjuncts or conditions (upadhi) 
it appears individuated and differentiated. When consciousness 
is enveloped by nescience (avidya) it appears as God. When 
it is determined by antahkarana and related sam skara it appears 
as self. When consciousness is reflective of both the highest 
reality and subject to internal self-consciousness it is deemed 
to be the witnessing {n ot  active) self. Consciousness is said to 
be four-fold, (i) objective (i.e., object-related), (ii) knowing 
subject-related, (iii) unknown (but knowable), and (iv) known 
consciousness. Samskara is said to be of the view [in
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A tm abod h ]  that self-know ledge is the direct means to 
liberation. If this type of knowledge dawns on one, one ceases 
to act. The pure self is beyond the ken of time, really ageless 
but the stages of life are super impositions (aropita). In other 
words, the normal categories used for identification of objects 
and subjects like space, time, colour etc. are inapplicable to 
the pure self.
Bodies are said to be of three types — gross, subtle and causal. 
The gross body is a combination of five elements; the subtle 
body consists of five pranas, ten sense organs, manas and 
buddhi, and the causal body is avidya or nescience. Though 
the self as such is eternal and omnipresent, it is clearly reflected 
only in the buddhi. By non-discrimination of the mixing parts 
of existence and consciousness with the variations of citta the 
idea of avidya arises. When avidya is destroyed by knowledge 
this self manifests itself as the sun in its full splendour without 
the cover of cloud or nocturnal darkness. Brahman  is expressed 
in the universe only in a limited and temporary way. Strictly 
speaking, it never expresses itself in the universe. So the 
question of its transcendence beyond, or withdrawal from, 
the universe does not arise at all. This is merely a hypothetical 
issue, a pedagogically useful mode of clarification of a very 
profoundly meaningful but elusive concept for unrealised 
mortals.
24 DP Chattopadhyaya
3. Fragments of Indian naturalism
The full depth of the concept of consciousness can hardly be 
understood in the scientific context without referring to such 
basic concepts as brain and self. But, I think, it would be 
advisable for me, given the temper of our time, to approach 
the issue first from the physical standpoint and then from the 
biological one. Many physicists, classical and modern, have 
tried to establish the identity of body and mind.
To start with, let us have a quick look at the ancient Indian 
and Hellenic materialists or naturalists. In the Indian tradition 
it is Prajapati Paramesthin to whose naturalistic views and 
sceptical attitudes we may turn for a plausible beginning point 
of Indian science. He maintains that Water (salila) is the 
fundamental principle of all things. Water is the original 
substance of all that exists. He seems to have drawn his 
inspiration from the ^gvedichymn (Wilson 1977). X.129.1 which 
Samkara calls N asadlya-sukta. The sukta which is interpreted 
in a naturalist way by Paramesthin is differently constructed by 
Sariikara. The latter seeks to establish that Prana or Spirit is 
uncreated. Paramesthin has been said to be the Thales of India, 
although, historically speaking, the former seems to have preceded 
Thales of Miletus (c. 600 BC). The naturalist tradition of Indian 
thinking was not peculiar to only Paramesthin. It is also due to 
Brahmanaspati or Brhaspati who maintains that the clue to the 
origin of the world is to be found in the Rgvedic hymn X.72 
(Wilson 1977). He is interested in ascertaining the nature of the 
world-ground, how the generation of heavenly beings and all 
ultimate forces were made possible. According to him, Being 
came out of non-Being. His doctrine of the relation between the 
Finite (Diti) and the Infinite (Aditi) resembles that of Anaximander 
(c. 600 BC), also of Miletus and a follower of Thales, who thinks 
that the sky is a complete sphere and not merely a semispherical 
arch over the earth. For the first time the notion of spheres was 
introduced in astronomy which ultimately culminated in the 
sophisticated but erroneous Ptolemic picture of the vmiverse. 
Accordig to him, the ultimate reality is a formless mass and 
unobservable substance, apeirom , which means Infinite. Because 
of the similarity between Brhaspati’ s view of A diti and 
Anaximander’s notion of apeirom , Brhaspati has at times been 
described as the Anaximander of India (Barua 1998).
Another firm ancient naturalism is found in “Anila” of India 
and Anaximenes of Miletus (c. 500 BC). Both “Anila” and 
Anaximenes are of the view that Vayu or aer  is the ultimate
Physics, body-mind and the beyond 25
reality of the world. The doctrine of “Anila” is traced to another 
Vedic hymn, namely, the hymn of XI.6 Atharvaveda.
These examples, drawn from the Indie and the Hellenic 
civilizations, show that the aim of the ancient philosopher- 
cum-scientists was largely directed to discover a single First 
Principle to explain all wordly phenomena. To resort to one 
single natural principle for explaining all natural and other 
phenomena is obviously pro-naturalist. Interestingly enough, 
this naturalism, though it appears to be materialistic in 
character, lends itself to spiritualist interpretation as well. What 
is more, the reflective philosophers and the mystic thinkers of 
the ancient times are of the definite opinion that apparent 
materialism or naturalism is an intended and symbolic cover 
of an underlying spiritual reality.
In fact the history of Indian materialims/naturalism has been 
reconstructed mainly from the fragments and writings of the 
anti-materialist and anti-naturalist writers. The two well- 
known traditions of Indian naturalism, viz., Svabbavavada, 
which claims that every power necessarily belongs to the 
material objects, and Yadrcchavada, which maintains that the 
world process is a dance of chances, are often critically referred 
to by their mainstream Vedic opponents. For example, Saiiikara 
refers to Svabhavavada  in his commentary on the ^vetasvara 
U panisad, 1.1.2. He tries to show that those who think that 
tim e, self, nature of m aterial o b jec ts , and fortuitous 
combination of material objects are the causes of the world 
are basically mistaken. The rejection of accidental naturalism 
is a prelude to the establishment of causation, in this case 
^atkaryavada. But to ^arhkara, as we know. Brahman is the 
ultimate cause of all that we see and can possibly know, 
including our own selves. In this connection one may recall 
the Vedantic criticism of Jaina naturalism defended by the 
thinkers like Gunaratna. It is interesting to recall that 
Y adrcchavada  (accidentalism) and Svabhavavada  (naturalism)
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are opposed to each other. While the naturalist accepts a kir\d 
of causalism, the accidentalist denies it. But both may be 
viewed as allies in their common opposition to AdrstavM a 
(supernaturalism) and in their inclination, if not commitment, 
to positivistic naturalism which seeks to restrict scientific 
enquiry only to what is am enable to com m on human 
experience (lokayata). Rejecting this sort of naturalism a 
Vedantin  like ^arhkara ascribes causality to God who, in 
addition to his own power, uses the help of time and self to 
regulate the course of the world [Sv. Up. 1.4].
For the most classical and comprehensive account of naturalism 
one is advised to turn to the Sam khya thinkers. It is widely 
believed that the elements of Sam khya philosophy may be 
traced to Chandogya Up., Katha Up., M ahabharata, Manusmrti, 
B uddhacarita, C arakasihhita, ^usrutasarhhita and different 
Puranas. The development of the .Samkhya naturalism, perhaps 
one of the oldest traditions of India, is attributed to Kapila, 
Isvarakrsna, P atan jali (o f Y og asu tra ), V acaspati Misra 
{Sam khyatattvakaum udi) and Vijfianabhiksu {Sam khyaprava- 
canabhasya). About the original development of the ^arnkhya 
naturalism, the scholars are not unanimous. Some writers 
attribute it to Kapila. Some writers like S N Dasgupta think 
that it has to be understood best in terms of the work of 
Vijfianabhiksu of Vedantic persuasion. While B N Seal tries to 
give it a scientific interpretation in terms of number or 
enumeration (Sam khya), K C Bhattacharyya reaids in it the 
principle of spiritual and spontaneous freedom . To Sri 
Aurobindo the concept of Prakrti developed by Sam khya seems 
to be extremely important and he views it as the Executrix- 
Force of Consciousness itself.
The Sam khya system is dualistic in its appearence, consisting 
of two main principles — pure consciousness (Purusa) and 
primordial materiality (Mula prakrti). Besides, it speaks of 
twentythree other reals (tattvas), viz., intellect (bu d d h i or
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m ahat), egoity {aham kara) and mind (m anas), which is 
claimed to be both a sense capacity and action ability. Further, 
five specific sense capacities (visual, tactual etc.), five action 
capacities (speaking, prehending, moving etc.), five subtle 
elements (sound, contact, form, taste, etc.,) and five gross 
elements (space or akasa, wind, fire, water and earth). Nature 
or Prakrti, consisting of as well as constituted by three gunas 
or qualities (luminosity or expressiveness, energy or power, 
and inertia or d ullness), is ceaselessly  active. P urusa  
(consciousness) is without any activity in it. This Consciousness 
is contentless, devoid of any sensation and action, initiative 
and enterprise.
If Nature is ever active and Consciousness is absolutely 
actionless and pure, naturally the question arises: how do 
these two principles “come together” for bringing about what 
is acknowledgedly shared wordly reality? Sam khya spells out 
an evolutionary naturalism and purports to show that all reals 
(tattvas) evolve out of Nature. Nature is partly unmanifest 
and partly manifest. The subsequent evolutes are claimed to 
be latently or promissorily preexistent in their causes. In 
technical language this is said to be ^ atkaryavada. All 
ontological entities, epistem ological, psychological and 
physiological phenomena somehow or other are traceable to 
Nature and its qualities, their various progressive, stationary 
and regressive combinations. Even ethical or axiological 
activities and discerning faculties are rooted in Prakrti or 
Nature. Yet, this S am kh y a, because of its evolutionary 
character, refuses to be described as reductionist.
In their encounter with the defenders of the Advaita Vedanta, 
the p rop onents of the classical S am kh y a  had been 
understandably called upon to explain the precise relation 
between Prakrti and Purusa in the context of explaining the 
world of sense and science. The explanatory analogy of the 
mutual cooperation between the crippled (pangu) Self or Purusa
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and the blind (andha) Prakrti was dismissed by the Vedantins. 
They both attacked the Saihkhya dualism and tried to assimilate 
its elements under the V^edanfic monism with God at the apex as 
the necessary bridging, if not unifying, principle. In the process, 
Samkara-like Vedantins made liberal use of the S a ih kh y a ’s 
commitment to verbal testimony (sruti) as a legitimate and reliable 
means of knowledge. The gradual emergence of God as the 
bridging principle, mainly due to the Yoga system of Patahjali 
and others, substantially explains the decline of the classical 
Saihkhya  dualism. This philosophico-scientific situation has a 
striking resemblance to the Cartesian efforts to counter or 
minimize the effects of anti-dualistic attacks on it mounted by 
the Christian theologian of Europe in the 16th Century.
Why I mention here this well-known point is scientifically 
central to our body-mind discourse. Though himself a Jesuit 
Christian, Descartes, under the mixed influences of dualist Plato, 
teleologically inclined Aristotle, mechanically disposed Kepler 
and Galileo, was almost logically led to the mind-body dualism 
and a mechanistic world-view. Yet, for theological (maybe also 
to some extent personal) reasons, he wanted to give an 
honourable place to God in his system without disowning, 
however, his commitment to either mechanism or dualism. 
D escartes has offered three arguments in support of the 
existence of God — causal, cosmological and ontological. As a 
professional physicist and mathematician he was required to 
explain the existence of external, i.e ., m ind-independent 
substantial character of the world of physical bodies. Somewhat 
stuck up in his Ego or the knowing self, he was obliged to explain 
how could he plausibly and cognitively reach out to the objects 
of the physical world. To answer the question Descartes invokes 
the argument o i Veracitas Dei, the veracity of God, which, he 
claims, has been implanted in us by God himself. Distinct and 
clear  ideas of valid cognition of our own knowing self and, 
through it, of the world out there in space are said to be due to 
non-deceiving God (Cottingham 1992).
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This sort of tortuous argument has been avoided in India by 
Vedantins like Sri Aurobindo in their bid to purge the Sam khya 
off its alleged m echanistic dualism by referring to and 
painstakingly elaborating three very important paired concepts, 
viz.. Brahman  and M aya, Purusa and Prakrti, and Isvara and 
iakti. All these they do on the proclaimed authority of the Vedic 
literature.’
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IV. European naturalism and its fallout on 
pliilosoptiical, social, psychological and 
biological disciplines
It is true that in their philosophical basics Indian Naturalism 
and European Naturalism do have some similarities between 
them. But I will now try to show that the development of 
Naturalism in Europe has taken a strident mechanical turn, 
particularly in the last four centuries or so. Perhaps to take 
Newton as the high water mark of this approach will be 
methodologically warranted.
Newton, born in 1642, eight years before the death of Descartes 
(1650), was not apparently happy with Cartesian dualism and 
mechanism (Koyre 1968). But his deistic God, leaving all natural 
things, their actions, reactions and the resulting processes to 
the comprehensive care of the famous three Laws of Motions, 
had nothing non-mechanical to do with worlds of life and mind. 
His theological writings, relatively minor and practical exigency- 
related in character, were clearly critical of many aspects of 
Christianity. His natural philosophy was to see God through 
Nature, echoing D escartes’ s cosmological argument and 
anticipating Kant’s teleological argument for the existence of 
God. Apparently this does not have any critical or constructive 
bearing on his mechanistic world-view. Somewhat unlike the 
Cartesian body-m ind interaction ism , the scope of his own 
version of interactionism is universal in terms of gravity. The
power of Newton’s mechanical physics proved far-reaching and 
overwhelming on the subsequent physiological, psychological 
and social thinkers.
Writing well before him, William Harvey (1578-1657), educated 
in Italy and open to the prevailing mechanical influence of 
Galileo (1564-1642) (Koyre 1978) and Francis Bacon (1561-1626) 
(Urbach 1987), had tried to show experimentally that the 
circulatory system of blood in the human body obeys the Law 
of Mechanics. Understandably, the apparent success of the 
mechanical approach in the area of physiology gladdened 
Descartes and received his whole-hearted support.
The whole British school of philosophical empiricism, notably 
represented by Locke (1632-1704) (Chappell 1994), Berkeley 
(1685-1753) (Brook 1973) and Hume (1711-1776) (Struod 1977) 
was under the overwhelming influence of Newtonian mechanics 
and the celebrated Laws of Motion. Locke is on record to have 
even said that the philosopher is nothing but an under-labourer 
of the scientist and engaged only to clear the path of scientific 
progress. Berkeley ’ s theory of optics, of example, is Newtonian 
in its inspiration. Hume’s skepticism is purely methodological, 
indicating the incurable questionability all scientific laws arrived 
at through inductive  generalization. His three psychological 
Laws of Association — of similarity, of continuity, and of 
contrast, are on analysis found to be not-so-veiled adaptations 
of Newton’ s Laws of Mechanical Gravitation. It is easy to 
demonstrate by numerous examples the clear invasion of 
Cartesian dualism and of Newtonian mechanism into the fields 
of not only social sciences but also humanities.
Only a few like Leibniz (1646-1716) (Frankfurt 1972) and Vico 
(1668-1744) (Berlin 1976), had the genius and courage to swim 
against the strong Newtonian current of the time. By affirming 
that all monads or atoms, including God himself as the Monad 
of the monads, are essentially spiritual and mutually isomorphic.
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and that all the grades of monads — physical, biological, 
psychological — and the Divine form a continuum. In contrast 
to Newton’ s materialist model of science, Vico defends in his 
N ew  S cien ce  (1725) the primacy of the cultural continuum 
marked by four different stages, poetic, theological, heroic and 
human. Notwithstanding his relative obscurity, this Neapolitan 
scholar from Italy succeeded in influencing widely different 
thinkers like Herde, Hegel, Marx, Comte, Coleridge and Croce 
(also from Naples). But the humanistic trend represented by 
the Leibnizian and Vician was more in the nature of departure 
from the mainstream European thought of the 18th Century than 
in the nature of a distinct and sustained identity of its own.
The then very new movement of the French Encyclopaedists 
(1751-1765) like D ’ Alembert, Diderot, and d’Holbach was 
essentially under the Newtonian influence and only partially 
under the influence of scientific thinkers like Bacon, Locke, 
Boyle and Montesquieu. For the most logical and consistent 
culmination of the Cartesian-Newtonian legacy, one must look 
into the works of La Mettrie (1709-1751), particulary his Man, 
M achine and O ther Writings, 1747 (Thompson 1996). Medically 
trained. La Mettrie conceived man as a machine, obviously 
taking his cue from the Cartesian thesis that all sub-human 
animals are complicated clock-like machines. His view was so 
radical that even French Encyclopaedists like Diderot and 
D ’Holbach, in spite of their deep indebtedness to La Mattrie’s 
ideas, distance themselves from him to avoid the wrath of the 
powerful ecclesiastical authorities.
The typical Newtonian ambivalence between mechanical science 
and spiritual consciousness is perhaps best illustrated by the 
writings of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Like his famous French 
contemporary Laplace (1749-1827) but independently of him, 
Kant offered his most famous astronomical explanation of the 
origin of the Earth (1755) generally known as the Kant-Laplace 
hypothesis in History of Science. At one stage he went to the
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extent of asserting in a youthful and heroic vein, “Give me 
Matter, I shall fashion the whole world out of it.” Like Laplace, 
he was also a staunch Newtonian and determinist. But, deeply 
moral in his personality, through this “Sage of Konisberg” (that 
is how he was known) is found to reject the man-machine 
analogy of La Mettrie. He had the true scientific modesty in 
him to recognize even the availability of parapsychological 
experiences. He points out that a machine has no value except 
when antique or rare. Human lives are intrinsically valuable. 
The man-machine analogy, for Kant, is not only scientifically 
untenable but, what is more, objectionable and also undermines 
humanistic ethics. He goes to the extent of even defin ing  man 
as a “responsible being” , differing from Aristotle’ s age-old 
definition as “rational animal” . It seems he was not clear how 
to reconcile plausibly scientific epistemology (concerned as it 
is with the p h en om en a l w orld  defined by the concepts and 
categories like space, time, causality, quality and quantity, etc.), 
on the one hand, with the n oum enal or transcendental world, 
the sphere of God, Immortal Soul and Freedom, on the other. 
To Kant these tran scen d en tal “ e n titie s” , “ th in g s-in - 
themselves” , are “absolute presuppositions” of knowledge, 
which as such though not cognitively available, are truly 
indispensable for theoretical knowledge of the world of sense 
and science. Simultaneously, he points out that the practical 
availability of ethico-religious and aesthetic consciousness. 
Good Will and the sense of sublimity, strongly suggest that 
everthing in the world, from the movement of the celestial 
bodies in the heavens to human moral impulses, is subject to 
the samelaws. However, even a sympathetic critic of Kant thinks 
that he also seems to have failed to overcome the die-hard 
dualism between Naturalism and Spiritualism, between the Pure 
Reason of Science and the Practical Reason of Ethics and 
Religion, between the realm of body and that of soul. He found 
no acceptable uji/fy between the two and had to remain content 
with only their affinity  (Brittan 1978).
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In spite of the Absolute Spiritualism of Hegel, encompassing all 
things and beings of the world, the Newtonian hangover, 
mediated and somewhat diluted by Kant, apparently survived 
as it is evident from the works of thinkers like Condorcet (1743- 
1794) and Comte (1798-1857). While Condorcet, a mathematician 
by training, developed, following his probabilistic  method, a 
monumental and secularized history of the dynamics of man’s 
progress from the primitive state of Nature to modernity, Comte 
aimed to fashion all cognitive disciplines — physiology, social 
studies and even metaphysics and theology, in terms of positive  
sc ien ces. To him psychology appeared to be a part of 
“phrenology” (science of brain), social studies as “social 
physics” (only later on he coined the term “sociology” ), and 
religion as the worship of (an abstract entity called) Humanity. 
It is noteworthy that he is one of the earliest to anticipate the 
close relation between brain and mind (what is studied to-day 
in Cognitive Science).
It is difficult for a layman of today to believe that chemistry as 
an independent discipline was not there even 300 years ago. 
B iophysics, biochem istry, neurology and other frontier 
disciplines are of relatively recent origin. Not that the issue and 
problems studied in these disciplines were unknown in principle  
in earlier times. What I like to highlight is that the proliferation 
of frontier disciplines only shows that the frontiers of human 
knowledge are gradually and continuously receding like the 
seemingly distant horizon to a traveller. The horizonal expansion 
of knowledge is due (a) m ain ly  to new findings and new 
researchers and (b) partly to daring hypotheses of the informed 
scientific thinkers. The issues and problems which philosophers 
discussed under the very broad heading of Matter, Life and Mind 
are now to be found under too many scientific specialisations 
to be exactly  and fixedly enum erated. The process of 
specialisation encountered in life science is illustrated also by 
the history of scientific progress. And that persistent fact poses 
an instructive problem for the committed scholars of truly
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interdisciplinary studies. They have to try to prevent the 
pulverization  o f  the unity o f  sc ien ce, and also try to consciously 
refrain themselves from the temptation of flying to the dizzy 
heights of speculative philosophy. They are methodologically 
well-advised to steer clear of the deep sea of metaphysical 
generalization and the devil of over specialization. What is 
required of the interdisciplinary researchers is to avoid the twin 
dangers of (what I call) tbeory-intoxication  and fact-fetishism .
In the light of the above observations, what I propose to do, 
within the limits of this paper, is to indicate in brief the relation 
between consciousness in general, and the human body, 
particularly, the brain. In the process, understandably, I shall 
be drawing upon the sign-post theories of physics and biology 
which are central to our themes of discussion.
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V. Evolution, new physics, biology and psychology
It has been rightly observed that four of the chief architects of 
the modern scientific age are Charles Darwin (1809-82) (Kohn 
1985); Karl Marx (1818-83) (Chattopadhyaya 1988), Sigmund 
Freud (1856-1939) (Clark and Wright 1988); and Albert Einstein 
(1879-1955) (Fine 1986). This is not in the least to forget the 
importance of the other great ancient, medieval and modern 
thinkers already referred to earlier. In fact it must be realized 
that the greatness of the moderns rests substantially on the time- 
tested heritage and wisdom of the ancients. The Naturalist 
Darwin, who started his scientific career as a geologist, ended 
up as an epoch-m aking biologist of the 19th century by 
upholding a new theory of evolution and defending the origin 
of the human species in terms of Natural Selection. Marx, who 
initially studied philosophy, history and law, shaped himself 
later on as the author of the new Labour Theory of Value and 
one of the leading economists of the last Century. Freud, who, 
to start with, studied medicine, got interested in neurology.
and finally turned out to be one of the niost influential 
psychologists and psychoanalysts of the 20th Century. Einstein, 
who, except for a brief spell as a junior official of the Patent 
Office at Berne, was a scientist from the beginning to the end of 
his professional life, never ceased to have deep interest in the 
areas of education, Zionism, culture and peace. Two things which 
are common to all these four greats are, first, their theoretical 
commitment to Naturalism and, second, their rejection of the 
classical mechanical Materialism. Both points are relevent to 
interdisciplinary scholars mainly for two reasons, namely, (a) one 
can be outstanding in a specialized area remaining, at the same 
tim e, reasonably conversant with developments in other 
neighbouring disciplines, and (b) creative scholars take always 
critical note of the findings of great predecessors and subsequent 
unsolved problems remaining.
At the very start of my presentation, I have spoken of three levels 
of reality, namely. Matter, Life and Mind, and also indicated another 
level by using the word Beyond. One very important trait common 
to the four great scientific architects of the modern era is thier various 
ways of rejection of reductionism. That is, they refuse to reduce all 
the said levels of realities to one single level of reality called mind 
or matter. Even Marx, the inveterate materialist, distances his own 
dialectical materiaMsm, mainly due to Hegel, scrupulously distances 
himself from (what he calls) mechanical materialism of the French 
Encyclopaedists Darwin’s Evolutionism, Freud’s Psychology of the 
“Unconsciousness” , and Einstein’ s Relativistic Physics, all 
acknowledgely committed to Naturalism; however, all of them 
refuse to be described as materialists in the received sense. 1 read 
this significant development (i) as the beginning of the decline of 
the Cartesian dualism and the Newtonian mechanism, and (ii) as 
the beginning of the rise of creative or emergent evolutionism with 
a promise of “the beyond” within it.
In this connection, I would refer specifically to some important 
contributions by a select group of physicists, biologists
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(including neuro-biologists) and, particularly, philosophers. 
Many of the philosophically inclined physicists, biologists and 
physiologists of the 19th Century, intrigued by the problems 
posed by the interactive relations between the main two levels 
of reality, namely, the physical and the biological, started 
researching and writing on life science. That physical objects 
are causally influenced by their environmental conditions was 
w ell-recognized for a long time but the interest in their 
quantitative properties was yet to make satisfactory progress. 
Gradually some discerning scientists working on the frontier 
between the physical world and the life world realized that even 
plant life, not to speak of animal life and human life, was 
distinctly responsive to natural and environmental stimuli. It is 
true that in the ancient literature of India and some other 
countries one comes across clear reference to this relatively 
unexplored area. To record and report the observable impact 
of the natural on plant life is one thing and to study it 
scientifically under experimental conditions is another thing. 
Admittedly, the former has a clear explorative bearing upon 
the latter.
It is instructive to recall that J. C. Bose (1858-1937), a well-known 
Indian physicist, who, taking cues from Maxwell and Hertz, 
carried out promising experiments concerning the transmission 
of electrical energy and also with the possibilities of radio 
communication, and steadily developed research interest in 
plant life (Scribners 1981). Though Bose is said to have 
demonstrated radio transmission in Calcutta as early as in 1895, 
the credit of inventing successful Radio communication went 
to Marconi of Italy and he was awarded the Noble Prize on this 
account. Bose started measuring the response of plants to such 
stimuli as light, sound, touch and electricity. He was persuaded 
that there were no clear-cut boundaries between the nervous 
systems of plants and those of animals. For the purpose of his 
investigation he invented an instrument, the Crescograph, 
which was capable of magnifying the movements of growth in
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plants about 10 million times. Though later on many other 
distinguished life scientists like C S Sherrington (1857-1952)^, 
Adrian (1889-1977) (A drian), L J Henderson (1890-1967) 
(Henderson 1958), Dobzhansky (1900-75) (Dobzhansky 1976), 
Rene Dubos (1910-82) (Dubos 1975) and Ernst Mayr (Mayr 1982) 
made significant contributions to the nature of the complex 
relationship between environment, heredity and organisms, in 
this relatively unfrequented field of enquiry B ose’ s work 
deserves pride of place. Bose was at times unduly criticized for 
his alleged introduction of a heavy dose of Indian philosophy 
into his scientific work.
Besides Bose, another physicist who also made notable 
contributions to the understanding of the relation between the 
physical world and the life world is the famous Neils Bohr (1885- 
1962). Because of his understandable fame for initiating and 
pioneering many works in the area of Quantum Mechanics, the 
significance of Bohr’s work in the area of life science and social 
science has gone relatively unnoticed. In the last years of his life 
he expressed deepest satisfaction with the spectacular advance 
of molecular biology. In the last paper he wrote, “Light and Life 
R evisited ” . Applying his w ell-know n p r in c ip le  o f  
complem entarity, he tried to show that there is no incompatibility 
between the functional concepts of biology and its physical 
description (Bohr 1985). On the contrary, he anticipated unlimited 
prospects of articulating biological processes in physical terms 
without prejudice to an equally rich account of their functional 
aspects. It may be recalled here that Bohr’s interest in the 
philosophical issues, particularly, the epistemological ones, 
regarding the relation between life and the world, was pardy due 
to the influence of his father on him. His father was a Professor of 
Psychology at the Copenhagen University and a close friend of 
the famous Danish philosopher. Herald Hoffding. Bohr also 
speaks of the complementarity between modernity and tradition, 
relating the latter, i.e., tradition, to the heredifary transmission 
in determining the essential elements of culture. In order to
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forestall the then emerging (Nazi) racial implications of heredity 
he pointed out that both the modes of description of biological 
phenomena, namely, physico-chemical and functional, must be 
accorded comparable and complementary importance. In his 
epistemological scheme of thought, complementarity figures as 
the logical relationship referring both to (i) the linguistic ways of 
describing and communicating our experience of the world, and 
(ii) the world itself in which we occupy a singular position — 
the position of being both spectators and actors.
A nother very d istinguished p h ysic ist-p h ilo so p h er and 
contemporary of Bohr who contributed much to our clearer 
understanding of the relation between matter, life and mind is 
Erwin Schrodinger’ . After he succeeded in discovering and then 
establishing, with the help of Hermann Weyl, the basic identity 
of matrix m echanics and wave m echanics, he turned his 
attention partly to philosophical questions pertaining not only 
to science but also to essentially humanistic issues. It is perhaps 
due in some measure to his temporary stay (after leaving 
Germany) at the Pontifical Academy in Rome, before his travel 
to his last scientific home at Dublin, provided by the President 
of the Country, De Valera, himself a talented mathematician. 
Convinced of the limits of science and of the irrelevance of 
Heisenberg’ s uncertainty principle to the age-old question of 
human free will, he started delving deep into the ancient 
Hellenic and Indian philosophical systems. He sincerely shared 
Albert Schweitzer’ s resp ect fo r  life. Without being forgetful of 
his professional first love for the physical world, he like Neils 
Bohr felt that the biological process of growth could be 
understood on the basis of quantum theory according to the 
schema “order out of the order” . Though his views have been 
superseded by subsequent research, during his own life time 
(as Francis Crick tells us) he motivated many promising 
physicists to study biology. The posthumous publication of his 
M y W orld-V iew  confirms his intimate familiarity with the 
ancient Vedantic philosophical view of life.
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That a scientist’ s preoccupation with one particular branch of 
knowledge, physics in this case, does not prevent hin\ from 
being professionally familiar with other branches of knowledge 
has been clearly understood by the life and works of scientists 
like Bose, Bohr, Schrodinger, Helmholtz, Von Neuman and 
Norbert Wiener. Also in this connection one must justly recall 
the outstanding works of Sherrington. When he, together with 
his junior colleague, Adrian, was awarded Noble Prize for 
physiology/medicine in 1932, in his citation the Noble Prize 
Committee specifically acknowledged, honouring him specially, 
that biological research inspired solely by philosophical 
questions and free from any practical concern with immediate 
medical application would some day go a long way to the 
experiment of the human life. In his later life it is clear that 
Sherrington became more and more interested in philosophical 
questions. In his two famous books, Man on His Nature (1942) 
and Integrative Action  (1947), he relates the results of his very 
late years. While he draws a necessary distinction between the 
purely motor integration of the decerebrate animal and the 
complete conscious one of the sensing being, his position should 
not be construed as dualistic. For Sherrington speaks of two 
complementary syntheses which simultaneously take place in 
the normal functional nervous system. While the physico­
chemical process, induces man to behave like a goal-seeking 
machine, the psychological process articulates his emotions, 
aspirations, volitions and memories. He was not quite sure 
whether these two processes are commensurable. Up to the 
1940’ s he did not like to attach any religious connotation to his 
scientific works. But John Eccles tells us that when he met 
Sherrington, immediately before his death in 1952, the scientist 
told him that “now my concern is soul” .
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VI. Ascent iUttarana) and descent (Avatarana) 
in and through matter, life and mind
What I have stated above would indicate my conviction that the 
relations that obtain and work betw een the three m ain  
scientifically ascertainable levels of existence. Life, Matter and 
Mind, are complex and interactive. In this concluding section I 
will try to show, though briefly, that the nature of these 
interactions may best be brought out in terms of the conjoint 
implications of evolution and involution, upward causation and 
downward causation. In arriving at my conclusion the views 
which proved very helpful to me are those of my own teacher, 
Karl Popper, a physicist turned philosopher, then social scientist 
and finally evolutionary theorist of knowledge, John Eccles, a 
brain scientist turned philosopher, and Sri Aurobindo, a true 
polymath trained in history, who could easily move from 
history, culture and revolutionary politics to Vedic studies. Yoga 
and epic poetry. Close scrutiny of the writings of these thinkers 
clearly shows their internal difference. Let me say how I read 
them.
First, when I use the word “causation” , obviously I have neither 
the Cartesian push-pull view nor the Newtonian gravitational 
view of it at the back of my mind. I am not clear about the 
implications of the probabilistic-cum-chance view of causality 
defended by the most Quantum physicist. To make my point 
clear I would denote, purely for heuristic purpose, the three 
main Levels of existence. Matter as LI, Life as L2 and Mind as 
L3. Personally speaking, I am inclinced to accept the seven levels 
of Being referred to in the Vedas and persuasively elaborated, 
among others, by Sri Aurobindo. However, for our present 
limited purpose we may concentrate only on the stated three 
levels, — LI, L2, and L3. LI, mainly consisting of physical and 
chemical forces and phenomena, is studied in such disciplines 
as physics, geology and chemistry. L2, mainly consisting of 
biological and psychological forces and phenomena, is studied
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as botany or zoology, and biology in the most extended sense, 
including molecular biology, neurobiology, psychology, and 
epistemology. L3, mainly consisting of the abstract and durable 
products, m ainly ot the human psychological workings of level
2, is illustrated, among other things, by tradition and culture, 
language and numbers, archaeological remains and musical 
notations, surviving theories, world-views and unsolved 
problems. Indirectly LI has its upward impact on LI mediated 
through and by L2. Conversely, L3 has its downward impact on 
LI mediated through and by L2. These two processes are 
increasingly complex in evolution and decreasingly simple in 
involution.
On most of these issues, 1 suppose. Popper and, particularly, 
Eccles, are likely to agree with me. But Popper does not believe 
in the existence of any level beyond L3, beyond the products of 
the human mind. He rules out the very possibility of evolution 
beyond L3. He does not believe in any Supermind or God. Even 
the term “ soul” is not to his scientific taste because of its alleged 
theological undertone. He prefers the term is “self” . This is 
evident from his works like O bjective K now ledge  and The Self 
and Its Brain. The latter has been jointly authored by Popper 
and Eccles. Their Dialogues in Part III of the book make the 
difference betw een the two abundantly clear. While the 
philosopher in the experimental scientist, Eccles, is willing to 
recognize the transcendental promise of biological evolution, 
the scientist in the philosopher. Popper, is clearly non-committal 
on the issue.
While I agree with both of them in their criticism of, and 
common opposition to, the main two forms reductionism, viz., 
materialism and panpsychism, I find that Popper’ s formulation 
of panpsychism is clearly mistaken and even that of Eccles’s 
unsatisfactory. For example, when it is said in the true Vedic 
tradition  that “ all is co n scio u sn ess” or “ sarvarn idariri 
caitanyam \ it certainly does not fail to recognize the distinction
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between L I, L2 and L3 and the promise jointly held out by all 
three levels. The main reason for most Euro-American thinkers’ 
failure to see this clear distinction drawn by Indian thinkers 
between the empirical world {Jagat-prapanca) and Brahman or 
God, or between the Buddhist’ s Nirvana and ^unya as reality, 
is their lack of exposure to the Indian ways of thought as 
expression. Preoccupied with the Cartesian form of body-mind 
interactionism  and the Spinozistic forms of body-m ind 
parallelism, they, in most cases, are unable to fairly assess the 
Indian theories of relation between body and mind. As said 
before, it is substantially because of their unfamiliarity with, 
and indifference to, the eastern modes of spiritual thought. 
While most of the Indian thinkers, philosophic and scientific, 
take the welcome trouble of closely studying the Euro-American 
schools of thought, they do not reciprocate this open- 
mindedness. Unfortunately, our mind is thoroughly colonized 
by western influences, particularly of English-speaking writers 
and we uncritically accept the ideas of globalization, coming 
from the West and sweeping all our spheres of life and learning, 
— econom ic, philosophical and even scien tific . I must 
emphatically add here that I do not believe in chauvinism in the 
field of learning. But learning in the modern context should be 
a mutually respectful process of exchange.
Once the materialist or the naturalist rejects, explicitly or 
implicitly, emergentism, or creativism, they land themselves 
wittingly or unwittingly, in a number of difficulties, anomalies 
and inconsistencies, if not outright contradictions. To the 
materialist, the universe seems to be a mere collection of things. 
The seemingly higher-level objects are merely by-products of 
the interaction between and within material bits of things. Only 
forms of matter are claimed to be durable, if not eternal entities. 
All other things are taken to be merely temporary and destined 
to perish soon or late. This formulation of reductive materialism, 
inspired basically by a particular theory  of matter from  ab ov e  
can hardly stand the scrutiny of experimental findings from
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below . We have already reffered to some disconfirming findings 
earlier. I would briefly refer to some additional findings and 
arguments to show the infirmity of this position.
First, many modern physicists are of the view that matter 
because of its inherent motion or contrary electric charges wihtin 
it can never retain its structural identity over a long period of 
time (Feinberg 1977). The fo rm al identity that it outwardly 
exhibits is not truly reflective of its inner changes. That formal 
identity and material change may and do go together may be 
cited as the only or main evidence of continuity, identity and 
reidentifiability of human persons through the passage of time. 
This purely physicalist argument “from above” appears shaky, 
if not very metaphysical.
Second, the materialist defender of the body-mind identity 
theory fails to explain why bodily changes and mental changes 
do not interact instantaneously (Popper and Eccles 1977). The 
parallelist among the materialists fail to tell us why the terms of 
the bodily process and those of the mental process do not exhibit 
any one-to-one, particular-to-particular or even general-to- 
general, corresponden ce. There is always an element of time- 
lag betw een, or the non-instantaneous character of, the 
allegedly para lle l or interactive  courses of somatological and 
mental events. This suggests that all mammals, certainly from 
the level of developed apes to human beings, have an 
interpretative inability within them which intervenes between 
physical stimuli, neural intakes and actual behaviour. The 
behaviourist is wrong in thinking that the existence of the 
supposed mental events and actions are merely due to our 
inverse and illegitim ate inference from the visible or the 
perceptible to the “inner and invisible” space. The statements 
about the somatic signs can hardly be taken as premises from 
which mental phenomena can be validly inferred. The latter, 
i.e., invisible mental phenomena, cannot also be logically taken 
as mere bodily dispositions. For example, knowledge itself.
44 DP Chattopadhyaya
which ordinarily turns out to be dispositional and not episodic, 
cannot be validly attributed to the mere biochemical processes 
of the brain. The fruf/i-claim of our thought is determined not 
by the laws of biochemistry but by those of logic. For example, 
a computing machine, though supposedly obeying the laws of 
physics, is clearly and fully obedient to the laws of logic as well. 
Primacy of logic does n ot  support the primacy of materialism 
(Goldman 1995).
Third, the irreducibility of consciousness to the physical/ 
material conditions of our existense may be shown in another 
way. For example, when we get up from deep sleep or even 
shallow dreams, often we find our time-sense becomes blurred 
or/and misplaced. A patient, immediately after gaining post­
operative consciousness, is found to ask a typical question, 
“where am I?” . That shows that his post-surgical consciousness, 
though consciousness in the true sense, is not in consonance 
with his immediate environmental conditions. Even when we 
sleep in a totally new and different place, away from our 
customary place, we find it difficult to be sure of our position 
or, to take an example, where exactly to put our fingers for 
switching on the light. This is also proof, though admittedly 
somewhat weak, of the gap between our bodily consciousness 
and the environmental conditions within which it is placed. This 
“gap” clearly indicates the in d ep en d en ce  of consciousness— 
independence from physical settings and conditions.
Fou rth , the ways of fu nctioning  of our m em ory also 
convincingly bring out the inadequacy of the physicalist account 
of consciousness''. M em ories are very cen tral to the 
understanding of consciousness. Psychologists who deny the 
possibility and prospect of self-introspection find it often very 
difficult to explain the retrieval systems of past memory or lost 
memory. Does not introspection help us in our retrieval efforts? 
How can one deny it reasonably? Some memories of the past, 
on demand of the will, can certainly be recalled immediately or
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mediately and retrieved but some others cannot be. The 
reservoir of the really forgotten is indeed very vast. In the case 
of aging people, with the loss of memory of proper names starts 
the expanding area of increasing forgetfulness. Memory may 
be passive or become active. It is at times due to need and will 
and at times due to external stimulation or provocation. Memory 
is activated not only for the purpose of retrieval of our past 
experience but also for recognition  of the items of experience 
and their objective references. Memory, though in different 
minimax ways found in differently developed animals, is 
available in its best form only in human beings. All these 
consid erations again suggest the irreducibility  of self- 
consciousness and self-recognition to somatic or even simply 
conscious experience. To maintain the differences between 
consciousness and self-consciousness, between simple retrieval 
and recognizable retrieval, is essential to a sound understanding 
at the human mind.
Fifth, some philosophers and psychologists often speak of the 
elusive  character or thinningness or even the non-existence of 
the self'’. However, their use of language appears opposed to 
their theoretical conviction. That shows that they develop 
theories disregarding their own practical experiences and also 
their conscious linguistic behaviour. Unless one believes in the 
existence of one’ s self there is little meaning in one’ s utterances 
such as “these are mymemories” , “these are my mental states” . 
These are not instances of grammatical inadvertence but of 
theoretical misconception about the very nature of self.
S ixth , it is not surprising that many philosophers and 
philosophically oriented biologists take the concept of body as 
essential to that of persons. To avoid the difficulties of explaining 
the identity and unity of self-consciousness to espouse a concept 
like person seems to be basic and therefore unavoidable to many 
thinkers. Admittedly, to recognize body is n ecessary  for 
personal identity but it is of sufficient to explain some of the
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phenomena like recognition  of lost memory after a long time- 
gap. Self-consciousness, particularly some forms of yogic 
consciousness, is relatively independent. The interdependence 
of body and mind is not of identical extent.
Seventh, what I like to affirm is that consciousness is certainly 
due to integral functioning of our nervous system. However 
self-consciousness cannot be explained exclusively in terms of 
this integral functioning. Brain, as a part of the body, is certainly 
necessary for understanding consciousness, but consciousness, 
both human and sub-human, has a definite inherent element 
of self-transcendence in it.
Finally, I would like to conclude my brief survey on the relation 
between body and mind in this way. Self-consciousness works 
on our consciousness and our consciousness works on our body 
and also as a part of it on our brain. Not that brain has no impact 
on consciouness and consciousness on self-consciousness but 
what is most important in the context of uttarana or upward 
causation and avatarana  or downward causation, between 
material body, consciousness and self-consciousness is the 
primacy of the last term.
However, p iim acy  should not be confused with finality. If we 
really believe in the self-transcendent capacity of consciousness, 
then, as a token of the same logic, we have to recognize that 
human self-consciousness has in it a promised level beyond 
itself. In other words, there is no really final foreclosure of 
human consciousness. The question is logically and widely 
open.
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Notes
1. Cita, Xlll, 17 & 20, Taittiriya Upanisad, II. 1 and Sv. Upanisad, IV, 10 & 
VI, 1,7,8,11.
2. See, for example, Sherrington C S (1975) Man on His A/afure (Cambridge 
University Press)
3. See, for example, the entry on Schodinger in Dictionary o f  Scientific 
B io g ra p h y , C h arles S crib n er’ s Son s, N ew  Y ork , Vols. 11 & 12 
(combined). See also, J S Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum  
M echanics, CUP, (1987): J A Wheeler and W H Zurek, (eds.). Quantum  
Theory and M easurem ent, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
J J 1983; and David Bohm , W holeness and the Im plicate O rder, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1982.
4. For the Vedanta View see, for example, Padm apada’ s Pancapadika, tr. 
D Venkatramiah, Gaekwad’ s Oriental Series 107, Baroda, 1948
5. In this connection one may profitably look into the works of the early 
W ittgenstein, Ryle, Foucault and Derrida.
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Challenges to philosophy and religion 
from development in life-sciences
N S S RAMAN 
Banaras Hindu University 
Varanasi, India
Abstract
In the 19th and 20th Centimes, advancement of knowledge in the 
physical sciences had a tremendous effect on philosophical thought, 
introducing a 'revolution in philosophy'. And many physicists 
contributed much towards philosophical speculation, during the first 
half o f last century (e.g. Einstein, Heisenberg, Schrddinger, Weizdcker 
etc.). Their discoveries in physics contributed much towards the growth 
of metaphysical speculation. Similarly contribution to life-sciences, 
especially the doctrine of evolution, inspired many philosophers and 
scientists to contribute substantially to philosophical speculation (e.g. 
Bergson, Lloyd Morgan, Julian Huxley and Sri Aurobindo in our oum 
country).
But it appears that the new life-science and its far-reaching discoveries 
have not inspired many philosophers. We can trace certain landmark 
discoveries in this field, that can change the nature of speculation o f the 
philosophers about man and about life in general significantly. In our 
view, even psychology has not been able to meet the challenges posed by
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the outstanding discoveries in the field of genetics, tlwt can change 
their vieius on man's mind and behaviour to n large extent. From 
Mendel's earliest formulations in the 19th century, to the discovery of 
chromosomes (by Flemming and Waldeyer), formulations of the concept 
of 'imitation' (by Hugo de Vries), establislmient of the concept o f the 
'gene' (by T H Morgan), discovery of DNA as constituting the 
hereditary material, isolating the functions of the RNA, discovery and 
the 'cracking' o f the genetic code (by Nirenberg and Khurana), application 
of genetic trarisformation to medicine, cloning of several species, and 
the possibility of cloning a human being are only some of the stages in 
the dei^elopment of this science during its short history of only 150 
years.
Philosophy and Religion have been somewhat static in their attitude to 
the three basic problems: God, Self and its immortality, and the external 
worlds. They ignore the various life forms abnost completely when they 
talk about 'cosmos'. In my view they did not completely succeed in 
meeting the challenges of discoveries in the physical sciences, both in 
the sphere of the macrocosm and of the microcosm. In their attitude to 
the world of living beings it is either negative or indifferent. Taking the 
example of consciousness, which the philosophers and theologians have 
regarded as unique to man, it can be shown how obscure and ambiguous 
this term means even to the philosopher. The idea of 'God' both in 
philosophy and religion has meant quite a lot o f things and philosophers 
and theologians (even when they belong to the same faith) are not 
entirely in agreement. We are aivaiting a nezu philosophy that can meet 
all challenges.
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Post-renaissance Europe has witnessed a tremendous growth in 
knowledge which has no parallel in the entire intellectual history 
of the world. During the twentieth century, in particular, the 
advancement of science has been so rapid that it has become 
highly difficult even for scientists themselves to keep pace with 
the developments, not to speak of philosophers, historians and 
social scientists, who find these developments beyond easy grasp. 
Above all, the men of religion, the theologians, are hopelessly 
lagging behind in their assimilation and appreciation of the new 
scientific knowledge.
I
3As far as the physical sciences were concerned, philosophers 
were highly struck by the new revelations regarding the cosmos 
which led to a somewhat revised outlook on the external world. 
God, self and the nature of the physical world have been the 
three fundamental metaphysical problems in the philosophical 
traditions of both the East and the West. Immanuel Kant in the 
18th century declared that two things had inspired wonder in 
him: 'the starry heavens above and the moral order within'. The 
Baconian-Galilean-Newtonian outlook regarding the external 
world and the Copernican revolution in astronomy modified our 
philosophical vision of the world beyond us, but philosophers 
continued to assert that knowledge alone was not enough; it had 
to be guided by faith. This was some sort of a concession to the 
religious world-view, which had been guided by dogmatism 
based on the scriptures. Gradually the chasm between philosophy 
and theology became wide, the former leaning more towards 
science and the scientific world-view, so much so that it was said 
early in the last century that philosophy and theology were not 
on speaking terms; the situation has not changed very much 
now.
If 18th and 19th century British empiricism was influenced by 
what the American philosopher E A Burtt has called 'Baconian- 
Newtonian-Galilean world-view'; then as the twentieth century 
began some philosophers found the explanations and discoveries 
of physics inaccessible, owing to lack of training (especially in 
mathematics). But still, the students of philosophy, with a little 
hard work, could comprehend the basic concepts of modern 
physics like quantum mechanics and relativity. Philosophers like 
Russell wrote understandable treatises on new science. Besides, 
we also come across writings on philosophical problems of 
modern physics by scientists (e.g. Einstein, Schrodinger, 
Heisenberg, Jeans, Eddington etc.), though many of them are no 
longer read. Some scientists indeed became philosophers 
(e.g. Whitehead, Pascual Jordan, and Weizacker).
II
Around the beginning of the 20th Century, psychology broke 
away from philosophy, as both its anti-metaphysical assumptions 
and its experimental methods were found to be out of tune with
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those of philosophy. However, psychology as a science (unlike 
biology) has failed in my assessment, to make a lasting impression 
on modern cultural history, owing to its failure to provide more 
information about the human mind than was already known, 
and became bogged down in its mechanistic methods and 
conclusions. The new science of genetics is more successful in 
this regard, as it pursues the same goals about knowing more 
about life by following a more rigorous method. It was remarked 
somewhat laconically a few decades ago, that psychology first 
lost its soul, then its self, then its mind and finally it lost even its 
consciousness. Anthropology too offers less information about 
man than genetics.
During the middle of the 19th century, Darwin took the intellectual 
ŵ orld by storm, and gave a new fillip to the development of 
biological sciences by his doctrine of evolution. Its main theses, 
its modifications, reformulation etc., during the 100 or more 
years of its history are not relevant here, while some philosophers 
at the beginning of the last century saw contradictions in the 
doctrine (when applied to a scheme of reality), others like Henri 
Bergson, Teilhard de Chardin and Samuel Alexander built their 
own metaphysical systems based on the doctrine of evolution. 
Some biologists themselves built their own metaphysical theories 
(e.g. Lloyd Morgan and Julian Huxley). To some extent, the great 
Indian philosopher, Sri Aurobindo, seems to have been very 
much influenced by the doctrine of evolution, judged by the way 
he treats problems of human life, history, and human mind. 
There is no need to elaborate them here.
Some other philosophers abandoned their interest in the problems 
of the physical world, of life, of history and of man and fell back 
into understanding and analysing the language of the various 
sciences and their logic. In the thirties of the last century, they 
published an Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, and under the 
latter they brought in language and logic of physics, biology, 
social sciences etc. There is need to bring forth a work on logic of 
genetics. Thus we see that not all philosophers were ready to face 
the challenges of science. It is true to a large extent that the 
philosophers' interest in the problem of life in general has been 
indifferent and their attitude towards the world has also been 
negative, as some of them have been asserting the phenomenality, 
the unreality and even the illusory nature of the physical world.
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Even in the West the interest in the problems and values of life 
has been comparatively of recent origin. It may have started from 
the period of renaissance in the 16th and 17th centuries, and 
received an additional fillip after the so-called phase of Aiifkiarung 
or enlightenment in European cultural history, after the eighteenth 
century.
I l l
Modern science came to India only after the middle of the 19th 
century. Some scholars may dispute this statement, but it is a fact 
that the Asian continent as a whole was ignorant of the methods 
and secular goals of modem science till the end of the 19th 
century. In ancient Indian cultural history, one does come across a 
kind of science, e.g., astronomy, medicine, mathematics etc. 
Ayurveda did initiate studies of anatomy. In spite of all this, 
modern tools of research like the microscope, telescope etc., were 
totally unknown, not to speak of computers. There is no need to 
develop an 'inferiority complex' about this, because European 
science before the renaissance and enlightenment was exactly in 
the same position as India of the early 19th century. Science to-day 
has crossed geographical and parochial boundaries, and there is 
,no point in talking of Indian or European Science, or Christian or 
Vedic science. It has to be admitted, however, that Ayurveda did 
give a credible account of the human body and the Yoga system 
attempted to probe into the working of the human mind.
However, the ancient Indian philosophies that deal with human 
consciousness (e.g., the Advaita Vedanta, the Vijnanavada school 
of Buddhism and the Yoga system of Patanjali) lead us to a lot of 
am biguities, which are caused by their statem ents on 
consciousness and self-consciousness, which are either partly or 
wholly unintelligible (the terms used in Sanskrit are 'prajnana', 
'vijnana', 'citta' etc.) and the various commentaries do not help us 
much in understanding them. The parallels in European thought 
are found in the philosophies of Kant and Hegel (who writing in 
German use the term 'Bewusstsein', which is better translated as 
'awareness', as the term 'consciousness' sounds more like a 
hypostatized thing, rather than a process), and these philosophies 
have attracted the immediate attention of Indian Vedantins 
because of the similarities between the two concepts, Indian and 
Western. Needless to say that the entire approach was based on
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epistemology or an outdated human psychology and was made 
long before human physiology and experimental psychology 
developed as exact sciences. It was pointed out early in the 20th 
century that many philosophical concepts have their origin in 
'fictions' (using that term in a somewhat technical sense). Such 
'fictions' include consciousness, mind, reason, intellect and even 
the so-called 'self' or 'the ego'; such concepts are empty shells 
without content and impossible of scientific verification. This 
view has of course been disputed by many so-called 
phenomenologists and existentialists, whose starting point is the 
affirmation of the reality of the self ('the transcendental ego' for 
the phenomenologists), but we will not elaborate the thought of 
these systems for want of time and relevance.
IV
Philosophers, it may be asserted with some confidence, were 
never seriously concerned with the problems of human life, 
much less with life in general. At best, the problem was 
approached negatively, and in this it was definitely influenced by 
a theological outlook, which relegated life here as something full 
of misery and not worth living, as compared to an eternal life 
beyond, a vision of which was put forth by almost all religions. 
The history of the life sciences during the last two centuries has 
changed this attitude of the philosophers, who have left the 
dogmatic theologians far behind. The affirmation of the reality of 
the human person is one of the prominent features of 20th 
century philosophy. Life sciences themselves in this short life 
span of a little more than 200 years have brought about a 
formidable change in man's attitude towards himself and to 
other forms of life, which he had ignored earlier. From William 
Harvey's discovery of the circulation of blood and Leeuwenhoek's 
discovery of micro-organisms through his new tool, the compound 
microscope, in the late 17th Century, to the cracking of the 
genetic code during the sixties of the last century and the 
deciphering of the entire human genome as well as that of other 
animals is a far cry with highly significant consequences, that 
throw formidable challenges to the traditional outlook on human 
life and existence.
The science of genetics itself has had a short life of 100 years, the 
word itself being introduced by Bateson in 1903, though the
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geneticists have not forgotten the pioneering work of Mendel. 
Prior to that, as is well-known, there were quite a few who were 
interested in finding out what characters of a living organism 
were passed on to other organisms taking birth from it, and what 
were acquired. There were philosophers like Lloyd Morgan who 
spoke of new qualities, which become 'emergent' during the 
course of evolution of life through various stages. Bergson had 
spoken of evolution being 'creative'.
The doctrine of evolution or a study of the nature of the world of 
life or even of the problems of heredity and environment do not 
throw any challenge to traditional beliefs about man. They have 
in fact opened new vistas in man's understanding of himself, 
isolated or in relation to the cosmos. But a transition from such 
problems to far-reaching discoveries regarding the nature and 
origin of life, and further into what has come to be known as 
'cloning', i.e., creation of forms of life identical to the one the 
scientist is having before him, from a single cell. Genetic 
engineering promises to re-design the world of life. It has already 
found ways and means of eliminating human suffering by offering 
genetic therapy. One also hears of the boast that man in the near 
future will play the role of God, creating new species and 
eliminating the old.
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The transformation of a mere biological challenge to traditional 
beliefs into a genetical one is an invitation to man to throw away 
many of these beliefs, some of them bordering on superstition, in 
favour of more acceptable and verifiable facts, which seems to be 
unavoidable. If human intellect cannot keep itself abreast of 
these developments it is lost. In fact, the developments have been 
so fast that it is not possible even for the biologist to keep pace 
with them. The discovery of chromosomes, mutation, genes, 
DNA and RNA, the construction of a genetic code and its so- 
called 'cracking', application of genetics to medicine and the 
recent human genome project have all happened within our 
lifetime, and we do not really know what is going to happen in 
the near future. All these scientific events have taken human 
civilisation by surprise, amidst outcries against such developments 
and that all these go against the laws of nature and against God's 
will (as if we know what they are!). More than the philosophers
the theologians have talked of a Cosmic Purpose, a Divine Will 
and man's impudence in disturbing God's acts of creation. 
Sometimes Scriptures are quoted in support of objections to 
scientific advancement.
But one has to be wary of over-enthusiasm. What has happened 
is not merely a new genetics or even a new biology, but the 
discovery of a new world, at the microcosmic level comparable 
to the discovery of the new world by the explorers in the 15th 
Century. Indeed man is well-set to re-design and reshape the life- 
world on his own, attempting to change history, which has come 
down to us after millions of years of evolution, and above all 
trying to create new meanings and values of life. He assumes the 
role of God (perhaps it is only a metaphorical way of describing 
man's stupendous endeavours) in designing and creating new 
organisms by genetic engineering. Aided by supercomputers, 
geneticists now seem to know the intricate structures of various 
species, the 'genomes' of various species, including the human. 
This also involves the discovery of the so-called 'chemical spelling' 
of the biological types. It has been reported that bio-scientists 
have found the new data revealed by their painstaking 
investigations so powerful that they are now in a position to lay 
bare and compare the 'genomes' of various animals with that of 
man. They are now even able to probe into man's past (even 
before the species homo sapiens came into being) in its most 
minute genetic details. We are now told that the discovery or 
rather the deciphering of the human genome is as complete as 
those of most other species. This completes the picture of biological 
evolution in its minutest genetic details. Scientists are also able to 
pinpoint clearly the genes that cause many deformities and 
diseases. This has completely changed our picture of the world 
of life and of man and his place in the world.
V I
The discoveries made by these researches into genomes can come 
as a stunning blow to many of the traditional philosophical 
beliefs about the nature of man. The need has arisen to revise 
many of the traditional metaphysical concepts like the self, mind, 
consciousness, thought etc. Above all, the effect of such a scientific 
revolution on the realm of values is yet to be assessed. It has 
probably landed us in a mechanistic world-view, though it can
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be asserted in favour of the scientist that but for his freedom of 
thought and action, these discoveries v^ould never have been 
made. The Western world has in my view broken out from its 
theological past to a more open and free world of scientific and 
philosophical inquiry. It also follows from this development of 
thought that man is solely responsible for his future evolution, 
and that he can shape the future of man and of civilization, thus 
eliminating any reference to a supernatural, transcendental agency, 
which has so far been regarded as responsible for man's 
appearance and his history. Man has become the sole arbiter of 
his own future destiny.
But the entire project has been commercialized to such an extent 
that these far-reaching discoveries are not available to the world 
at large. The firms, especially the pharmaceutical companies 
which have pumped in billions of dollars in genetic research, 
have kept the discoveries a closely guarded secret, to prevent the 
human community all over the world from benefiting from them 
in the control and prevention of disease, infirmities and 
deformities. Mechanization and commercialization of human 
culture and civilization had been foretold more than 100 years 
ago, in response to science and technology.
Another important challenge thrown open by this new science of 
genetics consists in the fact revealed by its latest researches into 
the genetic structure of man and other animals, that man is no 
different from other animals. A few submicroscopic genes are all 
that matter. This conclusion shocks many who hold the traditional 
view about the basic differences between man and other animals. 
But the reaction of the theologians this time is not so sharp as 
when Darwin propounded the evolutionary hypothesis. The 
theologians then encountered him an argumentum ad hominem, 
whether Darwin accepted that he was descended from apes. The 
dogmatic theologian and the religious man have always had 
suspicions about science and scientific progress. He was also 
indifferent to forms of life other than his own. Even humanism as 
a philosophical doctrine is one-sided, though it has an emotional 
appeal, because it directs the main attention to the human 
species only. It may in this connection also be observed that 
Western religions (i.e. the so-called Semitic religions) are not 
friendly to life forms other than man. Contrary to this. Eastern 
religions (i.e. Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism) have a more
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sympathetic attitude to all forms of life. Life has been treated as a 
totality. This is confirmed by modern researches into the human 
and animal genomes, which demonstrate that there is very close 
kinship between them. The fact that the human genome is no 
different from that of a dog or a rat may disturb our minds, 
influenced as we are by centuries of dogmatism and superstition. 
It remains an irrefutable fact that geneticists have been able to 
cross what are described as 'species barriers'. In the plant 
kingdom, biotechnology with the aid of genetics has been able to 
produce better and high-yielding varieties of food-grains, and 
has helped to usher in a green revolution. Judged by the speed 
with which genetic research is progressing, it may not be long 
before we are presented with a new race of supermen, relatively 
free from disease and capable of living for hundreds of years.
What effects such results of genetic research would have on our 
traditional values and cultural norms are yet to be assessed, and 
is beyond the scope of this essay.
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Abstract
The paper seeks to discuss the presuppositions of a theory of consciousness 
in general. For this three models of classification of human consciousness 
are being taken up for discussion, namely, Kantian, Marxian, and 
Sartrian. These shall be examined in the context of contemporary 
scientific thinking on the problems of mind and/or consciousness. An 
effort will be made to take stock o f divergent perspectives o f the 
structure o f consciousness, i.e., moral, aesthetic, and scientific-episteinic. 
In this context the views of such theoreticians o f morality who describe 
moral consciousness as the basis for moral experience, moral judgments, 
moral disagreements and the resolution of moral controversies have 
been taken up. A discussion on comparative frameworks will be taken 
up to illuminate the continuity of thought from the ancient (Hellenic) 
to the contemporary times to show how the evaluations o f character 
traits refer to structures of moral consciousness in different historical 
epochs. A similar treatment of presuppositions will be taken up for 
elucidating aesthetic experience and the structure o f feelings.
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Lastly, the contemporary perspective on the nature of consciousness as 
provided by sciences like physics, biochemistry, biophysics, neiiro sciences, 
anthropology etc., will be taken up for in-depth analysis and to see 
ivhether any points of convergence could be found in these scientific 
studies. The view points of eminent scientists like Ilya Prigogine and 
Hans Morgenau will be taken up for examining the relationship 
between Physics and Philosophy. Can the 20th Century consciousness 
o f science be meaningfidly related to the theories o f consciousness 
provided by philosophers of the 19th Century? This question has been 
seen in the context of Inmanuel Kant's analysis of structure of human 
consciousness in general. How rich the insights of Indian philosophy 
are in the context of our understanding of mind and consciousness is 
the last question which has been raised and answered in this paper.
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Among the theories that have been handed down to us, 
nnaterialistic and idealistic, metaphysical and scientific regarding 
mind and consciousness, the following deserve our attention for 
deliberation and critical reflection.
The first formulahon perhaps was made available to us by 
Anaxagoras, who spoke about Nous as the world mind which 
conceives and regulates all that happens in the cosmic order. The 
second formulation comes to us from Leibnitz. He conceives the 
self as consisting of monadic substances each reflecting the 
whole universe at its circumference, thus explaining consciousness 
as a cosmic phenomena of reflection on the surface of monads 
which enables the substantial reality of the monad to be aware of 
what is happening in the universe. In fact, by positing the notion 
of a monad, which is eternal and encapsulated, Leibnitz 
formulated a theory of immanent evolution which looks only 
upwards and presupposes an idea of irreversibility of time even 
though Leibnitz had paved the way for Kantian and Einsteinian 
theory of relativity of time.
By presupposing that the two primary functions of the monad 
are (a) perceptions (b) appetitions, he paved the way for a theory 
that during the course of time monads only move towards higher 
and superior perceptions and appetitions. This position constrains 
him to lay down the foundations of a theory that this world is the 
best and the most perfect available to us of its kind. Leibnitz 
further proposed a three-layered conception of consciousness in
the vertical hierarchy of the Hving world namely "apperception" 
for human beings whose soul shall be not the ordinary soul but 
"spirit", this level of consciousness being accompanied by the 
illumination of reason itself. At the second level, i.e., at the level 
of animals it was maintained that there exists mere consciousness 
without the element of reason. And at the third and lowest level 
it was suggested that there are only minute and unconsciousness 
perceptions. The highest monad has been described as being 
divine, i.e. God Himself and is conceived as having the highest 
content and purity of consciousness which enables him to see 
through all that exists.
Next to Leibnitz, Immanuel Kant seems to have formulated a 
significant theory which has had deep impact on the development 
of science in the 20th Century. For the first time in the history of 
philosophy consciousness was visualised as endowed with the 
element of empirical reality and transcendental ideality at the 
same time. Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason describes 
the whole process of acquiring knowledge as based on the 
general possibility of experience. However, this possibility must 
be restricted to the possibilities provided by the structure of 
consciousness in general. This entitled Kant to call his study a 
transcendental study of consciousness, which includes the 
elements of sensibility, understanding and reason. Perhaps 
nowhere else such a comprehensive approach to the conditions 
of scientific certainty of knowledge is made available other than 
in Kant's treatment of the structure of consciousness in general.
He specifies the role of "time" and "space" as the inner and outer 
forms of sensibility and explains how imagination makes a 
transition from the domain of "sensibility" to that of 
"understanding". Through the doctrine of categories Kant explains 
how at this level of consciousness these principles of unification 
provide the much needed elements of necessity and universality 
to an otherwise heterogeneous and divided content of sense 
manifold.
Kant further makes it plain that unless reason regulates the 
whole content already schematised by the imagination of the 
level of categories, no unity of apperception can be achieved and 
no knowledge would be possible. In fact the structvire of 
consciousness has to be brought within the fold of this unity of
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apperception so that consciousness in terms of its empirical 
content and transcendental ideality can render knowledge 
possible. Therefore Kant defines an object of knowledge as "that 
in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is 
united". A mere sensation becomes an object of knowledge only 
when it is brought within the field of unifying consciousness by 
means of its relation to the unity of apperception.
It is here that we need to emphasize that categories, a priori 
belong to consciousness. Kant expresses this: in the statement that 
all unification of sense presentations supposes a principle of 
unification, which is the structure of consciousness, in general.
We shall see how contemporary scientists imbibed these insights 
of Kant and explained the role of a priori factors in the acquisition 
of knowledge. Next to Kant, the materialistic perspective of 
consciousness expounded by Marx has a definite place in our 
present enquiry. Therefore, before we examine the scientific 
explanations of consciousness and mind, it would be appropriate 
to discuss Marx's theory of consciousness.
The concept of consciousness is of crucial importance in Marxist 
Epistemology. The whole Marxian system and particularly the 
theory of change depends upon it. Marx's effort was consistently 
directed towards expounding the profound meaning of events, 
making plain the process, the necessity and the rules of social 
and historical development, and solving the riddle of the essential 
relationship between man and nature, and man and society. His 
objective was to enhance the "self awareness and life awareness" 
of man as he was gripped by the class system’.
He wanted to liberate man from an ambiguous, fragmented 
individuality, from the dread of an insecure and inhuman 
existence, in and through the consciousness of the entire social 
reality and the laws in accordance with which a fundamental 
change can be brought about in social reality. In other words, his 
aim was to restore the lost unity of man with his own self, with 
nature and with society.
In Marx's framework, the whole process of history forms the basic 
given fact of human existence. He says in the German Ideology 
"The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence
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of living human individuals"^. These individuals are not mere 
abstractions, but real conscious individuals engaged in practical 
activity, living under certain material conditions and simultaneously 
creating new conditions. All human action is actualised through 
consciousness which alone gives it practical shape.
Marx's emphasis on action is substantially clear from his XI 
Theses on Feuerbach where he says " The philosophers have 
only interpreted the world in various ways, the point, however is 
to change it"^ The importance of the other aspect that it is men 
who change the world is clearly demonstrated by Marx in his 
Third Thesis on Feuerbach; and by Engels in his "Ludwig 
Feuerbach and the End of classical German Philisophy"'*. Marx 
says in this thesis "The Materialist doctrine forgets that it is men 
who change the circumstances and that it is essential to educate 
the educator himself" and he continues in the same thesis "The 
co-incidence of the changing of circumstances and of human 
activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as a 
revolutionizing practice"\ The realization of this revolutionizing 
practice is possible only through the consciousness of men .̂
Man as a conscious being is the point of departure for Marx^ the 
basic reality. Making man the standard of judgement, Marx 
condemns the prevalent social order which only increases human 
bondage and impoverishment. Marx proclaims the authenticity 
of human existence which manifests itself through the 
consciousness of man and through consciousness makes man "a 
universal and therefore a free being"®.
The physical existence of man implies that man is a species being. 
The whole character of a species is contained in the character of its 
life activity according to Marx. In the case of man it is "The free 
conscious activity which is his species character"^. Man makes his 
life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. 
This is precisely what directly distinguishes man from animal'“. 
While an animal is identical with its life activity and produces only 
under an immediate physical need, man produces universally and 
freely. It is precisely in creating an objective world by his practical 
activity that man proves himself a conscious being. He duplicates 
himself not only intellectually in consciousness alone, but also 
actively in reality giving rise to the object of labour which Marx 
calls, "the objectification of man's species life"".
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Another important consideration with regard to consciousness is 
that Marx does not accept the notion of abstract consciousness, 
for him particularity of thought and consciousness remains an 
essential feature of reality. In this context he says "Tliought for 
example, is the thought of a particular, definite individual; it 
remains his definite thought, determined by his individuality 
and the conditions in which he lives"’ .̂
Marx explains the material nature of the relationship between 
consciousness and language. He calls it the practical consciousness. 
It is "Spirit cursed with the burden of matter which appears in 
this case in the form of agitated layers, of air sounds, in short of 
language"’ .̂ Laiiguage, Marx explains, originated from the 
necessity of intercourse with other men and as such consciousness 
is a social product from the very beginning and shall continue to 
be so as long as men are in existence.
The evolution of consciousness starts with the awareness of the 
immediate surroundings and of nature in general. This stage of 
consciousness Marx calls the "animal consciousness" because in 
it nature appears to man as an all powerful, unassailable and 
completely alien force. This was the stage of natural religion 
when nature was deified as an all-powerful god.
Then arose the necessity for the historical transformation of 
nature for maintaining the very existence of human race. Here 
man felt the necessity of associating with other men around him 
and from this emerged the "herd consciousness" amongst men 
which bound them together almost instinctively. The horizons of 
this stage widened through the increase of productivity which in 
turn gave rise to the division of labour. Finally, industry emerged 
in its true anthropological character as a true historical relation 
between man and nature. As such Marx conceived it as the 
exoteric form of the realization of the essential human faculties''*.
The whole argument points in one direction that consciousness 
always corresponds to a definite stage of social existence. Man's 
consciousness changes with every change in the conditions of his 
material existence, in his social relations and in his social life'\ 
Marx says iii this context "The ideas of the ruling class are in every 
epoch the ruling ideas i.e., the class which is the ruling material 
force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force"" .̂
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Marx identifies consciousness with conscious existence and 
conscious existence itself is nothing else but the actual life 
process of men”’. Strictly speaking Marx gives ontological priority 
to being over consciousness in his treatment of the relationship 
between thinking and being. According to him consciousness is 
determined by life. In his "Preface to the Critique of Political 
Economy" he says, "The mode of production of material life 
conditions the social, political and intellectual life processes in 
general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
being but on the contrary, their social being that determines their 
consciousness"'*.
This is the wedge which has divided interpreters of Marxist 
Epistemology into two divergent and mutually exclusive groups'*. 
But it appears that there is really no contradiction involved in the 
.wo view points, namely that all change is possible through 
human action, human action itself being actualised through 
consciousness, and that consciousness is of derivative importance 
in so far as it is determined by the life and the being external to 
itself.
Marx here perhaps only wanted to emphasize the objective 
character to consciousness from the point of view of truth, to 
which it must correspond. He only wanted to eliminate the 
abstract, purely subjective, speculative and purely ideological 
elements from the realm of our consciousness of the social reality. 
He wanted reality to be represented as it actually exists. He held 
the correspondence theory of truth as the basis of his 
epistemological position^". True consciousness is that which reflects 
the true reality. Such a consciousness alone could be the genuine 
spring of human action and motivation.
Consciousness is very essential but there are other forces at work 
as well. This has been amply made clear by Engels when he 
admits that both the factors are of equal significance; neither has 
the absolute validity or existence in so far as the history of 
mankind is concerned. Engels says, "Everything which sets men 
in motion must go through their minds; but what form it will 
take in the mind will depend very much upon the 
circumstances"^'.
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The process of history works towards a certain ideal set in 
advance. The actors are all endowed with consciousness, they are 
men acting with certain deliberation and passion towards definite 
goals. "Nothing happens without a conscious purpose and without 
an intended aim"^ .̂
However, this consciousness itself is conditioned by a reality 
external to itself. In reciprocal action consciousness enables man 
to comprehend the social reality, to increase his determination to 
make it more human and more worthy of mankind. For instance 
the Moses of Michelangelo was not only the artistic image of 
Renaissance man, or just the embodiment in stone of a new self- 
aware personality, it was also a ringing call to the men of 
Michelangelo's generation for positive human action^. Thus 
consciousness helps man to uncover new social relationships 
with the specific purpose of recreating unity, so that feeling of 
collectivism flows even from the brimming subjectivity of man, 
so that individual life is not lost in the vast unison of human 
reality. As such an individual no more stands in isolation from 
society but in fact merges with its concrete reality and becomes 
one with it.
In the grand vision of Karl Marx the whole march of history 
was a gradual evolution from the conventional moral 
consciousness to higher dynamic moral consciousness, a 
dynamic aspiration of the soul of each for the love of all 
humanity. Marx conceives the true function of consciousness 
to raise man from the fragmented dehumanised state into that 
of a whole integrated being, not only to enlighten and stimulate 
action, but to change the whole social reality. To move towards 
true humanism -  in the direction of deification of man and as 
such towards a true religion of man.
From the above account it becomes clear that within the Marxian 
framework emergence of consciousness is explained as a "leap of 
consciousness". During the course of evoluhon somewhere man 
emerged as a conscious being, consciousness being an endemic 
natural quality of his species being. It simply means that 
consciousness is an innate disposition which has the capacity of 
moulding itself in the myriad forms of objects that it engulfs. But 
here we have to ask the following questions.
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If it is in an emergent of evolutionism, what then, is the specific 
role of time in our contemporary discussions of consciousness? Is 
time real or an illusion? If it is real, is it reversible or irreversible? 
The idea of evolution can be sustained only if time is ultimately 
found to be real and irreversible. In fact, the Spectre of time 
haunts while we live in this realm of the "between", i.e., perennial 
and temporal existence and non-existence, being and nothingness, 
finitude and infinity.
While answering these questions, dimensions of existence, 
consciousness and mind are woven into our fabric of thinking. It 
is in this context that the current philosophical concepts and 
contemporary scientific knowledge about the nature of being, 
consciouosness, mind and time, assume significance in the 
domains of scientific and metaphysical thinking.
Antiquity stressed upon the metaphysics of the object, believing 
in one single authentic reality; the idea and concept of substance. 
However, the next epoch asserted the predominance of science in 
so far as the conception of the fact and the language expressing 
the science of facts came to the fore. Today we witness a 
symmetrization of stresses, the object and the subject, the word 
and the concept, and consequently science and metaphysics 
become complementary aspects of the relationships in which 
man finds himself engulfed and struggles to grasp the reality.
Therefore, it is not a mere accident that the rediscovery of 
Consciousness in the context of physics is occurring at a time 
when human existence is subjected to extreme acceleration of 
transition in human history. In this context philosophic and the 
cultural contexts have to be synthesized. We have also to incorporate 
the complex relations between "internal" and "external" 
determinations of scientific concepts. Perhaps the confluence of 
the two traditions, i.e., of the Eastern and the Western, and the 
scientific and the metaphysical is nowhere as clear as in the 
problem of microscopic foundations of consciousness.
The past one hundred years have been marked by several crises 
that correspond closely to the description of Thomas Kuhrf"*, e.g., 
discovery of the instability of elementary particles or of the 
evolving universe. The recent history of science is also 
characterized by a series of problems that are the consequence of
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deliberate and lucid questions asked by scientists who knew that 
the questions had both scientific and metaphysical aspects.
For most of the founders of classical science, even for Einstein 
science was an attempt to go beyond the world of appearances to 
reach a timeless world of supreme rationality. But perhaps there 
is a more subtle form of reality, i.e., the consciousness which 
needs to be explained in the context of laws, and games, time 
and eternity.
Consequently, there appeared on the horizon an irreducible 
opposition between the classical reason with its a temporal vision 
and our existence with its vision of time at the Centre trying to 
unravel the mystery of consciousness. The first defined the 
metaphysical search of a man lost in the wonder of Eternity and 
the second reasserted man's resolve to remain grounded to 
perceptible reality and to look for scientific certainty. This posed a 
dilemma which appeared irretrievable and irresolvable. Indeed, 
the dilemma of man's existence is that we have to make a tragic 
choice between timeless reality with alienation as its consequence 
and an affirmation of time with its rootedness in scientific rationality.
The spectacular developments in science are making us aware of 
the fact that on all levels from elementary particles up to 
cosmology, science is rediscovering the nature of consciousness 
in the framework of time and that we are engaged in the process 
of re-conceptualization in physics. It is in this context that the 
relation of science with human existence and human values can 
be explored meaningfully, which will have far reaching 
consequence for human development and excellence in human 
pursuits. In fact it is being emphasized increasingly that all 
science is bound up with human values and culture and that 
scientific findings, however advanced and esoteric, are 
meaningless outside the cultural context^^
The philosophy of nature today has an endemic relationship with 
disciplines of physics, mathematics, biology and linguistics, and 
explores the nature of "complementarity" and "system theory" 
etc. Philosophers like Quine, Putnam, Rorty and Kripke ask for a 
return to ontology and enquire into historico-cultural context of 
the scientific and philosophical language. Yet another emerging 
trend is that of neo-transcendentalism with philosophers like
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Quine, Strawon, Hintikka and Noan\ Chomsky examining such a 
priori concepts as 'community of communication' and the 
'language of matrices'. Philosophers like Donald Davidson speak 
from a personalist perspective and uphold the centrality of the 
person in the integration of science thus placing all invention and 
creativity within the matrix of consciousness^®.
This is the most notable trend as it attempts to substantiate a new 
"philosophy of nature", conceiving human consciousness and 
existence as a system and placing science in the perspective of 
human values and the cultural matrix.
Ilya Prigogine happens to be an important exponent of this trend of 
philosophy of nature trying to establish minimal sets of categories 
and principles within a coherent theoretical framework in which 
both being and becoming, entropy and negentropy, reversibility and 
irreversibility, causality and finality can find simultaneous place.
Prigogine is recognized for his work on "dissipative structures" 
arising out of non-linear processes in non-equilibrium systems. 
He has set the Second Law of thermodynamics in a fresh 
perspective. He examines the goals, methods and the epistemology 
of science in th context of human values and vindicates that 
science is an open system embedded in society and linked to it. 
This, therefore, reiterates the necessity of a new philosophy of 
science within the context of new awareness and a definite 
emphasis on the new philosophy of consciousness.
Prigogine, in his Tanner Lectures on 'Changing perspectives in 
science and their impact on human values', has tried to answer 
some of these fundamental questions, in the context of emerging 
trends in the philosophy of science. He makes us aware of our 
responsibility to our future and to the future of mankind. Thus 
he recasts the problem of consciousness and human values in the 
context of social and scientific realities. He calls it the dialectics 
between what is in time and what is beyond time, 'between 
external truths' and 'time oriented existence'. This synthesis is 
found by him to be a singularly unique feature of Indian 
philosophical tradition^’'.
Prigogine describes human consciousness and existence as an 
engima of incertitudes and of open questions. Yet he pleads for a
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world view which in spite of all asymmetry ar\d disequilibrium 
is capable of weaving itself into an integrated view of human 
reality through human consciousness.
Speaking about a fascinating dialogue between Einstein and 
Tagore on the nature and meaning of reality he has shown the 
dilemma posed by the viewpoints of these two great minds. 
While Einstein had come along and put the observer at the heart 
of the system, Tagore emphasized that "science had to be 
independent of the existence of observer". Tagore had emphasized 
that "even if absolute truth could exist and had a meaning it 
would be inaccessible to human mind" *̂*. This controversy 
between Einstein and Tagore assumes meaningfulness if man is 
conceived as separate from nature. But Prigogine on the contrary 
is of the opinion that if as a self-conscious being, man is embedded 
in nature and this fact is taken into account, human truths cannot 
be divorced from the truths of nature.
Prigogine gives a concept of time which does not separate man 
from the nature but rather expresses his belongingness to nature. 
Therefore, it stands for the affirmation of his being rather than 
his alienation. He gives an elaborate analysis of the concept of 
time, links it to human consciousness and human existence, 
nature, society and values. This provides for a notion of 
consciousness centring around a belief in the synthetic unity and 
convergence of a vision of a social world around us and a moral 
world within. It binds the finitude of man and his consciousness 
to society and to the goal-oriented human existence^’ .
Prigogine admits the role of conceptual contribution through 
forms of consciousness in constructing the concept of reality. This 
is also clearly expressed by Bohr to Heisenberg in the reflections 
of their visit to Kron Berg Castle wherein he says, " ... how this 
castle changes as soon as one imagines that Hamlet lived here? 
As scientists we believe that a castle consists only of stones, and 
admire the way of architect put them together ... and yet it is 
changed completely. Suddenly the walls and the ramparts speak 
a different language...
This raises some fundamental questions about the nature of 
reality and the role of consciousness as an a priori factor in 
constructing reality. Hme, human consciousness, reality and
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concepts are seen to be intinr\ately related. But is this necessarily 
so?
Henry Bergson attempted to defend the cause of multiplicity of 
co-existing "lived" times against Einstein. However, Einstein 
categorically rejected the "philosophers time" which is founded 
only in Human Consciousness. He asserted that lived experience 
cannot save what has been denied by science.
Bergson's "lived time" referred to the basic dimensions of 
becoming, the irreversibility which Einstein was prepared to 
accept only at the phenomenological level. For him distinctions 
among past, present and future were outside the scope of physics. 
This spells the distinction between what a Philosopher seeks in 
the metaphysical realm and what a Scientist seeks to establish in 
the scientific domain. One is sensitive to the mysteries of the 
deeper layers of consciousness, while the other restricts the 
authority of consciousness to what can be delivered within the 
precincts of precision and scientific certainty.
Einstein's position can be understood in the context of the statement 
that time basically is a geometric parameter that makes it possible 
to follow the unfolding of the succession of dynamical states. This 
position had been the manifestation of the basic category of 
human reason within the structure of human consciousness for the 
last three centuries which sought to eliminate time. Einstein, 
therefore, appeared as a symbolic representation of this drive 
towards formulation of a physics in which no reference to 
irreversibility would be made on the fundamental level.
To the question, what is irreversibility? What is its relationship to 
the laws of physics? Einstein answered again and again 
"irreversibility is merely an illusion produced by improbable 
initial conditions"^'. This is a strange and mysterious world. For 
us, convinced physicists, the distinction between past, present 
and future is an illusion although a persistent one.
Prigogine examines the question why Einstein was so strongly 
opposed to the introduction of irreversibility into physics. Perhaps 
Einstein in his desire to perceive the laws of physics identified 
the 'intelligible' with the 'immutable'. Having lived during the 
two world wars perhaps Einstein was haunted by the spectre of
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time, through which victory could be negotiated only through 
science. Yet strangely, Einstein's world was full of observers, 
placed in multiple co-ordinate systems in motion with one another, 
situated on various stars, exchanging information through signals 
all over the universe.
Prigogine has commented that objectivity of communication 
which was in fact what Einstein wanted most of all was closely 
related to irreversibility. Prigogine calls illusion mentioned by 
Einstein as the symbolic power of the mind at the level of 
consciousness which determines that men must think in a 
particular way. The ripples of consciousness flow on the matrix 
of time and spell out the scientific and the metaphysical 
dimensions of the reality that they encounter. Correspondingly, 
the two dimensions become the two sides of the same pursuit 
one delineating on nature within the parameters of objectivity, 
the other within the framework of rationality intertwined with 
intuition and sensibility, seeking the semblance of objectivity. 
Both seek to unravel the domains of immutability and eternity 
and at the same time grasp the nature of that which appears to 
the consciousness and defines its emphemerality and transiency.
Homer's Iliad in this context provides an interesting insight as it 
centres around the problem of time. His reflections prove that for 
us men, immutability, freedom from change, total security and 
immunity from life's agonies will come only when we depart 
from this life by dying or becoming gods. His Odyssey is the 
dialectical counterpart to Iliad. Odyssey has the choice between 
ageless immortality and return to humanity and ultimately to old 
age and death. Still he chooses time and over eternity, human 
fate over God's fate. Achilles, on the other hand, embarked on 
the quest for something permanent and immutable. But such 
glory could be attained only at the cost of one's humanity.
Why do things happen the way they do? Perhaps we cannot 
proceed from the assumption that in some sense all is given in 
the form of a finished model. Within the framework of what may 
be called illumination, the elements of irrationality, creativity and 
invention can be highlighted as necessary and integral parts of 
human consciousness which explains the wide diversity of human 
responses to forms of life. In this context, the significance of 
constructive contribution of imagination can be pointed out.
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Determinism militates against anthropomorphism and the 
freedom of man. If it is attributed to the gods it will be a grave 
irony and will even defy any attempt to comprehend the universe. 
It may however be concluded that determinism is only possible 
for an observer outside his world while we describe the world 
from within. Therefore, with the givenness of consciousness as a 
matrix, there can only be the view point of an insider from within 
the system.
Tagore seems to have envisioned the direction that scientific 
enquiry was to follow. The verdict of Einstein declaring time to 
be an illusion was not indeed final and therefore the paradoxes 
of time and human existence to which the Einsteinian conception 
of time gave rise, could at last be resolved. This restored the 
entitlement of man to claim this life, world and nature as his own 
by what Prigogine calls the concept of "Embedding of life in 
Consciousness and matter as well as of man in life"“ . This brings 
back the lost relationship of man with nature, society and values.
Prigogine says in this context, "I am convinced that we are only 
at the beginning of a deeper understanding of the nature around 
us." He obviously means that the world view created by classical 
physics with its predominant concept of basic processes being 
deterministic and reversible, has been substituted by a world 
view envisioning randomness and irreversibility. The models 
considered by classical physics seem to us only to correspond to 
limiting situations which we can create artificially.
Prigogine concludes that it is only the unification of dynamics 
the thermodynamics through the introduction of new selection 
principle that gives the Second Law its fundamental importance 
as the evolutionary paradigm of the sciences. This paradigm is 
associated with the concept of bifurcation and the idea of 
irreversibility in which life appears much less isolated and having 
much deeper roots in the basic laws of nature. This has, indeed, 
changed our entire perspective on science, its relation to 
consciousness, human existence and the domain of human values. 
At the human level consciousness is a fundamental concept 
which for us is inseparable from the meaning of our existence. It 
is symbolic of our participation in a world dominated by an 
evolutionary paradigm. However, it relates us and our position 
to the world that we try to describe in our humble effort whether
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in scientific terms or at the more abstract level in metaphysical 
terms. Yet at best we can only attain approximations to that 
which is real, for all our endeavours to build paradigms ultimately 
elude the reality and at best can be described only as fleeting 
visions of the givenness of this wonderful but mysterious 
manipulation of the divine nature.
76 Bhuvan Chandel
Notes
1. Ernst Fischer (1963) The Necessity of Art -  A Marxist Approach, 
(Penguin) pp. 3 8 -4 8
2. M arx E ngels (1964) The German Ideology (M oscow , progress  
publishers) p. 31
3. Ibid., p. 653
4. Engels (1950) Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German 
Philosophy, (M oscow) p. 72
5. M arx Engels, The German Ideology, p. 652
6. A dam  Schaff (1962) "Studies of the Young M arx" IN Leoplod 
Labedz (ed.). Revisionism, (London, Allen & Unwin) p. 193
7. M arx (1961) Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, (M oscow) 
p. 103
8. Ibid., p. 74
9. Ibid., p. 75
10. M arx (1965) Capital, Vol. I, (M oscow) p. 178
11. M arx, Ec.phil.M SS., p. 76
32. The German Ideology, p. 285
13. Ib id .,p .A 2
14. M arx, Ec.phil.M SS., p. 110
15. M arx Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, (Moscow, Progress 
Publishers) p. 71
16. German Ideology, p. 60
17. Ibid., p . 37
18. M arx (1962) "Preface to the Critique of Political Econom y" In M arx 
Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, (M oscow) p. 363
19. Cf. The Controversy between Leszek Kolakowski, "Karl M arx and 
the classical definition of truth" and A dam  Schaffm "Studies of the 
yoim g M arx" in Leopold Labedz (ed.) Revisionism, (London, George 
Allen & Unw in, 1962) pp. 179-188 and pp. 188
20. Barrows Dunham (1962) On teaching Marxist Epistemology. 
Philosophy of Science 29,4, p. 366
21. Engles, Ludwig Fererbach p. 75
22. Ibid., p. 71
23. Ernst Fischer, op. cit., p. 47
24. Thomas S Kuhn (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(The University of Chicago Press, London) p. 66
25. H Margenau (1979) Ethics and Science, (Krieger Pubhshing Co., 
New York) See also H Margenau (1987) The Miracle of Existence, 
(New Science Library, London) p. 101
26. Donald Davidson (1986) 'Empirical Content' in Truth and 
Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson 
(ed. Ernest Lepore), (Basil Blackwell, Oxford) p. 327
27. Ilya Prigogine,' Changing Perspectives in Science and their Impact 
on Human Values', Tanner Lectures, (New Delhi, Jawaharlal Nehru 
University, December 18, 1982) p. 32
28. Rabindranath Tagore (1931) The Nature of Reality. Modern Revieiv 
XLIX, pp. 42-3
29. Ilya Prigogine, loc.cit., p. 14
30. Ilya Prigogine and Isabella Stengers (1984) Order out of Chaos, Man's 
New Dialogue loith Nature (Bantam Books, London) p. 293
31. Ibid., p. 29i
32. Ilya Prigogine, 'Changing Perspectives in Science and their Impact 




1. Why a "neural correlate of consciousness"
is not just a metaphor 81
□  I ly a  F arb er
2. Why consciousness cannot be deconstructed:
Towards a positive theory of consciousness 98
□  R  C  Pradhan
3. Genetics, first-person methodologies, and
the "hard" and "easy" problems of consciousness 107
□  Jo n a th a n  S h ea r
4. Consciousness expanded 125
□  W esley  J  W ild m a n
5. From experiences to consciousness 142
a  H N  S h a n k a r
6. Consciousness by any other name - Some outstanding
problems in the life of the mind 148
□  P iir u s h o tta m a  B U im oria
7. Beside the 'intentor' and the 'integrator': Looking
at two 'faces' of consciousness 164
□  S an g ee th a  M en on

Why a “neural correlate of 
consciousness” Is not just 
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Abstract
A frequent criticism of the neuroscientific approach to consciousness is 
that its theories describe only “correlates" or "analogues" o f  
consciousness, and so fail to address the nature o f consciousness itself. 
Though often presented as a simple intuitive point, this criticism relies 
on some substantive assumptions about the nature and evolution of 
scientific explanations. In particular, it is usiially assumed that, in 
expressing correlations, neural correlate o f consciousness (NCC) theories 
must fail to capture the causal structure relating the brain and the 
mind. Drawing on work in the history and philosophy o f science, I 
argue that this assumption -  along with the related claim that even a 
correct NCC theory would fail to explain consciousness -  is grounded 
in an inadequate conception o f the way in which scientific explanations 
develop. Examination o f parallel developments in early 20th century 
biology suggests that, under the right circumstances, seemingly crude 
analogies can play a crucial role in the development o f new conceptual 
resources. In closing, I provide some examples to suggest that NCC 
theories are poised to play such a role in the study of consciousness.
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Neuroscientists who aspire to explain consciousness face a 
daunting array of methodological hurdles. Like all their peers in 
cognitive neuroscience, they must guard against criticism from 
above and below: neuroanatomists may accuse them of over­
interpreting the data, hastily generalizing across species, and 
abandoning the realm of the empirical for that of the speculative; 
psychologists and philosophers may lodge charges of reductionism 
and determinism. This multi-front battle is challenging, but in 
fighting it the neuroscientist can fall back on the usual canons of 
scientific virtue; define your terms, gather lots of data, eliminate 
confounding factors, and develop tests to distinguish your 
hypothesis from each new competitor. This is a game that 
conceptually ambitious scientists in any discipline must learn to 
play.
But there is a different sort of criticism that seems to be the 
special burden of those who would propose a neural correlate of 
consciousness (NCC). “That's a very nice theory you have there," 
their critics may say, "but you must realize that it doesn't explain 
consciousness at all. We've known at least since Hume that 
correlation is not causation; you may have established what goes 
on in the brain at the same time as consciousness, but that tells us 
nothing about the nature of consciousness itself."
It's important to understand what a radical criticism this is. It 
doesn't allege that the theory is false; it says that, even if true, the 
theory is simply irrelevant to the fundamental problem of 
consciousness. What we want to know, the critic says, is what 
consciousness is and where it comes from; if indeed it comes 
from the brain, we want to know hoiu and why it comes from the 
brain. It seems that NCC theories -  however well-supported by 
evidence -  cannot answer these questions, but merely recast 
them in narrower terms: "How and why does the brain produce 
consciousness?" becomes "How and why does 40 Hz oscillation 
in the visual cortex produce subjective visual experience?"
The logic of this argument seems simple, and many find it 
compelling (Searle 1992; Chalmers 1995). At the root, it seems to 
be a variant on the old (and eternally relevant) point that many 
different causal models can underlie an observed pattern. Deep 
Humean worries aside, statisticians have taught us to be wary of 
quick inferences from correlation to causation. If (for example) a
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correlation is found between coffee consumption and mean armual 
risk of death by heart failure, one might conclude that the coffee 
is causing the heart attacks; but one would have to conduct 
further investigations to test that causal hypothesis (C -» H) 
against others, such as the possibility that heart trouble makes 
one thirsty for coffee (H C) or that type-A genes or a stressful 
lifestyle predispose one both to coffee drinking and to heart 
attacks (F ^  (C & H)). From this perspective, the NCC theorist 
who claims to have explained the causal basis of consciousness 
seems to be making an elementary logical error.
It's even fairly easy to see why this problem plagues NCC 
research in particular. The gold standard for resolving causal 
ambiguity is the elucidation of a mechanism that produces the 
observed correlahon. In the coffee case, researchers arguing for 
the C ^  H model would try to elucidate the precise 
physiochemical pathway from coffee to cardiac arrest. And indeed, 
one can draw several direct connections: coffee contains caffeine, 
which blocks the effects of adenosine, leading to an increase in 
both heart rate and blood pressure. Caffeine also increases calcium 
availability in heart muscle tissue by opening membrane channels 
in the sarcoplasmic reticulum, an intracellular storage structure; 
calcium plays a profound role in all nervous and contractile 
tissue, and increased calcium levels in heart tissue can speed and 
destabilize the cardiac rhythm.'
This detailed mechanistic explanation is possible because the 
entihes involved all belong to the same approximate domain: call 
it the domain of "middle-sized organic objects and their 
biochemical constituents." Even though no specific scientific 
discipline encompasses all of the entities involved, there are 
multiple overlapping chains of disciplines connecting coffee and 
heart function (for example, organic chemistry to biochemistry to 
physiology to cardiology), and each step in the causal story can 
be tested using data and methods from the relevant fields.
It's hard to imagine where one would even begin constructing 
such a bridge between (say) synchronous oscillations in sensory 
cortex and subjective perceptual experience. "The neurons oscillate 
together, which in turn ..."  ... what? There are no -  or at least, 
too few -  intermediate disciplines to bridge the gap between 
neurons and experience. And if, as a consequence, we can't fill
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out the steps of the causal story, then it seems that even our best 
neural models won't be able to give us the sort of satisfying 
causal explanation we want; they won't be able to tell us how or 
why the observed psychophysical correlations hold.^
But at this point, one must ask: is the NCC theorist really in the 
same position as an epidemiologist studying population variables? 
Unlike the epidemiologist, the neuroscientist is in a position to 
intervene directly in the systems under study (or, in humans, to 
examine cases where nature or accidents have "intervened" to 
cause brain damage). The experiments that underlie modern 
NCC theories generally involve manipulating perceptual stimuli, 
in realtime, and observing the resultant changes in neural activity. 
This method of establishing causal linkage is at least as old and 
well-entrenched as the explication-of-mechanism method; it's 
fallible, to be sure, but so are they all. Unless and until somebody 
can make a useful model out of pre-established harmony or 
epiphenomenalism, there doesn't seem to be any important 
alternative to the hypothesis that there is some direct causal 
relationship between neural activity and subjective experience.
The question of whether NCC theories are explanatory is a little 
trickier, though. Before we can address it directly, we need to 
look a little more closely at the structure of the theories in 
question. When one proposes a neural correlate of consciousness, 
what kind of proposal is one making?
First off, it's important to realize that there's something misleading 
about the "correlate" part of "neural correlate of consciousness." 
The term naturally focuses attention on correlational sources of 
evidence for NCCs, such as Nikos Logothetis' experiments in 
which the activity of single cells was correlated with the monkeys' 
reported percepts. But all good neural theories of consciousness 
also draw on broader anatomical, comparative and/or 
evolutionary considerations, and in most cases they incorporate 
causal/functional arguments which relate the putative neural 
basis of consciousness to structures known to be implicated in 
related phenomena such as memory, dreaming and emotion. The 
relation between (on the one hand) the neural model and (on the 
other) the structure of consciousness is thus something much 
richer and more complex than mere correlation; it is an 
isomorphism, a drawing of connections between entities.
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structures and dynamics in two different realms (the neural and 
the mental).
In other words, "correlate" here means something like "analogous 
structure."^ Contra (Searle 1992; 1997), the structures described 
by NCC theories are not meant to be causal precursors of 
consciousness; rather, they (or their dynamics) are meant to be 
consciousness. The goal is not to produce a causal model on 
which consciousness stands apart as a product of the brain, but 
rather to find the patterns of consciousness in the structure and 
dynamics of the brain. The methodology for pursuing this goal 
has already been charted out by researchers studying memory 
and perception: in roughest outline, it involves functionally 
decomposing the cognitive process, functionally and physically 
decomposing the brain, and trying to find matching patterns 
amidst the bits on each side. This process is fundamentally 
analogical, even if its ultimate goal is something closer to identity.
At first, this may seem an odd sort of goal for neuroscience. Why 
analogy? Why seek vague metaphors instead of precise, direct, 
literal descriptions?
This is one of those questions that almost seems self-answering, 
once you look at it the right way; but it helps to understand a set 
of advances that took place in analyses of metaphors 
approximately thirty years ago.
The received view of metaphors -  both in science and in language 
generally -  had long been that they were convenient shortcuts, 
ways of compactly (if unreliably) expressing something that would 
require far more time and effort to express literally. It was believed 
that the role of scientific metaphors (such as "the atom is like a 
little solar system" or "planets curve space like balls on a rubber 
sheet") was pedagogical: they allowed scientists to express their 
complex technical ideas to students, or to layfolk who lacked the 
background required to vmderstand the literal versions of the 
theories as expressed in defirutions and mathematical laws. This 
paralleled the broader view of metaphors as primarily poetic 
devices, tools whereby one broad statement ("man is an animal") 
could, given a particular context, stand in for one or more specific 
ideas ("man is governed by instinct rather than reason," or "the 
human species evolved from non-human species").
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Within linguistics, this view was first seriously challenged by 
Max Black (1962). Black argued for what he called "the interaction 
view of metaphor/' as opposed to the "substitution view", which 
held (as above) that metaphors merely stand in for some long list 
of literal statements. The interaction view has three principal 
components:
1. "A metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects, 
to be identified as the 'primary' subject and the 
'secondary' one ..."
2. "The secondary subject is to be regarded as a 
system rather than an individual thing ..."
3. "The metaphorical utterance works by 'projecting 
upon' the primary subject a set of 'associated 
implications,' comprised in the implicative complex, 
that are predicable of the secondary subject ..." 
(Black 1979).
In other words, metaphors work by transferring some of the 
implied properties of the secondary system onto the primary 
system. Later researchers extended this line of thought to show 
that metaphor plays a similarly ineliminable role not just in 
language but in thought more generally (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980). According to these theorists, the very structure of much 
human thought is best thought of as metaphorical, in that it 
works by assimilating unknown systems to known ones and then 
exploring the extent and validity of the implicative projections.
Boyd (1979) took the "interaction view" into philosophy of 
science, in a way consistent with his emphasis on the historical 
and dialectical nature of science. The resultant model assigns 
metaphors a central and irreducible role in scientific discourse. 
According to Boyd, the open-endedness of metaphors is a virtue, 
for at least two related reasons. First, it allows scientists to put a 
name and tentative structure to some set of phenomena that they 
only vaguely understand: for example, the "atom as solar system" 
metaphor makes it possible to begin discussing and investigating 
electron "orbits" without committing researchers to any particular 
story about how exactly electrons are moving about the nucleus. 
And second, it allows metaphors to suggest directions for research, 
since negotiating the meaning of the metaphor requires working 
out which aspects of the systems do and do not correspond.
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(Planetary orbits can decay -  can electron orbits decay? If so, 
what happens when they hit the centre? Are there elliptical 
electron orbits? Do electrons nearer the nucleus orbit faster?)
Boyd presents the use of digital computer metaphors in cognitive 
science as an example of how the analogical links can be more 
fundamental than any of the properties that would be used to 
describe them. These metaphors can be traced back even farther, 
to Turing's original formulation of an analogical model for human 
computation. (See figure 1 for examples from both eras.) For 
anyone familiar with mid- to late 20th century psychology, it 
seems impossible to deny either of Boyd's essential premises: 
that these metaphors provided the structure for most theorists' 
conceptions of the mind, and that they did so largely in the 
absence of any literal definitions of the concepts in question.
I
from  Turing
idea «• physical symbol
thinking «• syntactic manipulation of symbols
thinking person ♦* Turing M achine (TM)
algorithm  ** procedure implementable in a TM
com plexity of «» w orst-case tim e/sp ace  required to
a problem solve a problem using the best TM
program  
from  cognitive science  
brain «• com puter hardw are
mind «♦ com puter software or operations
thought ** information processing
m em ory ** information storage and retrieval
volition *♦ executive control
consciousness feedback or monitoring
Figure 1. M ind-com puter analogies. Some of these elements w ent 
to make up different models, though no one model contained  
them all. For a contem porary list of com puter m etaphors that 
w ere current in the salad days of classical cognitive science, see 
Boyd (1979).
What can we conclude from this example regarding the role of 
NCCs? One clear lesson is that an analogy can be an important 
tool for developing our understanding of an abstract, mysterious 
domain. Neural analogies can help us to see new structure and
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distinctions within the realm of consciousness: for example, in 
the wake of anatomical localizations it has become a commonplace 
that spatial and linguistic reasoning are separate mental faculties. 
In my own experience, I found that learning that the olfactory 
system codes smells primarily by identity and similarity (rather 
than on some abstract set of axes like frequency or sweetness) 
helped me to better conceptualize the way that olfaction interacted 
with the other senses and with memory.
This role alone would make neural theories of consciousness 
worth pursuing ... but at the same time, one must suspect that 
something more is supposed to be at stake. After all, NCC theorists 
choose to investigate the brain because they assume that it is 
directly causally involved in consciousness, not just because its 
structure provides for especially handy metaphors. Shouldn't the 
fact that the mind is made of the brain make some difference here?
The historical limitatioris of the computer analogy provide at least 
the beginnings of an answer to this question. For all its metaphorical 
power, the computationalist approach in cognitive science relied 
on an assumption that was not borne out; the assumption that 
evolved, wet brains and designed, silicon computers were 
functionally equivalent at all the functionally interesting levels of 
analysis. As it turned out, the differences are just too deep and too 
pervasive to be ignored as matters of "implementation." The more 
we leam about the brain, the deeper the disanalogies seem to run: 
see figure 2 for a few examples. This does not mean that the 
original metaphor has lost its utility; but it now seems that we've 
run up against the limits of that utility, and consequently there is 
less confidence that new and interesting mental structure can be 
discovered by looking for parallels with known structures in the 
realm of formal computation. With respect to consciousness in 
particular, the prospects of developing a full-fledged model in 
terms of computer-inspired concepts such as "executive control" 
and "monitoring" now seem quite dim.
But again, is there any reason to believe that brain-based analogies 
will do any better? In particular, does the fact that we're made of 
neurons (and not of logic gates) make any difference?
I believe it does. To see why, it will be necessary to make one 
more brief detour, through the history of another field that has
88 Ilya Forber
made extensive use of metaphors; the science of heredity. One 
way of understanding the novelty of Gregor Mendel's famous 
approach, published in 1866 and rediscovered in 1900, is to look 
at its m etaphorical structure. (See fig u re  3.) M endel 
reconceptualized the organism as a container, and its properties 
or "factors" (such as seed colour and shape) as independent 
objects within that container. This metaphor provided him with a 
simple and mathematically tractable "marbles in boxes" system 
whose dynamics mirrored the dynamics of heredity.
Brains D igital C om puters
Com ponents are imprecise and Com ponents are precise and
fault-tolerant fault-sensitive
Architecture is affected by activity Architectiu-e is fixed
M assively parallel processing Serial or w eakly parallel
processing
N o central timekeeper Central timekeeper is essential
Processing mechanism s are content- Processing m echanisms are
specific general
Evolved prim arily for sensorim otor Designed prim arily for symbol
integration processing
Figure 2. A  few brain-com puter disanalogies
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Organism ** container
Factor ♦» contents
Inheritance ** random  pairwise mixing
of contents
Figure 3. Mendel's analogy for heredity
The advantages and disadvantages of Mendel's metaphor strongly 
parallel those of the computer metaphor in cognitive science. It 
provided a way of formalizing heredity, opening the way for 
abstract, even mathematical treatments of the subject; it postulated 
a set of entities and dynamics which scientists could start looking 
for in real organisms; and it provided impetus to a number of
research projects that can be understood as attempts to check 
whether, and how, various impUed properties of the source 
domain could be extended to the target domain. At the same 
time, the source domain was so abstract that it made 
implementation seem utterly mysterious: how are the objects 
randomly assorted, what are they made of, and how are they 
transmitted by a sperm cell? In reducing the organism to a 
container, it also left no room for questions about the relations 
between heredity and development; as T H Morgan complained 
in 1909, Mendel's "factors" conflated the characteristics of the 
adult organism with their physical medium of transmission.
Morgan, whose background was in embryology, extended the 
reach of the model by redefining "factor" as first and foremost a 
physical entity that resided in the organism, was passed from 
parent to child, and guided the child's development. (Its precise 
physical identity was left open, though it was already assumed 
that hereditary material resided in the cell's nucleus, and Morgan 
eventually accepted the identification of factors with loci on the 
chromosomes.) This allowed him to integrate Mendel's organism- 
as-container metaphor with the organism-as-machine metaphor 
which had been gaining popularity among turn-of-the-century 
embryologists, and around the same time Wilhelm Johansen 
coined the term "gene" to refer to the other half of Mendel's 
original factor concept, the heritable trait of the adult organism. 
(See figure 4.)
W ilhelm  Roux (1890s)
O rganism  «• machine
em bryonic developm ent «• m echanical movement 
hereditary material mechanical part
T hom as Hunt M organ (1915)
Factor »  m echanical part that guides assembly
inheritance »  division and duplication of above parts
W ilhelm  lohansen (1910s)
heritable trait ("gene") »» characteristic of complete machine
W atson and Crick (1953)
DNA plan or bluejsrint
Developm ent «♦ decoding and following plans
Figure 4. Further developm ent of analogies for heredity
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This finer-grained metaphor could now be used to pose questions 
about the physical basis of heredity and its relation to 
development, but there remained one major inadequacy. Nothing 
in the metaphor accounted for the way in which the hereditary 
material guides development so as to reliably achieve the same 
adult form. In 1930 it was possible (just barely) to imagine a 
machine that added parts to itself, but how could a machine -  a 
physical system without intrinsic purpose, without teleology -  
rebuild its own missing parts in the right shape, or produce a 
tiny new machine that would grow into a duplicate of itself?
What was missing was the idea of encoding, the notion that form 
could be stored in matter without being literally expressed. The 
only familiar concept that had something like this structure was 
writing, and so early thought on this subject was dominated by 
the metaphors of written language and the "book of hfe" (Kay 
2000). With the discovery of DNA and the elucidation of the 
transcription process'*, the metaphor shifted a bit to become one 
of instructions or blueprints to be read and followed by the 
organism-as-machine.
Despite its complexity, this extended metaphor -  of a physical 
part containing a plan for the organism, a plan which is read and 
carried out by other physical parts -  is perhaps the most successful 
scientific metaphor of all time. It has made accessible, even to the 
lay imagination, a system whose literal description is both 
extremely daunting and still far from complete. Anyone with a 
grade-school education can use the metaphor to discuss the 
phenomena of heredity -  fallibly, to be sure, but with a reasonable 
chance of capturing at least some of the properties and dynamics 
that are central to genetics. And, in fact, the metaphor is now so 
fundamental to our thought about heredity that it has, in some 
respects, ceased to be a metaphor. Genes aren't lilce instructions, 
they are instructions; the body isn't like a machine, it is a machine 
(albeit a very complex and squishy one).
It's important to understand how this state of affairs developed. 
In its early days, the metaphor had to be a metaphor because the 
relevant literal concepts hadn't been developed far enough yet. 
One could distantly imagine a machine adding parts to itself, but 
there was no model or technical vocabulary for describing how 
this might actually be done. One could speak vaguely of
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development as the following of instructions by a machine, but 
there was no body of theory explaining how such machines 
would work or what the instructions would look like. Tlie 
conceptual resources for describing these things came long after 
the metaphors that picked out the relevant dynamics.
This pattern has direct consequences for the evaluation of theories 
of consciousness. It seems Hkely that a mature theory of 
consciousness will require at least as much new conceptual 
apparatus as did our mature theory of heredity -  and probably 
much more. If we accept (following Boyd) that metaphorical 
theories should be evaluated pragmatically, it becomes apparent 
that one very important pragmatic criterion should be the extent 
to which a theory is likely to drive the development of new 
conceptual resources. Theories that assimilate consciousness to 
another mystery (like the soul) are unlikely to do this; so, too, are 
theories which begin by declaring that consciousness is irreducible 
and basic, since this blocks the "decompose-analogize- 
reconceptualize" strategy which has proven to be such a powerful 
engine of conceptual development. A promising metaphor will 
be one that hints at finer-grained structure within consciousness, 
structure that can be explored and developed within the 
framework provided by the metaphor.
And this gets back, finally, to the "why the brain?" question. The 
problem with analogies like Turing's and Mendel's is that, in 
decomposing the target system functionally rather than 
mechanically, they sacrifice the open-endedness of the metaphor. 
A part defined in terms o f its function neither stimulates nor 
permits the development of new conceptual resources, because 
it's already bound by its very definition into the old system of 
concepts. By contrast, a physical part can be picked out long 
before one has any good idea of what it does, and this provides a 
powerful stimulus for research.
Chromosomes played just such a role in the study of heredity. In 
the mid-19th century biologists using the best available 
microscopes reported that, during cell division, the nucleus could 
be seen to disappear and a mass of what came to be called 
"spindles" would appear in its place and then divide into two 
masses which became the sites of the new nuclei. By the 1880s, 
Walther Flemming was able, by fixing and staining cells at all 
stages of division, to show that there were persistent nuclear
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structures (the chromosomes) which were divided and distributed 
during this process. This strongly suggested that they played a role 
in heredity, and once Mendel's theory gained currency, scientists 
were quick to note the parallels between the behaviour of 
chromosomes during cell division and tlie Mendelian assortment of 
factors. A turning point in Morgan's work was when he concluded, 
around 1915, that the statistical patterns he was observing in his 
fruit fly work could be well-explained by the assumption that 
factors were laid out linearly along the chromosomes.
It seems likely that neurons will play a similar role in the study 
of consciousness. We know they're there, we know they're 
intimately related to mental activity, and we can observe their 
individual behaviour in detail -  but yet, as any honest 
neuroscientist will admit, we have precious little idea what 
exactly they're doing on a larger scale, and this ignorance mirrors 
our ignorance about the fine structure of consciousness. As a 
result, NCC theorists are often in the position of simultaneously 
proposing novel analyses of consciousness and developing novel 
accounts of neural function to underlie them.
Let me briefly describe what I believe to be the most exciting 
example of this phenomenon. (For a fuller discussion of the 
technical details of these models, see the book by Banks, Farber 
and Churchland, forthcoming.) Perhaps the clearest and best- 
known case is the development of models which attempt to 
resolve the perceptual "binding problem" (Singer 1994; Llinas 
and Ribary 1994). Before much was known about the architecture 
of the sensory systems, it was regarded as relatively unproblematic- 
that we could perceive whole objects as whole objects. There 
were Kantian questions about the types of structure that we 
impose on our perceptions, but the very imposition of structure 
wasn't seen as an especially challenging step in perception. Look 
at the organization of (say) the visual system, though, and things 
begin to get a bit puzzling: as it turns out, information about 
different aspects of the perceptual world (shape, colour, 
movement, even the presence of faces) is extracted in different 
parts of the brain and never converges on any single area or small 
group of areas; in other words, there is no "Cartesian theater," no 
central viewing screen in the brain. The question arises, then: 
How is it that we can put all these properties back together so as 
to have a unitary experience?
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Christof von der Malsburg dubbed this puzzle "the binding 
problem," and it has been a substantial goad to en\pirical and 
theoretical progress. Though there is not yet a well-elaborated 
consensus solution, attention has focused on synchronous 
oscillation as a possible mechanism of binding. {See figure 5.) The 
idea here is that an integrated percept can be represented by the 
synchronized activity of neurons distributed widely across the 
brain. The parallels with the structure of subjective consciousness 
are sharp. These dynamically-bound "clusters" have an enhanced 
impact on associative processes such as memory, emotion and 
motor response, paralleling the way in which a conscious percept 
is more likely to drive such associations than is an object which is 
perceived but not consciously attended to (Edelman and Tononi 
2000). Limitations on the number of available frequencies for 
synchronous oscillation mean that only a small number of objects 
may be simultaneously represented in this way, though each 
object may have many features associated with it (Singer 1994); 
this mirrors the severe limitations on our ability to consciously 
attend to multiple separate objects without grouping them into 
larger, aggregate objects.
94 Ilya Farber
Quale ** local feature representation
Image ** set of feature representations firing in
synchrony
"core" or "general" approxim ately 40H z oscillation
consciousness sweeping across cortex ("binding
w ave"), driven by intralaminar nuclei 
of the thalamus
specific contents of feature representations firing in
consciousness synchrony with binding wave
consciousness vs. presence or absence of binding wave
unconsciousness
waking vs. dreaming «  ability or inability of sensory
consciousness input to reset binding wave
memory, m otor choice associations driven by the greater
associative power of representations 
oscillating in the 40H z band
Figure 5. Recent ideas about the neural correlates of consciousness. The 
above framework is m y synthesis of related ideas proposed by Wolf 
Singer, Francis Crick, Christof Koch, Antonio Damasio, Gerald Edelman  
and (most centrally) Rodolfo Llinas. See text for references.
In some cases, this work has even led to novel results regarding 
the subjective nature of consciousness. Working backwards from 
theoretical implications of his parhcular model of synchrony- 
based binding, Rodolfo Llinas calculated that there should be a 
"temporal quantum" of consciousness: in other words, conscious 
experience should be divided into "chunks" of approximately 
12-15 ms, and below this scale finer distinctions should not be 
possible. Subsequent experiments bore this out: if two fast "clicks" 
are played in succession, a subject will hear them as separate if 
they are divided by at least 13 ms, but will hear only one click (of 
normal duration!) if the two are divided by less than 12 ms. This 
distinction is also visible in the "resetting" once or twice of a 
trans-cortical 40 Hz oscillation wave that normally resets in 
response to each consciously perceived click. For this and other 
reasons having to do with the frequency of oscillations originating 
in the intralaminar nucleus of the thalamus 0oliot et al 1994), it 
now seems extremely plausible that conscious experience is 
"quantized" into discrete chunks of approximately 12.5 ms 
duration. This is an interesting discovery about the structure of 
conscious experience -  admittedly, a modest one, but one which 
came not from introspection but from the elaboration of analogies 
between the structure of consciousness and the structure of the 
brain.
None of this is to suggest that consciousness should become the 
sole dominion of neuroscience, for the same reason that the brain 
should not become the sole dominion of consciousness studies: 
both systems should be approached using whatever resources 
help us to understand their respective structures in finer detail. 
But it has long been an (underacknowledged) problem that 
nobody has been able to offer a concrete model of what a 
successful theory of consciousness should look like; given the 
celebrated gap between the subjective and the objective, many 
have been tempted to declare either that some sort of revolutionary 
insight is required, or that we will never be able to find relations 
deeper than mere psychophysical correlation. The lesson I draw 
from history is that progress will require the gradual development 
of new conceptual resources, and we can expect much of that 
progress to be driven by theories which establish analogical 
relations between the structure of consciousness and the structure 
of the physical system in which it inheres.
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Notes
1. The reader may be relieved to learn that in this case, despite the 
presence of a plausible mechanism, the correlation itself has not been 
observed: even fairly high levels of coffee consumption do not 
significantly increase the risk of heart failure in normal subjects.
2. John Searle (1997) exemplifies this approach in The Mystery of 
Consciousness: he su rveys a num ber of scientific m odels of 
consciousness in separate essays, often with some excitem ent, but at 
the end of each one he w^inds up concluding more or less the same 
thing: that they've completely failed to address the fundamental 
question of "how  the brain produces consciousness," and hence that 
"the m ystery rem ains."
3. With the im portant addition that the neural structure is presum ed to 
causally underlie the structure of consciousness, more will be said 
about this below.
4. Along with the development of information theory, itself a profoundly 
m etaphorical discipline. Information theory has had a profound 
im pact on the developm ent of m etaphors in the life sciences; for a 
brief discussion of this with respect to consciousness, (see Farber 
2000). Kay (2000) gives an in-depth treatm ent of its role in genetics.
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Why consciousness cannot be 
deconstructed: 
Towards a positive theory of 
consciousness
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Abstract
The present paper concerns the construction of a positive theory of 
consciousness which can provide a method for  understanding 
consciousness as a metaphysical reality. Scientists and philosophers 
have been grappling with the problem of consciousness for long as it is 
one of the most fundamental facts about the universe. But there has 
been no final understanding of the facts regarding consciousness. It is 
not known why there is consciousness at all and hoiu it has been 
possible to be conscioiis beings 07i our part.
Sciences o f the brain/mind have offered causal explanations of the how 
and what o f consciousness. But they have failed to explain the why of 
consciousness. There have been attempts by scientists and philosophers 
alike to prove that there is no consciousness at all as a positive reality. 
Their claim is based on the ground that consciousness is causally 
supervenient on the material universe and that all conscious phenomena 
can be explained by mapping the physical universe. The resulting
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picture of the universe is one of physical reality minus the conscious 
subjective reality of the mind.
My argument is basically to counter this picture of the universe. 
Admittedly the universe is more open-ended to accommodate co)iscious 
forces than the scientists are ready to admit. The fact o f the matter is 
that consciousness is presupposed by the sciences themselves and the 
depth-structure of consciousness is still beyond the grasp of the sciences. 
Therefore philosophers are at pains to suggest that consciousness is a 
deeper metaphysical phenomenon and that it can be explained, but 
cannot be explained away by the known sciences.
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In this paper I would like to argue for a theory of consciousness 
that can account for why consciousness is a deeper phenomenon 
and how it can be situated as a primary phenomenon in the 
universe. It is a fact that consciousness is manifested in the 
natural world and is associated with natural phenomena like 
language, physical behaviour, the human brain etc. But 
consciousness cannot be identified with any one of them, nor can 
it be derived from the natural phenomena themselves. Thus 
there is a gap between what consciousness is and how it can be 
explained in terms of its manifestations in the physical universe.
I would argue that consciousness can be understood 
independently of the material world with which it is associated.
1. Consciousness in the natural universe
There are two ways in which consciousness can be explained: 
one is the naturalistic way which makes consciousness intelligible 
as part of the universal natural order; the other is that which 
makes it intelligible as part of the higher order non-natural 
phenomena. While the first is how the natural scientists 
-  psychologists and the neurophysiologists -  generally explain 
the phenomenon of consciousness; the second method is how 
some philosophers approach the problem. It is the naturalistic 
way that has been the most successful so far because of the fact 
that scientific data have supported the general theory that 
consciousness is part of the natural order and that in itself is not
very different from a sophisticated natural phenomenon. The 
brain sciences have shown that consciousness is causally 
conditioned by the brain and that the conscious phenomena are 
supervenient on the latter. However, it is still a mystery how 
consciousness is caused by the brain, that is, how a material 
object like the brain produces a characteristically different 
phenomenon called consciousness.
Philosophers raise the question: Why does consciousness appear 
at all in the universe? Given that there is a brain, it does not 
necessarily follow that there is consciousness. Scientists, however, 
claim that consciousness is a function of the brain that has 
emerged in course of the evolution of the universe. Even if the 
story of evolution of consciousness were true, it still has to be 
explained how this takes place in the absence of clearly established 
psychophysical laws.
There have been attempts to reduce the so-called psychological 
laws into the laws of physics and thereby to abolish the problems 
of consciousness altogether. But that has not satisfied philosophers 
because the problems of consciousness remain unsolved even 
when the problems of the physics involved are solved.
Consciousness is a deeper phenomenon. It is the "biggest 
mystery... the largest outstanding obstacle in our quest for a 
scientific understanding of the universe" (Chalmers 1996). Any 
easy explanation of consciousness leaves the problem as it is. 
Therefore there are no short-cuts to a genuine explanation of how 
consciousness arises in the universe.
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2. The conscious centre of the universe
The most important feature of consciousness is its subjective character, 
that is, its belongii-ig to tlie first-person (Searle 1994). Tliis itself 
underlines the fact that we cannot understand the consciousness 
phenomenon without positing a conscious subject or an "I" which 
has the conscious experiences. Tlie experiencer is not a material 
body or a physical system that produces the conscious states; it is 
the subject over and above the material system which causes 
consciousness. It is the non-material nature of the conscious subject 
tlnat provides a clue to the mystery of consciousness.
Now the question is: What is the nature of the self or "I" which is 
the subject of consciousness? Is there any physicalistic explanation 
for the emergence of the self in the world? There is a physical 
and a biological way to explain how a particular organism comes 
into being. But can there be an equivalent method of explaining 
how the self comes into the world? The answer is obviously in 
the negative because even when every bit of my body is examined 
and explained, the mystery of the "I" still remains. The "I" is 
neither the body nor the psychological experiences attached to it; 
it is something more and is deeply metaphysical (Wittgenstein 
1961).
The self or the subject of experiences constitutes the virtual 
centre of the universe precisely for the reason that it is from the 
point of view of the self that we situate the universe. That is, we 
construe the universe as "our universe" (Wittgenstein 1961), 
because we weave a mirror-image of the universe out of the 
fragments of our mental experiences. This I-centric point of view 
or the "first-person point of view" is the unique feature of 
human consciousness.
The I-centric nature of consciousness does not preclude the 
possibility of a third-person point of view but cannot be replaced 
by the latter. The objective world-view or the "the view from 
nowhere" (Nagel 1986) sits ill-at-ease with the first-person point 
of view for the reason that subjective experiences are inalienable 
from the universe. The cosmo-centric world-view has to 
accommodate, nay, yield primacy to the I-centric world-view in 
order to facilitate our understanding of consciousness.
The bridge between the self and the universe is thus at the core 
of the phenomenology of consciousness which the philosophers 
offer as an alternative to the scientific explanations of 
consciousness. While the sciences in general offer an easy solution, 
the philosophers offer a better model of taking consciousness 
more seriously (Chalmers 1996).
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3. Evolution of consciousness
As already indicated, there is a way of explaining consciousness 
as an evolutionary phenomenon. Scientists as well as philosophers
have sought to explain consciousness as emerging out of the 
material matrix of the universe (Morgan 1923; Broad 1925). This 
approach has yielded results showing that consciousness is a late 
arrival in the evolutionary process of the universe. Besides, it has 
been shown that consciousness has properties, which are 
supervenient on the properties of the material world.
The supervenience thesis argues that the material universe 
remaining what it is in its basic structure, the mental properties 
can be predicted. That is, the mental properties have a 
supervenient base in the material stuff of the universe (Kim 1984; 
Morgan 1997). Supervenience is thus determined by the nature of 
the dependence of the mind on the material world. This 
dependence can be characterized by strict nomic necessity 
depending upon whether the mind is caused by the material 
world or only conditioned by the latter.
In any case the evolutionary view of consciousness does not 
explain how the unconscious material world can give rise to the 
conscious mind. If the universe is inherently material in nature, it 
cannot allow for the conscious mind to emerge. Besides, if the 
universe is materially closed, it cannot make room for 
consciousness as an independent phenomenon.
All that the emergenist view can argue for is that consciousness 
is deeply embedded in matter and that through a mapping of the 
natural universe we can predict the emergent mental properties 
of evolving natural organisms. But the fact of the matter is that 
no amount of mapping can predict what the mental properties of 
the organisms will be. It is an open question what conscious 
phenomena the organisms will have at any particular stage of 
evolution of the universe. Thus there is no natural necessity 
about the occurrence of mental phenomena because it can be 
imagined that the material world remaining the same, there is no 
conscious phenomenon at all.
If the evolutionary view of consciousness is valid, then there is 
no reason why evolution should stop at the emergence of the 
mind only. It can go further and produce the supermind. But the 
materialist world-view offering a deterministic evolutionary 
scheme of things denies the possibility of supramental 
consciousness. This leads to the paradox of evolutionism. If it is
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true then it denies its validity, that is, it proves that materiahsm is 
false. The evolutionary view of the universe embedded in 
materialism is thus bound to fail because it is based on 
unacceptable premises.
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4. Why supervenience does not work
Supervenience as a relation between matter and consciousness 
does not work for the reason that it does not specify how exactly 
material conditions prevailing in the universe determine conscious 
states. The fact that material properties are associated with 
mental properties does not make the relation between the two 
types of properties clear. First of all, there is no logical identity 
between the two and so they do not share a common logical 
structure. Even the hypothesis of a contingent identity (Smart 
1959) does not make sense in the absence of any solid proof that 
the conscious states are exactly the same as the brain states. Since 
identity fails, supervenience is supposed to be the next best 
alternative for explaining the relation between matter and mind, 
that is, between the brain and the states of consciousness. 
Supervenience seeks to bridge the gap between the two by 
incorporating psychophysical laws into the natural order 
(Chalmers 1996).
However, it is arguably true that no logical supervenience is 
possible because we can imagine possible worlds- which are 
identical with our world in their material structure and yet do 
not have conscious phenomena at all. That is, consciousness 
cannot be guaranteed in every possible world which is materially 
identical with ours (Chalmers 1996). Therefore the only alternative 
to logical supervenience is contingent or natural supervenience 
that claims to postulate supervenience of conscious states on 
brain functions. The natural supervenience thesis intends to 
explain consciousness as causally dependent on the material 
body because of the presence of psychophysical laws in the 
universe.
The natural supervenience thesis is likely to fail because there are 
no psychophysical laws in the universe (Davidson 1980). If there 
were such laws possible, then we could have mapped the nature 
of consciousness by understanding such laws. But we have not
so far succeeded in understanding the phenomenon of 
consciousness in its true nature. This therefore establishes that 
we have not discovered any bridge between consciousness and 
the material world.
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5. Why consciousness cannot be deconstructed
The heroic attempt to deconstruct the mind and consciousness 
(Churchland 1984; Dennett 1991; Stich 1996) does not lead to any 
concrete results because consciousness can in no case be 
eliminated. All elimination strategies are built upon the 
assumption that consciousness is a product of the material causes 
in the brain. This does not sound coherent because the funchons 
of the brain can only logically cause other brain states and not 
the conscious states which are different from the brain states. The 
conscious states have certain properties which cannot be traced 
back to the brain states. Therefore we have to admit a gap 
between the funchons of the brain and the conscious phenomena.
Elimination of the conscious states into brain states fails because 
conscious states are themselves presupposed rather than explained 
by the deconstruction procedures. The latter are designed to 
make consciousness redundant in the universe. The standard 
argument in all such cases is that mind makes no difference to 
the universe and that it is causally inefficacious. This argument is 
obviously false because the mental states are not redundant and 
in fact they are inalienably there in the universe. Besides, mental 
states do make a difference to the world as evidenced in human 
thoughts and actions. Thus every attempt to eliminate the mind 
reiterates its presence.
The states of consciousness demand autonomy in the sense that 
they can be treated independently of the physical universe. The 
possibility of autonomy is open in view of the fact that the 
conscious mind is real and that it is different from the material 
world. The conscious mind is nested in the material universe and 
yet does not belong to the causal history of the physical world. It 
is siii generis. This may lead to dualism. But that presents to us 
the real state of affairs in the universe because consciousness is 
posited against the physical universe in all our understanding of 
the universe.
6. Primacy of consciousness
The crux of the matter is that consciousness is a primary fact 
about the universe. It is a fact of a higher kind because conscious 
states arise only against the background of the material universe. 
The universe in that sense houses consciousness but cannot 
causally situate it. The conscious subject introduces an element of 
surprise into the universe; the universe cannot account for it and 
yet the subject is a central fact about it.
The primacy thesis defended here presupposes that there is 
already consciousness in the universe and that it is ontologically 
primary to all other entities in the universe. This primary datum 
is sometimes called mind or intelligence scattered throughout the 
universe. From this primary intelligence has arisen the concept of 
self or the subject as a manifestation of higher consciousness. It is 
the possibility of higher consciousness that makes the mind 
superior to the material conditions which provide the background 
for the conscious mind.
The conscious mind thus (1) has an irreducible non-materiality 
about it, and (2) can generate new forms of consciousness. 
Because of its non-materiality it remains unaffected by the material 
universe and its causal forces. As a creative self-evolving 
phenomenon the conscious mind retains a trans-material 
dimension that makes consciousness autonomous.
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The completion of the Human Genome Project promises to be of great 
vahie in helping us understand all aspects of human existence, including 
huuian consciousness. Human consciousness is essentially a subjective 
phenomenon, however, so to be really useful here the "third-person" 
(objective) knowledge o f genetics must be complimented by 'first- 
person" knowledge o f consciousness gained from within. Unfortunately, 
however, the scienti f̂ic study of consciousness is still quite primitive. 
While our physical sciences in general, and genetics in particular, 
employ highly sophisticated, objective investigative methodologies, the 
subjective methodologies used in the scientific study of consciousness 
are generally still quite primitive, often relying merely on simple, 
conunonsensical sorts o f introspection. Eastern meditation traditions, 
on the other hand, have been employing sophisticated meditation 
techniques to explore consciousness for many centuries. Study of their 
techniques is thus a natural beginning point for developing the first- 
person approaches needed by a genuine science of conscioiisriess. More 
than tzuo thousand scientific studies using such methodologies have
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now been completed, and it is clear that some of the methodologies are 
capable of producing significant results. Developing a sophisticated 
science of consciousness may thus be a real possibility.
This pwssibility, together with the results of the Human Genome 
Project, in turn suggests that it may be possible to identify the 
physiological underpinnings of the deepest structures and dynamics of 
Inmtan consciousness. This would clearly be a major advance in human 
knowledge. Nevertheless, it loould at best resolve only the So-called 
"easy," correlational problems of consciousness. The "hard" problem of 
explaining the very existence of consciousness in a material universe 
ivould remain untouched. This latter, "hard" problem is often held to be 
unsolvable in principle. Reflection on specific procedures and claims 
from texts of ancient meditation traditions, however, indicates that the 
difficulty in solving this problem is only an empirical, and not an 'in 




"The Human Genome Project" has recently been completed, at 
least in rough outline. This is a milestone in human knowledge. 
With it comes the possibility of explaining all sorts of facts about 
humanity, including our evolution, kinships, morphology, 
metabolic processes, and behaviour. Indeed, it might seem that 
we are on the threshold of being able to explain, at least in 
principle, every aspect of the human organism. When we turn 
our attention to human consciousness, humanity's most distinctive 
feature, however, we find some unique difficulties. The first of 
these involves the current lack of a well-developed science of 
consciousness. The second involves the distinction between the 
so-called "hard" and "easy" problems of explaining consciousness.
2. Thie present and potential contribution of genetics
Modern science takes it as given that our consciousness is a 
product of the activities of our nervous systems. Consciousness 
itself, however, is a subjective phenomenon. Thus there are two 
main sides to the study of consciousness. The first involves
examination of the subjective phenomena of consciousness as 
known through the reports and other activities of conscious 
individuals. Tlie second involves examination of the physiological 
causes and correlates of consciousness and its contents. The 
completion of the Human Genome Project has enormous 
significance for this latter aspect of consciousness studies, for it 
promises to help us identify the physiological structures and 
processes that underlie every type of human consciousness.
Behavioural geneticists look for direct correlates between genes 
and particular sorts of behaviour, and by implication in the case 
of humans at least, conscious awareness as well. Some striking 
correlations have already been found between the presence and/ 
or absence of individual genes and gross behaviour in a few 
primitive organisms (e.g., sexual preference in fruit flies, aggregate 
feeding in microscopic worms). And it is well-known that there 
is a significant genetic component to a number of features of 
human consciousness such as colour vision and intelligence, 
even where (as in the case of intelligence) the underlying 
particulars of nervous system structure and functioning remain 
completely unknown.
Very few such direct correlations between genes and human 
consciousness have so far been found, however. This should not 
be surprising. The human genome has only recently been largely 
decoded, and we still have almost no knowledge of what the 
bulk of the sixty thousand or so genes it contains, actually do. 
Furthermore, the brain and human consciousness are both 
extraordinarily complex. Indeed, it is often said that the number 
of potential connections between neurons in the human brain is 
comparable to the number of primary particles in the universe. 
Moreover, we at present have very little detailed knowledge of 
the relationships between our genome and the micro- and macro­
structures and processes of the brain. But even if our knowledge 
of these relationships were complete, this by itself would not tell 
us much about human consciousness. This is because 
understanding the relation of these physical structures to our 
conscious experience requires that they be correlated with 
components and activities of consciousness that experimental 
subjects have to identify subjectively from within their own 
awareness. And this sort of identification raises some severe 
empirical scientific problems.
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The problems I have in mind are not the well-known philosophical 
ones raised by people such as Wittgenstein and B F Skinner. They 
are instead purely practical, scientific ones that derive from an 
asymmetry in the ways the objective and the subjective 
components of psycho-physiological correlations are identified. 
Researchers regularly use sophisticated "third-person" (objective) 
methodologies (EEG, fMRI, electron microscopy etc.) and theories 
to identify the typically unobvious components of the physical 
correlates of subjective experiences and processes. But the 
experiences themselves are generally quite ordinary, easily 
recognizable subjective phenomena (visualizing a simple shape, 
remembering a sequence of terms, willing the motion of a limb 
etc.) chosen in the absence both of any deep theory of 
consciousness and sophisticated "first-person" (subjective) 
investigative methodologies. In short, this sort of work is a blend 
of sophisticated third-person neuroscience with what amounts to 
crude "Aristotelian" first-person investigations of consciousness 
itself.
Such work of course is quite necessary, but it is also necessarily 
preliminary, and given the extraordinary complexity of human 
awareness, necessarily rather hit-and-miss. Thus there is no 
reason to expect great progress in identifying, much less 
explaining, the deep structures and dynamics of consciousness in 
this way. Adding the results of work in genetics to this mix 
cannot in itself be expected to do anything to alleviate the 
problematic asyrrvmetry. What is needed is a genuine, sophisticated 
science of consciousness, utilizing sophisticated theory and 
exploratory methodologies rather than mere commonsense 
introspection. Only then might we reasonably expect significant 
results to emerge systematically from correlational studies. How 
such a science might be developed is not a trivial question, and 
we will return to this topic later. But first let us turn to the 
distinction between the so-called "hard" and "easy" problems of 
explaining consciousness.
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3. The Hard problem
The so-called "easy" problems of explaining consciousness we 
have been discussing so far are the problems of identifying what 
the physical correlates and conditions of consciousness are. These
problems, of course, are not at all easy, as we have seen. Indeed 
they are extraordinarily difficult. But they are also very different 
from those that comprise the so-called "hard" problem. For this 
latter problem is not concerned with the empirical task of 
discovering physical correlates of and conditions for 
consciousness, but the conceptual one of explaining why in a 
material universe consciousness should ever exist at all. And this 
problem turns out to be so difficult that it is often held to be 
insoluble in principle, making the first seem "easy" by comparison 
(Shear 1997).
Why should the problem of explaining the existence of 
consciousness be so difficult? Modern science as it has developed 
over the past several centuries is straightforwardly materialist. 
The universe is conceived of as fundamentally physical, beginning 
with a "big bang," and evolving over billions of years before 
consciousness appeared. Consciousness on this view is a very 
recent product of a long sequence of purely physical processes. 
There is good reason, of course, for the physicalist orientation of 
modern science, for it has proven enormously successful in 
explaining all sorts of phenomena that once seemed to require 
non-physical elements for their explanation. The list ranges from 
"acts of God" such as lightning, floods and earthquakes, to 
biological processes such as metabolism, evolution, reproduction 
and the very processes of life itself. Organic chemistry, molecular 
biology, and genetics have all played major roles here, and the 
results of the Human Genome Project promise to contribute even 
more to our understanding. Nevertheless the existence of 
consciousness poses unique difficulties for this physicalist 
explanatory programme.
Physics is generally taken as the paradigm for the objective 
sciences, and it is widely held that all natural phenomena ought, 
at least in principle, to be describable and explainable in terms of 
an ideal, complete science of matter. There are of course technical 
problems with this view, including those arising from paradoxes 
in the theories of quantum mechanics. But for the purposes of 
our discussion let us simply take it for granted here that the 
modern scientific view is physicalist, and that physics gives us 
our clearest notions of what it is for something to be physical. 
The first thing we should note is that physics describes the world 
purely in geometric terms, that is, in terms of shape, size.
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position, time, fields and dynamic potentials for spatio-temporal 
entities defined in this way to influence other such spatio- 
temporal entities. The second thing to note is that it does this 
without referring at all to the subjective qualities -  such as 
colours, sounds, tastes, feelings, hopes, etc. -  that constitute the 
bulk of the contents of our ordinary awareness. Indeed, such 
subjective entities, called qunlia in the contemporary jargon -  
appear so different in kind from the contents of the theories of 
physics that it does not seem possible for purely physical theories 
even to describe, much less imply or explain, them. For nothing 
that one says about actual and potential transformations of 
purely colourless, soundless, tasteless shapes will by itself ever 
imply the existence of even a single colour, sound or taste, much 
less the rich diversity of our subjective experience. In technical 
language, purely topological (spatial) concepts will never imply 
the existence of qiialia (subjective experiential qualities).
This is not to deny, of course, that purely physical theories can 
identify the physical conditions for the existence of qualia, such 
as, for example, the experience of a colour or a sensation of joy. 
Indeed, this is precisely the sort of thing that neurophysiological 
research often does. But, as we saw, this work is essentially 
correlational and requires the existence of conscious experiencers 
to report the relevant subjective experiences (colour, emotion 
etc.). Without such reports there would be nothing to correlate 
with the neurophysiological parameter, and they would remain 
mere descriptions of physical processes, yielding no knowledge 
of even the mere existence, much less the experiential nature, of 
qualia at all.
A simple thought-experiment adapted from one originally devised 
by the philosopher Frank Jackson should make this clear. Imagine 
a neuroscientist, Mary, who, although entirely colourblind herself, 
knows all the physical science there is to know about how the 
central nervous system processes colour vision. That is, she 
knows everything there is to know about the interaction of 
wavelengths of light with the human optical system, including 
the neural processing of the effects of interactions with these 
wavelengths on the retina, the optic nerve and the brain as a 
whole. None of this purely physical knowledge, however, would 
tell her what it is like to see blue, or the contrast between red and 
green, or to enjoy the colour play of a Kandinski painting at all.
112 Jonathan Shear
For this requires a kind of i<nowledge that lies entirely outside 
the realm of the purely physical sciences, and comes only with 
direct experience of the relevant qualia. Purely physical theories, 
no matter how complete they might be, by themselves neither 
say nor imply anything at all about the purely subjective quality 
of such phenomena.
This however makes consciousness scientifically utterly 
problematic. If, as many believe, the theories of physical science 
are in principle able to account for all objective phenomena, then 
the existence or non-existence of consciousness would make no 
difference at all to anything in the objective world, since all 
objective phenomena would already be accounted for. In other 
words, the presence or absence of consciousness would make no 
difference at all to any material process. This of course would 
make it impossible to give any scientific explanation of the 
existence of consciousness. Thus, for example, it would be 
impossible to give any biological evolutionary account of 
consciousness. For if all animal and human actions are already 
accounted for without reference to consciousness, consciousness 
could serve no purpose, and therefore no evolutionary purpose, 
at all. As the philosopher David Chalmers put it, such 
considerations would appear to make it impossible to answer the 
question of why everything in nature does not go on completely 
"in the dark," that is, without the existence of any consciousness 
at all. On the other hand, the existence of consciousness is 
rationally undisputable; it is an obvious, indeed perhaps the most 
obvious, feature of our existence. So the problem of not being 
able to explain consciousness is not just a problem about 
consciousness, it is a problem directly confronting the enterprise 
of science.
It might at first seem odd that science should have developed in 
such a way that it is incapable of accounting for the conspicuous 
existence of our everyday awareness. From a historical 
perspective, however, it is not hard to see something of how this 
has come about. One of the most basic needs of scientific method 
is to distinguish objective fact from subjective bias. Another is to 
formulate theories as precisely and testably as possible, and this 
has led to the extensive mathematization of scientific theories. As 
a result scientists, in accord with Descartes' proposal centuries 
ago, have generally come to remove as many features of
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consciousness as they could from their descriptions of the objective 
world, and to describe it as much as possible in exclusively 
mathemahcal, qualia-free terms. Thus, ironically, having worked 
for centuries to remove elements of consciousness from the 
content of its theories, science is now faced with the problem of 
accounting for what it has removed.
One more difference between consciousness and the physical 
w'orld that is often taken to contribute to the hard problem is 
worth noting here. Consciousness, in addition to being qualia 
filled, appears to be non-spatial, and non-spatiality contrasts 
strongly with our basic notions of the objective world. It makes 
no sense to ask if one's hope is to the left or right of one's 
understanding of a theorem of mathematics, or if an itch is above 
or below the location of a fanciful dream one had last year. Thus, 
while many of the contents of consciousness, including in 
particular our perceptions of the world, can be organized spatially, 
it is clear that many of them cannot, and consciousness, taken as 
a whole, does not appear to be spatial in nature. The objective 
world appears by contrast to be spatial through and through, as 
Kant pointed out. For in our ordinary understanding all of its 
contents are necessarily organized in a spatial fashion. And it is 
very difficult to understand how something thoroughly spatial, 
that is, the physical world, could give rise to something so non- 
spatial as consciousness.
Now let us note some of the basic responses to the hard problem. 
One is to point out that, as we mentioned above, solid scientific 
explanations have been developed for phenomena that were 
once held to be in principle outside the grasp of scientific 
explanation. It was once held, for example, that "celestial 
phenomena," that is, the phenomena of the heavens, obeyed 
different laws than the terrestrial, and that earthly scientific laws 
would never be able to explain the movements and nature of the 
planets, sun and stars. Newton's work overturned this, and 
modem astrophysics and space exploration have made its rejection 
complete. It was also once held that life processes such as 
respiration and reproduction were intrinsically beyond the grasp 
of materialist science, and required reference to some kind of 
non-material "life force." Now the scientific community is virtually 
unanimous in holding that organic chemistry, molecular biology 
and genetics have made it apparent that whether or not such a
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"life force" exists, reference to it is completely unnecessary to 
account for the observed phenomena. Thus our past experience 
with the ability of science to explain phenomena seemingly in 
principle outside its proper domain suggests that the same thing 
should happen with the phenomena of consciousness -  that is, 
that consciousness, too, will come to be explained scientifically.
This response, insofar as it suggests that the hard problem of 
consciousness will in time come to be resolved within the 
framework of objective scientific theory as we know it today, by 
itself seems to me to be inappropriate. Analogies from the past 
cannot help us much here. For they all involve objectively 
observable spatial phenomena coming to be explained by more 
advanced objective, spatio-temporally articulated theories. Thus, 
in all the past examples both the phenomena to be explained and 
the theories that have explained them are objective, spatio- 
temporally defined and qualia-free. Yet the hard problem is one 
of explaining subjective, «on-spatio-temporal, qualia-filled  
phenomena in objective, spatio-temporal, qualia-free terms -  a 
different kind of problem entirely. As a result, the simple-minded 
response of "Don't worry, science will ultimately resolve this 
hard problem, too," is as it stands little more than an act of faith 
ignoring the specific problems involved.
There are, to be sure, other, more radical responses to the hard 
problem, responses that take the problem more seriously and try 
to meet its challenges head-on. These include, among other 
things, suggestions (i) that we need to include consciousness as a 
fundam ental property of the universe along with 
electromagnetism, gravity etc., (ii) that quantum mechanics has 
transformed our scientific notions of matter in a way conducive 
to resolving the problem, and (iii) that we will need deeper 
knowledge of consciousness, based on systematic first-person 
methodologies, before we can even understand the full 
implications of the problem. In other words, the problem may 
well prove to be amenable to scientific resolution, but this 
resolution will require some major changes in our basic scientific 
paradigm of the world, and/or significant expansion of our 
notion of what constitutes appropriate methodologies for studying 
consciousness scientifically.
Genetics, first-person mettiodologies 115
4. First-person methodologies
A genuine science of consciousness will, as we saw earlier, surely 
requires development of sophisticated first-person scientific 
methodologies. We do not, however, need to begin the task of 
developing such methodologies entirely de novo. Asian cultures 
have worked for many centuries on developing systematic meditation 
procedures for exploring the subjective domain of consciousness 
and analysing their results. Many meditation traditions, for example, 
report systematically evokable experiences of what they hold to be 
the ground and basic structures of consciousness. Such claims, if 
true, would be directly relevant to the questions both of developing 
a science of consciousness and of the so-called "easy" problems of 
consciousness that we have been discussing. Other experiences and 
claims, as we shall see, will also prove to be relevant to the "hard" 
problem. Western researchers accordingly have over the past half- 
century begun to investigate various Eastern meditation procedures 
and their reported results, and perhaps two thousand psychological, 
physiological and behavioral studies of meditating subjects have by 
now been published in scientific venues.
The results of these studies have not been entirely consistent, 
however. Given the newness of the field and the large number of 
very different meditation procedures involved, this should not be 
surprising. The earliest studies generally examined small groups 
of individuals, or even single individuals, so questions of 
individual variance could not be adequately addressed. And the 
early literature reviews often tended to lump all sorts of meditation 
procedures together and look for effects of "meditation" in 
general, ignoring the fact that the very different types of 
procedures studied might well be expected to have different 
effects on any particular variable. Such simplistic reviews naturally 
failed sometimes to find any significant effects at all from 
"meditation" considered generically. More discriminating analyses 
were clearly called for.
When enough individual studies became published in the scientific 
literature, it became possible to make more discriminating 
analyses, using the sophisticated techniques of "meta-analysis" 
designed specifically to clarify the results of multiple individual 
studies by separating out individual causal factors, enhancing 
statistical power, and reintegrating the data. A number of meta­
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analyses examining studies of the most widely researched 
meditation procedures has now been published. These procedures 
include, in particular, the Transcendental Meditation (TM) 
technique from Advaita Vedanta as taught by Maharishi Mahesh 
Yogi, several Zen Buddhist techniques from Japan and China, 
and the "Relaxation Response" procedure put together by Herbert 
Benson at Harvard. The results of some of these first meta­
analyses will, I think, prove both informative and suggestive.
One of the earliest and most basic questions asked by researchers 
is whether there is any reason to believe that meditation 
procedures have any real, objectively measurable effects at all. 
Since meditation traditions around the world claim that meditation 
can significantly reduce overall metabolic activity, even to the 
extent of producing cessation of perceptible respiration, 
physiological parameters are a natural place to begin. More than 
forty studies of meditation practices and respiration describing 
reduction of oxygen consumption, CO  ̂ elimination, and 
respiration have by now been published in the scientific literature. 
In an early literature review of such research published in the 
American Psychologist, Holmes (1984) concluded that meditation 
does not differ significantly physiologically from simple eyes- 
closed rest. Three years later, however, Dillbeck and Orme- 
Johnson (1987) published a careful meta-analysis in the same 
journal that examined different procedures and types of procedure 
separately and came to a different conclusion. Since the majority 
of published scientific studies used the TM technique, either 
alone or in comparison with others, the authors focused on this 
procedure. The data from the thirty-one relevant studies showed 
significant larger effect-size than eyes-closed rest for basal skin 
resistance, plasma lactate, and respiration. This result indicated 
that something objective was in fact taking place, and that at 
least some meditation techniques are capable of producing 
metabolic and respiratory effects in the direchon described in the 
traditional literature.
The traditional literature also, as we saw, makes claims about 
respiration that go quite beyond this. For we often find claims to 
the effect that in the deepest state of meditation, where the 
meditator experiences what can be called "pure consciousness" 
(the simplest state of awareness with no sensations, thoughts, 
feelings, or even sense of extension etc.), perceptible respiration
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becomes entirely suspended. Several studies now provide support 
for this claim as well. Badawi et al (1984), for example, report 
very high correlation (p < 10'“) of respiratory svispension (as 
indicated by "flat-line" pneumotachygraph tracings) with reports 
of episodes of pure consciousness experiences in meditation (as 
indicated by button pushes during meditation by advanced TM 
practitioners).
Research on pure consciousness and respiratory suspension 
involving multiple subjects has, to my knowledge, to date been 
conducted on only one technique, the TM technique. The studies 
of this one technique nevertheless have larger implications. In 
the first place, they clearly support the claim found in the 
literature of diverse meditation traditions (Yoga, Zen, Taoism 
etc.) that respiratory suspension is a physiological correlate of the 
experience of the completely settled state of pure consciousness. 
Indeed, it would strain credulity to think that so many different 
traditions, developed in different cultures, and with different, 
often conflicting metaphysical beliefs, would correlate the same 
unusual physiological state (respiratory cessation) with the same 
equally unusual experience (pure consciousness) except on the 
basis of actual observation. The cross-cultural commonality of 
the experiential reports also strongly suggests that they reflect 
the natural experiential correlate of this unusual physiological 
state, rather than somehow being congruent products of different 
techniques and diverse, often conflicting, beliefs and cultural 
factors. In short, the research on this technique directly supports 
the claims that it is possible to experience a completely settled, 
contentless state of awareness accompanied by respiratory 
suspension, as reported in the literature of diverse meditation 
traditions. Of course, questions of which procedures can produce 
this experience on what particular populations, and over what 
time frames, remain to be determined.
Another claim commonly made by meditation traditions is that 
successful meditation can produce positive psychological effects. 
Many studies have now been done in this area as well, enough 
for some meta-analyses to have been published. A meta-analysis 
by Eppley et al (1989), for example, analysed relevant studies on 
reduction of trait-anxiety, one of the most reliable measures in 
clinical psychology. Another by Alexander et al (1991) evaluated 
studies of self-actualisation, the most widely reported construct
118 Jonathan Shear
of positive psychological outcomes in the meditation literature. 
In both cases the results indicated that the TM technique had an 
effect size significantly greater than placebo (two and three times 
that of placebo for trait-anxiety and self-acti-ialisation respectively), 
with other procedures and groups of procedures generally having 
effect sizes comparable to placebo.
The difference between the effect sizes associated with the TM 
technique and those of the other procedures studied needs to be 
accounted for. Perhaps it is a product of the standardization of 
the TM technique and training of instructors, and the general 
absence of such standardization for the other procedures studied; 
or perhaps the relevant factor could be the mechanics of the 
various procedures themselves. In any case, even if most of the 
procedures studied so far do not appear to produce results on 
enough people quickly enough to be distinguished from placebo, 
this does not indicate that significant results are not produced by 
a wide variety of procedures. Indeed here, as in the case of pure 
consciousness and respiration, the results suggest that the claims 
of reduction of anxiety and growth of self-actualisation found in 
a wide variety of traditions must have some basis in fact.
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5. Meditation-related researcti and 
thie “Easy” problems
Let us now take it as given that some, if not many, traditional 
meditation procedures are capable of producing experience of 
pure consciousness, and speculate about the significance this 
might have for consciousness research in general. Many meditation 
traditions claim that this experience of consciousness in its 
simplest, most settled state can not only be experienced but also 
be used as a platform for uncovering and exploring the most 
fundamental structures and dynamics of consciousness in general. 
Two analogies might help make this claim seem somewhat 
plausible. The surface tension, ripples and subtle fluctuations 
that give rise to gross wave activity are clearly more isolatable 
and observable in a quiet body of water than one filled with 
waves. Moreover a common strategy for studying the properties 
of new substances is to isolate them in their pure state, introduce 
simple inputs, and evaluate the way the substance reacts. Not 
surprisingly, both silence and interaction with simple inputs are
emphasised in the research strategies of various Eastern 
meditation traditions. Tibetan Buddhist Shamnin practice, for 
example, emphasises the use of completely settled consciousness 
for exploring the nature of consciousness, as does the Yoga Sutras 
of Patanjali (1957). And the Yoga Sutras, the basic text of Yoga, 
devotes one of its four chapters to saniyama procedures designed 
to allow the settled state of consciousness to interact with selected 
simple inputs in order to display details of the nature of 
consciousness. Such traditions then often go on to claim that 
consciousness has a universal deep structure and dynamics 
discoverable by such methods. Unfortunately, however, the 
catalogs of fundamental structures and dynamics described in 
different Eastern systems are, to put it mildly, often less than 
completely consistent, although there are many points of 
congruence as well. Thus plausibility is one thing, reality is 
another, and established fact another thing yet.
Evaluating the many traditional procedures and. theories 
scientifically will require careful research. Ideally such research 
should employ highly trained meditators from different systems 
conducting internal explorations using appropriate "blind" 
protocols, such as the meditators' exploring without prior 
knowledge of particular experiences and structures supposed to 
exist and be discoverable within (or not) by the theories of 
different systems. Carrying out such research would be a major 
undertaking. But the results could really be worthwhile. For if 
the ancient accounts are even roughly correct, it could open the 
possibility of uncovering a detailed map of the fundamental 
structures and dynamics of consciousness -  the "genome" of 
consciousness itself, so to speak. And this, together with the 
results of the Human Genome Project, could be expected to 
contribute greatly to the so-called "easy" task of locating in detail 
the biological mechanisms underlying the basic contents and 
dynamics of human consciousness.
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6. Meditation and the “tiard” problem
We are of course nowhere near uncovering any such "genome" 
of human consciousness. And even if such a "genome" of 
consciousness were to be discovered, this by itself would bring 
us no closer to resolving the "hard" problem of explaining how
consciousness could even exist in the universe. This will require 
something more radical. One such radical response, as we saw, is 
to suggest that we need to include consciousness as a fundamental 
property of the universe. This response has taken several forms. 
One argues that the intractability of the hard problem itself 
shows that consciousness needs to be included as a fundamental 
property of nature. Another argues that consciousness is in some 
sense prior to matter, because it is needed for the quantum- 
mechanical "collapse of the wavefunction" that gives rise to 
matter. A third comes to similar conclusions from considerahons 
of the nature of knowledge.
Each of these suggeshons has serious contemporary defenders who 
offer forceful arguments in their support. But they all suffer from the 
major difficulty that they are grounded entirely on very theoretical 
considerations. Tlius, even if the hard problem, the nature of 
quantum mechanics, and the nature of empirical knowledge, each 
separately actually does imply that consciousness must be inferred 
to be a fundamental property of nature, the inference remains just 
that -  a theoretical inference. Indeed, even if one finds this inference 
conceptually appealing, psychologically it is opposed by the weight 
of both the enormously successful materialist paradigm of modern 
science and well-known universal factors of human cognitive 
development. It is also clear that there is at present nothing even 
remotely resembling consensus that this inference is required on any 
one of the above grounds, much less all three together. Resolving 
the hard problem clearly requires something more.
The hard problem is a problem of explaining an empirical fact, 
the existence of consciousness. Thus to be really convincing, an 
explanation should be well-supported empirically as well as 
conceptually. But it is hardly obvious how one could go about 
demonstrating scienhfically that consciousness is a fundamental 
feature of nature. Clearly the world does not look that way. 
Ancient meditation traditions, however, suggest some interesting 
approaches here. For many of these traditions base their claims 
about consciousness as a fundamental, all pervading feature of 
nature on reports of how the universe is said to be experienced 
by advanced practitioners in "higher" states of consciousness 
with sufficiently refined perceptual abilities.
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Such experiences might at first glance seem to be just what is 
needed to support the above sorts of inferences about the relation 
of consciousness to the objective universe, and ancient texts (and 
contemporary accounts) leave little doubt that psychologically 
speaking they do prove quite convincing. Bvit from a scientific 
perspective much more is needed. For by themselves such 
experiences provide no evidence that they are anything more 
than remarkable -  if remarkably satisfying -  artifacts of the 
individual experiencers' nervous systems. The claim that 
consciousness is the ground of the universe is a claim of objective 
fact, supposedly true independently of individual subjective 
perspectives. Establishing the truth of this claim therefore requires 
objective data, evaluatable independently of the existence of 
these unusual individuals' assessments of their own experiences.
Once again the hard problem might appear empirically intractable. 
But if we dig a little deeper into the traditional meditation 
literature we also find descriptions of procedures that suggest 
that the claim in question is, in fact, empirically testable. For in 
addition to holding that consciousness is a fundamental, pervasive 
feature of the objective universe, they also often maintain that 
procedures exist for interacting with the field of pure 
consciousness within and obtaining knowledge of any given 
objective fact about the universe whatsoever. If this latter claim 
were true, it would be possible for a suitably adept practitioner 
to use the relevant procedures (e.g., from the Smnyama chapter of 
the Yoga Sutras) to go within and come out, for example, with 
knowledge of events outside of what physicists call "the light 
cone." That is, one could gain objectively evaluatable knowledge 
of events which according to relativity lie too far away to be 
known at that time and place (such as, knowledge on earth of 
sunspot activity that occurred less than eight minutes ago). Such 
experiments would be easy to design. And if they turned out 
positively, they would provide striking objective support for the 
thesis that the "pure consciousness" experienced within either 
was, or was at least in intimate contact with, something radically 
more fundamental than matter as modern science understands it.
Unfortunately, however, accomplished practitioners capable of 
such performances do not appear to be available for such 
experiments, either because they do not exist, or they are unwilling 
or uninterested. Nevertheless, the above "thought experiment"
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shows that the hard problem of explaining consciousness need 
not be intractable in principle as often thought.
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7. Conclusion
Let us return from these imaginative flights and draw some 
practical conclusions. The science of genetics is at the forefront of 
our human sciences, and the success of the Human Genetics 
Project show how deep such knowledge can become. This success 
also highlights the need for comparable efforts to develop a 
genuine science of consciousness, the most important aspect of 
our uniquely human nature. It is also clear that sophisticated 
first-person investigative methodologies are going to be needed 
if we are to have any reasonable chance of unfolding knowledge 
of consciousness in the deep way that genetics is unfolding 
knowledge about the physical side of human nature. The centuries 
of work of Asian meditation traditions in developing and using 
systematic procedures for exploring the deep structure and 
dynamics of consciousness should prove most useful here. Some 
serious scientific work evaluating these procedures has already 
been done, and much more is needed. It is worth noting that 
ancient meditation traditions suggest that it may be possible to 
develop something comparable to knowledge of the human 
genome, a "genome" of consciousness. Such knowledge would 
obviously have enormous practical as well as theoretical 
usefulness.
So far, everything we have said about a potential future science 
of consciousness has been in terms of its intellectual value. Its 
greatest value however, it seems to me, would be in terms of how 
it might help us understand human fulfillment, individual and 
collective, and attain it to the maximum extent possible. Here, 
too, I think, ancient meditation traditions can give us direction. 
Indeed some relevant research has already been done here as 
well. But this is another topic altogether.
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Abstract
Mamj kinds of human states of consciousness have been distinguished, 
including colourful or anomalous experiences that are felt to have 
spiritual significance by most people who have them. The neurosciences 
have isolated brain-state correlates for some of these colourful states of 
consciousness, thereby strengthening the hypothesis that these 
experiences are mediated by the brain. This result both challenges 
metaphysically dualist accounts oflmman nature and suggests that any 
adequate causal explanation of colourfid experiences ivould have to 
make detailed reference to the evolutionary and genetic conditions that 
give rise to brains capable of such conscious phenomena. This paper 
quickly surveys types o f conscious states and neurological interpretations 
of them. In order to deal with the question of the significance of such 
experiences, the paper then attempts to identify evolutionary and 
genetic constraints on proposals for causal explanations of such 
experiences. The conclusion is that a properly sensitive evolutionary 
account of human consciousness supports a rebuttal o f the argument
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that the cognitive content of colourful experiences is pure delusion, but 
that this evolutionnry account also henvily constrains what might be 
inferred theologically from such experiences. They are not necessarily 
delusory, therefore, but they are often highly misleading. Their 
significance must be construed consistently with this concliisio)t.
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This paper addresses the nature and operations of the relatively 
unusual, typically colourful states of consciousness that are of 
enormous spiritual significance to most people, including 
especially religious people. Other scholars are producing much 
needed neurophysiological theories and philosophical 
interpretations of consciousness in its ordinary operations -  
important efforts on which this venture depends. The limited 
aim here -  and surely it is adventurous enough -  is to give an 
organized description of the relevant experiences. Space permits 
only an outline of this organized description. For the sake of 
economy of expression I shall refer to the experiences in question 
as "vivid experiences".
A comprehensive account of vivid experiences would require 
at least the following five components:
• phenomenology of vivid states of consciousness;
• neurophysiology of vivid states of consciousness;
• sociology of vivid states of consciousness;
• evolutionary interpretation of vivid states of 
consciousness; and
• philosophical and theological assessment of the 
significance of vivid states of consciousness.
This paper deals only with the first of these five components. 
This is valuable in itself, however, because an organized and 
comprehensive phenomenological description of vivid experiences 
is the precondition for effectively working on the other four 
issues.
My motivation for this study is three-fold. I am curious, of 
course. And I am often concerned by fanatical interpretations of 
vivid experiences that seem to produce socially undesirable 
effects. But I am also in search of an interpretation of vivid
experiences that is capable of helping the many people who are 
confused by such experiences come to terms with them. The 
three associated elements of inquiry, criticism, and pastoral 
concern may not be especially evident in this paper becavise the 
focus here is on description. Hopefully, subsequent work will be 
able to express more directly these equally strong elements of my 
motivation.
Vivid experiences are far more diverse than one might think. 
Mystics think first of mystical experiences. New Age enthusiasts 
of shamanic journeys or psi-related phenomena, traditional 
religious people of corporate worship or ritual experiences, and 
nature lovers of feelings of peace and awe while hiking or sitting 
beside a still mountain lake. There is no comprehensive 
phenomenology of the full range of such experiences. Rather, 
there are many partial phenomenologies directed by the interest 
and attention of the researcher. Here I present several such 
partial phenomenologies and also make an attempt to coordinate 
them into a richer account of vivid experiences by indicating the 




"Religious" experiences are the most diverse and elusive category 
to be discussed here. Religious involvement is associated with a 
host of experiences from the spectacular to the mundane, from 
the individual to the corporate, and from supportive to disruptive 
of ordinary social processes. The result of oversimplifying this 
diversity tends to be superficial or culturally slanted accounts of 
religious involvement and its significance for people. Yet any 
attempt to capture the diversity in a working definition seems 
futile. Defining religion is itself a famously difficult -  by now, 
perhaps a humorously hopeless -  task. The diversity of 
experiences associated with religious involvement is at least as 
complex.
For my purposes, the way to proceed is to make use of the 
vagueness of "religion" and simply refer "religious experiences" 
to the experiences people have by virtue of being religious or 
being involved in religious groups. This does no more than
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distinguish religious experiences from non-religious experiences, 
of course, but at least it establishes a modicum of resistance to 
oversimplifying treatments of religion.
Figure 1. Overlap between vivid [V] and religious [R] experiences.
As the description of vivid experiences unfolds, it will become 
clear that some religious experiences are vivid and some are not. 
Likewise, some vivid experiences are not associated with being 
religious or with religious involvement. Thus, the relation between 
religious and vivid experiences is one of significant overlap, with 
vivid experiences probably being more diverse than religious 
experiences and neither being a subset of the other.
Vivid experiences
Vivid experiences can be thought of as constituted by two major 
overlapping classes of experiences: anomalous experiences and 
ultimacy experiences. Within these two classes are other types of 
experience that have received phenomenological attention and 
they will be discussed presently. First, though, I discuss the two 
major classes. Their relationship to each other and to religious 
experiences can be sketched as follows.
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Figure 2. Relations betw een religious [R] experiences and vivid  
experiences, w here the latter class is constituted by ultim acy [U] 
and anom alous [A] experiences.
Anomalous experiences
The term "anomalous experiences" refers to experiences that 
apparently violate the operations of the world, as these are 
understood in normal life. Tlie word "abnormal" has unwarranted 
negative connotations but in some sense anomalous experiences 
are classifiable as such precisely because they are not normal -  
which is to say nothing about the normalcy or mental health of 
those who have them.
Though anomalous experiences are diverse, psychologists have 
studied many types. For example (Cardena et al 2000) offers 
survey articles on a number of types of anomalous experiences, 
including hallucination, synesthesia, lucid dreaming, out-of-body 
experiences, alien abduction experiences, anomalous healing 
experiences, past-life experiences, near-death experiences, psi- 
related experiences, and mystical experiences. Other anomalous 
experiences include mental phenomena associated with drug- 
induced altered states, psychiatric disorders, extreme 
circumstances, ecstatic states, group frenzy, snake-handling, fire­
walking, possession, as well as more marginally anomalous 
experiences such as dramatic self-deception and uncanny insight. 
There are also anomalous experiences associated with severe 
brain trauma.
The investigation of anomalous experiences is in its early days. 
Neurological studies have been conducted in some of these cases 
but not to any great extent. Experiences linked to brain trauma 
have received a great deal of attention in the neuropsychological 
literature because they help establish correlations between brain 
regions and functions. Only in the last couple of decades have 
careful investigations disclosed the devious magician-like 
techniques associated with some anomalous experiences, such as 
psychic healing and cold reading (see Randi 1982 and Skeptical 
hujuirer magazine). And survey data on the frequency and effects 
of such experiences have barely begun to be collected. Thus, it is 
difficult to draw stable conclusions about the causes and dynamics 
of anomalous experiences. Several vague and generalized 
comments can be made, however.
First, anomalous experiences are usually felt to be out of the 
control of those who have them. Even when they are sought 
after, which is sometimes the case with out-of-body or lucid 
dreaming experiences, typically the experiences themselves feel 
beyond the control of the subject.
Second, despite the first point, the study of anomalous experiences 
shows that some of them are reliably reproducible under the 
right conditions. For example, bright and fast-changing lights, 
loud and rhythmic music, a dynamic central personality, and an 
intensely supportive social atmosphere are recurring factors in 
cult conversions, group frenzy, anomalous healing experiences, 
and dramatic self-deception. Certain neurological conditions may 
be relevant also, making a person more likely to experience a 
whole range of anomalous experiences.
Third, anomalous experiences are emotionally and cognihvely 
potent. They produce powerful convictions in those who have 
them, convictions about the nature of reality and the significance 
of key events within it. These convictions are driven home by 
equally powerful, confirming experiences that are often felt to be 
the most important experiences of a person's life, determining 
many other decisions and commitments of time and energy.
Fourth, anomalous experiences often have little to do with religion 
and spirituality. Of course, they do sometimes occur in the 
context of religious involvement -  indeed, some religious groups
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make unconscious use of the environmental factors that render 
people more likely to have anomalous experiences. They 
commonly occur in non-religious contexts, however, where they 
are usually (but not always) felt to have great spiritual significance. 
A common situation is the occurrence of anomalous experiences 
outside the context of religious involvement, followed by the 
construction of an idiosyncratic spirituality based on the cognitive 
and emotional impact of the experience and a search for like- 
minded people with whom the experience can be shared safely. 
These rather impressionistic remarks indicate the importance of 
further research in this area. Anomalous experiences are more 
common than many people who have not experienced them 
might estimate. Their impact on personal self-understanding and 
worldview is easily underestimated, accordingly. They are vital 
factors in any attempt to understand how people come by their 
convictions and why they make the decisions they do. They are a 
colourful part of the experienhal fabric of human life.
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Ultimacy experiences
If anomalous experiences are defined by objective unusualness, 
ultimacy experiences are defined by subjective judgments of 
ultimate significance. These are experiences that a person feels 
are of vital importance for his or her life. They bring orientation 
and coping power, inspire great acts of courage and devotion, 
underlie key life decisions, and heavily influence social affiliation. 
They overlap with anomalous experiences but anomalous 
experiences occur without the subjective judgment of ultimate 
importance and ultimacy experiences occur in recognizably 
normal fashion, so the overlap is significant without being 
dominant.
When the parsing of experience begins from subjective judgments 
of ultimate significance rather than objective judgments of 
unusualness, very different distinctions emerge. Most prominent 
is the need for a distinction between short-term and long-term 
ultimacy experiences. The obvious phenomenological difference 
between discrete states and extended experiences is directly 
attributable to neurology: short-term states are tied more directly 
to discrete brain episodes whereas extended experiences usually 
require a rich social context to sustain them. It is discrete ultimacy
experiences that overlap most significantly with the anomalous 
experiences just reviewed. Both types have recurring 
characteristics (see Wildman and Brothers 2000) that can be 
reviewed here.
Extended ultimacy experiences seem to be of two basic sorts; 
those that serve the need for orientation and those that facilitate 
personal transformation. Orientation ultimacy experiences are 
vital for the stability of human social life. The embedding of 
ultimate ethical and religious commitments in social patterns 
(see Durkheim 1915; Berger 1967) is a process that only achieves 
coherence and conviction for individuals when supported by 
orientation ultimacy experiences. People also need to change, to 
break free from oppressive social constraints, to transcend their 
culturally limited imaginations. Whether sought or not, 
transformation ultimacy experiences facilitate such change.
Both types of ultimacy experiences have the same recurring 
characteristics in different relative weightings. Both types are 
existentially potent. They are embedded in a social context to 
various degrees, which is particularly important in the case of 
orientation ultimacy experiences. They also involve the 
transformation of behaviour, personality, and beliefs. These 
changes are important in both types of ultimacy experiences; 
whereas transformation ultimacy experiences obviously require 
change, orientation ultimacy experiences more subtly require 
changes that serve to conform individuals comfortably to the 
regularities of a social environment.
Discrete ultimacy experiences have very different characteristics, 
which are to be expected given the association with short-term 
brain states. They involve any combination of the following 
factors: a wide variety of sensory alterations, dramatic alterations 
in the sense of self, feelings of presences, compelling cognitions, 
and potent emotions. Discrete experiences often occur at the 
beginning of a process of personal transformation and then 
sometimes recur within that process; this is one way in which 
discrete and extended ultimacy experiences are related.
Like religious experiences, vivid experiences are constantly in 
danger of being misunderstood through the reduction of ultimacy 
experiences to anomalous experiences or vice versa. Either of
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these errors trivializes the complexity of human experience and 
leads to the underestimation of the significance of vivid 
experiences for healthy human beings. In fact, my impression is 
that almost everyone has ultimacy experiences of one sort or 
another even when they never get close to any anomalous 
experience. To put this point in another way, while an evolutionary 
interpretation of human experience could perhaps set aside 
anomalous experiences as, well, anomalous, ultimacy experiences 
have to be placed front and centre in any evolutionary account. 
The collapse of the distinction between ultimacy and anomalous 
experiences is potentially disastrous for a well-rounded 
understanding of human life.
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Meditation experiences
Tlie area of vivid human experiences profiting from the most 
extensive phenomenological, physiological, and neurological study 
has been and continues to be meditation experiences. South Asian 
and Buddhist traditions, particularly, include vastly elaborated 
distinctions of states of consciousness achieved in meditation.
The most comprehensive survey of meditation effects is that of 
Jean Kristeller (2001), who has developed a multi-modal 
developmental model to organize the relevant data. Kristeller 
distinguishes six types of meditation effects: physical, cognitive- 
attentional, emotional, behavioural, relation to self/others, and 
spiritual. For all of these types, she distinguishes between effects 
achieved early in the practice of meditation, those that require 
moderate meditation expertise, and those that tend to appear 
only in advanced practitioners. Together, the "modal" and the 
"developmental" axes constitute a two-dimensional grid upon 
which can be placed a host of recognized meditation effects 
(these effects are not shown in iigiire 3).
Apart from its intrinsic interest, Kristeller's model has significant 
value for clinical psychological and medical intervenhon. If 
impulse control or self-awareness is a problem for a client, for 
example, then a clinical recommendation of meditation may be 
appropriate because increased impulse control and heightened 
self-awareness are effects that can be expected quite early in the 
process of developing meditation skills.




Physical C o g n it iv e /  Em otional Behavioural R elation  to  Spiritual 
A tten tio n a l S e lf /O th e rs
F ig u re  3. Schem a for K ris te lle r 's  m u lti-m o d al d evelop m en tal  
model of meditation effects.
Further research is needed to evaluate claims about the therapeutic 
effectiveness of meditation but there is no question that those 
who practice meditation report positive changes. Account also 
needs to be taken of the fact that some engaging in meditation 
report terrifying and personality-disintegrating experiences, and 
others seem immune to at least some of the reported effects. Such 
considerations are particularly important if meditation is to be 
conceived as a means of therapeutic intervention. The therapeutic 
dimension of meditation also needs to be more closely integrated 
with existing work on the physiology of meditation (see Fischer 
1971) and new work on the neurophysiology of meditation (see, 
for example, Newberg and d'Aquili 2001).
The fact that meditation regularly produces specific experiences 
is important. Tliis reproducibility underlies the interpretation of 
me'ditation as a technology of self-cultivation and, in turn, the 
formation of communities devoted to meditation practice in 
religious and medical traditions throughout the world. An 
evolutionary interpretation of vivid experiences must take account 
of this fact.
Profound experiences
Of the vivid experiences discussed to this point, it is ultimacy 
experiences that are most important for people's existential self­
interpretation and orientation in the world. Ultimacy experiences 
are defined just so that the existentially most significant 
experiences are registered. It is of special interest for
understanding human spiritual formation, therefore, that a couple 
of subclasses exist within the class of ultimacy experiences: 
profound experiences and, within them, mystical experiences.
Theologians with a special concern for religious experience have 
long used metaphors to express the way experiences feel 
significant or profound for those who have them. Key metaphors 
of this type are depth, mystery, and horizon (used by Tillich 1951; 
1957; 1963 and Rahner 1987) both influenced by Heidegger 
(1962). These metaphors have become sensittve phenomenological 
tools for describing profound experiences but the toolbox is 
incomplete. For example, attending to the spiritual insights of 
scientists in their work invites the introduction of another 
phenomenologically tuned metaphor, complexity. And the 
metaphor of scale enables us to distinguish the familiar mystical 
experience of oceanic calm from the experience of depth. These 
five characteristics of profound experiences can be associated 
with mental states as follows (see Wildman 2000).
• Depth (terror, joy, bliss, ...)
• Horizon (fascination, attraction, alienation, fear, disgust, 
hate, ...)
• Scale (awe, oceanic calm, vastness, emptiness, ...)
• Complexity (surprise, wonder, confusion, disorientation, 
irritation, ...)
• Mystery (ignorance, incomprehension, loss of control,...)
These characteristics occur in various combinations in profound 
experiences, provoking different responses. For example, while 
depth invites surrender and scale induces worship, the other 
dimensions of profound experiences provoke interest in institution 
building, from different points of view: horizon for the sake of 
defence from the other, mystery for the sake of protection of the 
holy, and complexity for the sake of inquiry. Space does not 
permit further elaboration but this phenomenological toolbox is 
extremely useful for describing how human beings deal with 
their profound experiences. In short, profound experiences are 
the fundamental wellspring of inspiration for spirituality and 
religious expression in ritual and organization.
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Mystical experiences
Another subclass of ultimacy experiences is also a subclass of 
profound experiences: mystical experiences. In fact, mystical 
experiences lie at the triple intersection of ultimacy, anomalous, 
and religious experiences. So mystical experiences can be 
understood as intense forms of profound experiences that are 
also anomalous and religiously relevant.
Traditionally, the word "mystical" is reserved for experiences 
that are cultivated or experiences that occur spontaneously in the 
context of an ongoing effort to cultivate spiritual vitality of 
mastery. Phenomenologically, however, experiences other than 
these may be indistinguishable from mystical experiences. This is 
a reminder that taking names at face value may mislead and that 
it is prudent both to seek phenomenological descriptions for the 
experiences in question and to make allowance for the complex 
motivahons and social realities that underlie naming conventions.
Mystical experiences have been the most studied of all ultimacy 
experiences. Many distinctions have been invoked to account for 
the diversity of experience evident in mystics' self-reports. These 
reports span from nature mysticism to mysticism of supernatural 
beings such as angels and demons, and from mysticism related
Figure 4. M ystical experiences lie at the intersection of three other 
classes: ultim acy experiences [U], anomalous experiences [A], and 
religious experiences [R].
to a personal divinity to mysticism that transcends all concrete 
imagery and names, so there is a lot to comprehend. Usually, 
some of this diversity is omitted, perhaps because mysticism is 
construed more narrowly, or perhaps to make the models of 
mysticism theologically more coherent.
Perhaps the most widespread distinction in use is the essentially 
theological contrast between kataphatic mysticism, which is 
characterized by concrete imagery and a personal relationship 
focus, and apophatic mysticism, which involves a refusal of 
imagery and construes divine union as absorption rather than 
intimate relationship. Whether the experiences of mystics divide 
as neatly as this distinction suggests is difficult to determine 
because the hermeneutical issues involved in interpreting mystics' 
self-reports are complex. At the very least, however, this 
distinction has proved useful as a rubric for interpreting the self- 
understanding of a couple of kinds of mystics.
The most infamous debate over mysticism has extended through 
most of the twentieth century. It concerns what can be inferred 
about mystical experience and reality itself based on apparent 
similarities and differences between mystics' self-reports across 
the chasms of culture and era. Constructivists hold that local 
contexts are the leading factor in mystics' accounts of their 
experiences, to the point that stable generalizations are extremely 
difficult to make (see Katz 1978). Opposed are those who defend 
the reality of a so-called "pure consciousness event" and who 
detect this event recurring in mystics' self-reports (see Forman 
1990, 1999). At times, this debate seems to be conducted in the 
murky realm of unverifiable, unstable hypotheses, which is 
doubtless why it has persisted for so long. In our time, I suggest, 
the most productive questions about mysticism are the empirically 
tractable ones, such as the discovery of neural correlates for 
reliably reproducible mystical states of consciousness, and the 
elaboration of similarities and differences among mystical self- 
reports.
Most people do not have mystical experiences. Those who do 
tend to seek them out. The fact that such experiences are cultivated 
even while being so difficult to achieve is thought provoking and 
leads directly to questions about the value for people of such 
unusual experiences. Why go to such extraordinary lengths for
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mystical experiences? The answers appear to be three: the 
experiences feel good, they produce desirable practical effects, 
and they inspire compelling beliefs about reality. At least, that is 
how mystics seem to view matters. These are compelling enough 
reasons for some to pursue mystical experiences, perhaps, but 
evaluation of the associated epistemological claims to truth and 
the moral claims to beneficial effects needs to be carried on using 
means in addition to the positive self-assessments of mystics. 
Perhaps an evolutionary framework for interpreting mysticism 
can aid such evaluation.
Conclusion
The description of vivid experiences is now as fulsome as space 
allows here. Combining all of the types of experience mentioned 
to this point, the diagram illustrahng relations of membership 
and overlap among classes is now as follows.
Figu re 5. Relationships betw een religious [R] experiences, vivid  
experiences (where the latter class is constituted by ultim acy [U] and 
anom alous [A] experiences), meditation effects, and two subclasses of 
ultim acy experiences: profound experiences and mystical experiences.
This descriptive presentation of the diversity of vivid experiences 
suggests a number of conclusions. First, many people claim 
prosaic, humdrum experiential histories but typically this merely 
excludes mystical or other anomalous experiences, and perhaps 
the more extreme discrete ultimacy experiences. Many other 
experiences count as vivid and spiritually significant, however, 
and few people indeed are entirely bereft of vivid experiences so 
construed. Within tolerable limits of precision, therefore, and in 
anticipation of better survey data to confirm this, it is safe to 
conjecture that vivid experiences are normal and common, while 
the truly prosaic life is exceptionally rare and, correspondingly, 
difficult to comprehend.
A second conclusion bears on the need for neurological studies of 
religious experience. There has been some neurophysiological 
research on a few types of vivid experiences but most types 
remain neglected. The neuropsychological results to date are 
suggestive for a wider interpretation of vivid experiences, 
however, so there should be motivation to expand the reach and 
number of such studies. Such studies would be of two kinds. On 
the one hand, there is great value in "classical data" deriving 
from long-studied conditions such as temporal lobe epilepsy that 
produce colourful mental phenomena. Such data need to be 
enhanced and revisited to evaluate their relevance for 
interpretations of vivid experiences. On the other hand, and 
more recently, there have been studies that make use of various 
brain-scan technologies (Newberg and d'Aquili 2001). These 
studies suffer greatly from underfunding, which limits both 
sample sizes and the ability to perform digital summing and 
analysis of multiple scans, greatly hindering stable interpretation 
of the experiences being studied. Both types of research are 
important for reinforcing the phenomenological descriptions of 
vivid experiences and deepening knowledge of correlations 
between brain states and subjective reports.
A third conclusion bears directly on any attempt to give an 
evolutionary interpretation of vivid experiences. I think the 
evolutionary lens is the most salient for discerning the critical 
importance of vivid experiences in human social life but the actual 
description of such experiences is essential. The organized 
description of vivid experiences presented here should affect what 
counts as relevant and plausible in any evoluhonary interpretahon.
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While a narrowly scientific theory of vivid experiences perhaps 
could rest content with marshalling the relevant data and placing 
it in an evolutionary context of interpretation, a comprehensive 
theory would have to venture more. For example, people make 
claims about the character of the world based on vivid experiences, 
claims that can be assessed -  and ought to be when their moral 
implications are significant. Again, people's lives and their social 
environments appear to be regulated by the consistent occurrence 
of relatively mundane vivid experiences and occasionally 
dramatically transformed by unexpectedly potent ones. The way 
vivid experiences work to regulate and transform is a matter not 
just for the social sciences and psychology to describe. The 
relevant questions include the following; Are the sensory readings 
and cognitive information associated with vivid experiences 
valid? Under what conditions are they reliable? When should 
they be regarded with suspicion? These are truth questions, in 
one way, and questions about causation, in another. As such, 
they call for disciplines that are competent to handle issues of 
truth and causation, and in relation to the topic of vivid 
experiences the right discipline is a philosophically sensitive 
form of theology. The most important conclusion of this paper is 
that any such evaluative attempts must take account of the 
variety of types of vivid experiences in order to resist 
oversimplification and the distortion that results from it. Whatever 
else they may be, vivid experiences are ubiquitous, diverse, and 
highly significant for human personal and social life.
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Abstract
We nil have experiences of various kinds. What is experienced by one 
may not be experienced by another. Nonetheless, experiences per se are 
common to all -  young or old, learned or ignorant, wise or othenvise, 
blind or deaf, and so on. And in the case of all o f us, it is a matter of 
direct experience that we are conscious of such and such. We say, “I am 
conscious of the room", "I am conscious of the book", "I am conscious 
of my body", and so on down to "/ am conscious of my thoughts". This 
naturally leads us to the conclusion that consciousness must be 
inseparably embedded in all our experiences.
The attempt here will be to set out from the above appraisal and take a 
guided tour cidnnnating in getting a foothold on consciousness. It may 
be said en passant that something as commonplace as consciousness 
cannot be out of the puroiew of anybody's experience.
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1. Introduction
The agenda in focus here is to inquire into consciousness leading 
to its understanding. The strategy is to proceed from the 'known' 
to the 'unknown'. It is pertinent at this stage of the discourse to 
query as to whether consciousness is something that we 
understand or something we have no clue about. Naive and 
pedestrian as it may seem at first blush, the nontrivial pertinence 
of this question here will become evident on deeper consideration. 
In fact, the doubt itself needs to be first clarified before it may be 
cleared! After all, an individual having no idea whatsoever of a 
sphygmomanometer is, in principle, incapable of asserting, or for 
that matter, even negating, its existence.
In the early stages of the discussion on the nature of Brnhman in 
the Sutra Bhashya (commentary on the Brahma Sutras (1.1.1) of Sage 
Sri Badarayana), Sri Shankara recognises the possibility of the 
seeker being saddled with a similar situation in respect of Brahmaji. 
To settle the matter. He launches into a debate as follows.
That Brahman is either understood or it is unknown. Had it been 
understood, it is futile to investigate into it! If it were unknown, 
it is impossible to even probe into it!
Evidently, the bottleneck lies in considering two extreme situations; 
in each of them, we reach a dead-end. A detailed analysis that 
follows the above question in the Sutra Bhashya leads to a 
conclusion which for our limited purpose here may be 
summarized as follows.
"One who is neither totally ignorant of it nor fully knowledgeable 
about it is the candidate fit for this study" {Yoga Vasishtha, 
Vairagya Prakarana, 1.2).
It may be objected to here that what has been said in so many 
words is tantamount to: "If it is known, then it is known; if it is 
not, then it is unknown". In the process of countering a similar 
charge Sri Vidyaranya {Panchadasi 1.12) cites an example by 
which the possibility of partial knowledge is demonstrated.
"Just as the voice of his son from among a chorus chanting is 
recognized by the father,.... ". The father here is at a distance and
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his son, out of his sight, is one in a group of students chanting in 
chorus. The father is able to recognize the voice of his son; but 
due to the distance, he is unable to discern the details of the 
chanting. That is, 'he knows; yet does not know fully'. Neither 
knowledge nor ignorance is in full measure.
Let us consider a second example from mathematics, a branch of 
science widely recognized for its clinical precision set in a rational 
framework. Let /be a real-valued function on the reals and let 
F=L(f) be its Laplace transform. The problem is to find the limit 
of/(f) as t approaches infinity. The 'final value theorem' in the 
Laplace domain states that the limit of sF{s) as s approaches zero 
is the same as the limit of/(f) as t tends to infinity when the latter 
limit exists. Thus it is required to ensure the existence of the limit 
before it may be evaluated using the final value theorem. Else the 
results could be rubbish. Take/(f) to be sin (at), for instance. F(s) 
= L(J) is then a/{s^ + â ). If we were to blindly apply the final 
value theorem to this F, the result would be zero, which is clearly 
inadmissible. This implies that there can exist a nontrivial case 
wherein we have convinced ourselves merely of the existence of 
the required limit and have yet to get to its value! As in the first 
instance, neither knowledge nor ignorance is in full measure.
The implication is that knowledge in part, and in association 
with ignorance regarding the detail, is a sine qua non for any 
investigation. Sri Shankara fashions such situations as follows 
{Brahama Sutra Bhashya 1.1.1): "All parlance pertaining to pramana 
(the means to valid knowledge) and praineya (the object of 
knowledge) is exclusively in the realm of ignorance". It may be 
noted here that the take-home message of the above statement is 
not that 'All parlance ... is in the realm of total ignorance'.
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2. From experiences ....
We have, presently, set out to 'understand' consciousness. As we 
have seen from the foregoing, it would have been, even as a matter 
of principle, impossible (and meaningless!) to embark on this 
exercise had we been in total darkness regarding consciousness. 
Wliat is it that we know, however halting and in small measure, 
about consciousness at an entry level? To seek an answer to this, 
where is it that our search should begin? In the backdrop of the
discussion in the previous section, we proceed to probe into 
consciousness resorting to a known-to-the-unknown approach.
Those which are directly and indubitably known, and hence 
common, to all of us — young or old, schooled or unlettered, 
learned or ignorant, wise or otherwise, blind or deaf, and so on,
i.e., without loss of generality — are our own individual and 
immediate experiences. Experiences may differ from individual 
to individual, though. Recognition of this fact naturally suggests 
that we may as well start our probe by looking into our 
experiences in some depth. Our experiences tell us that 
consciousness is 'somehow' linked with them. Had we not been 
conscious of our experiences, there would have been no way we 
could have come to know of our experiences. We articulate our 
experiences as
* I am conscious of the trees out there;
* I am conscious of the book;
* I am conscious of the chair;
* I am conscious of my body;
* I am conscious of my hands;
* I am conscious of my eyes; 
and even so far as
* I am conscious of my thoughts.
Thus we see that consciousness is inseparably embedded in all 
our experiences. Something common to a collection of instances 
must be in the set of their intersection. A closer examination of 
the experiences listed above reveals that the objects which we are 
conscious of cannot exist in the intersection of the set of all 
experiences. For instance, 'the book' is not in the experience "I 
am conscious of my body" and 'my body' does not find a place 
in the experience "I am conscious of the book". When we are 
focused on our thoughts with our eyes shut, we may not 
comprehend any external object at all. The intersection of the set 
of all our experiences is consequently
* I am conscious.
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3...... To consciousness
It may seem somewhat difficult to digest the conclusion at the 
end of the previous section. The following dialogue between an
enlightened master and his seeking pupil (Sri Sankara's Ekasloki) 
will help clear the cloud.
Master : What is light for you?
Studeiil : It is the sun during day; at night, the lamp, etc.
Master : May that be so. In seeing the sun, lamp, etc., tell me as 
to what serves you as your light?
Student : The eyes.
Master : When your eyes are shut, what (is it)?
Student : My intellect.
Master : In perceiving your intellect, what (is it)?
Student : There, it is I.
(It is significant to point out that till this stage of the 
dialogue, the master was addressing his ward in 
common second person. Now, however, on having 
seen that his student is enlightened himself, the master 
addresses him in respectful second person, bhavaan) 
Master : So, you are the ultimate Light.
(Now the student does not arrogate to himself the 
elevated position hinted at by his master. His words 
are poignant.)
Student: That I am, O Lord.
The ultimate light alluded to by the master here is nothing but 
consciousness. The student does not realize this subtlety at the 
outset and provides his answers taking only the gross meaning 
of 'light'. The master leads him tactfully through a sequence of 
progressively penetrating probing. The competent disciple, in his 
turn, picks up the cues from stage to stage and responds with 
sharpness and progressively deeper insights. The moral of the 
story, based on experience, is therefore "I am consciousness".
One may be tempted to argue that consciousness cannot be 
divested of an external object. The subjective experience of 
dream-free deep sleep may be cited to counter such a stance. Are 
we indeed conscious in dream-free deep sleep? Suppose not. 
Then our post-sleep recollection, "I slept peacefully; I was not 
aware of anything", must fall short of an explanation. After all, a 
recollection must suppose a prior experience. And as we have 
seen, there can be no experience shorn of consciousness. This 
message is forcefully driven home by Sri Vidyaranya (Pancliadasi 
10.11) with the aid of the following illustration.
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In a stage play, a light illuminates, sans prejudice, the makeshift 
stage, the objects on it, the characters on stage, the audience, and 
so on. When after the play, the audience depart, the actors and 
actresses retreat and the stage is totally dismantled, the light 
continues to shine though it does not illuminate any object. The 
light not illuminating any object is not to be construed as the 
light being switched off! If any object presents itself, we say that 
the light illuminates it; else, it shines by itself, and that in fact is 
its true intrinsic nature.
Yet another significant and captivating illustration is brought out 
by Sri Shankara (Manisha Panchakam 4). On a day with thick dark 
clouds, we say that the sun is not seen as it is occluded by the 
clouds. Lo and behold! Here, the clouds, which we say are 
obstructing our vision of the sun, are themselves revealed only 
because of the illumination of that very sun! The simple matter of 
fact is that, clouds or no clouds, obstructing or otherwise, the sun 
shines by itself. That is its true intrinsic nature.
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4. Conclusion
We set out to fathom consciousness. We saw that that presupposed 
some foothold on consciousness without which our probing is 
infeasible. That common minimum foothold, we discerned, was 
our experiences. A cursory look at our experiences suggested a 
'working definition' for consciousness, namely, "that which is 
common to all our experiences". Through a sequence of 
ratiocinated steps supported by examples and illustrations, we 
arrived at the conclusion that
I AM CONSCIOUSNESS.
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Abstract
There has been much said about consciousness, but very often the right 
questions are not asked. In this paper, the author sets out to press 
certain "limit questions" that raise both matters o f epistemological 
constraints in the inquiry and issues in metaphysical speculations 
about this thing called consciousness (and whether it names anything 
real at all?). Various candidates for a partial or (doubtfully) complete 
description of consciousness are entertained, before moving on to 
propose certain basic characteristics that would appear to be basic and 
in need of further explication. Drawing from critical phenomenology, 
these are identified as the surprising traits of intentionality, subjectivity 
(or deep self-awareness and the unconscious), and history o f 
consciousness. On the metaphysical side, the paper concludes by arguing 
against faith in both the dualism o f mind/spirit over matter, and 
reductionist materialism or physicalism, leaving open a qualia-based 
model o f decentralized conscious states.
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Is consciousness any of these things?:
(i) An event; (ii) a process; (iii) a substance; (iv) a phenomenal 
property or ; quality {qmlia); (v) a function of some other event 
or process; (vi) an extension (of mind, of corporeality); (vii) 
momentary contentless mental movements; (viii) time-sequenced 
awareness contents; (ix) utterly contingent; (x) experiential 
apperception; (xi) an eliminative by-product.
Of course, these are not the exhaustive categories in terms of 
which consciousness has been described or analysed in accounts 
that abound in the various fields of investigation on the 
phenomenon apparently unique in at least the living human 
constitution, I do not have a particular theory to propound, but I 
wish to take this opportunity to register some of the questions 
and issues that, for me at least, remain outstanding or insufficiently 
addressed. What I set out to do in this paper is to underwrite 
certain 'Umit-questions', or bounds of discourse, beyond which it 
would be fruitless to speculate; but 'limit-questions' may also 
point to possibilities by stretching the logic of the discourse and 
appealing to reasonable metaphysical propositions (the ontology 
of 'what it might be like'’ ) as critical demands coming from 
outside a discipUne. I believe there is a good deal of high-fluting 
scholasticism matched only by extreme cynicism and positivism 
in the inquiry; and yet there are certain insights that need to be 
highlighted in such discussions as we are engaged in here at the 
symposium, but these may come from unexpected quarters. One 
of the questions that we have not dealt with but which gets a fair 
degree of attention these days in the literature is that of 
intentionality? So I will begin with this observation before moving 
on to other more ontological and metaphysical questions.
I
All conscious experience appears to have the characteristic of 
being intentional, i.e., whenever we have some awareness that 
state of consciousness (even if it is without any specific form) 
tends towards or is directed towards some object or other (however 
obliquely).^ No other part of our body or bodily state seems to 
possess this characteristic, unless consciousness is already involved 
even at a most primitive, subconscious level. For instance, the 
finger may pull itself away from the flame or the syringe as a 
stimulus of pain, but the finger does not in and of itself refer to
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the object of likely pain, or is in any sense about the stimulus of 
pain in the way in which awareness, cognition, feeling, memory, 
anxiety, fear and such other experiential states in such an 
occurrence are precisely of or about (the object) of pain. The pain 
when it occurs may itself become an internal object or noetic 
content of consciousness. But for consciousness, it seems, the 
body is not in a dis-position to direct itself (or be disposed) 
toward the world or anything outside.'' In short, then, we 
experience consciousness not directly but in the course of an 
awareness that is of or about something; there is no such moment 
as 'pure' non-intending consciousness. Unless, of course, we 
mean by the latter some primitive, inchoate mental episode 
momentarily absent of content, nonetheless expectant of it (as in 
dreamy or drowsy states, or in a dash of anguished rage where 
the subject has lost sight of that to whom or which the anger is 
directed, whence some innocent bystander or the family pet cops 
the heat). Apart from certain strains of mysticism which are not 
necessarily based on empirically sustainable phenomenological 
data that is accessible across the spectrum, there is no good 
evidence to believe that consciousness is formless, contentless, 
without parts and in essence non-intentional and absolute (i.e. 
neither dialectical nor dynamic) as the doyen of Advaita Vedanta, 
Sankara had argued back in the 8th Century. Professor Mohanty 
has pointed out elegantly elsewhere, that Indian philosophers 
and mystic theosophies alike tend to conflate something not 
having form, or contents, or parts, or without a locus etc., with 
not being intentional.® Even the distinction between something 
being an act or being a state, and being without form or without 
parts, or bereft of location and non-referential re-identification 
('ego'), can be critical in such matters, as the debate between the 
Nyaya, the Miinainsa, and Buddhist on the structure of 
consciousness (or conscious-/«g moment from the Buddhist 
perspective) have attested to. But we cannot go into this intricate 
debate here, suffice it to note that a thorough critique of faith in 
'pure' consciousness (or the presumed stark opposition between 
'asmad' and 'yusniat' -  self as consciousness and the other -  on 
the flawed analogy of light to darkness'’), leads to the unavoidable 
conclusion on the basic intentional character of consciousness. 
This is not to argue for the 'essence' of consciousness, for to 
admit to any esscnce would be to suggest already that there is 
such an existent as consciousness; when in fact, following the 
wisdom of the Buddhist philosophers, the phenomenologists.
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and reports from modern science, we are better off 'bracketing 
out' (epoche) all ontological existential presuppositions. Because, 
the argument goes, consciousness may well turn out in the end to 
be a no more than a convenient naming term for what is basically 
a process, an event, a property (or balloon of properties), a 
momentary series of awareness (phenomenal) states that arise 
and disappear with each apprehension of an object or more 
likely the concept of the object. Furthermore, these discrete mental 
states are bindingly held together by another unifying and slightly 
more enduring mental state, individuated or, as it were, pegged 
down to a virtual-spatial locus (roughly around or within the 
body). This binding qualia acts as the 'owner' of the intentional 
series, which we call the 'ego' (the egological qualia), or what 
manifests itself in its self-reference as 'I ', the 'I-sense' 
(ahampratynya), or (more theoretically) as the transcendental 
subjectivity (in neo-Kantian terms, where 'transcendental' is a 
phenomenological and not a metaphysical ideal for an 
experiencing subject or person)7
The foregoing analysis thus far, then, has made a strong case for 
intentionality within any discourse of consciousness. This has 
been one of the great discoveries attributed widely to Husserlian 
phenomenology, although Ramanuja (the 12th century Indian 
philosopher) was also insistent upon this trait, albeit more on 
metaphysical grounds than from any studied empirical or 
phenomenological consideration, but all the richer for it within 
the Vedantic discourse*. This fact about consciousness has huge 
ramifications for any systematic study thereof, one of which is 
that it should prove theoretically difficult to isolate consciousness 
as a substance (in a vat for example, or in supposedly deep 
meditate state), that is not at the same time in relation to some 
other thing or things -  and it is hard to see how a thing could be 
in relation to itself, as is often implied in the Vedanta (Advaitic) 
utterances about the self-luminosity of atman as siii generis 
consciousness (cit). I fail to see what certain experiments such as 
the arrestive ECG and probes into the neural chemistry or 
anatomy of the brain can yield when these seem scantly attentive 
to the dimension of intentionality, not as a side-product, but as a 
correlate part of what constitutes (or is constitutive of) 
consciousness. It is not unlike the situation where an etymologist 
thinks he can pronounce on the meaning of a sentence as a 
speech-act simply by discerning the root denotation of each word
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in the sentence in its formal structure. Like meaning, that can vary 
with each utterance or occurrence of the same sentence (depending 
on the context, norms of interpretation, disposition of the audience 
etc.), consciousness too appears to have this peculiar subjective 
dimension which cannot be easily, reductively, extricated or 
suspended for want of a 'clean' analytic or scientific account. But 
this does not necessarily affect eliminative accounts which are 
also reductive to a degree. But before saying something more on 
the heuristic significance of such accounts, I wish to say something 
about another model I have in mind, which I call the 'ideality' of 
consciousness, in terms of which certain hard-headed assumptions 
that have been around so long can be eliminated.
By 'ideality', I mean to underscore several points at once. In the 
most general terms, ideality can be taken to mean 'just the very 
idea of' or paradigm of controlling ideas (as perhaps when we 
think of 'ideology' in the Hegelian sense); but in more specialized 
terms, it would suggest something like a capacity for formal 
abstraction, a geometry or architectonic if you like, which lends 
itself to conceptual or discursive analysis. Ideality covers certain 
specific and in many ways inexplicable characteristics of 
consciousness alongside intentionality. These are capacities of 
higher mental order, much besides sensations, reactions, and 
similar light-weight empirical measure of the presence or 'facticity' 
of consciousness (to avoid talk of 'essences'). And these, mind 
you, still cry out for explanation or adequate integration within 
all accounts of consciousness. Let me list a few of these elements:
Subjectivity (self-conscious apperception)
The capacity for a priori concepts 
Categories of understanding 
Moral intuitions
Historical sense (individually and collectively)
Aesthetic experiences 
Compassion
Time and space fore-grounds 
Language 
Logic and reason 
Extension or universalization
These capacities, tendencies, or dispositions do not just happen 
to us and they are not as easily reducible to psychological traits
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as more simple-minded psychologistic or positivistic accounts 
would have it: just my sense that there is an extended temporal 
space and several sites or locations outside of the extremities of 
my individual body is not (as far as I can tell) experienced by, for 
example, inanimate things, such as the table 1 am sitting at and 
the computer 1 am writing on (or even by the deceased body that 
I dreamt of last night in its blissful self-folding sleep of oblivion 
to my concerns about its proper ritual disposal). Notice that I am 
also, unlike the table, able to describe my behaviour and make 
decisions about what to write (if the inspirahon moves me!). In 
other words, I am a subject, who has a range of experiences 
which are episodically or periodically brought under an 'I', often 
described as the unity or apperception of all the experiences 
connected mereologically in a series. How can we explain this 
sense of awe at being a drop in the vast panorama of phenomenon 
coupled with being self-conscious?.
II
Subjectivity
This is a major category heading the list under 'Ideality' and 
presents a major challenge to all accounts of consciousness, 
especially naturalist, reductive, and eliminative ones. But is this 
subjectivity an act, an event, a property, or is it nailed, so to 
speak, solidly onto a substance of some kind? One of the enduring 
virtues of the Cartesian model -  despite its dualistic excess on 
which I will comment shortly -  is that by focusing on the mental, 
the 'ghost inside', it kept this challenge in the forefront and has 
continued to rear its cinematic head to critique unbending 
naturalist accounts. Many traditions have wondered who is the 
‘V that sees and hears, that listens and speaks, that thinks and 
writes, and even thinks about thinking? But then scholastic 
tendencies in these traditions have tended to run far off the 
immediate questions only to bring back, as it were bigger ghosts 
and mysteries from afar to explain this small mystery -  such as 
God, Brahman, universal Atman, spirit-self, unio mystico. More 
precisely, in Descartes' case in European thought or echoing the 
case of Nyaya in Indian thought, a mental non-material substance 
(incorporeal mind or spiritual self) that is separate and 
independent of the corporeal body (physical matter, biological 
nervous system and brain), that makes possible this self- 
consciousness of an extended being {res extensa) amidst all the
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furniture of the universe. Ontological dualism, however, has not 
got us very far, and if anything -  going by current wisdom in 
Philosophy -  has rather got in the way of clear thinking in 
respect of this inquiry. The problem has not so much been in 
what we have been led to believe on the mind (or the broadly 
spiritual) side of the equation but in respect of the tacit intuition 
about the material substance. As David Ray Griffin has pointed 
out (rephrased by George Shields, (1998)“') that the Cartesian 
formula of res extensa as representing the essence of matter has 
impacted on both the materialist and the dualist traditions alike; 
"(S)ince consciousness has been regarded as the opposite of 
extended matter, those who presuppose Cartesian matter are 
then logically forced into two divergent paths, each rife with 
difficulty and paradox: either completely reduce consciousness 
to extended matter (or eliminate consciousness entirely) or 
ontologically separate it from the material domain. On the first 
option, we end up with a most implausible denial of the reality 
of consciousness and its qualia, and, on the second, we give up 
naturahsm and thus introduce notions of occult agency (among 
other perplexities)."
Now, Kisor Chakrabarti's (1999) attempt -  here closely following 
the Nx/aya ontology -  to shift the burden of extension (vibhu) from 
the material substance to the non-material substance called ahm  
(self) does not get us out of this paradox, as it leads to reducing 
consciousness in the other direction (the purely spiritual, the 
'occult agency'), without providing a satisfactory answer to the 
major question of how can substances of entirely different nature 
or kind be said to interact at all?'° Well, perhaps we ought to 
recognize this unique suggestion coming from the Nyaya for 
what it is worth: namely, that, unlike in Cartesian dualism where 
it is the material substance (the body and its sense-organs) that 
has extension, in the Nyaya, it is the essence of the self, the non­
material substance, to have vibhu or (literally 'extensional 
pervasion') that makes possible this extension." But how exactly 
this inversion of the source of extension helps solve problems in 
dualism is not clear.'  ̂ There is a same old causal impasse here as 
in the Cartesian (or any other) model of mind-body dualism qua 
realist ontology (as distinct from aspectual or discourse dualisms). 
The analogy of my thought moving the pen (or to a post­
modernist, the act of writing re-inscribing ideas in the head) will 
not work in the context of accounting for how the mental or
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spiritual substance, which has none of the properties of matter 
(and cannot even be said to occupy space for that matter or 
spirit), could move the physical (or vice versa), and not just 
v^hisk right through the physical base (body, brain, pineal point) 
as low-frequency radio waves do without necessarily breaking 
into sound or noise at every point. We are left with an unworkable 
epiphenomenalism.
Moreover, ascribing states of consciousness to the disembodied 
self {atma) as a property (guna) or qualia -  which is really the heart 
of the Nyaya account of consciousness - presents the further 
difficulty of separately establishing the existence of the atma, 
which is an even more formidable challenge than establishing a 
non-materialistic Cartesian mind. It is interesting though that the 
Nyaya 'mind' (inanas) is more akin to the Aristotelian communis 
sensus (the 'common sense') than it is to the Cartesian mind, as it 
is described virtually as the sixth sense-organ and yet distinct 
from the body and its basic sense-organs. However, locating the 
mind as a cognitive-affective hermes or conduit in some nebulous 
space between the given material substance (constituting the 
body and its sense-organs) and a supposed spiritual substance 
does not resolve the problem of a more plausible explanation of 
just how it is that two entirely and essentially different kinds of 
substance can work through a medium that does not share the 
properties (fully or even partially) of one side of the divide. Just 
the same problems arise for other Indian accounts: in respect of 
the 'inner sense' antahkarana in Vedanta, 'intelligence', manas- 
citta in Samkya-Yoga, and in Mimamsa with its own variant concept 
of the 'mind-function', manapratyaya, although not a supplemental 
sense-organ. There is something missing here in all these accounts; 
and what is missing is not some thing but an explanation of the 
transparency of atma (spiritual self-substratum) to the body qua 
mind and vice versa. It is often said that at death the atma, like 
the electricity in a table lamp, departs from the body, and 
cripples or renders dysfunctional the mind, like the globe of 
varying voltage and amps, and there is no possibility of 
consciousness states thereafter . But what is this evidence of? The 
absence of evidence to the contrary does not amount to evidence 
of absence.
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III
It seems that we need to free ourselves of the erstwhile polarity 
of 'inside' and 'outside', i.e., of trying to locate consciousness 
within the mortal frame (whether in the cinema of the 'Cartesian 
theatre', the supposedly non-physical mind), or, in some single 
spot within the body, such as the brain, much less in a single spot 
within the brain (the 'Centre of Narrative Gravity'). Our mental 
life, and if the intentionality that I spoke of earlier is anything to 
go by, is located neither outside in the world, nor inside our 
body. Perhaps in the new language that we are desperately in 
quest of we may have to speak of consciousness as that which is 
both constituted by and constitutive of the body (or brain) and 
the mind (as the meaning-act). This sure does sound circular, but 
it is not viciously so; it is defensible. Because, what we are trying 
to do is to avoid both the horns of the Cartesian-implied dilemma 
that we pointed to a moment ago: (i) the mind (alone) is 
responsible for consciousness; (ii) the natural world is itself 
generative of consciousness. 1 am tempted to say, consciousness 
begins with (i), and matures with (ii), and yet -  when we take in 
the historical dimension or long-term persistence of consciousness 
as of time (which is how I would re-write Heidegger's much 
cliched 'Being and Time') -  consciousness curiously also 
constitutes (i) and (ii).
To develop this point a bit further, by historical consciousness I 
mean the collective repository or archeology of the inner-time 
consciousness across the board picking up on discrete human 
experiences. There is, as it were, a cumulative growth of 
consciousness states, layers upon layers, like fossils, now perhaps 
inert but once upon a time every bit consciously felt and owned 
(or 'pre-loved') by some living agency. The agents may be' dead' 
or mute but the discrete train of traces or subtle effects, as it 
were, are brought forward as many artifacts, testimonies, records, 
achievements, merits and sins, values and aspirations -  indeed, 
the outer-time consciousness or histori/ in that more Hegelian 
sense -  from generation to generation, epoch to epoch, and so on. 
How dare we leave consciousness out of the movement and 
trajectory of history, human and other sentient history (unless, 
we have moved through life like stars and galaxies governed by 
unself-conscious hidden laws of nature)! For, the very sense of 
history is the collective self-consciousness and reflection upon
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the folding layers of qualias, such as are attached to whole 
groups', races', or corr\munities 'I's (or 'we's), replicating in 
many ways the individual's narratives and life-stories writ large 
(as when we speak of civilizations, the preserve of cultures, 
transcendental self-identity of enclosed communities etc.).
This back-logged consciousness also creates us in a manner of 
speaking; meaning that each individual (body-mind complex) 
inherits or imbibes fragments (in Hindustani there is a 
universalizing poetic image of 'chand ka tukra', 'bits of the moon') 
of the collectively conscious subjectivity or transcendental qualia 
(again, in a contingently historical rather than pre-assigned 
ontological sense). It is this that enables (or em-powers) many a 
capacity, and identifies us as distinct individuals belonging to 
distinct communities, not least of which are speech-language or 
lingua franca, discourse, self-story or social identity, moral values, 
religion, aspirations, and so on. And we pass these on, somewhat 
transformed, evolved or regressed, often without self- 
consciousness {authorial imprimatur) to the next generation, ad 
infinitum. We should not lose sight of this unique dimension of 
transparency (as trans-parenting) of consciousness, which I have 
called constitutive - although some philosophers will still argue 
that it is merely correlative.'^ Nevertheless, like history, the next 
moment is never the same because it is 'interpreted' or formed and 
fused through the antecedent moments. This was the genius also 
of the Buddhist theory of consciousness in its recognition of the 
branching effect, the mereological spread over finite time of a self- 
narrating, self-referring, stream of conscious-ing moments bound 
together (the 'binding' effect) in a loosely urufied field, we like to 
call 'self' (not as an irreducible substance here), whose present 
self-awareness and knowledge of the world are supervenient 
upon properties and relations leftover from all the past experiences 
(conscious-mg states), and whose future is likewise determined by 
or is a mere trajectory of the vanishing present. Beneath all this 
noise so to speak, and beyond also, is nothing but emptiness -  
meaning, no-self, no-soul, no-mind, no-God, no-Brahman, no- 
Absolute, just nothingness. (There are, of course, subtleties and 
differences within Buddhist schools, such as Yogacara, Sautrantika 
and Madhyamika, that we need not go into here.)
Coming back to the point about the historicality of consciousness 
and its cumulative effect on phenomenal experiences in every
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next moment; however this in itself might not be, as it clearly 
need not, essential to consciousness, for if there were just one 
person (a purusha) in the whole universe who lived only 
temporarily without progeny {aprajapati), we would not necessarily 
want to deny consciousness to the Mahapurusha. The difference 
nevertheless will be in the qualia of consciousness, the properties 
that is, which will be one of degree rather than of kind, just in the 
way your or my consciousness has refracted through many 
previous (time-sequenced) and different prisms (spatially) of 
conscious-mg^ moments. Suffice it however to show that 
consciousness is something, it is profoundly enigmatic but a sure 
remainder in human experiences. This would suggest an 
irreducible core within consciousness or at least in the explanations 
and definitions of consciousness. Now this has been a moot issue 
and the subject of much debate in recent works in philosophy 
and psychology on consciousness. But reductionism is alive and 
well in several quarters, some more ruthlessly eliminative than 
others. For example, Daniel Dennett (1991) does not believe that 
irreducibility in respect of the arresting mystery of subjectivity is 
such a big deal: that is to say, the reference to the subjective, to 
intentionality, can be carved off, and these too can be reduced to 
ordinary biological, physical features of the brain (qua Searle 
(1992) and Churchland (1981)), and exhaustively redefined in 
third-person (ordinary thing-language) descriptions and criteria 
(e.g., our experience of heat is redefined in terms of kinetic 
energy that increases mean temperature).’"' Such a redefinition 
eliminates any reference to the subjective appearances, the way 
heat or colour appears to individuals.'-^
There are some philosophers, such as Thomas Nagel,'* Roger 
Penrose'^ and David Chalmers'* more recently, who have resisted 
ironing out the perspectivism of persons into the smooth 
objectivity of the world of physics, much less in terms of 
unbending hard-wired materialism. They urge that even if 
consciousness is not mystery, it is still unexpected from an 
objective' approach to what it is like inwardly to be in a conscious 
state and to have conscious (or unconscious) experiences which 
we may never be able to pass on, again, to the table or the 
computer that are in some ways the only 'witnesses' to these 
ruminations in the early hours of each morning (while the 
resident dogs seem to have a better sense of my angst). Given 
these characteristics, consciousness is at least 'surprising', as
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Chalmers puts it.'  ̂ And so these philosophers believe that there 
is at least an epistemological irreducibility of mental processes to 
brain states that calls into question all attempts at one-sided 
elimination. Thus Nagel has argued that '(t)he subjectivity of 
consciousness is an irreducible feature of reality -  without which 
we couldn't do physics or anything else -  and it must occupy as 
fundamental a place in any credible world view as matter, 
energy, space, time, and numbers'.^” Any 'correct theory of the 
relation between mind and body would radically transform our 
overall conception of the world and would require a new 
understanding of the phenomena now thought of as physical. 
Even though the manifestations of mind evident to us are local -  
they depend on our brains and similar organic structures -  the 
general basis of this aspect of reality is not local, but must be 
presumed to inhere in the general constituents of the universe 
and the laws that govern them.'^' Nagel's epistemic non- 
reducibility (with a remainder) reinforces the point I have been 
trying to stress here about the involvement of the larger picture, 
so to speak, of the world as a constitutive element in the 
emergence of consciousness, neither inside in the brain nor 
wholly outside in the heavens: but in the matrix that holds them 
together in an organic whole. Again, I agree with Nagel that the 
same entity can have causally emergent physical and mental 
properties; this is called by Nagel, and others, the 'dual-aspect 
theory'; I prefer to call it, non-dual naturalist emergentism, in which 
the necessity of an absolute ontological substratum to 
consciousness is eliminated. However, this position does not 
argue for a wholesale elimination of mental concepts in the 
explanation (for the 'mentalese' has a central role to play in terms 
of phenomenal properties that are supervenient upon physical 
occurrences, but they could also be dependent upon other’inter­
looping phenomenal properties or qualia). Nor does the non- 
eliminative view of our mental world imply that we succumb to 
some version of ontological transcendentalism or the 'mystical' 
within subjectivity and intentionality!
Such a position, which echoes recent developments in Process 
Para-Philosophy,“ retains intact a common sense commitment to 
non-reductionist naturalism, while at the same time assuming a 
broad 'radically empiricist' notion of the data a theory ought to 
accommodate, including the capacity for non-sensory ('extra­
sensory') perception, by virtue of admitting a role for Nyaya's
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notion of mensa extensa, the mind as having its own extension (in 
cohorts with res extensa within an organized division of labour). 
This overcomes the difficulties of accounting for the emergence 
of consciousness and its properties from purely extensional matter 
on the one hand, and pristinely extensional psyche on the other. 
The same topic can have both these correlative qualias or aspects. 
Still, I confess, a further argument is needed to explain how these 
can be constitutive or productive of consciousness. We are burdened, 
indeed haunted, by the same sort of problem that arises in 
attempting to make liriks from observing behaviour and properties 
of neurons and synaptic responses to stimuli inserted and 
observed from without and to subjective states and intentionality 




To bring this discussion to a close, let me highlight again some 
salient issues and characteristics of consciousness that have been 
uncovered in order that the discussion moves forward rather 
than backward in the multi-disciplinary inquiry that we are all 
engaged in. Here are 10 significant points (with two supplements) 
I have argued for in this short analysis.
1. Consciousness is the name for the preeminent principle of
awareness in every day experience that is responsible for 
making an occurrent self-consciously (or self-awareingly) an 
experience: it is what illuminates an experience -  we may 
call this the conscious mind;
2. Consciousness has content but no particular form; it takes
the form or contours of the occurrent experiences which the
awareness shadows or witnesses, albeit not as an entity
distinct from sensations, feelings, cognitions and other mental 
states as mapped in phenomenological analysis;
3. Awareness may be submerged or suspended as in 
unselfconscious processes, dreams and deep sleep states -  or 
the unconscious;
4. There is (either way) an irreducible core of subjectivity and 
intentionality that makes the conscious mind more than all 
sensations, bodily ascriptions, experiences, including the "I- 
sense" and moral knowledge;
5. It is thus more than the physiological-neural and synaptic- 
receptor etc. activities inside the brain or sense-organs {manas 
included);
6. The processes and brain mechanisms observed or chartered 
from outside (or yogically, i.e. m ystical-m editative 
introspection) yield at best correlates and not what is 
constitutive of consciousness in all its complexity;
7. Basically, consciousness is constituted by and constitutive of 
the world (recurrently birthing) within a historical and social- 
cultural process; this is the horizon of the transcendental 
subjectivity into which the individuated subjectivity is fused; 
in other words,
8. The 'Narrative Gravity' extends beyond the individual 
'owner' to the larger cumulative historical dimension that 
constitutes the world and interactively the qualias of all 
consciousness (i.e. differentially spaced branching streams of 
conscious-fngs each of which creates its own contingent 'I- 
feeling' );
9. It follows from 4 and 8 above that consciousness is not a 
substance (materialistic or spiritual and non-corporeal) but a 
phenomenal property qualia (or intertwined clusters of 
qualias) and there is no such thing as 'pure' or 'absolute 
consciousness' in the metaphysical sense (it could be 
transcendental in the phenomenological sense, as in the 
'inner core structuring noema');
10. We need principles of phenomenological supervenience in 
lieu of unidirectional causal language (thus, e.g. mental 
event M is supervenient on physical event P which is observed 
from outside as P*, ceteris paribus), mereological apperception 
(identity is generated from within the branching and binding 
series), and a more inclusive ontology of non-dual naturalism 
(aspectual or property dualism within 'natural' philosophy) 
to re-define and refine our understanding of consciousness
11. This would help eradicate outmoded discourses of mind- 
body dualism and epiphenomenalism (Cartesian and Indian), 
false identifications {upadi, adhyasa) of consciousness with 
Self, Soul, Spirit, God, Brahman, Absolute, Nirvana- or Svarga- 
bhokta (each of whose existence remains in doubt);
12. By such a test, we will have put the Grand Narrative of the 
Mind to rest, and given the life of the mind a chance.
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Beside the ‘intentor’ and the ‘integrator’: 
Looking at two ‘faces’ of consciousness
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Abstract
Understanding is always o f something which is 'other' than us, that 
which we are not acquainted with. We intend to know the 'other'. We 
understand the 'other' by means of images, ideas, words and metaphors. 
In the process o f understanding loe also try to integrate the knowledge 
we get, to a larger system of our world-view, which in turn influences, 
consciously and unconsciously, our ways of responding to situations.
In study of mind and consciousness the basic duality involved in 
understanding takes an interesting turn, that o f integrating the 
understanding o f the experiencer with experience itself. Experience 
itself is a factor in the process of intending to understand it. If 
definition and knowledge are to be objective, potential o f predictability 
and repeatability, can study of human mind and consciousness be 
included under classical ways o f understanding? Can we define 
consciousness based on pre-experiential understanding o f it? Can the 
experience be studied with the experiencer having minimal or no role?
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Conversely, can the self/experiencer be understood with experience 
having minimal or no role? In short, will the definition o f consciousness 
be exhaustive of its complexity?
I propose that these questions are as difficult or as easy as asking 'Can I 
see my face?'. I can see my face as much as it is represented. But none of the 
representations can replace my original face. What we 'see' is only the 
reported. The being of the reported cannot be confused with the being of the 
original. Whether they are two distinct duals is o f course a metaphysical 
thane for discussion. However, I think, the most interesting issue is that 
though the reported and that which is reported about can not be reduced to 
one, 'the reported' and 'that which is reported about can influence each 
other. I understand and define myself based on my experiences. At the same 
time, my experience depends upon the notion 1 have of myself. I intend to 
know. I also integrate that which I know. And this mysterious power of 
consciousness to intend as well as to integrate is the puzzle we are all 
trying to solve!
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1. Introduction
Be it of the physical, mental or social world, understanding is 
always of something which is other than us, that which we are 
not acquainted with. We intend to know the other. We understand 
the other by means of images, ideas, words and metaphors. All of 
these tools are involved in the building of institutions and 
organized knowledge systems. In the process of understanding 
we also try to integrate the knowledge we get, to a larger system 
of our world-view, which in turn influences, consciously and 
unconsciously, our ways of responding to situations.
In the study of mind and consciousness the basic duality involved 
in understanding takes an interesting turn, that of integrating the 
understanding of the experiencer with experience itself. The 
experiencer itself becomes a factor in the process of intending to 
understand the experience.
If 'definition' and 'knowledge' are to be objective, with the 
potential for 'predictability' and 'repeatability', can we include 
the study of human mind and consciousness under classical 
ways of understanding? Can we define consciousness based on
pre-experiential understanding of it? Can the experience be 
studied with the experiencer having minimal or no role? 
Conversely, can the self/experiencer be understood with 
experience having minimal or no role? In short will the definition 
of consciousness be exhaustive of its complexity?
I propose that these questions are as difficult or easy as asking 
'Can I see my face?'. I can see my face as much as it is 
represented. But none of the representations can replace my 
original face. What we 'see' is only the reported. The being of the 
reported cannot be confused with the being of the original. 
Whether they are two distinct duals is of course a metaphysical 
theme for discussion. However, I think, the most interesting issue 
is that though 'the reported' and 'that which is reported about' 
cannot be reduced to one, 'the reported' and 'that which is 
reported about' can influence each other. I understand and 
define myself based on my experiences. At the same time, my 
experience depends upon the notion that I have of myself.
I intend to know.
I also integrate that which I know.
And it is this mysterious power of consciousness, both to intend 
as well as to integrate the puzzle, that we are all trying to solve!
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2. Methods and approaches
2.1 'Name-ing' and 'Form-ing' the unknown
A common feature of many of the approaches to the study of 
'consciousness' is the distinctness in the method of defining the 
problem. The study of 'consciousness' is initiated by two 
parameters such as the 'name' and 'form' of consciousness. In 
other words 'the what' and 'the where' of consciousness (Menon 
1999) mark the starting point to address the complex issues 
involved of the unknown. The definition for 'consciousness' 
would restrict the specific areas for investigation and also 
categorise them on the basis of related functions whether cognitive, 
physiological or even trans-mental. The classification of different 
approaches to consciousness studies could be based on this point 
itself. And, without this classification, there is not only the
possibility of the absence of conceptual exchange between 
methods but also semantic confusion. This would also mean that 
'the perspective' is as important as the problem at large for the 
interdisciplinary discussions on a complex phenomenon like 
consciousness. If the perspective itself is clearly laid down by 
means of the categories and concepts used, the 'mystery' and 
'anonym ity' generated during the discussions about 
'consciousness' could be avoided to a larger extent.
A major clash between discussions being how the subjective 
and/or objective (functional) nature of consciousness is accounted, 
an initial clarity and specificity in terms of the conceptual 
framework and extent of the applications of the method would 
be helpful as well as foundational in constructing theories and 
developing interdisciplinary exchanges.
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2.2 Localisation o f conscious experiences
To elaborate further on this contention, a widespread 'attitude' 
towards consciousness, namely the 'given-ness of the problem of 
consciousness', could be looked into. A taken-for-granted 
assumption that 'consciousness' is something static and sedentary 
'sitting' somewhere to be understood has led to a major part of the 
research towards the localization of the conscious experience/s. 
Though the 'unknowability' of 'consciousness' as a complex 
phenomenon is conceded, it (the 'unknown') has also encouraged 
the classical way of knowing which is by means of segregation 
and performance. Distinct performances of 'consciousness' are 
taken and these are labeled as 'conscious experiences' and their 
origin, function and localized area (neurophysical and 
neurochemical) identified as the problems to be solved. The 
understanding of 'consciousness' is essentially the understanding 
of neuronal functions, cognitive or sensory-motor. The major 
trend beholden by this trend is the 'building block approach' 
(Searle 2000) which explains the conscious field as consisting of a 
series of building blocks each being a conscious experience. The 
knowledge about any one conscious experience would contribute 
to the understanding of other kinds of conscious experiences. 
The mystery of consciousness would finally be solved by the 
understanding of the interconnections between the causal 
mechanisms of different conscious experiences. Questions about
continuity, uniqueness and nonphysical attributes of 
consciousness, by this approach become auxiUary or even 
redundant.
The building of consciousness from fewer characteristics to more 
number of characteristics is certainly an approach that would 
favour the Darwinian evolutionary advantage. This approach 
would also be able to forsake the need for a specific working 
definition of consciousness. Eventually the method (instrument, 
design, measurement etc.) for investigation becomes the crux of 
the study. The means to understand becomes the subject for 
analysis and focus. But 'what' is to be understood, in the process, 
is either not defined, or ontologically reduced and pushed into 
an epistemological oblivion.
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3. Is consciousness unknown like any other 
unknown?
3 .M  neighbour unnoticed and the 'puzzie o f consciousness'
Obviously it is the 'why' of 'consciousness' that has made it so 
interesting for us to know more about it. Why should discrete 
neuronal functions and neurochemical reactions 'generate' a 
unified feeling of having physical sensations such as pain, or 
even mental dispositions such as sorrow, happiness etc.? Why 
should quantitative phenomenon have qualitative co-relates? 
These two questions form the basis of the 'puzzle of consciousness' 
distinguished as the 'easy' and 'hard' problem of consciousness 
(Chalmers 1995). The 'unknowablity' of consciousness, which is 
centred around the 'hard' problem of consciousness, is not just 
about the subjective and qualitative nature of consciousness but 
also about the prior distinction between subject and object that 
precedes any theory formation or metaphysical discussion.
The distinction between the subject and object, that is, something 
which is near to me/part of me and something which is far away 
from/other than me, is fundamental to human thinking and 
experience (See Drg-Drsya Viveka of Adi Sankaracarya) whether 
physical, m ental or socio-cultural. The mystery about 
consciousness is the mystery about the gap between two distinct 
'entities' namely the objective and the subjective. Can one be
reduced to the other; or can the existence of one be caused by the 
other: explaining one in terms of the other seems to be also the 
way to solve the 'disturbing' duality.
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3.2 The changing and the abiding
The discussion on the 'hard problem' of consciousness has 
generated a consensus on identifying the 'puzzle of consciousness' 
as involving a qualitative duality. Whether this duality is apparent 
or real is the intractable question eluding neurobiologists and 
philosophers. If ontological nature is taken as the defining and 
demarcating factor, the duality involved in consciousness could be 
seen as ontological too. The neurophysiological function and the 
sensory-motor response caused/triggered by an external stimulus 
are two distinct reals from a physical point of view of the brain/ 
consciousness. From a personalistic/non-physical point of view 
the picture is different. It is ME having an experience of pain; 
whether I am cognizant of the neuronal functions or not is not a 
deciding factor on which MY EXPERIENCE is dependent. I may 
or may not be having the knowledge about the neuronal functions 
responsible for my specific conscious experiences. But for sure, I 
have the knowledge of/am aware of distinct conscious experiences 
relating to and abiding in ME. The neuronal reactions and the 
sensory-motor responses are also not the significant signs of 'my 
conscious experience'; but it is the unified 'identity feeling' of 'me 
having such an experience' which is the significant sign of my 
conscious experience. Even if we look at the duality involved from 
this perspective it is that which is initiated by the identity of 'me' (I 
AM having an experience) and 'mine' (MY EXPERIENCE).
The duality problem of consciousness is of two kinds: one is of 
the 'easy' and 'hard' problem; and the other is within the hard 
problem. The duality within the 'hard problem ' is a 
phenomenological puzzle and raises a 'harder problem' (Menon 
2001a). The duality of the 'easy' and 'hard' problem is a 
neurobiological problem.
There are three distinct 'features' known of 'consciousness'. At 
every instance of physical pain (physical-conscious experience), 
mental pain (non-physical-conscious experience) or any
(conscious) experience there is a 'gestalt' meaning brought out by 
a union of three units such as,
(i) experience (e.g. pain),
(ii) experiencer (e.g. me in pain)
(iii) I-ness (me having pain)
The first two: 'experience of pain' and 'me in pain' are 
ontologically of a transient nature. Just as the 'experience of pain' 
I can have many other distinct experiences. Correspondingly the 
'experiencer' also changes.
The third unit that is of a meta-experiential nature ('me HAVING 
such an experience') is changeless, since it accrues to a continuing 
and abiding 'I-ness'. It is this unit that integrates both the distinct 
conscious experience/s and the conscious experiencer/s and 
presents a meaningful continuity.
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3.3 The other-ness and near-ness o f the unknown
Experiences are mostly characterized by their 'distance' and 
broadly divided as objective and subjective. We can have a range 
of experiences, a certain type pertaining to outside objects, and a 
certain type pertaining to inside objects. When my toe hits a 
stone, the pain I feel is 'inside', but the stone, which has triggered 
the pain, is an object outside, which has its own distinct physical 
properties. The experience of pain is nearer to me than the 
experience of the existence of the stone. 'Is the perception of the 
stone nearer to me and belonging to the same class of the pain?' 
is another question to be looked into. At this juncture of our 
discussion, what is attempted is to see the broader classification 
of that which is outside the subject and that which is inside the 
subject.
Whether it is the existence of the stone, or the pain, both are 
given meaning, by relating them to a personal identity.
(i) [I see that] the stone exists,
(ii) I feel pain.
The feeling of pain is nearer [to me] than the existence of the 
stone. At the same time the pain as well as the stone are 
recognized as other than me. There is something unknown about 
both the pain as well as the stone. The stone as well as the pain 
are also 'felt' as other than me.
Is consciousness 'unknown' like the 'other' unknowns? This 
question once again focuses on the 'harder problem' of 
consciousness. The stone (object which has physical properties) or 
the pain (object which has mental properties) is experienced as 
other than me, changing and having meaning when related to an 
experiencer. They are unknown because they are OTHER than me.
Consciousness is not totally unknown, since it is possible to 
know about it through the distinct experiences and also through 
the distinct experiencers. What is unknown and mysterious 
about consciousness is threefold:
i) How is a meaningful continuity of ME HAVING different 
and distinct experiences produced?
ii) Why is a meaningful continuity of ME HAVING different 
and distinct experiences produced?
iii) Where is the meaningful continuity of ME HAVING different 
and distinct experiences produced?
The unknown-ness of consciousness is about the 'harder problem' 
of consciousness, the distinct and unique I-ness performing two 
functions differing by their ontology: There is an intentional 
'outward' movement of consciousness; there is also an integral 
'inward' movement of consciousness.
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4. Two faces of consciousness
4.1. How does consciousness 'look like'?
Like causality, attributing a name and limit to a form are also 
ways of the human mind to know the 'unknown'. It is also 
interesting that our minds (and institutions of knowledge creation) 
use history as a tool (may be because we essentially deal with
relative time: past, present and future) to understand and classify 
new objects of knowledge, and therefore comparison is as important 
as uniqueness. To know something new, we first compare it with 
classified and validated knowledge (by the accepted tests, 
measurements etc.) and then allocate them under a category. 
Therefore the 'new' is always relative to the 'old'. In other words, 
the 'unknown' is relative to the 'known'. It is this basic structure of 
duality embedded in our thinking that helps us to know, to relate 
and to have meaningful interactions and institutions.
In consciousness studies, we look for measurable physical 
correlates of qualitative non-physical conscious experiences. The 
contenhon is that discrete conscious experiences could be localized 
and identified by their neural correlates. Whether the neural 
correlates are also the neural causes of conscious experiences is 
an issue debated within this camp. This method also helps to 
trace the evolutionary path of consciousness starting from its 
primordial beginnings (in terms of functions).
How much of a conscious experience can be identified and localized 
by its neural correlate is an important question. The discussion on 
this question brings forth the quantitative and qualitative 
distinctions vivid in a conscious experience. "Does the brain need 
to be the centre of focus for understanding consciousness?" might 
also emerge as a question to be looked into. At the same time, 
unless we identify cortical areas and limits to neuronal functions, a 
matching of cognitive abilities and degrees of consciousness cannot 
be possible. Matching brain functions and degrees of consciousness 
is a major step towards understanding the complexity of not only 
human behaviour and intelligence but also life as a whole. But 
then, how far can we reach by such a ladder of linear and 
hierarchical steps? Will we be able to find all the missing links? 
Will we be able to understand the qualitative jumps made and the 
vast differences between kinds of consciousness (such as: waking, 
dreaming, deep sleep; conscious, unconscious, subconscious; 
attitude, personality trait, identity)?
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4.2 Ways to knowledge and ways to transformation
There seem to be two kinds of pursuits: The first kind is that 
which attempts to generate, classify and categorize knowledge
for building institutions and understanding various levels of 
complexities in human behaviour. The second kind is that which 
does not follow a structured database, but which attempts to 
transform existing patterns of thinking and experience. The 
distinction between ways to knowledge creation and ways to 
transformation is well spelt out in the area of consciousness 
studies. Therefore, understanding consciousness in terms of 
degrees of intelligence and thereby degrees of self-awareness 
(based on cognitive and social functions) is as important as 
practices and philosophies that focus on the transformation of 
states of mind and experiences. Neural mechanisms and even 
their artificial simulations to cause specific experiences are indeed 
significant and need to be understood. Their understanding is 
considered significant since it leads to the removal of myths 
created about the ethereal continuity of consciousness. Reducing 
conscious experiences to their neural mechanisms, causes and 
cortical areas, according to this camp, is tantamount to reducing 
something (self) mistaken as qualitative to something quantitative.
This reductionism is good enough to obtain focal understanding 
about consciousness, and based on this, to obtain better 
classification of intelligence ranging from humans to other animals 
to machines. But is the problem fully grasped and accounted for 
by that attempt? If we look a bit closer, the answer is 'No'. The 
problem of consciousness is not just about having different kinds 
of conscious experiences and their explanation in terms of neural 
causes and correlates. Had this been the case, reductionism 
would have solved the mystery underlying the phenomenon.
The problem of consciousness is less about conscious experiences 
and more about the conscious experiencer. Based on the brain, 
we might be able to map the history of life and the evolution of 
human intelligence. Unfortunately, however this mapping is not 
sufficient to understand the principal nature of consciousness, 
namely self-orientation (Menon 1999). The problem of self is not 
even the problem of degrees of self-awareness (which is accounted 
for by cognitive abilities and social intelligence) but is the problem 
of self in and by itself. Ways to understand neural mechanisms 
underlying conscious experiences and ways to transform states 
of mind and experiences are distinct by method as well as by 
their ultimate goals. The goal of the first is scientific knowledge 
about life and intelligence and the second is spiritual inquiry.
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The distinctions between these methods and goals also bring 
forth two levels of complexity in consciousness, of the 'V and of 
the 'experience'.
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4,3 The 'who am  /' question
Since it is not in accordance with the usual norms of scientific 
thinking, the question relating to the nature of consciousness 
pertains to its phenomenological functions (neural and cognitive) 
and physico-chemistry which can be specified and quantified, 
and not to its ontology. The ontology of consciousness necessarily 
involves qualitative factors and understanding, which would 
then emphasize not the many-ness of conscious experiences but 
the uniqueness of the conscious experiencer or what is easily 
available to us as our 'I-ness'. The 'who am I' question (see 
Saddarsanam of Sri Ramana Maharishi, 1970) could open new 
avenues to the understanding of consciousness, and herald a 
different approach (from locating conscious experiences) to 
spiritual enquiry and transforming states of mind.
4.4 The one face and two looks
If the question about 'I-ness' is significant for understanding 
consciousness, what is the meaning of neurobiological and other 
locus-specific approaches to consciousness? Are they opposed to 
self-approaches or even redundant? We can say that the answer 
is negative. The two approaches, though distinct by their very 
nature and method, are equally meaningful. We might even 
consider that the complexity of consciousness would see some 
light of unraveling only in the corridors where the two approaches 
would meet and be complementary to each other.
The complexity of consciousness is such that it is simple in the 
context of the experiencer, but intricate when the experience is 
analysed. Therefore it is likely that the first person approaches 
would contribute to the growth and transformation of the human 
self, and the third person approaches to the generation and 
application of knowledge about human intelligence and life as a 
whole. In both the cases, we should remember that the complexity 
about consciousness lies not in its nature but in understanding its
two distinct and different expressions of the 'experiencer' and 
the 'experience'. The 'Face' is simple. The two 'Looks' are complex 
and difficult to understand.
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4.5 Intention, integration and the irreducible l-ness
It is difficult to understand the two varied expressions of 
consciousness because they are different in terms of their 
production, function and evolution. Much of the discussion in 
the circles of philosophy and science is centred on the intentional 
mode of consciousness (Varela 1999) and its production (or 
qualitative nature). For some reason it is forgotten that many a 
time human lives are guided by the habitual (social and 
psychological) ways of responding to situations and unintentional 
consequences of human actions (see Brahmasutra Adhyasa Bhashya 
of Adi Sankaracharya, 1996). The intentional act and thinking 
and the non-intentional act and thinking, both have meaning, 
when we look at the human mind, since they are co-coordinated, 
structured (Menon 2001b) and given continuity by their belonging 
to an 'I-ness'. This 'I-ness' is irreducible.
Intentional and non-intentional acts and thinking could as well 
come under the purview of philosophical and neurobiological 
analysis. But the 'irreducible 'I-ness' is transcendental to even a 
meta-level of understanding and is purely experiential and self­
oriented.
Our conscious experiences could be the product of our intentional 
or non-intentional acts and thinking. Analytical knowledge about 
them also is the product of the intentional mode of consciousness. 
What is often missed in attempts to understand consciousness is 
the categorization of the 'irreducibility' of consciousness in terms 
of 'I-ness'. Reductionism can work only at the level of 
intentionality. The irreducibility of 'I-ness' could be appreciated 
better if we introduce the 'integral' mode of consciousness (see 
Bhagavad Gita Bhasya, Ch.13 of Adi Sankaracarya). We not only 
(intend to) know and experience, we also integrate that which is 
known and experienced to a larger self. What is beside both the 
intending and the integrating is (yours and mine)'I-ness'.
4,6 Self-exploration and the unavoidable mystery about 
consciousness
The mystery about consciousness is the mystery about its 
'belonging' to a self. This mystery is unavoidable to the extent 
we try to understand the integral mode of consciousness and the 
simple given-ness of your 'I-ness' and mine. We can understand 
consciousness as far as it is represented and reported. It would 
be like saying that the story is complete at its introduction, if we 
conclude that the problem of consciousness is answered by its 
representations. Representations cannot replace the original. And 
therefore the reported cannot be confused with the original. 
However intricate and interesting the reported is, it would be 
unwise to think that the original has nothing more to it than its 
representations.
Understanding consciousness is continuous self-exploration. 
Knowledge about consciousness does not work in a linear and 
causal fashion. Self-knowledge is transcendental. Therefore 
understanding consciousness would be also by exploring the 
many possibilities of the human self and mind, than just the 
convenient addressing of it as a figment of imagination. What is 
interesting and worthy of exploration is to look at what is beside 
both the intending and the integrating mode of consciousness. 
Focusing on the duality (intentional and integral mode) of 
consciousness might result in epistemological circularities until 
and unless we look at what is 'beside' both the modes, which is 
the 'I-ness'. To see the 'wave' is to see the 'sea'. To see the 'sea' is 




What was attempted in this discussion was to look at whether 
the duality involved in the understanding of consciousness is 
basic. Intentional and integral modes of consciousness can be 
better explained and the epistemological circularity involved in 
duality-approaches can be avoided if we include a third factor of 
'I-ness' which is nonlinear, alocal and acausal, and hence 
metaphorically described as 'beside' in this paper. The mystery 
about consciousness is that it is self-oriented. Breakthroughs in
c o n sc io u sn e ss  re s e a rc h  co u ld  h a p p e n  if w e  e n c o u ra g e  self­
e x p lo ra tio n  a n d  sp iritu a l e n q u iry  a lso  a lo n g  w ith  th ird  p e rso n  
a p p ro a ch e s .
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Consciousness and rebirth 
in classical Yoga
T R ANANTHARAMAN 
Ashram Atmadeep, Gurgaon, India
Abstract
The tradition o f  Adhyatma or Classical Yoga is based  on p re-  
Buddhistic verbal foundations viz.. Early Upanisbads, Yoga-Sutras 
and Bhagavad Gita. It deals inter-alia with the evolution  o f  
consciousness in Homo sapiens and the crucial role ofyogicpractices 
in accelerating the movement towards attainment o f  Prajnana. i.e., 
universal consciousness. In this context one has to com e to grip with 
the age-old concept o f  an evolving An tab-Karana (internal instrument 
o f  cognition and consciousness) and the possibility o f  its purification, 
refinement and eventual perfection through sustained yogic practices, 
particularly meditation, that may well n eed  more than a life time on 
this earth. Thus Punarjanma (rebirth) finds its appropriate place in 
Classical Yoga, assuring continuity in evolution o f  consciousness from  
one life to another.
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Modern Science can adopt a new  and pragmatic approach to the 
them e o f  human consciousness in the light o f  not only ancient 
yog ic w isdom , but also recent findings o f  N euro-surgery and  
Neuro - physiology.
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1. Introduction
The beginnings of the Yoga tradition are definitely shrouded in 
the mists of antiquity, but it is now universally recognized that 
Yoga constitutes one of India’ s oldest and most important 
scientific-spiritual legacies to the human family. There is enough 
evidence to show that Yoga was conceived and developed, 
studied and researched, practised and perfected, experimented 
upon and expanded in scope uninterruptedly, primarily on the 
vast Indian Subcontinent, since the dawn of human history. 
Today m illions of eager and enthusiastic seekers, from 
practically all countries of the world, are responding positively 
to the call of Yoga and reaping diverse benefits in terms of 
enhancement of the quality of life, particularly physical and 
mental health, through regular yogic practices. Numerous 
rigorous scientific studies of the last few decades, in India as 
well as elsewhere, have also established beyond doubt the 
therapeutic value of many yogic exercises, apart from their 
enormous contribution to positive health and increased sense 
of well-being of the practitioners constituting men, women, 
boys, girls and people of all ages.
Gautama Buddha (563-483 BC) is perhaps the first important 
historical figure of the Yoga tradition, whose date can be fixed, 
whose life can be sketched and whose teachings on the problems 
of human existence can be ascertained, with some measure of 
certainty. It is reasonably obvious, however, that the meditative 
practices associated with advanced stages of the yogic discipline 
were well established in India lon g  b e fo re  the Buddha was born.
The excavation of seals portraying deities in time-honoured 
meditative postures in the sites of Mohenjodaro and Harappa 
of the Mature Indus Valley Period (3000-2000 BC) strongly 
suggests that the Yoga traditions are not only over four millennia 
old, but was in fact given special recognition in Indian society 
well before the Vedic period beginning around 1500 BC. 
Considering that any movement takes its own time to germinate 
and grow, and that many, many generations of development 
are the sine qu o non  for the wide acceptance of any concept or 
practice, today’ s votaries of Yoga in all parts of the globe may 
be fully justified in considering themselves the inheritors of a 
vibrant and glorious tradition that goes back to at least 5000 years 
of human history.
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2. Adhyatma yoga (Classical Yoga)
Not surprisingly, the present global scenario related to this 
ancient and dynamic tradition of Yoga is a vast, complex and 
often  confusing  one, many of its ram ification s and 
manifestations as dealt with in numerous texts, treatises and 
manuals causing great bew ilderm ent in students of its 
theoretical and applied aspects. Derived from the Sanskrit root 
“y u j” , meaning to unite. Yoga was generally understood from 
the beginning as a state o f  union  of pairs like
1. Individual Consciousness and Universal Consciousness;
2. Atman (the individual self) and Brahman  (the Supreme, 
All pervading Self);
3. The human and the Divine; and
4. Man and God,
where the second entity is invariably conceded as beyond the 
reach of the human intellect. Down the ages the word Yoga came 
to be used not only to refer to the afore-stated goal or objective, 
but also to describe the several paths that can lead to this
transcendental state of union. Thus the yoga Hterature deals with 
special pathways to Yoga like Jnana Yoga (Path of Discriminative 
know ledge), B b a k ti Yoga (Path of D edicated Love and 
Adoration), Karm a Yoga (Path of Unselfish Action), Dhyana 
Yoga (Path of Spiritual Meditation), Kundalini Yoga (Path of 
Awakening Kundalini, the Evolutive Potence), Laya Yoga (Path 
of Total Absorption) etc., each supposed to suit a particular 
temperament at a particular stage of spiritual evolution.
A dhyatm a  or Classical Yoga is concerned with Atm an, the 
Individual Self or the Person in Depth and its union with 
Brahman, the Cosmic or Divine or Universal Self. It derives its 
strength and significance from the three ancient philosophical 
systems of Saihkhya, Yoga and Vedanta. The verba7foundation 
of this unique Science, of Man in Depth and Spirituality of Self- 
Unfoldment rests, surely and securely, on the triune bed-rock 
of the Early U panishads, the Yoga Sutras and the Bhagavad- 
Gita. Whatever the suggested dates for the extant editions of 
these texts, the sanctity of spiritual traditions and the evidence 
of inherent thought content stamp these three important and 
precious Sanskrit texts unmistakably as pre-Buddhistic.
Sam kbya  and Yoga, the two closely related darsanas (systems 
of philosophy built on intuitive or experiential knowledge), are 
generally accepted in the Indian spiritual tradition as the earliest 
in the long line of codified systems of transcendental thought 
and practice. These two massive structures of the intellect raised 
on the foundation of spiritual experiences of individual 
researchers are attributed to Kapila and Hiranyagarbha 
respectively in ancient Sanskrit texts of the Vedic tradition. These 
two sages and seers seem to be pre-historic personages who 
deified at some period well before the advent of Gautama 
Buddha on the Indian spiritual scene. Incidentally , the 
Bhagavad-G lta, which forms part of the long M ahabharata epic 
and is generally considered to have been composed by Vyasa 
before 500 BC, refers to the Sarrikhya-Yoga tradition aspuratana.
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meaning age-old or ancient, and also as uttaman rahasyam  
(well-guarded secret knowledge) {Gita, IV.3). Sri Krishna also 
says (Gita, III.3) the following almost at the beginning of his 
famous dialogue with, Arjuna:
“L oke-'sm in  dvividha Nistha pura p rok ta  M aya- N agha, 
Jnanayogena Sam khyanam , K arm ayogena Yoginam.
In days of yore a two-fold spiritual discipline was taught by me 
in this world, O Arjuna, the path of knowledge for votaries of 
Sam khya  and the path of works for practitioners of Y oga” . Thus 
the internal evidence of many ancient Sanskrit classics also 
confirms that Yoga constitutes a very old tradition indeed, 
considered ‘ancient’ well before 500 BC.
The Upanisbads constitute the last portions of the Vedic revelation 
and, as generally acclaimed by scholars, represent a very bright 
chapter in the history of the human spirit. Any one who reads 
them in the original Sanskrit is caught up and carried away by the 
elevation, earnestness, profundity and compelling fascination of 
the pregnant, often poetic, utterances through which they unravel 
the mysterious and sacred relationship between the human soul 
(Atman) and the Supreme Reality (Brahman).
Although one hears of 108 Upanishads, most of them composed 
in the first millenium or even later, and some of them sectarian 
in character, by common consent twelve of them viz.. Is a, Kena, 
K atha, K au sitaki, Prasna, M undaka, M andukya, Taittiriya, 
Aitareya, C handogya, Brhad-Aranyaka and ^veta-svatara, are 
labelled as the Early Upanishads and were apparently composed 
between 1000 and 800 BC. These contain the hard core of 
V aid ika -D arsan a  or the Vedantic philosophy and have 
dominated Indian thought and action for the last three millennia.
On the other hand, the Bhagavad-G lta, the Song, of the Lord 
or the Song Celestial, often referred to as the thirteenth major 
Upanishad, is a compact work of 700 verses (slokas) divided
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into 18 Chapters. It has long been hailed as the best known and 
most widely read spiritual classic of India. Described in the text 
itself as Yoga-^astra (Treatise on Yoga Practice), the Gita, as it 
is popularly referred to, enjoys maximum popularity among 
yoga practitioners having some acquaintance with Sanskrit.
Hailed as the first systematic and scholarly treatise on Yoga theory 
and practice, the Yoga-Sutras consist of just 196 short statements 
or aphorisms (Sutras), divided into four sections (padas) entitled 
Sam adhi (Unitive Experience), Sadhana (Spiritual Practice), 
V ibhu ti (Para-norm al A ttainm ents) and K aiv a ly a  (Final 
Liberation). According to tradition, this work was composed by 
Sage Patanjali, who is supposed to have lived around 300 BC. The 
composition of Sutras in any discipline presupposes in India the 
existence of large reservoirs of knowledge accumulated over 
centuries and the necessity at same point of time to condense 
each important concept or idea therein in just a few  words for 
convenient transmission in the then prevalent oral tradition. The 
last century has witnessed a steady increase in interest in this 
ancient treatise embodying India’s timeless wisdom on Yoga.
The expression Adhyatma Yoga (Classical Yoga) goes back to one 
of the very early Upanishads viz., Katha, that deals with Yoga in 
some detail. In an inspiring dialogue between a great teacher 
referred to as Yama, the God of Death, and a brilliant young 
disciple called Nachiketas, we have in this U panisbad  some 
incisive questions dealt with, related to AdhyMma Vidya (Science 
pertaining to the Atman) and Yoga Vidhi (Rules of Yoga Practice). 
Thus Adhyatma Yoga emerges here (Katha, 1.2.12) as the Yoga of 
Self-Knowledge or Science-cum-Spirituality of Man in Depth.
Significantly, in the tenth chapter of the Gita, while dealing with 
special divine manifestations like Himalaya among mountains, 
Ganga among rivers, Kapila among sages, Aurh among syllables 
and the Holy Peepal among trees, Sri Krishna says;
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“Adhyatm a - Vidya Vidyanam  (Aham).
Among Science or sectors of knowledge, I illumine in particular 
Adhyatm a Vidya (Science and Spirituality of Man in Depth).” 
(X.32)
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3. Prajnanam (Consciousness)
As can be ascertained from the basic texts of Adhyatm a Yoga, 
the Indian sages and seers were aware from the very beginning 
of the vastness, complexity and transcendental nature of the 
field of Consciousness. It is not therefore surprising that different 
expressions were used in these early texts to refer to this most 
elusive and yet inescapable of all phenomena. Starting with 
Prajnanam, Prajna and Jnanam , we come across words like Chit, 
Chitta, Chetana, C hetas, Chiti etc., the actual meanings having 
subtle nuances related to the actual theme under discussion and 
the context in which a word is used.
The early Upanishads present us already with an impressive, 
detailed, convincing and profound vision of the Supreme Reality 
or Truth, starting with the defintion and description of Brahman, 
the All-Pervading Consciousness, without begining and without 
end. Beyond the reach of words, this Reality can, however, be 
DIRECTLY EXPERIENCED by the seeker of Truth, as claimed 
unequivocally by the Rishis, the spiritually advanced sages and 
seers of Ancient India. The word Brahman  is derived from the 
Sanskrit root ‘Brh' meaning to grow, to burst forth and suggests 
gushing forth, bubbling over, ceaseless growth, continuous 
activity, in short, a LIMITLESS DYNAMIC EXISTENCE.
Among the numerous statements and descriptions in Vedic texts 
unveiling the mystery of Brahm an, the following four M aha - 
Vakyas or Seminal Utterances have a hallowed place:
1. Sarvam K halv-idam  Brahma 
All this is verily Brahman
{CHANDOGYA UPANISAD, III.14.1)
2. Prajnam Brahma
Brahman is pure Consciousness
{AITAREYA UPANISAD, III.1.3)
3. Ayam-Atma Brahma
The individual Self is Brahman
{MANDUKYA UPANISAD,!)
4. Aham Brahm a-'sm i 
I am Brahman.
{BRHAD-ARAmAKA UPANISAD, 1.4.10)
Some institutions and schools of thought consider the following 
well-known Vedantic assertion as a M aha-Vakya:
TAT TWAMASI — - That Thou Art.
(CHANDOGYA UPANISAD, VI.8.7)
However, the word Brahman  is missing from this statement and 
the same U panishad  gets quoted again, thus questioning the 
special status of this undoubtedly pregnant and oft-quoted 
sentence.
Expressed in the neuter gender. Brahman is beyond the range of 
our mind and speech. All things manifest in the universe exist in 
space and time and are subject to ceaseless change under the 
inexorable law of causation, but Brahman is changeless, eternal, 
infinite, ever-free and beyond the reach of the senses. Brahman 
is the very essence of Sat (Existence), Chit (Consciousness) and 
Ananda (Bliss). Brahman is the source and support of every object 
in creation and is both  the efficient and material cause of the 
universe. The Zn/inife becomes finite in infinite ways in creation.
Another related basic concept in Adhyatma Yoga, is Atman, the 
individual Soul or Self. Derived from the Sanskrit root “an ” , to 
breathe, and hence referred to as the breath of life, Atman is
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the invisible and undying element of the human personality. 
Any individual being consists of the Sthula ^arire (gross body) 
made up of things material and the Suksma §arira (Subtle or 
fine body) composed of the functions of the mind, intellect and 
will, the so-called Antah-Karana (the Internal Instrument of 
Cognition and Consciousness). The fine body builds up the gross 
body and keeps it going, but it is not active by itself or on it 
own. It is actually animated and made to work by the Atman, 
the true Self or Soul, the substantive part of any living being. 
The Atman is the source of all life, activity and consciousness. 
Warmed up into life by its touch, the fine body animates the 
gross one, just as the moon illumined by the Sun lights up the 
Earth.
The identity of Brahman  and Atman, the Cosmic Self and the 
Individual Self, is the most important and the most basic 
assertion of the Upanishads. The realization of this identity, this 
m erger or union of Atman  and B rahm an , is the supreme 
objective, the summ um  bonum , of human existence and looms 
large, bright and resplendent in the spiritual vision behind 
AdhyMma Yoga. Let us savour of some glimpses of incandescent 
eloquence in this regard from two great Upanishads;
“A drstam , avyavaharyam , agrahyam , alaksanam , acintyam , 
avyapadesyam , ekatm a-pratyata-saram , p rap an cop asam am , 
santam , sivam , advaitam , caturtham , m anyante, sa Atma, sa 
vijheyah. It is unseen, incomunicable, unseizable, featureless, 
unthinkable, unnameable, the essense of Self-Knowledge, into 
which all phenomena dissolve, the peaceful, the benign, the 
non-dual, it is considered the fourth state of consciousness, it 
is Atman and has to be experienced” .
{MANDUKYA UPANISAD, 7)
“Atma va are drastavyah, srotavyo, mantavyo, 
nididhyasitavyah  —  Atmam khalv-are drste, 
srute, mate vijnate, idarh sarvarh viditam.
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Atman is to be actually perceived, my dear, it has to be heard, 
to be reflected on and to be meditated upon. When verily my 
dear, the Atman is actually seen, having been heard, reflected 
on and experienced, then all this is known” .
{BRHAD-ARAmAKA UPANISAD, IV.5.6)
4. Punarjanma (Rebirth)
From its earliest days the Indian spiritual tradition has dealt with 
Punarjanma (Rebirth) and Samsara (Cycle of births and deaths 
of the human being) in a matter-of-fact way. There has been no 
doubt expressed and no explanation offered in relation to this 
doctrine. It has been a self-evident axiom and has always been 
coupled with Karm a, the important and complex law of cause 
and effect in the moral sphere. These two concepts have been 
accepted by all Indian religious traditions viz., the Hindu,.the 
Buddhist, the Jain and the Sikh, and have been actively and 
enthusiastically propagated in the West during the last century 
by the theosophical and anthroposophical movements launched 
respectively by the Russian, Madam Blavatsky, and the German, 
Rudolf Steiner. According to statistics floated by the media from 
time to time, a good number of Jews, Christians and Muslims 
have started believing in these concepts in recent decades.
Why has one to be born again and again on this earth? The Indian 
answer to this question is clear and unambiguous. Man can attain 
perfection or realize the Spirit or Divinity within, only when 
the mind and intellect are sufficiently evolved and cultivated, 
and become fully mature, obviously healthy and spotlessly pure. 
This process understandably takes a long time and cannot 
possibly be com pleted in one life tim e. M any, perhaps 
innumerable, births are needed for this purpose, the actual 
number of lives depending on the sincerity and intensity of the 
efforts consciously put in by the concerned person to attain 
maturity, purity and perfection. The Sthula ^arira (gross body).
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referred to earlier, is what meets death and gets discarded. The 
Sukshm a ^arlra (subtle body) animated by the Atman (Soul or 
Self) works the gross body as long as it effectively can and then 
leaves it to build a fresh body.
As shown below, the basic texts of A dhyatm a Yoga follow this 
ancient tradition and deal with rebirth with clarity and precision 
and as needing no further comment or explanation on what they 
say. As is to be expected, in this regard the concerned verses in 
the Gita are indeed the most informative and also the most 
beautiful to recite:
1. “Sasyam -iva Martyah pacyate, Sasyam -iva jayate  punach. 
A mortal ripens and withers like corn, and like corn is born 
again” .
{KATHA UPANISAD, 1.1.6)
2. “Ayam Atma idarh ^ariraih nihatya, Avidyam  gam ayitva 
anyam , navataram , kalyanataram  Ruparh kurute.
The Atman, having thrown away this body and dispelled its 
ignorance (according to the Law of karm a), makes unto 
Himself another, newer and move beautiful shape” . 
{BRHAD-ARAmAKA UPANISAD, IV.4.4)
3. “Sati m ule, tad-V ipako Jaty-'A yur-Bbogab.
So long as the root cause (generation of merit and demerit 
through the Law of Karma) exists, it will bear fruits like 
rebirth, long or short life and experience of pleasure and 
pain .
{YOGA-SUTRAS, IL13)
4. “Sam skara-SaksM karanat, Purva-Jati-Jnanam.
Though Samyama (controlled concentration and meditation) 
on the latent impressions in the sub-conscious, the Yogi 
attains knowledge of his previous lives” .
{YOGA-SUTRAS, IIL18)
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5. “D ehino- smin yatha D ehe, Kaum aram , Yauvanam, Jara, 
Tatha D ehantara-praptih, Dbiras-tatra na muhyati.
As the soul or the self passes in this body through childhood, 
youth and old age, even so is it taking on of another body. 
The sage is not perplexed on this account” .
(GiTA, 11.13)
6. “ Vasamsi jirnani yatha vihaya, navani grhnati Naro'parani 
Tatha ^arJrani vihaya jlrnany- anyati sam yati navani Dehi. 
Just as a person casts off worn-out garments and puts on new 
ones, even so does the ennbodied Soul or Self cast off worn- 
out bodies and take on others that are new” .
{GiTA, 11.22)
7. “Prapyapunyakrtam  Lokan, usitva sasvatih Samah, ^ucinam 
srimatam G ehe, Yogabhrasto- bhijayate.
Having attianed to the world of the virtuous and dwelt there 
for many years, the Yogi still short of his objective is born 
again in the house of such as are pure and prosperous” . 
{G ItA, VI. 41)
8. “ Tatra tarn Buddhi-SarhYOgarh lab h a te  p au rv a -d eh ikam  
Yatate ca tato bhuyah, Sam siddhan, Kurunandana.
There the Yogi regains the intellectual impressions and 
connections developed in the previous life and strives again 
from that starting point for perfection, O Arjuna” .
{GiTA, VI.43)
9. “P ray a tn ad -y a tam an astu , Yogi sa rh su d d h a -k ilb h isa h ,  
A neka-janm a-sarhsiddhah tato yati param  Gatim.
Striving assiduously, cleansed of all blemishes, perfecting 
himself through many lives, the Yogi then attains to the 
highest goal” .
{GiTA, VI.45)
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5. Antahkaranam (The inner instruments)
From the point of view of Modern Science, the concept of 
A n tah k aran a ,  the Inner Instrum ent of Cognition and 
Consciousness, in Classical Yoga is perhaps the most important, 
deserving of careful study from the experimental angle. As is to 
be expected, Sam khya and Yoga philosophies are already seized 
of the important role of Antahkarana as the interface between 
Matter and Spirit, the Human and the Divine, as also the lower 
and higher Selves in an individual. The following quotations from 
Sam khya-Yoga-K osah, a compendium of philosophical terms in 
these two ancient darsanas put together by Acharya K N Tripathi 
of the Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, in 1974, bring out the 
basic characteristics of this complex inner instrument:
1. B uddhir-A ham karo M ans-ceti Trayam-Antahkaranam. 
The Inner Instrument is made up of three viz., Manas 
(Instinct), B u d d h i(Intellect) and A ham kar (Ego, I-ness, 
Will).
2. Panca Jnanendriyani, pan ca K arm endriyani ceti 
Bahyakaranam .
The five senses of Knowledge and the five senses of 
Action constitute the Outer Instrument.
3. Cittam - Antahkaranam . Chitta (the Mental Being?) is 
(a synonym) for the Inner Instrument.
4. K siptam -M udham - V iksiptam -Ekagram -N iruddham -iti 
pan ca Cittasya Bhumayah.
Chitta can exist in five states viz., confused/wandering foolish/ 
forgetful, occasionally steady/steadying, one pointed and 
restrained.
In the light of the above, the famous definition of the State of 
Yoga in Yoga-Sutras is easy to comprehend, viz..
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“ Yogas- Citta - Vrtti-Nirodhah.
Yoga is the state of N iw dha  (restraint) of all Vrittis (fluctuations) 
in the Chitta (Inner Instrument).”
(YOGA-SUTRAS, 1.2)
The Gita follows the Sam khya-Yoga  line and describes Prakriti 
(Nature) as made up of eight entities viz.,
“ B bu m ir-A p o -'N alo Vayuh K han i M ano B u d d h ir-'ev a  ca, 
Ahanikara iti-'yam M e, bhinna Prakrtir-'astadha. Earth, Water, 
Fire, Air, Ether (Space?), Instinct, Intellect and Ego - this is the 
eight-fold division of My nature.”
{crrA, vn.4)
Here the first five constitute the field of the Outer Instrument, 
while the last three make up the Inner Instrument, that deals 
with the inputs from the Outer Instrument.
Incidnetally, the expression Antahkarana occurs frequently in 
Sanskrit literature and is widely in use today in most Indian 
languages. To give an interesting example, in Kalidasa’ s most 
famous drama, the hero, king Dushyanta, justifies his attraction 
to the heroine, Shakuntala, as it has the approval of his 
Antahkarana:
“Satam h i san dehapadesu  Vastusu,
Pram anam -An tahkarana-pra vrtta yah.
The doubts that perplex the good get resolved by the directions 
from the Inner Instrument.” {Abhijhana-^akuntalam , 1.20)
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6. Buddhi (The intellect)
Of all three constituents of the Antahkarana, the human intellect 
endowed with the capacity to know, to think, to analyse, to 
reason, to reflect, to ponder and to meditate has been assigned
the highest place in the Classical Yoga tradition, particularly 
because of the crucial role it has to play in probing and grasping 
the unseen Atman. The clarion call of the Gita is;
“Buddhau ^aranam -anviccha.
Take refuge in the intellect.” (II.49)
“ Buddhi-nasat pranasyati.
With the loss of intellect, (Man) is ruined.” (IL63)
The Gita is also clear that the Buddhi is fully involved in the 
final and full realization of the Self or the Divine:
“^ruti-vipratipanna te yada sthasyati niscala,
Sam adhav-acala Buddhih, tada Yogam -avapsyasi.
When thy intellect, confused by wearing conflicting statements, 
will rest, steady and undistracted, in total absorption (in the 
Self), then wilt thou attain to thy State of Yoga.” (11.53)
“Sukham -atyantikam  yat-tad-B uddbigahyam -atindriyam .
The supreme joy of union with the Self can be graspd by the 
intellect, but not by the senses.” (VI.21)
The Katha Upanisad, generally assigned a date much earlier than 
the Gita, also accords a high place to the human intellect, not 
the average one, but the highly evolved, carefully cultivated, 
extrem ely sharp and spotlessly pure intellect, which can 
comprehend and grasp the Higher Self;
“Esa Sarvesu Bhutesu Gudhatm a na p rakasate ;
Drsyate tv-agryaya Buddhya Suksmaya Suksm adarsibhih.
He is the secret Self in all existences, but is invisible. Yet is He 
“seen” by the seers of the Subtle, through their subtle and sharp 
intellects.” (1.3.12)
It is in the same inspiring U panishad  that we come across the 
beautiful and off-cited metaphor of the chariot, that helps us to 
distinguish clearly between the roles of the different constituents 
of the Inner and Outer Instruments of Man;
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“Atmanarh Rathinam viddhi, Barham Ratham -eva tu, 
Buddhim  tu Sarathim viddhi, Manah Pragraham -eve ca; 
Indriyani H ayan-ahur-V isayam s-tesu Gocaran, 
A tm endriya-m ano-yuktam , Bhoktety-ahur-M anisinah.
Know the body for a chariot, and the Self for its Master; know 
the intellect for the charioteer and the mind for the reins only. 
The senses they speak of as the horses of the chariot and the 
senses as the paths in which they move. The wise call him the 
true enjoyed, who has his mind and senses Yoked to the Self 
(by the intellect).” (1.3. 3 and 4).
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7. Involution and evolution
Evolution is a concept now quite familiar to the educated, but 
Involution is not a word that has been very much in use, at least 
not until Sri Aurobindo (1872-1950) started writing about 
creation or cosmic manifestation as the consequence of a dou ble  
m ov em en t o f  Involution and Evolution. Actually, Involution as 
a process of self-limitation or a densification, by which Brahman 
or the Universal Consciousness-Force veils itself by stages into 
a dense, cosmic in conscience in Matter, is already hinted at in 
the Upanishads themselves. In its Brahmanada Valli and Bhrgu 
Valli, the Taittiriya Upanisad  deals with the so-called veils or 
covers or sheaths hiding the Supreme Consciousness and the 
possibility of evolving to the state of Brahmananda (the Ananda 
or Bliss of realising Brahm an) by gradual and progressive 
shedding of these veils and the movement or passage through 
a series of ascending planes of the Consciousness-Force. Starting 
with Anna (Matter), the uncovering process leads first to Prana 
(Life), then to M anas (Instinctive-cum-Intellectual Mind) and 
eventually to Vijnana (Intellectual-cum-Intuitive Mind), which 
is yet to become the common possession of mankind. For above 
the present normal human consciousness and experience is the 
state of Ananda (Bliss of Brahm an), which represents the goal 
of Adhyatm a Yoga, as also of Integral Yoga of Sri Aurobindo.
To sum up, the process of Involution  and Evolution  is going on 
all the tim e; it has had not beginning and will have no end. 
Creation is a spontaneous emanation from Brahm an, as the 
U panisads instruct us with apt metaphors:
“ T ad-etat Satyam: Yatba sudiptat Pavakat, Visphulihgah 
sah asra sah  p rab h a v an ti saru p ah , T ath a-'ksara t V iv idhah , 
Saumya, Bhavah, Prajayante, tatra caivapi yanti.
This is the Truth: As from a blazing five thousands of fiery sparks 
leap out, even so, my dear, a multitude of beings issue forth 
from the Imperishable (Brahman) and return,thither too.” 
{MUNDAKA UPANISAD, H .l.l)
“ Y a th o rn a -n a b h ih  s r ja te  g r h n a te  ca , Y atba P ritb iv y am  
O sadayas-S am bhavan ti, Yatha Satah Purusat K esa-lom an i, 
Tatha-ksarat sam bhavatiha Visvam.
h s  the spider brings forth and also draws in its thread, as herbs 
sprout on the face of the earth, as the hairs grow on the head 
and body of a living person, so from the imperishable (Brahman) 
emerges here the Universe” .
(MUNDUKA UPANISAD, 1.1.7)
In this ceaseless process of Involution and Evolution, the human 
being represents with his intellect a peak in the evolutionary 
process, capable of cooperating with Nature in contributing to 
and expediting the onward movement to the acme of evolution 
viz., merger of his Higher Self (Atman) with the Universal Self 
(Brahman.) Adhyatma Yoga lays down the paths to perfection, 
but the Yogi has a long and arduous journey to perform, even 
while keeping the means and ends clearly in view. To quote the 
Gita on the last step (meditation) and the final goal,
“ Yunjann-evam  sada-'tm anarh. Yogi v igata-kalm asah, 
Sukbena Brahm a-sam sparsam , atyantam Sukbam -asnute. 
Uniting his mental being (Lower Self) constantly with the 
Supreme Consciousness (Higher Self) i.e., practising meditation
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constantly, the Yogi gets rid of all imperfections and enjoys the 
Infinite Bliss of contact with Brahman. ” (VI.28)
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8. “Footprints” of ttie Atman
The recent almost explosive revival of scientific interest in the 
fascinating and complex field of Consciousness has brought 
AdtiYatma Yoga and Modern Science together, bridging in that 
process a gulf of over 3000 years. As Yoga and Science now rub 
shoulders, as it were, at National and International Conferences, 
it is essential to appreciate that the basic texts of Adhyatma Yoga 
involve terms and concepts that were current in an ancient 
society and are hence far from easy to comprehend today. Even 
when explained in modern idiom and in the English language, 
there are difficulties in coming to grip with basic concepts like 
those of Brahm an  and Atman, which seem to transcend all 
available paradigms in modern science.
It is surprising and significant that an Upanishad could anticipate 
such a difficulty and also suggest a possible way of overcoming it:
“A tm etyevopasita, atra hy- ete  sarve Ekaih bhavanti 
....Tat Etat padan iyam , asya sarvasya y at ayam.
Atma, anena h i etat Sarvam veda, yatha ha vai 
p ad en a  anuvindet, evam .......
Research should concentrate on Atman  alone, since all these
several aspects are united in I t ......The Atman  has to be sought
after, because one known all things throught It, just as one 
searches and finds out an animal through its footprints.... 
(BRHAD-ARAI^AKA UPANISAD, 1.4.7)
“f o o t p r i n t s ” -  that has to be the watchword now for 
scientists. The Antahkarna  is obviously the main field for the 
location of the Atm an’s foo.tprints.
To start with, one can think of the vast invisible and inaudible 
spectrum of electromagnetic radiation and how one has come 
to “know” it through its “footprints” on the instruments tracking 
this radiation. The problem is perhaps more complex here with 
the very vast spectrum of planes or states of consiousness 
already divided into dozens of unconscious, sub-conscious, 
sublim inally conscious, norm ally conscious and super­
conscious states. However, as the old adage has it, “where there 
is a will, there is a way.”
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Science, religion and spirituality'
SWAMI HARSHANANDA 
Ramakrishna Math, Bangalore, India
Abstract
Today's world needs all the three disciplines o f knowledge and wisdom. 
Imperfect and partial knowledge has resulted in competition and conflict, 
bringing misery to mankind.
Science: Science is any organized body o f knowledge based on facts and 
principles gained by systematic study. Scientific method and attitude 
are important. They must be used for the benefit o f mankind. Though 
technology and pure science have made our lives more comfortable, they 
have also made our life miserable because o f the attitude of the people 
involved in them. I f the scientists reform themselves into better human 
beings, the benefits o f science and technology can be used for the 
upliftment o f the whole of mankind.
" R e p r o d u c e d  f ro m  " S y n th es is  o f  S c ie n c e  a n d  R e lig ion  a n d  S p ir itu a lity "  p u b l is h e d  
b y  S w a m i H a r s h a n a n d a ,  P re s id e n t,  R a m a k r is h n a  M a th , B a n g a lo re  560016
2 0 0
Religion: Faith in the existence o f God or a superhuman, controlling 
power and intellect behind the universe. Religion o f dogmas and formal 
observance is not religion at all in the true sense o f the term. Fanaticism 
and regimentation are other factors, which have suppressed freedom of 
thought and action. Intolerance and hatred of religions other than one's 
own is a byproduct of this. True religion lies in spirituality. All the 
great religions o f the world, when understood properly and practiced 
sincerely have led to the same kind o f mystical experience.
Spirituality: Spirituality is an expression o f the spiritual dimensions 
inside us, which comes after attaining the highest state of mystical 
experience. Though the expression and terminology o f mystical 
experiences o f the various saints and sages o f the world appear to be 
different from one another, the content o f their experience is the same. 
Spiritualism should not be confused with spirituality.
The basic aim of all arts and sciences, all fields o f knowledge, is to give 
us true happiness. This can be got only by true spiritual experience. I f  
science and religion can cooperate properly, humankind can easily 
attain this final goal o f life.
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Introduction
Today's world has come to the threshold of an explosion in 
science and technology. During the last five decades or so they 
have advanced at such a terrific pace that all the progress of the 
previous five millennia put together pales into insignificance. 
This explosion is threatening to develop into a veritable volcano 
as has already been amply proved by the two world wars, the 
third, perhaps, peeping around the corner.
Curiously enough, there has been an explosion in the field of 
religion too, if the plethora of new cults and sects, along with the 
revival and reform movements of the old religions is any cue to 
the same. Bizarre as it may look, it is yet a fact that religion -  or 
rather, religious leaders -  are trying to 'prove' the facts of 
religion via the ways of science. Whether this wooing of science 
by religion has succeeded in coaxing the former to accord 
respectability to the latter or not, is a moot point. However, it is 
an undeniable fact that instead of religion providing a meaningful
direction to science, it has put itself in the unenviable position of 
defending itself!
To be sure, the world needs science. To be sure, again, the world 
needs religion also. Hence, for the sure progress of mankind, 
both science and religion must cooperate and coordinate their 
efforts.
Is this ever possible? Is it ever conceivable to bring together light 
and darkness and hope to produce a charming mystic twilight? 
Yes, if it is first conceded that they are complementary disciplines 
and not contradictory. It is not only possible but highly desirable, 
and not only highly desirable but also extremely urgent. It is the 
partial and imperfect understanding of each by the respective 
votaries that has resulted in unhealthy competition and self- 
destructive conflict, bringing mankind to the brink of the precipice 
of total annihilation.
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Science and scientific attitude
Derived from the root 'scire' (to know), 'science' signifies 
knowledge and enlightenment as opposed to nescience, ignorance 
and superstition. In a more restricted and technical sense, it 
stands for any organized body of knowledge based on observable 
facts and gained by a systematic study. It is no doubt a pursuit of 
truth, concerning itself mainly with the world outside and trying 
to understand what it is and how it works. Of course, in this 
adventure after truth, it is often confronted with the eternal 
question, 'why?' for which it often fails to get a satisfactory 
answer.
Science goes about this business by collecting information about 
observable facts through experiments and observations, classifying 
them in some known order and drawing inferences through logic 
and reasoning based on them. Tentative conclusions called 
'hypotheses', are drawn and further experiments conducted to 
confirm the same. Once these hypotheses are proved beyond all 
doubt through controlled and repeatable experiments, they are 
enunciated as 'theories'. However, while forming the judgement 
by the personality factors of the scientist, this is rightly termed 
the 'scientific attitude'. Only that person endowed with such an
attitude is a true scientist. He is ever ready to change his theories 
when new facts and deeper investigations lead to different 
conclusions. This is how science has grown enormously and 
gained respect.
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Applied science and technology
These discoveries of science, both basic and secondary, have led 
to the creation of, and to fantastic developments in, another field, 
that of applied science and technology. Energies of nature have 
been harnessed and converted beyond all recognition, to subserve 
human ends. Modern man is so deeply involved in the products 
of science that it is almost impossible for him to live without 
them.
Where the scientists have erred
Not withstanding all the blessings that science has wrought for 
mankind, it is a stark fact that it has also brought the world to the 
brink of total annihilation. Of course, we may concede that it is 
not science but scientists that are responsible for the predicament. 
Where exactly have they gone wrong? They have concentrated 
all along on the external world, the 'without', forgetting and 
neglecting the internal world, the 'within'. Hence they have 
obtained only a partial, and consequently an imperfect, view of 
the world. The story of the six blind men 'knowing' the elephant 
is an illustration very much to the point. This total lack of study 
of the world within has resulted in a lopsided development of 
the human personality. To be sure, a beautiful face needs a 
beautiful nose, which must be of the right proportion and set in 
the right place. Neither its total absence nor its all-encompassing 
presence, nor its displacement from its allotted place (suppose an 
ear and the nose exchange places, how will it look?) will contribute 
to the beauty of the face! Even so has the human psyche been 
warped as a result of the relentless pursuit of the external world. 
This has resulted in the total neglect of values and encouraged a 
sensate culture. To satisfy the insatiable hunger for material 
enjoyment, natural sources of wealth and energy are being 
depleted at a terrific rate. The two world wars have, in no small 
measure, been a consequence of this greed. Gadget-civilization is
adversely affecting the normal biological and psychological 
capacities of man. The writing on the wall is very clear. If we 
refuse to read it, our civilization can be destroyed by the 
'barbarians from inside'.
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What scientists can do, to reform ttiemselves and 
transform society
If this should not happen -  none, including the scientists, will ever 
wish it to happen -  scientists should change their basic outlook. 
Pursuit of truth, the whole truth, should be their sole aim, and the 
benefits that accrue from their toils should be extended to the 
whole o f mankind. This mearis that the scientists should refuse to be 
the handmaids of their greedy employers or selfish political and 
governmental leaders. Otherwise all the fruits of their efforts could 
be misused and even abused for destructive purposes.
But, in a highly commercialized society like ours, where Mammon 
has already driven out God, is it ever possible? Any scientist who 
dares to do it, will either be put behind the bars or have to face 
starvation. Even if these do not happen, he will not be able to 
muster enough support -  financial and otherwise -  to start his 
own institution for research work.
This is a serious impediment. There are two possible ways of 
overcoming it. First, the saner sections of our society including a 
few philanthropists should volunteer to back up such scientists. 
Second, the scientists themselves should work for a few years 
only and save up for their future projects.
Nothing is impossible in life. Where there is will, there is a way. 
Once the scientists reform themselves and pursue science in this 
spirit, they can transform society. In this adventure, religion can 
be a very helpful companion to inspire and guide.
Religion: whiat it is and what it is not
Almost from the beginning of its existence, mankind has believed 
in the existence of God or a superhuman controlling Power, a 
power often pictured as a person or a personality, entitled to
reverence and worship. It is this belief that gradually gave rise to 
the building of separate places of worship for Him, as also the 
evolution of various kinds of rituals of worship.
At the higher levels, religion has stressed the mystic experience 
of God -  this, in fact, is the quintessence of religion -  as the 
summum bonum of life, and has prescribed self-purification and 
self-discipline as the necessary means of achieving it. The result 
has been a galaxy of beings called saints, sages and seers.
However, the path of self-purification and self-discipline is difficult 
and invariably involves self-effacement also. The generality of 
mankind finds it easier to follow formal external rituals and 
observances than lead such interior life aimed at total 
transformation of the personality. This naturally resulted in formal 
religion replacing religious experience, dogmas getting the better 
of inner convictions and the development of an organized church 
with its concomitant evils of fanaticism, regimentation and a 
'holier than thou' attitude. Intolerance and hatred of religions 
other than one's own was also an important byproduct of this 
neglect of true religion.
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Rejuvenation of religion
The only way of rejuvenating religion is to emancipate it from 
the clutches of soulless formalism and redirect it towards the 
mystic experience of the inner Truth. This inevitably entails the 
stressing of self-purification and self-discipline. The details of 
such methods of purification and discipline could, however, vary 
from person to person.
While trying to describe ineffable, religious mystics all over the 
world, have left us quite a voluminous literature. A careful study 
of this reveals to us that the content of such experience is always 
the same, though their descriptions, and, even methods of discipline 
leading to them, vary considerably. From this we can conclude 
that 'Religion' (as realization of Truth, as mystic experience of 
God) is always ONE. If this is conceded, then we have to accept 
that all the 'religions' of the world are simply the various paths of 
discipline ultimately leading to that mystic experience, even as the 
various radii of a circle leads to one and the same centre.
Spirituality, ttie fulfilment of religion
The practice of religious discipline, if pursued relentlessly and 
with devoted faith, has got to lead to the direct experience of 
God, the all-pervading, all-knowing spirit. Once this spirit, the 
noncorporeal essence of all corporeal beings, nay, even of the 
insentient nature, is realized, then, that experience blossoms 
forth in every thought, word and action, as universal love and 
sympathy. It is truly universal since it is based on the direct 
perception of the fundamental unity behind the whole creation. 
At the subjective level, it results in perfect inner poise unaffected 
by the vicissitudes of life and an experience of unalloyed joy in 
the inner being. This is 'spirituality', the fulfilment and the acme 
of religion.
It is strange, but true, that man seems to have a special knack for 
misvinderstanding and even messing up things. It is perhaps due 
to this that spirituality has often been mistaken for miracles, and 
magical rites, sorcery and spiritualism. This has naturally induced 
unregenera te people into seeking to fulfil their vile and vulgar 
desires, even by harming others, through such ignoble means. Of 
course, charlatans have quickly seized such opportunities to 
masquerade as 'spiritual' men and wrought immense harm to 
gullible people.
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Synttiesis, ttie need of the tiour
By now it is clear that each one of these disciplines of science, 
religion and spirituality, is an honest attempt at discovering the 
truth and that all these disciplines are potentially capable of 
being used for the greatest good of the greatest number. It should 
be possible to synthesize them intelligently so that the three 
disciplines will get mutually strengthened and not hindered.
While jealously guarding the 'scientific attitude' and fearlessly 
devoting itself to the pursuit of the truth 'without', science 
should cultivate a positive respect towards religion as an equally 
valid discipline working in a parallel field, a field concerning the 
'within'. It should be tempered by the value-system of religion so 
that a scientist will never forget that others also are human 
beings like him, with similar desires and aspirations. This in turn
should inspire him to mobilize his discoveries for the good of 
humankind.
Religion on its part should shed its antipathy towards and 
suspicion of science. It should ruthlessly adopt the scientific 
attitude in its investigation into the 'within', so that all 
superstitions can be decrusted from its body. By emphasizing 
always the need for spiritual experience of the irmer truth 
through self-purification, religion should aim at transforming 
people from the level of brutes to the level of gods. It should 
vigorously propagate and impart the value-system to the scientists, 
so as to give them a new dimension in their pursuit of knowledge.
Whether we are scientists investigating the 'without' or scientists 
delving into the 'within', we are all pilgrims on the path of 
human progress. We must cooperate and help one another so as 
to reach our journey's end and share the joy of fulfilment.
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South Asian Islam finds its best expression in Kashmir's Rishi-Sufi 
order and its precious gift known in the valley and beyond as 
Kashmiriyat, o f which the Kashmiri people are justly proud. The 
defining features o f Kashmiri Sufism are a belief in both the transcendence 
and immanence o f God, respect for other religions, belief in reincarnation, 
anphasis on following the right path (very similar to the eight-fold path 
taught by Lord Buddha), developing the mind's potential through 
meditation and absorption, using primarily a technique called paas-e- 
anfaas (watching the breath, a form o f pranayama), belief in miracles 
performed by the Sufi saint and his capacity to intercede with God on 
behalf o f his followers, love of idols o f gods and goddesses and contempt 
for the Mullah, the priest who teaches a ritualistic version of Islam.
The evolution o f Kashmiri Sufism has been possible because of a 
peaceful interaction between Islam and Hinduism in the South Asian 
region over 14 centuries, in which both religions have discovered a
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spiritual symbiosis. But it needs to be emphasised, particularly in view 
of the current Islamic fundamentalist propaganda, that though it has 
remained open to influence from other religions and philosophies, the 
essential character of Kashiniri Sufism remains Islamic.
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Introduction
Born in the sandy dunes and hills of Arabian Desert 14 centuries 
ago, Islam has spread throughout the world. It now claims 
almost two billion followers. Wherever it has gone, it has acquired 
a local colour, while retaining its basic belief systems. Islam itself 
has encouraged this process. The Holy Quran exhorts its followers 
to believe in all the prophets of God, by whatever names they 
may now be known, who preceded Prophet Mohammad (peace 
be upon him!).
In Islamic traditions the number of such seers, who brought 
messages from God, is put at 1,24,000, though only 25 names 
could be mentioned in the Quran. Thus while expressing belief in 
the oneness of God and the prophethood of Mohammad, a Muslim 
simultaneously expresses belief in all the previous messengers of 
God as well. It is natural that the Muslims have not felt obliged to 
distance themselves totally from their previous beliefs and practices 
even after conversion to Islam, at least to the extent these did not 
contravene their new Islamic beliefs. Indian Islam, therefore, 
naturally has its own indigenous flavour. And it finds its best 
expression in the Sufi way of life in the Kashmir valley.
Kashmiri Islam is renowned for its broadmindedness and its 
deep commitment to tolerance of all streams of thought. It is 
known to be firmly anchored in the Indian soil. Where from does 
this deep commitment to a composite Hindu-Muslim culture, to 
what we Indians call secularism, which is basically respect for all 
religions, emanate? Why is Kashmiriyat so important to the 
Kashmiri Muslim? I think the answer lies in the eclectic and 
syncretic nature of their spiritual beliefs. It is the impact of Sufi 
and Rishi visions of Islam that have helped him synthesise the 
message of Prophet Mohammad with the teachings of earlier 
prophets of Islam that constitute the core beliefs of Hinduism, 
Buddhism and Jainism.
Peaceful spread of Islam in Kashmir
Perhaps the most important factor that contributed to Kashmiri 
Sufism is the history of a peaceful spread of Islam in this region. 
Definite historical facts that would account for the extraordinarily 
large number of conversions that took place in Kashmir are not 
available, as Sir Thomas Arnold points out' with regret in his 
highly regarded book. Preaching of Islam. But whatever scanty 
information is available leads us to attribute this surprising 
phenomenon to a long and continuous missionary movement 
carried out by Sufi saints, pirs, faqirs, dervishes and ulema. The 
Islamic missionary entered the valley at a time when, in the 
words of W R Lawrence {The Valley o f Kashmir), it "was a country 
of drunkards and gamblers." Such an atmosphere is very much 
suited for the spread of a new philosophy or religion.
In the introduction to his English translation of Rajatarangirii, 
another authority on Kashmir, Dr M A Stein maintains that Islam 
made its way into the valley not by forcible conquest but by 
gradvial conversion, for which the influx of foreign adventurers 
from the south and central Asia had prepared the ground. 
Bulbul Shah, also known as Sharf-ud-Deen Syed Abdur Rahman 
Turkistani, was one such adventurer, a mystic, who acquired the 
first notable success in the spread of Islam in the form of the 
conversion of Ranchan Shah who became the first Muslim ruler 
of Kashmir and assumed the name Sultan Sadr-ud-Deen.
Bulbul Shah died in 1327 A.D. He was a Syed from Turkistan. 
Another Syed who wielded an extraordinary influence on the 
spread of Islam in the valley of Kashmir was Shah Hamadan. 
Born in 1314 A.D. at Hamadan in Persia, the great Syed became 
interested in Tasauivwuf (mysticism) and learnt its first principles 
from his maternal uncle Syed Ala-ud-Deen. He became a disciple 
of great Sufi saints Sheikh Abul Barkat Taqi-ud-Deen and after 
his death Sheikh Sharif-ud-Deen Mahmud Muzdaqani. His 
teachers advised him to complete his education by extensive 
travels in the world. Shah Hamadan followed this advice and
visited several countries. In his 21-year long journey he came in
contact with several Sufis and mystics from various parts of the
world. As he returned to his native place, Timur started the
persecution of Syeds. This forced him to leave for Kashmir. Seven
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hundred Syeds are said to have accompanied him to Kashmir in the 
reign of Sultan Shahab-ud-Deen in 1372 A.D.
Tlie migration of so many Syeds along with the great mystic Shah 
Hamadan proved to be a decisive factor in the conversion of the 
great mass of Kashmiris to Islam. That the majority of the people 
embraced the new religion also gave a mystical colour to Kashmiri 
Islam. These mystic divines established hermitages all over the 
country, which served as centres for the propagation of their beliefs.
The present ziarat (shrine) of Shah Hamadan is said to have been 
erected on a spot that he used as a retreat on the Vitasta. This is 
where he used to discuss religion and philosophy with the 
Hindu divines and sanyasis and test their so-called supernatural 
powers. In two well-known incidents, the sanyasis embraced 
Islam along with all their followers following the test of their 
powers. These discussions and trials followed by conversions of 
a large number of Hindu divines greatly encouraged the process 
of the spread of Islam. It has also left an indelible impression on 
the Kashmiri mind, as many of the points raised and discussed 
here have become part of the local folklore.
Another wave of Syeds came from Turkistan in 1396 A.D. along 
with the 22-year old son of Shah Hamadan, Mir Mohammad. 
Three hundred Syeds came this time in the reign of Sultan 
Sikandar. The Sultan's Prime Minister was a brahmin named 
Malik Siya Butt. Impressed with a dialogue with Mir Mohammad, 
Siya Butt converted to Islam along with his family and many 
followers and assumed the name Malik Saif-ud-Deen. He married 
his daughter re-named Bibi Barea to Mir Mohammad. Syed Mir 
Mohammad's influence resulted in the prohibition of distillation 
and sale of wine. Gambling and Sati (the Hindu practice of 
wives being burnt on the pyre of their dead husbands) were also 
forbidden. He passed away in 1354 A.D. and was buried near his 
father in Khatlan.
The advent of such a large number of eminent Syeds who were 
seeking refuge from the persecution of Timur left a great 
impression on the valley. As G M D Sufi writes in his valuable 
contribution, Islamic Culture in Kashmir, "Deeply imbued with the 
Sufism of the age and country from which they emigrated, these 
Syeds and their followers seem to have stimulated the tendency
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to mysticism for which Buddhism and Vedantism had already 
paved the way. Perhaps also shocked at the tyranny and self- 
assertion of Timur, they may have sought refuge in the regions of 




The most important influence on the Kashmiri Muslims, in terms 
of their Kashmiriyat, is that of the Rishi order of Sufis. While the 
Sufi orders like the Suhrawardi, Kubravi, Naqshbandi and Qadri, 
arrived in Kashmir from Persia, Central Asia, and Central and 
North India, the Rishi order evolved in the Valley itself in the 
beginning of the 15th century.
The Kashmir valley was already permeated with the traditions of 
Hindu asceticism and Buddhist renunciation. As an authority on 
Kashmiri Sufism, Prof Abdul Qaiyum Rafiqi explains^ the term 
Rishi itself is clearly a derivation from Sanskrit traditions. 
Important chroniclers of this period, Abul Fazal, for instance, or 
Emperor Jahangir, reveal a close resemblance between the life­
styles of the Sufis and the Hindu Rishis as well as Buddhist and 
Jain monks.
Nand Rishi Sheikhul-Alam Sheikh Nooruddin is the forerurmer 
of the Rishi order of Sufis. Having wielded tremendous influence 
on the Kashmiri society. Sheikh Nooruddin is considered the 
national saint of Kashmir. His ziarat (shrine) at Chamr-e-Sharif is 
visited by thousands till this day and is the main target of 
Fundamentalist Islam's ire. His sayings show that he believed 
that God is both immanent and transcendent. God is everywhere, 
not confined to one place or another. According to Sheikhul 
Alam, all the branches of knowledge are nothing but the 
commentary upon the proclamation of faith, "There is no God 
but Allah". If one truly seeks God, he says, everything but Allah 
becomes worthless. One, who recognises himself, recognises God: 
"When I was able to recognise my own self, I was able to 
recognise God; both loss and gain became identical to me and the 
distinction between life and death disappeared."^
He once told his mother; "God was and is and shall be for ever; 
He is independent of all other creatures; He lacks nothing.'"* 
Further he says:
"There is one God,
But with a hundred names.
There is not a single blade o f grass,
Which does not worship Him." ^
"First I became certain that there is no God but Allah,
Then I made myself (acquainted) Divine revelations.
First I forgot myself and yearned after God,
Then I reached la-makan." *
With such deep comnnitment to spiritual growth and the Islamic 
philosophy of Divine Unity as expressed in the philosophy of 
Wahdat-ul-Wujud, which is uniquely similar to the Hindu 
philosophy of non-duality (Advaita), it is not at all surprising that 
the Rishis consistently preached complete harmony among 
different religions and peace and understanding among their 
followers.
This was not always easy. Sheikhul Alam Sheikh Nooruddin, for 
instance, faced restrictions during the reign of Suha Bhatt who 
had started persecuting non-Muslims in his new-found Islamic 
zeal after conversion to the new faith.
Aware of the tension created between Hindus and Muslims 
during the reign of Sultan Sikandar, Sheikh Nooruddin wrote:
"We belong to the same parents.
Then why this difference?
Let Hindus and Muslims (together)
Worship God alone." ’
"We came to this world like partners.
We should have shared our joys 
and sorrows together." *
Nand Rishi Sheikh Nooruddin's message was not confined to 
Hindus and Muslims alone. It speaks to all mankind. That is why 
his sayings and his verses have acquired the character of proverbs
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and are routinely referred to by Kashmiris of all hues in their 
daily life. Another reason for the popularity of his verses and 
that of many other Rishis may be the fact that they expressed 
their thoughts in the simple language used by the common folk. 
The message given by Kashmiri Rishis or even Sufis of previous 
orders, who had arrived from Central Asia, is always the same - 
divine unity of All That Is.
In fact it is the Sufis of previous orders who had prepared the 
ground for the emergence of Rishis with their powerful message 
of religious synthesis. One poem is of special relevance. This is 
from the verses of Sarfi, a Sufi of the Kubravi Order.
"O, Sarfi!
What benefit are you going to gain from the pilgrimage?
If Kaaba, temple and tavern are not identical with you.
O, Sarfi!
/4s on every side a ray has
Fallen from His face to light the night,
Impossible it is for you to say that Somnath
Has not the Kaaba's light".
It is also noteworthy that many a Sufi and Rishi, have had no 
hesitation in expressing their love of idols of gods and goddesses. 
In fact they consider idol-worship as part of the phenomenon of 
mystical love. Sheikh Yaqub, a Sufi of the Kubravi order, for 
instance, proudly calls himself a kafir of Ishq (Divine Love) and 
yearns to burn himself in the fire of love. He challenges the ulema 
(scholars) who find fault with the love of idols, to tell him if 
anything else is more meritorious in the world than the crime of 
loving idols. He asserts repeatedly that his faith is the love of 
idols.
The same convergence of Hindu-Muslim thought is discernible 
in Kashmiri mysticism on the question of reincarnation. While 
few Muslims in other parts of the sub-continent believe in 
reincarnation in the context of the philosophy of Karma, it is 
not unusual to find many believers in this theory among 
Kashmiri Muslims. Kashmiri Islam is much indebted to the 
Persian influence in this regard. Verses like the following from 
the Masnawi by Hazrat Jalaluddin Rumi, are common knowledge 
in Kashmir;
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"1 died as mineral and became a plant,
I died as plant and rose to animal,
I died as animal and I was Man.
Why should 1 fear?
When was I less by dying?
Yet Once more I shall die as Man,
To soar with angels blest,
But even from angelhood I must pass on..." ’
Sufism involves the improvement of man's relationship with 
man as well as man's relationship with Allah. Those who believe 
in Wahdut-ul-wujud also believe that the only real existence is 
Allah who is therefore Wajib-ul-wujud. All other beings are 
shadows, phantoms of our creation as the poet Meer Taqi Meer 
says:
Ye tawahhum ka karkhana hai,
Yan wohi hai jo aitebaar kiya.
This universe is nothing but delusion (Maya),
Nothing exists except what we assume.
This idea is similar to the philosophy of Vedanta -  'There is only 
one Brahma and none else exists'. The most distinguished 
exponent of Wahdat-ul-Wujud was Shaikh Mohiuddin Ibn Arabi, 
the author of Futuhat-e-Makkiya and Fiisiis al Hikam. Some Sufis 
like Mansur al-Hallaj, Qazi-ul-Qazzat Hamadani, and Masud 
Bak were martyred for propagating the philosophy of Unity of 
Existence, yet the idea remained a pillar of Sufi belief, especially 
among the Sufis of India, where the philosophy of Vedanta gave it 
a firm foundation.
For the Sufi, God is both transcendent and immanent. The 
concepts of transcendence and immanence (bhedabheda) in Indian 
philosophy too assert both identity and difference between the 
world and finite individuals, on the one hand, and Brahman, on 
the other. The world and finite individuals are real and yet both 
different and not different from the Brahman. Brahman is viewed 
as both the material and the efficient cause of the world. Though 
Brahman as cause is different from Brahman as effect, the two 
are identical inasmuch as the effect dissolves into the cause, as 
the waves return into the sea. As waves are both different from
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and identical with the sea, so are the world and the finite 
individuals in relation to Brahnnan. The finite selves are parts of 
Brahman, as sparks of fire are parts of fire.’“
The relationship between the broad-minded Sufis and the 
conservative Ulema has never been cordial in most Muslim 
societies. But whereas the Sufis were on the margins of society in 
several other places, in Kashmir, as in other parts of India, they 
were the dominant influence. This is what makes Kashmir 
different from Muslim societies in other parts of the world. This 
made it possible for the Sufi in Kashmir to rebuke the preacher 
rather than being the target of abuse as in other places.
One essential feature of Kashmiri Sufism is a faith in miracles 
performed by the Sufi saints and their ability to intercede with 
God on behalf of their followers, a power that was restricted in 
Islam to Prophet Mohammad alone, that too to be exercised on 
the Day of Judgement alone and not in matters of solving 
mundane day-to-day problems. Fundamentalists make much of 
it to prove that Sufism is far from Islam, as it seems to encourage 
pre-Islamic superstitions, though Islam wants to make people 
rational and the Prophet himself did not depend on miracles to 
convey his message to the people or to impress upon them his 
closeness to God as prophets had done before him.
This makes it imperative that we try to understand the Sufi view 
of the place and function of miracles in their scheme of things. 
"Miracles," said Naqshband”, "have a function, and that function 
operates whether they are understood or not. They have a true 
(objective) fimction. Hence, miracles will in some people produce 
confusion, in others scepticism, in others fear, in others excitement, 
and so on. It is the function of the miracle to provoke reactions 
and supply nutriment; nutriment in this case which varies with 
the personality acted upon. In all cases the miracle is an instrument 
of both influence and assessment of the people acted upon."
A point of convergence between Kashmiri mysticism and the 
general Vedanta philosophy is the belief that performance of 
duties together with knowledge of Brahman leads to liberation. In 
religious life, like many Vedantists, Kashmiri Sufis are an advocate 
of bhakti, but bhakti is not a mere feeling of love or affection for 
God, but rather is dhyaha, or meditation, directed towards the
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transcendent Brahman who is not exhausted in his manifestations. 
As Dara Shikoh’  ̂ pointed out:
Dost thou wish to enter the circle o f men of illumination?
Then cease talking and be in the "state";
By professing the unity of god, thou canst not become a monotheist 
y4s the tongue cannot taste sugar by only uttering its name.
Even the meditative technique that Kashmiri Sufis use is closer 
to the Indian tradition. By and large they use variations of paas-e- 
anfaas^  ̂(watching the breath). This is similar to various techniques 
of pranayama widely practised in India's Hath-Yoga traditions. 
These meditative techniques were being practised initially by the 
Shaivite yogis of Kashmir before the advent of Islam. The Sufis 
have added the repetition of the word Allah or Allahoo or 
huwwa to their meditative technique.
Islam and Hinduism - spiritual symbiosis
In order to fully appreciate the depth of the Kashmiri Sufis' 
commitment to both Islamic and pre-Islamic Buddhist and 
Vedantic ideas, it is necessary to study the perspective in which 
their interaction with the two great religions took place. Islam 
and Hinduism have lived together in this land for almost fourteen 
centuries -  the first thirteen as very good neighbours. 'Love thy 
neighbour, for he is yourself', said the Vedas. The Holy Quran 
agreed. It is this spiritual symbiosis that kept the followers of the 
two religions in near-perfect harmony for such a long time.
Islam's encounter with other religions was quite violent. The 
history of crusades launched by Christian powers is well known. 
It was Hinduism alone that provided Islam with a fertile ground 
for natural growth. Even the Central Asian bandits who invaded 
and looted India could not disturb the growing ties. A number of 
Sufi saints spent their lifetime in India, spreading Islam's message 
of peace. Prophet Mohammad, too, is believed to have felt attraction 
for India. Allama Iqbal put it in these unforgettable words:
Meer-e-Arab ko aai thandi hawa jahan se;
Mera watan wohi hai, mera watan wohi hai.
(From where the Prophet received a cool breeze; that is my land, 
that is my land).
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Beginning with the term they employed to describe themselves, 
Dharma and Deen (both meaning ways of life), and an emphatic 
assertion of the Oneness of God {Ekam Sat: La llaha lllallah), Islam 
and Hinduism share the vision of a moral order prevailing in the 
universe. Both dharmas inform us of cosmic agencies keeping an 
account of all our deeds for which we will be made accountable. 
Both talk about life after death.
While their perception of humanity's intellectual level is 
understandably different, both Islamic and Hindu scriptures 
accord the highest value to intelligence, reason, buddhi. The Holy 
Quran's repeated emphasis on reason and education is well- 
known. No wonder the advent of Islam heralded a period of 
great intellectual and scientific achievements that was also 
instrumental in propelling the Europeans from the Dark Ages to 
Enlightenment. The use of reason is regarded as one of the ten 
principles of Hindu Dharma as well. The greatest prayer in the 
Vedas asks inspiration for intelligence. Even the Gayatri mantra 
calls for 'an unerring guidance to our intellects.' In Yogavasistha, 
the redoubtable sage Vasistha exhorts Sri Ram Chandra to "discard 
irrationality even if it comes from the creator h i m s e l f " N o  
wonder our ancient Hindu ancestors had led the world in nearly 
all disciplines of scientific and artistic endeavour for several 
millennia.
Hinduism has been likened to a vast sponge, absorbing all that it 
can. As an ancient Deen it has to do that in order to stay modem. 
(The Vedas claim to predate Creation. This is confirmed by the 
Bible: 'In the beginning was the word''^. Hinduism has gracefully 
accepted a modified version of Islamic laws of divorce and 
property rights to women. Indian Constitution, largely prepared 
by Hindus, is based on the Hindu-Muslim ideal of equal respect 
for all religions. It gracefully accepts the Islamic ideal of human 
and gender equality. Similarly Islam teaches us to practice Ijtihad, 
that is accepting new ideas in order to keep up with changing 
times.’*
Islam also enjoins upon its followers to respect and learn from all 
the previous prophets. The Holy Quran, for instance, does not go 
into a detailed discussion of the Oneness of God. It does not 
teach teclmiques of meditation and concentration on God, though 
these are vital elements of prayer. There is no need. The Hindu
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scriptures, our A di-granth , had done that much earlier. They 
tackle the questior\ of the unity of God from all possible angles 
and teach such a variety of techniques of meditation that the 
world is flocking to India to learn them. Our philosophies are 
complimentary, not contradictory. In any case the richness of 
Hindu philosophy and its openness to all competing ideas 
themselves ensure that it treats all new ideas as complimentary 
rather than contradictory The spiritual symbiosis is an obvious 
fact. We only need to study and reflect with an open mind.
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Kashmiri Sufism is primarily Islamic in spirit
According to Reverend Stanton, the orthodox Muslim divines, 
following the Quran, taught from the first that the nature of man 
was utterly unlike that of God, and hence the idea of a divine 
incarnation was, and is, abhorrent to Islam. Yet there have always 
been Moslem seekers after a Way by which man could attain real 
communion with God. They taught that by meditation, mystical 
rites and asceHcism, following the example of illuminated teachers, 
it was possible for the believer to have direct touch with Allah, 
such as the mere observance of the law of religion could not give.
Kashmiri Sufism and indeed Sufism in general are under attack 
today from a political and fundamentalist version of Islam that 
considers them a deviation from Islam.
Much is made of the Kashmiri Sufi's belief in reincarnation, for 
instance. That reincarnation is a Hindu belief is well-known. But 
it is not known that the Q uran  refers as Kafir (non-believer) any 
one who does not believe in the possibility of rebirth. Most 
notable in this context are the verses of the great mystic, Hazrat 
Jalal-ud-Deen Rumi, quoted earlier, describing the process of 
evolution through reincarnation - from mineral and plant to 
animal and man and then to angelhood and beyond.'^
Another great mystic Mansur al-Hallaj, famous for his formulation. 
A n al H aq  (I am The Truth: A ham  Brahm o A sm i)  had written:
"Like the herbage I have s p ru n g  up m any a tim e on the banks o f  
flow in g  rivers. Fo r a h u n d red  thousand years I  have lived and worked  
in every sort o f body.
The Quran itself seems quite clear: "And you were dead, and He 
brought you back to life. And He shall cause you to die, and shall 
bring you back to life, and in the end shall gather you unto 
Himself."’’
The words 'you were dead' can only mean that they had lived 
before becoming dead. And the words "in the end shall gather 
you unto Himself" could very well mean the attainment of 
moksha rather than what is usually interpreted as an eternal life 
in Heaven or Hell.
Some other verses from the Quran are also relevant:
As the rains turn the dry earth into green thereby yielding fruits, 
similarly God brings the dead into life so that thou mayest learn
And He sent down rains from above in proper quantity and He brings 
back to life the dead earth, similarly ye shall be reborn}'
A Pakistani scholar Dr M H Abdi remarks that "commentator 
Ayashi on the authority of Imam Baqer says that the ultimate 
referred to in the foregoing verse really mean Rajat (reincarnation), 
or going up and down, and ...that Rajat means rebirth in this 
world of great Holy Beings as well as of well-known kafirs 
before Qiyamat (resurrection) ...Kafir means the perverse." In 
this context Abdi again quotes from the Quran: The Kafirs "have 
sworn by the strongest oath that one who dies shall not be 
reborn. Surely they will be reborn and this law is perfect but 
people who do not possess wisdom do not comprehend it."^
"Commentator Qummi quoting Imam Jafer, the well-known 
authority in the Islamic world, says that (this) means rebirth to 
be undergone before entering the Heaven world
In a series of articles, "Reincarnation -  Islamic Conceptions," 
Dr Abdi, expresses some interesting thoughts on how rebirth 
gradually lost popularity in Islam:
"The position adopted by the successive luminaries who followed 
(Mohammed) was to affirm the belief in reincarnation but not to 
propagate it as a teaching for the masses. The attitude was due to 
psychological reasons. (This is what seems to have happened in
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Christianity as well.) The emphasis in Islamic teachings has 
throughout been on the purity of action.
/
"Another factor to remember is that the defensive wars, which 
have been described as Jihad or holy wars, which the Muslims 
fought in the early days and the wars of conquests (therefore not 
holy) which the Muslims fought in later days...gave a different 
shift to Islamic teachings. Philosophical, mystical and ethical 
teachings received an impetus in the first phase but they had 
subdued existence in the later phase. During this phase the 
republican character of the State was changed into monarchy 
and the supremacy no more belonged to the saints and 
philosophers.
“A subject like reincarnation demands a subtle mental attitude. It 
entails understanding of the higher planes of consciousness, the 
laws of cause and effect and the working of the laws of evolution. 
The monarchs had no interest in such subjects. Like so many 
other teachings, reincarnation was confined to the study and 
attention of the outer and inner students of Sufism...(However,) 
there is no danger for a Muslim being called a heretic if he 
believes and expresses himself in favour of reincarnation."^"
Many Muslims look at the concept of rebirth in the context of 
resurrection on the Day of Judgement alone. But it needs to be 
remembered that the concept of Day is derived f r ^  the concept 
of Time and our concept of Time is an entirely earthly concept. 
As the Holy Quran is the word of God, the concept of Time 
contained therein must be a Divine concept. The Divine, let us 
remember is eternal. Timeless. For all we know, we may already 
be going through the Day of Judgement.
Scholars like Reynold A Nicholson have studied the subject of 
Islamic mysticism in depth. His conclusion is clearly that there is 
a basis for Sufism in orthodox Islam itself. Mohammedan 
orthodoxy in its present shape owes much to Ghazali, and 
Ghazali himself was a Sufi.̂ ^
Nicholson says: His (Prophet Mohammad's) deeper instinct craved 
a direct revelation from God to the soul. There are no 
contradictions in the logic of feeling. Mohammed, who had in 
him something of the mystic, felt God both as far and near, both
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as transcendent and immanent. In the latter respect, Allah is the 
light of the heavens and the earth, a Being who works in the 
world and in the soul of man.
“If  My servant ask thee about Me, lo, I am near"' ;̂
"We (God) are nearer to him than his own neck-vein" '̂ )̂;
"And in the earth are signs to those of real faith, and in yourselves. 
What! Do ye not
It was a long time ere they saw. The Moslem consciousness, haunted by 
terrible visions of the wrath to come, slowly and painfully awoke to the 
significance of those liberating ideas.
"The verses which I have quoted do not stand alone, and 
however unfavourable to mysticism the Koran as a whole may 
be, I caniiot assent to the view that it supplies no basis for a 
mystical interpretation of Islam. This was worked out in detail 
by the Sufis, who dealt with the Koran in very much the same 
way as Philo treated the Pentateuch. But they would not have 
succeeded so thoroughly in bringing over the mass of religious 
Moslems to their side, unless the champions of orthodoxy had 
set about constructing a system of scholastic philosophy that 
reduced the divine nature to a purely formal, changeless, and 
absolute unity, a bare will devoid of all affections and emohons, 
a tremendous and incalculable power with which no human 
creature could have any communion or personal intercourse 
whatsoever. That is the God of Mohammedan theology. That was 
the alternative to Sufism. Therefore, "all thinking, religious 
Moslems are mystics," as Professor D B Macdonald, one of our 
best authorities on the subject, has remarked. And he adds: "All, 
too, are pantheists, but some do not know it."”
Nicholson goes on to study the similarities and differences in 
Sufi, Buddhist and Hindu thoughts. The Sufis learned the use of 
rosaries from Buddhist monks, and, without entering into details, 
it may be safely asserted that the method of Sufism, so far as it is 
one of ethical self-culture, ascetic meditation, and intellectual 
abstraction, owes a good deal to Buddhism. But the features, 
which the two systems have in common, only accentuate the 
fundamental difference between them. In spirit they are poles 
apart. The Buddhist moralizes himself; the Sufi becomes moral 
only through knowing and loving God.
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Nicholson concludes that mysticism has its origins within Islam 
itself, no matter how much it may have gained from its interactions 
from Christianity, Neo-Platonism, Gnosticism, Buddhism and 
Hinduism. The receptivity of Islam to foreign ideas has been 
recognized by every unbiased inquirer, and the history of Sufism 
is only a single instance of the general rule...Even if Islam had 
been miraculously shut off from contact with foreign religions 
and philosophies, some form of mysticism would have arisen 
within it, for the seeds were already there.
How, it may be asked, could a religion founded on the simple 
and austere monotheism of Mohammed tolerate these new 
doctrines, much less make terms with them? It would seem 
impossible to reconcile the transcendent personality of Allah 
with an immanent Reality which is the very life and soul of the 
universe. Yet Islam has accepted Sufism. The Sufis, instead of 
being excommunicated, are securely established in the 
Mohammedan church, and the Legend o f the Moslem Saints records 
the wildest excesses of oriental pantheism.
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Conclusion
Kashmiri Sufism represents the best fruit of centuries of interaction 
between ancient Indian traditions and Islam. It is a synthesis of 
various religious traditions that has evolved over the centuries. 
But this could not have been possible without a spiritual symbiosis 
that exists between Islam and pre-Islamic religions, philosophies 
and traditions. Kashmiri Sufism is under attack now from 
fundamentalist Islam that calls Sufism a deviation from Islam. A 
continued peaceful co-existence of the Hindu and Muslim 
communities in South Asia is essential for the further evolution 
of Kashmiri Sufism. This demands that we rediscover the spiritual 
symbiosis between Islam and pre-Islamic traditions. It also needs 
to be remembered that though Kashmiri Sufism has evolved 
through an interaction with pre-Islamic ideas, in essence it remains 
primarily an Islamic movement.
Above all, we must remember that Prophet Mohammed has 
himself affirmed that the Holy Quran has an esoteric foundation: 
It was "sent in seven dialects; and in every one of its sentences 
there is an external and an internal meaning.. .1 received from the
messenger of God two kinds of knowledge: One of these I 
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Abstract
Sri A urobindo distinguishes several types o f know ledge ra n g in g  fro m  
the sense-based know ledge that we have o f the physical w orld outside 
ourselves, to the direct aw areness that w e have o f o u r own existence. 
O ther types o f  know ledge, in between these two, inform  us about our  
in n er states and  processes, thoughts and feelin gs . Science, with the help  
o f technology, has perfected and extended  ou r sense-based, "objective" 
know ledge to such  an extent that w e tend to consider this as the only  
valid source o f inform ation. O ther types o f  know ledge are com m only  
considered "subjective", private and unreliable. This paper argues that 
this is an im poverishing and perhaps even dangerous developm ent. The  
"subjective" types o f  know ledge are essential fo r  a com prehensive  
un dersta ndin g  o f ourselves as well as the world. It is these that g iv e  
m eaning and value to our individual and  collective existence. Before 
they can becom e an integral part o f science, however, they need to be 
honed to a sim ilar level o f perfection and reliability as the exact sciences  
have already achieved in the outer, "objective" type o f know ledge. It is
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suggested that the Indian systems of yoga could provide the philosophical 
basis as well as the practical techniques and methodologies to do this. 
Some of the core elements o f these approaches are discussed as well as 
the far-reaching consequences of a wider acceptance and pursuit o f such 
a perfected form of subjective knowledge.
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Introduction
What is it to know something? How can we know anything at all?
Within the normal routine of science these fundamental questions 
are seldom raised. Each scientific discipline has its own framework 
within which more immediately practical questions are selected, 
answers searched for and, in due time, generally found. As long 
as we remain within the boundaries of our discipline, the deep 
questions do not really arise. They do come up, however, when 
we get involved in interdisciplinary work. Then we get confronted 
with the significant differences in the approach to knowledge 
and its acquisition that exist between the different scientific 
disciplines. The issue comes up still more trenchantly when we 
try to study a subject that simply does not fit within the parameters 
of our particular discipline. Consciousness is one such subject 
that challenges the most basic assumptions of the disciplines that 
are at present trying to tackle it.
When consciousness was studied in the 19th century there was 
plenty of confusion, no doubt, but no essential, epistemological 
difficulty, for it was approached mainly from within the confines 
of a metaphysical and clinical psychology in which subjective, 
introspective forms of enquiry were still accepted as a legitimate 
source of knowledge. When psychology in the early years of the 
20th century, attempted to become an objective science, like 
physics, it redefined itself as behaviorism, and the subject of 
consciousness disappeared more or less completely from scientific 
enquiry (Guzaldere 1995). Only at the very end of the 20th 
century, did consciousness force itself again on the scientific 
agenda. This time around, however, it was taken up by an 
objective psychology, "evidence-based" medicine, and hard 
sciences like neurophysiology, computer science and physics. 
And here the epistemological difficulties arose.
There can be no doubt that the objective sciences have made 
tremendous progress during recent times regarding the functional 
and physical correlates of consciousness, but it is hard to believe 
that this will make us much wiser about consciousness itself. If it 
is confirmed, for example, that our human consciousness is not 
located in any one specific centre of the human brain but that it 
goes together with 40Hz electromagnetic waves that move from 
the front to the back over the frontal lobes, then this is extremely 
interesting in its own right, but it is not very clear how much this 
adds to what we know about consciousness itself (as distinct 
from its material correlates). That the essence of consciousness 
escapes scientific study as presently understood is perhaps not so 
surprising. Modern science has put all its energy into arriving at 
knowledge that is objective and independent of the observer, and 
consciousness might quite well be quintessentially subjective.
From where then do we get knowledge about consciousness 
itself? An answer might be found in the fact that modern science 
is not the only systematic effort to arrive at knowledge that 
humanity has made so far. There are in fact many other knowledge 
systems, but for our purpose the most promising is that of the 
spiritual traditions of India, which have specialized for thousands 
of years in the exploration of the inner worlds and on the 
acquisition of valid and reliable knowledge of consciousness. 
That the Indie traditions could play a major role in the further 
development of consciousness studies is widely acknowledged 
(Baruss and Moore 1998). What is less clearly seen, is that this 
contribution consists of a unique .combination of two elements: 
on the one hand a highly sophisticated theoretical framework for 
the study of consciousness and on the other a welter of practical 
techniques to change consciousness. How crucial this latter ability 
to modify consciousness could be for the effective study of 
consciousness has as yet hardly been recognized. This is surprising 
given the immense role physical technology has played in the 
advancement of the physical sciences: technology has not only 
provided the apparatus needed for more detailed observations, 
but has also been the spur for further theoretical work and the 
final test for the practical applicability of theoretical advances. 
Similar roles have been played by Yoga in the development of 
the Indie theories of consciousness. An effective "technology of 
consciousness" is absolutely critical for the development of more 
powerful and reliable methods to arrive at subjective knowledge.
Towards an integral epistemology of consciousness 227
Integrating Eastern and Western knowledge systems is however 
not easy. It is still comparatively simple, for example, to study 
the physiological effects of meditation techniques from within 
science. Such decontextualised phenomena do not conflict with 
the standard scientific paradigm and have been extensively 
studied in literally thousands of scientific research projects.' 
However, the more subtle aspects of the Indian understanding of 
consciousness carmot be fully grasped without challenging the 
materialistic, reductionist premises that are, according to many, 
still the bedrock of modern science.^ Such not physically reducible 
aspects of reality cannot be fully understood without adopting at 
least some essential elements of the Vedic, or Buddhist, ontology, 
which are incompatible with a materialistic view of reality. If one 
studies the materialist and the spiritual systems dispassionately, 
it becomes clear that the results of Yoga cannot be explained 
losslessly by the materialistic worldview, while, as we will see 
later, it is comparatively easy to fit the entire scientific enterprise 
within one or two specific niches of the more comprehensive 
Indian ontology. But before we can work this out, we must have 
a look at what the two different traditions actually mean by 
knowledge, consciousness and reality.
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What is meant by knowledge?
The words "knowledge" and "consciousness" are used in many 
different ways by different people, so before proceeding I will try 
to clarify how I will use these terms. I do not think it is possible, 
or for that matter, very useful, to give exhaustive definitions of 
either. These concepts are too complex and comprehensive for 
such an attempt. So the following is meant only as a first 
indication of the direction in which we will move. For our 
limited purpose it is sufficient to observe that the knowledge 
aimed at by science is not of the same type as the knowledge 
aimed at by the Vedic tradition. Scientific knowledge consists of 
explicit statements about things and processes and the 
relationships between them. One of the most generic descriptions 
of a valid statement of scientific knowledge is probably "If you 
do action a, under conditions c, you will get result r" (Velmans 
2001). This pragmatic formula holds even for much of yogic 
knowledge, but it does not hold for all of it: it presumes, for 
example, the existence of an independent agent, which does not
apply to the higher ranges of mystical experience. There are 
other differences as well. In the Vedantic worldview, where truth 
is not seen primarily as a property of sentences, but as something 
inherent in the observer as well as the observed, the knowledge 
aimed at does not consist of independently existing, external 
descriptions of such truth. The aim rather consists of the very act 
of seeing, realising or even becoming that truth. In ordinary 
science explicit statements about reality are complete in 
themselves; in Yoga statements about reality are rarely more than 
hints or aids, meant to arrive at a direct perception of a deeper 
truth, which itself remains concealed behind the outer formula. 
As Forman (1990, p.41) says with respect to "Pure Consciousness 
Events", "linguistic systems are afloat, not pinned down to the 
terms in which the mystic undergoes the event". While scientific 
knowledge can indicate avenues for outer action, Vedic knowledge 
indicates rather a different way to be and experience. Even the 
role of reason is not the same in both systems. In the early Vedic 
and Upanishadic tradition rational thinking is not used as a 
means to arrive at truth, but rather as a means to express as 
faithfully as possible a truth already seen or lived on a "higher" 
level of consciousness, so that the expression, by the quality of 
the consciousness inherent in it, can help others to experience 
that truth directly for themselves.^
Within the context of Yoga, Sri Aurobindo describes Vedic 
knowledge as follows;
[T]he knowledge we have to arrive at is not truth o f the intellect; 
it is not right belief, right opinions, right information about 
oneself and things, that is only the surface mind's idea of 
knowledge. To arrive at some mental conception about God and 
ourselves and the world is an object good for the intellect but not 
large enough for the Spirit; it will not make us the conscious sons 
of Infinity. Ancient Indian thought meant by knowledge a 
consciousness which possesses the highest Truth in a direct 
perception and in self-experience; to become, to be the Highest 
that we know is the sign that we really have the knowledge.
...For the individual to arrive at the divine universality and 
supreme infinity, live in it, possess it, to be, know, feel and 
express that one in all his being, consciousness, energy, delight of 
being is what the ancient seers o f the Veda meant by the 
Knowledge; (Sri Aurobindo, 1972a, pp. 686-87)
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It may be clear that this Vedic concept of knowledge is sonnething 
entirely different from the scientific concept of knowledge. Of 
course the ancients were aware of the more mundane type of 
knowledge, but they were less exclusively interested in it than 
modern science. Avidya, or "ignorance", as they called it somewhat 
disdainfully, denotes all knowledge that is not knowledge of the 
Absolute and the word is specifically used for knowledge of the 
world, in other words, for science. According to Sri Aurobindo's 
interpretation of the Isha Upanishad, both vidya (Knowledge of the 
One) and avidya (knowledge of the multiplicity) are needed for a 
complete understanding of reality;
Into a blind darkness they enter who follow after the Ignorance, 
they as if into a greater darkness who devote themselves to the 
Knowledge alone
. . . He  who knows That as both in one, the Knowledge and the 
Ignorance, by the Ignorance crosses beyond death and by the 
Knowledge enjoys Immortality.
(Sri Aurobindo's translation, 1996, pp. 21-22)
In the acquisition of the Vedic type of Knowledge four clearly 
demarcated stages are distinguished, of which only the first is a 
part of ordinary science: information, experience, realization and 
transformation. These four stages of understanding are most 
typically used to describe different levels of understanding the 
ultimate reality, but they also occur in other types of knowledge. 
Information can be gained by listening to others, by reading or 
by conducting objective experiments. It is the level of knowledge 
that science deals with. Unless it is related to something 
emotionally loaded, information generally does not directly affect 
a person. Only through the second stage of direct experience, 
knowledge becomes really one's own. Still, experience does not 
yet make any deep change to whom one is in one's essence. It is 
still something one has and is still separate from who one thinks 
one is. Direct personal involvement comes with the third step: 
realisation. Realisation involves a true reversal of consciousness. 
After realisation, there is no coming back. It changes who you 
feel you are. But even then, even though one has changed one's 
basic position and outlook on reality, one's nature remains still 
largely what it was. The whole nature changes only during the 
last stage, through the process of transformation. Experience and
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realisation can come by themselves, or after much effort, but they 
are things that happen at once. One can afterwards remember 
the exact date and time. Transformation however is a gradual 
and laborious process.
Before we can explore how the Vedic, irmer knowledge relates to 
scientific knowledge, we have to have a look at what 
consciousness is, for human knowledge is typically a combination 
of information with consciousness, or at least potential 
consciousness. Recent years have seen an enormous interest in 
information, largely spawned by the communications industry 
with its need to store and transfer information electronically. We 
will not get into this information aspect but focus rather on the 
aspect of consciousness.
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What is consciousness? What is reality?
In most scientific literature, consciousness is equated with the 
ordinary mental awareness of one's surrounding and one's internal 
movements. Sri Aurobindo uses the word "consciousness", in 
line with the Vedic tradition, in a much wider sense, for something 
that is pervasive throughout existence. As such it can take many 
forms. In man consciousness manifests most typically as mind, 
but in pure inorganic matter, for example, it manifests as not 
more than an obscure habit of form and movement. Consciousness 
in Sri Aurobindo's terminology is thus a much wider concept 
than mind. It exists in many grades or types that together form a 
hierarchy ranging from matter to the pure spirit, with the mind 
somewhere in the middle.
Sri Aurobindo formulates his view of this wider range of 
consciousness as follows:
Consciousness is usually identified with mind, but mental 
consciousness is only the human range which no more exhausts 
all the possible ranges o f consciousness than hwnan sight exhausts 
all the gradations o f colour or human hearing all the gradations of 
sound - f o r  there is much above or below that is to man invisible 
and inaudible. So there are ranges o f consciousness above and 
below the human range, with which the nor?nal human 
[consciousness] has no contact and they seem to it unconscious... 
(Sri Aurobindo, 1972b, p. 234)
This extended use of the term may in first instance be confusing 
for those who are used to the way the term is used in most of 
western scientific literature. Consciousness and mind are there 
often equated and in psychology mind is even used as a wider 
concept than consciousness (for example when a distinction is 
made between conscious and unconscious mental processes). 
Such a restricted conceptualization of consciousness makes of 
consciousness a freak phenomenon that suddenly appears at a 
certain level of physical complexity and that as such defies 
explanation. Much of the confusion that presently reigns in the 
field of consciousness studies seems to be due to an unworkable 
delineation of both matter and consciousness. Chalmers' "hard 
problem" (Chalmers 1995) for example, is hard only because it 
contains implicit assumptions about the relationship between 
matter and consciousness that are quite unwarranted.'*
If we take consciousness in line with the Vedic tradition as all- 
pervasive and existing not only within individuals, but also, 
independently, on a cosmic scale, then the individual 
consciousnesses can be seen as instances, portions or 
representatives of these different types of cosmic consciousness. 
The gradedness of consciousness and its cosmicity taken together 
have led to a conception of reality as a complex scheme involving 
interpenetrating but experientially distinct worlds, each consisting 
of a different type of consciousness and being.
Sri Aurobindo sees these different worlds as different relations 
between conscious existence as observer and the same conscious 
existence as the observed. Human mentality, that is our mental 
awareness of the physical world, is just one type of consciousness 
somewhere in the middle of a long scale. At the upper limit of 
the scale there is the consciousness the Divine has of himself. At 
the bottom end of the hierarchy we have the completely involved 
consciousness of inorganic matter. In the latter, self-oblivion is 
almost complete with the elemental particles of physics moving 
about in a seemingly inconscient, but still lawful organisation: 
"the force acting automatically and with an apparent blindness 
as in a trance, but still with the inevitability and power of truth 
of the Infinite" (Sri Aurobindo, 1972a, p. 344). The grades of 
conscious existence in between the two extremes of Spirit and 
Matter have been described in many ways. Sri Aurobindo uses 
generally the Vedic "sevenfold chord of being": Sat, Chit, Ananda,
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Supramental, Mental, Vital and Physical, with several subdivisions 
w'ithin each of these seven major planes.
We jnean [by planes o f consciousness, planes o f existence] a 
general settled poise or world of relations between Purusha and 
Prakriti, between the Soul and Nature. For anything that we can 
call world is and can be nothing else than the working out o f a 
general relation which a universal existence has created or 
established between itself or let us say its eternal fact or potentiality 
and the powers o f its becoming. That existence in its relations 
with and its experience o f the becoming is what we call soul or 
Purusha^, individual soul in the individual, universal soul in the 
cosmos; the principle and the powers o f the becoming are what we 
call Nature or Prakriti (Aurobindo 1972c, p. 429).
In this view there exists neither a purely objective world "out 
there", nor a purely subjective experience "in here". Reahty 
consists of the different relationships between consciousness- 
existence as observer and the saine consciousness-existence as 
observed. Conscious existence is all there is at any level. When 
consciousness-existence identifies itself with the ordinary physical 
mind, it experiences a separation between itself as subject and 
itself as object and senses itself as a separate subject in the midst 
of what appears to it as an "objectively", independently existing 
matter. There can be no doubt that this is the most common 
experience of reality amongst humans, but otherwise it is not 
privileged in any marmer. Matter as we see it and our ordinary 
mental consciousness are not real primitives, but rather 
intermediate points on a long continuum of conscious-existence, 
which ranges from what appears to us as inconscient matter to 
what appears to us as superconscient spirit. Of course in our 
ordinary mental awareness we do not see reality like this, we see 
the world as existing independently "out there", and we 
experience our own consciousness as existing "inside" and as 
looking out at that "objective reality". This is quite sufficient for 
most practical purposes, but will not do as a ^11 description of 
reality. It grants much too concrete a sense of reality to the world 
as we see it. It should be clear that not only acknowledged 
subjective phenomena like colour and hardness but even 
supposedly objective phenomena like space and time are 
constructs of our mental level of consciousness. All our 
descriptions of reality, whether stemming from a naive common
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sense or from the most sophisticated mathematical models of 
science, can, in principle, never be more than the outcome of the 
interaction between our observing conscious existence with 
whatever ineffable conscious existence presents itself to it as 
object. Even the very distinction between subject and object 
exists only on the intermediate levels: at the bottom consciousness 
is totally involved in its own separate existence, at the top it is all 
encompassing.
These different worlds of Veda and Vedanta are not closed systems 
that are completely sufficient within themselves. But it is not 
correct to speak of interactions between essentially different 
types of substances or forces either (e.g. of interactions between 
mind and matter). The different worlds are interwoven in a 
different manner, based on an underlying identity. In terms of the 
observing self, Vedanta holds that there is actually only one 
observing Self (the paramatnian). The many selves of the Sankhyas 
only appear separate and different from each other by a process 
of self-variation and "exclusive concentration" that takes place in 
portions of the original Self that in essence remains One. Similarly, 
as the Sankhyas acknowledge, there is only one objective reality, 
which is ineffable, or, in the more descriptive Sanskrit phrase, 
anantaguna, "of infinite quality". So there is actually only one 
world of which we are portions and see aspects. When our 
individual consciousness expands and begins to merge with the 
cosmic consciousness, we begin to realise that there is only one 
conscious existence that separates itself, for the joy of 
manifestation, into an infinite number of relations between itself 
as observing consciousness and itself as observed Nature. At any 
given time, the only thing we can know about the reality is the 
interaction between the centre, and thus the type, of consciousness 
we identify with and this ineffable Nature. The scientific, objective 
relationship is just one amongst many such relationships.
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Four types of knowledge
On the basis of this broad philosophical conceptualisation of 
knowledge, consciousness and reality, we can now attempt to 
build a more pragmatic bridge between scientific and Vedic 
knowledge. Though the scientific and the Vedic ways of knowing 
seem so different as to be incompatible, they may actually be
complimentary and prove to be equally needed for arriving at a 
complete picture of ourselves and of the world in which we live. 
While scientific knowledge has proven to be extremely effective 
within the limited range of the mental understanding of the 
physical world, the Vedic type of Knowledge has provided a 
comprehensive map of the whole field. Just like science has 
spawned a technology to explore the material level of reality in 
an objective way, the Vedic tradition has developed yoga as an 
effective technology to explore the irmer and higher levels of 
reality in a subjective way. It does this largely by enabling the 
observer to change the type and centre of his or her consciousness. 
This is not relevant only for those interested in metaphysics and 
spiritual growth; what happens on the higher and lower levels of 
consciousness has an enormous influence on our ordinary waking 
state, and their study is thus of the utmost importance for 
humanity.
The systematic study of consciousness will have to begin, however, 
on the level of the ordinary waking mind. Even in our ordinary 
waking state, there is not only one type of knowledge, but 
several. In one place, Sri Aurobindo distinguishes four different 
types of knowledge that are routinely used in the ordinary 
waking state. Together they form a gradient between the external 
knowledge that Science works with and the inner knowledge 
that according to the Vedic tradition is the essence of all other 
forms of knowledge. The four types of knowledge are called as 
follows;
(1) Knowledge by indirect separative contact (= scientific 
knowledge of the outer reality)
(2) Knowledge by direct separative contact (= objective 
introspection of inner processes)
(3) Knowledge by direct intimate contact (= experiential 
knowledge of inner processes)
(4) Knowledge by identity (= Vedic knowledge)
The first type of knowledge, knowledge by indirect separative contact, 
consists of explicit, objective information about what we see as 
the external world. Sri Aurobindo describes it as indirect because 
it is mediated by the external sense organs, and as separative 
because it goes together with a sense of clear separation between 
the self, who is the knower, and the object, which is the known.
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This type of knowledge has been developed and expanded 
impressively by the physical sciences over the last couple of 
centuries and is perhaps too well-known to need further comment.
The last type, knowledge by identity, is the very different type of 
knowledge that we have of our own existence. For this type of 
knowledge the senses are not required as it is knowledge that 
arises "from inside out." It is the knowledge we have of ourselves 
simply because we are. There is no difference here between 
subject and object and, in a way, not even a process: knowing 
and being are one. In our ordinary waking consciousness, 
knowledge by identity is hardly developed and almost point-like 
in character; it is undifferentiated and has no other content than 
the bare fact of its own existence. But according to the Vedic 
tradition, it is possible, through extensive spiritual practice, to 
develop this type of knowing further and then there is no 
theoretical limit to its scope. It is through this type of knowledge 
that the individual is considered capable of realising his or her 
identity with the Cosmic or the Transcendent Divine. It is also 
this type of knowledge that the Upanishad speaks about when it 
says: "When That is Imown, all is known." The logic behind this 
amazingly bold statement is that knowledge by identity is in 
essence the knowledge of the Self, and as all individual Selves 
are ultimately one, it is considered possible to have an intimate 
self-knowledge of other selves. This claim is in principle open for 
experimental testing, but it may be clear that it requires a rather 
radical change in many aspects of one's cognitive functioning to 
make knowledge by identity operational to a substantial degree. 
It should not be surprising, however, if smaller manifestations of 
the basic principle would be found to be fairly common, for 
example, in occurrences of telepathic communication.* As interest 
in consciousness studies increases and our insight into the 
processes and techniques of change in consciousness deepens, 
one can expect more and more interesting work in this direction.
In between these two extremes there are two more types of 
knowledge, both used for our internal states and processes. The 
first is knowledge about internal, psychological and physiological 
states and processes obtained by looking "objectively" at what is 
happening inside oneself. If one focuses on one's physical state, 
one could say for example, "My hands feel cold." The cold 
sensation is then felt as pertaining to a part of myself, even
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though I'm neither fully identified with the cold sensation nor 
with the hands. The same separation between the inner observer 
and the inner observed can be experienced with feelings or 
thoughts. I can say for example, "I like this approach to 
Epistemology," or "I think that he is right." In this type of 
knowledge there is a small gap between the observer and the 
inner process that is being observed. This type of knowledge is 
thus called knowledge by separative direct contact, separative 
because there is this sense of distance between the knower and 
the known, direct because the outer senses are not required. This 
type of knowledge was, under the name of "introspection", used 
extensively in Psychology till the second decade of the twentieth 
century when it was discarded in favour of a purely external 
study of behaviour. In a later section we will discuss some of the 
difficulties with introspection and the solutions Indian psychology 
has found for them.
In the third type of knowledge, one identifies with some inner 
psychological state or process. One is conscious, but one does not 
observe what is going on inside because one is fully involved in 
what one is doing. This type of identification is experienced, for 
example, when one is fully engulfed in a feeling, say a feeling of 
happiness. If one expresses what one feels in such a state of 
engrossing happiness, one does not say anymore explicitly and 
self-referentially, "Today I'm really happy," which would imply a 
certain distance, but one's happiness shows implicitly in the 
marmer in which one expresses oneself, e.g. "What a beautiful 
day it is today!". Similarly, when one is completely engrossed in 
one's own thinking one can express what one is thinking, but the 
expression does not involve a reflexive reference to the fact that 
one is thinking. One could say, for example, "You are right". 
Even in this case there must be some implicit awareness that one 
is thinking this, but one is not aware of it by looking at one's own 
thinking process from the outside. One is aware of it from within 
the thinking itself, or perhaps one should say, by being the 
thought. This third type is thus called knowledge by intimate 
direct contact, intimate because the observer is united with the 
observed, and direct because there are no intermediary sense 
organs involved. Knowledge by intimate direct contact is hardly 
used in the development of science but, under the name of 
"experiential knowledge", it is an essential element of all forms 
of "learning by doing" and the training of skills. It is also used
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extensively in psychotherapy, whether psychodynamic, cognitive 
behavioral, or humanistic/transpersonal. It can be trained to 
extraordinary levels of intensity and refinement by spiritual 
practice and it plays an important role in most mystical traditions.
Though it is useful to distinguish these four types of knowledge 
conceptually, in daily life they often go together, in quick 
succession or even simultaneously. The most fascinating aspect 
of this is, that the last, the knowledge by identity, is always 
present in the other three, be it often as a hidden, implicit 
presence. This is clear for the middle two: one simply knows that 
the hand one feels as cold is "one's own", one knows that it is 
oneself who is happy. But knowledge by identity is there in a 
diminished form even if our sense-based knowledge of the 
outside world: one recognises what one sees as part of one's world. 
This may look like a rather minimal level of identification, but 
the suffering caused by its absence in some of the most serious 
and "unlivable" forms of schizophrenia, makes clear how essential 
this basic sense of belonging is for a healthy existence.^ There is 
another form in which knowledge by identity presents itself 
within our knowledge of the outside world, and that is all we 
know about the structure of the world that we cannot derive 
from the raw data our senses provide. There are certain basic 
knowledge structures that are needed to make sense of what 
comes from the senses. The fundamental rules of logic and 
mathematics are some interesting examples of such innate or 
intuitive knowledge, but it occurs also in the less formalized 
knowledge individuals have of their surrounding. Sri Aurobindo 
holds that a lot of this "built-in," instinctive knowledge is required 
to make anything at all out of the extremely incomplete and 
imperfect information that our sense-organs provide. The necessity 
or otherwise of this type of pre-experiential knowledge has been 
discussed for centuries, but it appears the tide is slowly turning 
again in its favour. For example. Sir Karl Popper (1994, p.15) has 
given some of the most convincing arguments against a tabula 
rasa image of the newborn child and recent psychological research 
seems to provide experimental evidence corroborating the idea 
that we do have extensive innate knowledge about the structure 
of the world. How such innate knowledge relates to intuitive 
knowledge remains however a complex issue. In Sri Aurobindo's 
description of the manifold reality, logic and mathematics both 
belong to the pure mental plane and not to the physical plane.
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and they are derived from knowledge by identity rather than 
from knowledge by separative indirect contact.
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The honing of subjective l<nowledge
As a whole, science has concentrated almost exclusively on the 
acquisition of sense-based knowledge of the outer world. This is 
understandable in terms of the historical division of territories 
between science and religion at the time of Descartes. It can also be 
explained as a universal human trait: the windows of the senses 
look outwards, as the Upanishads say, and that is where we are 
inclined to look for truth in the first place. But there are also a 
number of pragmatic reasons that have maintained this strong 
external focus. The main one is the lack of reliability of untrained 
introspection and other forms of subjective knowledge. All human 
perception is prone to error, but perceptions of inner states are 
particularly inconsistent and unreliable. There are many reasons 
for this. One of them is that human beings are aware of only a tiny 
fraction of what is going on inside. We have access only to the 
surface and miss out on the forces and processes that take place 
below, behind and above the surface, and these surface appearances 
can be misleading. As Freud discovered in the early twentieth 
century and the Indian tradition in a completely different (and 
much more comprehensive) fashion several millennia earlier, it is 
from these deeper (and higher) layers of consciousness that our 
outer nature is determined. As long as one does not open the 
deeper recesses of one's nature to the inner sight, it is not possible 
to achieve a reliable form of introspection. A second distorting 
factor is that we have an interest in the outcomes. In introspection 
one typically looks with one part of oneself at another part of 
oneself. It is extremely difficult to watch oneself objectively without 
any bias, fear or expectation. The mind has its preferences, the 
vital nature its desires and needs, the body its physical limitations. 
All these interfere with "clean" observation. This is of course true 
for external observations as well, but the outer reality does not so 
easily change because of one's moods or desires. The inner states, 
on the other hand, change easily under such influences and even 
due to the observing process itself. Taking all this together it is 
quite understandable that introspection was discarded in the 
beginning of the twentieth century as too unreliable a source of 
information for scientific use.
But none of these problems with introspection is irremediable. 
Each one of them can by systematic effort be eliminated. The 
different paths of Yoga have in fact all developed techniques that 
are supposed to achieve exactly this. They all aim to arrive at a 
direct perception and finally a merger of one's individual 
consciousness and being with the consciousness and being of the 
Divine. To make this possible, a considerable purification of 
one's inner instrument, or antahkarana is essential. The different 
yogic traditions thus all have their methods to improve the 
range, the "resolution" and the reliability of inner perception. 
These techniques can be grouped into those that aim at greater 
concentration, at freedom from the sense-mind leading to an 
ability to penetrate the deeper and higher layers of consciousness, 
and at freedom from partial identifications, that is from the body, 
from the vital drives and emotions, from one's thoughts and 
finally from the ego-sense. These techniques are within their 
tradition considered to lead to a free consciousness, capable of 
watching the movements of Prakriti, nature, as a completely 
independent witness, making it possible to observe inner events 
not only with a greater precision but also with a perfect 
"objectivity" and thus reliability. The inner disciplines of Yoga 
can thus play exactly the same role for a science of the inner 
realities as modern technology is playing for the material sciences.
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Conclusion: Can we hove a reliable science of 
consciousness as a subjective reality?
If we presume that the essential nature, the svadharma, of science 
is to look for truth, then there should be every reason for science 
to expand its field and take up the methods of Yoga to achieve 
reliable and detailed knowledge of the inner realities. This is, 
however, an entirely new territory for science. Modern science is 
a child of the European Enlightenment* and systematic methods 
to train consciousness have, at least in recent times, not been part 
of the mainstream western tradition.^ Besides new methodologies, 
it would involve new attitudes towards personal involvement 
and, perhaps most difficult of all, the acceptance of Indie 
ontologies, which are more comprehensive than the materialistic 
and idealistic philosophies with which the West is familiar. It will 
even involve new scientific hierarchies, based less on intellectual 
acumen and vital assertiveness, and more on inner wisdom.
Given the political and economical dominance of the West at 
present, one can expect considerable resistance to this acceptance 
of Eastern techniques, philosophies and attitudes. There are, 
however, precedents of cultural influence moving in the opposite 
direction of political conquest. In classical Rome, for example, 
Greek art and science were widely, and we would now say 
rightly, valued above their Roman counterparts: after Athens had 
been defeated militarily and politically, slaves from Greece were 
used extensively as teachers for the Roman elite. Eugene Taylor 
predicts, on the basis of a detailed study of the history of 
spirituality in the United States, that a similar cultural counter 
stream will take place in the coming years. He sees that as a 
result of a "cross-cultural exchange of ideas between East and 
West unprecedented in the history of Western thought" there will 
be a "historical change in the very context in which reality is 
defined" (Taylor 1999, p. 290).
One can only hope that Taylor's prediction will come true. At 
present spiritual development is left entirely to the subculture 
and remains outside the compass of science. As a result, 
mainstream society is in a state that has much in common with 
multiple personality disorder. Public life -  the media, government, 
business, and education -  is entirely governed by the materialist 
and reductionist ideas of the physical sciences. Private life, after 
five and in the weekends, follows often a completely different set 
of values and truths. Like all such internal divisions this split 
leaves both sides diminished. Science is providing more and 
more power without the wisdom to use it. Religion and spirituality 
abound in uncritically accepted creeds and dogmas, and miss the 
best that the progressive intellect of humanity could have given 
them. If science and spirituality can come together we can expect 
an unprecedented collective progress in the inner realm, and it is 
hard to deny that this is sorely needed. All really serious problems 
facing humanity at the present stage are not material in nature 
but are psychological. Imagine the joy and fulfillment if the 
ancient yogic techniques for attaining inner peace, freedom and 
wisdom could again become an organic part of our collective life 
and could be developed further for the benefit of all present and 
future generations!
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Notes
1. An excellent example is the w ork of Benson on the "Relaxation  
Response". A good overview of this type of work can ’be found in 
M urphy and Donovan (1997).
2. Interestingly there are very few philosophers of science w ho  
advocate a strong reductionistic, materialistic worldview. (Daniel C 
Dennett is probably the m ost outspoken representative of this 
group.) I do not think there can be m uch doubt, however, that most 
scientific literature, at least in the "hard sciences", is written as if 
this is the "given" worldview.
3. The later philosophical schools seem to have used reason m ore in 
the m odern sense.
4. For a m ore detailed discussion of this issue, see Cornelissen 
(forthcom ing).
5. A ccording to the Sankhyas, the original Consciousness, which is one 
with Existence, splits itself in two: "the consciousness that sees and 
the consciousness that executes and formalises w hat we see" 
(A urobindo 1997, pp. 194). The first is called Pimisha, or Self, the 
second Prakriti, or Nature. Sri Aurobindo makes extensive use of 
the Sankhya philosophy, especially as a practical means to rise 
above the ego-sense. It is interesting that in the system of the 
Sankhyas, m ental processes are considered part of nature and 
illumined by the self, but not part of the self. This comes quite close 
to the m odern division between objective thought-processes and 
subjective experience. In this "standard" scientific view mental 
processes are seen as correlated with, or even identical to, objective 
processes in the brain while consciousness is seen as a subjective 
phenom enon of a different character. One m ay note that this is very  
different from the traditional dualism of Descartes, who placed  
thinking w ithout the slightest hesitation on the side of the self. 
T echn ology has thus n aturalised  the inform ation asp ect of 
know ledge and has left, as in ancient India, only pure consciousness 
on the side of the self.
6. Dean Radin (1997, pp. 269) actually suggests a similar theory of 
"in tercon nected ness" to explain the positive results in m any  
"p aran orm al" cognitive phenomena.
7. One should not confuse this involuntary, pathological dissociation  
with the spiritual Void. The inner emptiness the schizophrenic feels 
is a terrible state, which, if genuine and not a ploy to manipulate 
the environm ent, often leads to suicide. The spiritual state of
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emptiness is a completely different state going together with a 
sense of utter fulfillment and beatitude.
8. It is interesting to consider that the European Enlightenment w as 
supposed to have freed the collective hum an mind from the darkness 
of superstition and authoritarian religion, into the clarity of the 
reason, while the Indian concept of enlightenm ent is used for the 
release of the individual consciousness out of the semi-darkness of 
the reasoning mind into the light of the Spirit. Are w e ready for a 
collective change in this direction?
9. This is not to deny that meditative techniques have been used in 
some m onastic orders. But in contrast to the Indie tradition such 
inner disciplines have in the W est never been a central focus of 
m ainstream  culture. In the West science has focused on the outer 
reality and religion has been based on faith, authority and grace.
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A metaphysics of living systems
Reductionism and emergentism in the 
Yoga-Vasistha
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National Institute of Advanced Studies 
Bangalore, India
Abstract
The Yoga-Vasistha is a rich and complex philosophical ‘p o e m ’ 
(kavya) o f epic length, written in classical Sanskrit by an unknown 
author som e time between the 6th and 13th centuries CE, probably  
around the 7th century. It is notable for its eloquent praise o f  self­
effort and enquiry or analysis, and for its severe disparagement o f  
the notion o f  fate. It views consciousness as (a) characterising all 
living forms (includingplant and insect life), (b) being atomic, and 
(c) analogous to the emergence o f  waves and whirlpools in water; 
it therefore grapples with what today would be called the problem s 
o f reductionism and emergentism. Notions o f  the survival o f  the 
fittest, and o f  a dynamic process o f  creation and loss, are expressed 
with characteristic force. The paper presents a selection o f  verses 
(each with an English translation) setting forth these views, and a 
brief analysis o f  their implications.
245
Introduction
The purpose of this talk is to present a certain selection of 
verses from the complex but very rich work known as the 
Y oga-V asistha  (=Vasistha’s Yoga; Sastrl Panslkar 1981). A 
major reason for choosing this work to talk about is that it 
appears to represent a philosophy that I believe working 
scientists of today can live with, and perhaps even live by.
As is so often the case with Indian works of this kind, it is 
difficult to identify the author or date of the Yoga-Vasistha 
with confidence. The work is formally attributed to Valmlki, 
the author of the famous epic Ram ayana, and purports to be 
his account of a series of public conversations between the 
nearly 16-year old Prince Rama and the celebrated guru  of his 
royal family, Vasistha. It is however hard to believe that the 
true author of the book (longer than the Ramayana, by the 
way) is Valmlki. Scholars consider that the work must have 
been written some time between the 6th and 13th centuries; 
Athreya (1993) has presented some very persuasive arguments 
that the work was written around the 6th or 7th century CE —
i.e. around the same time as or slightly earlier than Sarnkara.
The Vasistha is basically a long philosophical poem, written 
in simple, classical, lovely Sanskrit. One of the most striking 
features of the philosophy underlying the work is its praise of 
vicara (enquiry, analysis)’ and paurusa  (human effort)’ , and 
its disparagement of the notion of daiva (fate)^ Indeed the 
Vasistha, whose ideal is jivan-m ukti, i.e., liberation while living 
(or living free , so to speak), takes the view that even a man 
of affairs may attain liberation."' This view leads to much 
debate in Vidyaranya’ s famous work (13th c.) Jlvan-m ukti- 
viveka  (Moksadananda 1996: 311-314, towards the end of 
Chapter 4), with the guru  being persistently asked by his 
disciple whether Vasistha is not guilty of vyavahara-prasam sa 
(=praise of worldly involvement). The guru denies this, but I
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get the impression that the debate ends lamely, on an 
inconclusive note.
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The eloquent advocacy of the overriding importance of human 
effort in the Vasistha modulates an otherwise generally advaitic 
viev/: the book seems to champion a ‘soft’ advaita\  A 
discussion of these points is available in a separate-work of 
the author (Narasimha 2000). And a fascinating account of the 
Vasistha view of reality and illusion is given by O’Flaherty 
(1984).
General Vasistha attitudes
Vasistha would have approved of the opening line of Timothy 
Williamson’ s recent book (Williamson 2000): ‘Knowledge and 
action are the central rejations between mind and world’ . 
Barely has the Vasistha got past the invocatory stanzas when 
Sutiksna dem ands from the sage Agasti unam biguous 
instruction about the path to liberation; and the answer he 
gets — stated in the seventh verse — is this:
It ta k e s  b o th  o f its w ings  fo r a b ird  u b h a b h y a m .e v a  p a k s a b b v a r h
To fly a b o u t in  th e  sky  -  y a t h a  k h e  p a k s in a m  g a l ih ,  I
So it takes  b o th  k n o w in g  a n d  d o in g  t a t b " .a iv a  jn a n a - k a im a b h y a m
For m a n  to  p e rfe c t h im self. j a y a t e  p a r a m a m  p a d a m .  11
(1:1.7)
Although the author of the Vasistha generally decries the 
notion of fate, he seems to recognize that there are certain 
immutable laws {niyati), as in the following verse.
H e m ay  k n o w  m u ch , h e  m ay  k n o w  all, s a r v a - jn d . 'p i b a b u - jn d .' p i
H e m ay  b e  M ad h av a , o r H ara  H im self, M a d b a v o .' p i  H a r d .'p i  c a  -  I
O r w h o e v er: b u t h e  is p o w erle ss  a n y a tb a  n iy a t im  k a r tu m
To d e flec t th e  co u rse  of th e  Law. n a  s a k t a b  k a s - d d . e v a  h i. II
(5:81.26)
Creation is not something which occurs on a certain day, not 
even something that might be attributed to God; it is a 
continuing, dynamic process:
T he riches  of c re a tio n , like  sp a rk s  avaiifi y a n t i  n ip a ta n t i ta th ” .o tp a ta n t i
from  a fire , s a r g a - s r iy a h  k a n a -g h a t a
A rrive, d e p a r t ,  a sc e n d  o r fall iv a  p a v a k ' .o t t h a h  I
In th a t p u re  a n d  u n if ied  sp ace  y a t r a - a w a la m  fad. a h a m . e k a m .
T hat is w ith o u t b e g in n in g  o r  m idd le ; a n a d i - m a d b y a w
I d o n ’ t th in k  th e  cau se  m a n y e  k h a m .e v a ;  n a  tu
Is w h a t is called  G od . k a r a n a m . I s v a r  .a k h y a m .  II
(6u:116.27)
Philosophically, therefore, for the Vasistha creationism is not 
an option, and absolute laws are not necessarily rejected.
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Life
One aspect of the Vasistha view of life may be said to 
correspond to the view of a nature that is ‘red in tooth and 
claw’ ; for example this is what Vasistha tells Rama:
All c re a tu re s  in  th is  ju n g le  o f life a ja s ra m . e v a m . a lu n a -
A re p lu c k e d  -  a n d  d e s tro y ed  -  v is lrn a iii b h u ta - ja n g a la m ,  I
C o n tin u a lly ; a n d , in  de lu .sion , feed  p a r a s p a r a - m a la m  m o h a d .
O n  each  o th e r  a n d  d e fe n d  th e ir  feed . a d y a te  r a k s y a t e .  ' p i  ca . 11
(5:14.28)
In general, the author appears to be a realist in matters of this 
kind (including war and peace). His eloquent advocacy of 
self-effort, discipline, analysis and good cheer*, and his 
categorical assertion that liberation {m oksa)  can come only 
from both knowledge and action, appear to arise from a hard- 
headed appreciation of the true nature of the world, not from 
a soft or romantic view. However the book is also lyrical at 
many places about the beauty of nature, of young married 
love etc. Indeed its view of the human body is characteristically 
appealing (especially because it is such a contrast to the 
aversion that is so often expressed in much other Indian 
philosophical writing):
T hat g rea t c ity  k n o w n  as o n e ’s b o d y  ta s y  .e y a m  b h o g a - m d k s a - a r t h a m
S hou ld  be  a so u rce  o f joy , n o t m ise ry ; t a jn a s y  .o p a v a n  .o p a m a  — I
To a w ise  m an  i t 's  like  a g a rd e n  s u k h a y  . a iv a  n a  d u h k h a y a  -
T ha t g ives h im  p le a su re  as it se ts  h im  free. s v a - s a r ir a - tn a h a - p u r i .  II
(4:23.2)
In fact, Rama is urged to be (simultaneously) a great doer, a 
great enjoyer and a great renouncer {m ah a-karta , m aha-  
b h ok ta , m aha-tyag i bhava.anagha, 6p:115.1), albeit that these 
words are invested with a meaning somewhat beyond what 
would ordinarily be attached to them.
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Atomism
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the work, from the 
point of view of the present discussion, is the way it grapples 
with what today would be called  red u ction ism  and 
emergentism — currently matters of much vigorous debate.
The author seems convinced that the universe is made of atoms 
(= anus and p aram a-an u s), which appear and reappear 
constantly in the dialogue between Rama and Vasistha. But he 
sees them as mental constructs as well:
O f th e  b illio n s  o f a to m s th a t m ak e  u p  j a g a t a m  k d t i - l a k s e s u
T his u n iv e rse , each  a n d  e v e ry  o n e  y a y a n ta h  p a r a m a - a n a v a b ,  I
Is see n  as an  in te rn a l w o rld  t e s a m .e k ' .a ik a s o . '  n t a b s th a n
By th e  d e ta c h e d  p h ilo s o p h e r . s a r g a n  p a s y a t y .a s a n g a - d h ib  II
(2:18.27)
He is thus certainly not critical of atomism (as Samkara was), 
but does not see the world as a mere collection of atoms 
(6u: 103.65), especially if atoms are inert {jad a s .te  param a-  
anavah, 6u:103.68). Nevertheless these atoms are also seen as 
an essential part of a living system:
T hat a to m , w ith  m em o ry  e n d o w e d , j iv a  i t y .u c y a t e  ta sy a
Is w h a t is called  j i v a  [live]; n a m a .a n o i- .v a s a n a v a fa h ;  I
At en d  of life it s tay s  to  re s id e  t a t r a ' .e v  .a s t e  sa  c a  s a v  -
In th e  sp ace  o f th e  b o d y  th a t ’s d ead . ag a re  g a g a n a k e  ta tb a . II
(3:55.6)
Thus it appears as if the Vasistha does take an atomistic view in 
general, but considers that some additional element {vasana) is 
needed for life. The immediate question that arises is how this 
atomistic view is related to conceptions of mind and consciousness.
First the mind, which is seen as central to all our perceptions. 
The following verse is typical of the author’ s view of the 
connection between mind and world:
U n d e rs ta n d , R aghava , th a t th e  m in d  a s y a  s a m s a r a - r u p a s y a
Is th e  g ra n d  h u b  a ro u n d  w h ic h  w h irls  -  m a y a - c a k r a s y a  R a g h a v a  I
M ad d e n in g ly  -  th a t m agical w h e e l c itta ih  v id d h i  m a h a - n a b h im
W h ich  is th is w o rld  w e see . b h r a m a to  b h r a m a - d a y in a b  II
(5:50.6)
Shades of m aya here, of course; that is a word that does keep 
cropping up, although it does not dominate the debate. But 
the connection with the atom is that its ‘structure’ , if we may 
use that word, is also a construct of the mind. Indeed,
W h erev e r  re s ts  th e  in c o n ce iv ab le  a c e ty a - c it - s v a r u p '  -a tm a
S pirit o f th e  b e h o ld e r ’ s m in d , y atra  y a t r  .a iv a  t is th a t i , I
T h e re  — ev en  in  th e  be lly  of a n  a to m  — d r a s ta  ta tra .a sy a  d r s y a - s r ib
R ises u p  a s p le n d o u r o f p e rc e p t io n . s a r n u d e ty .a p y .a n u .-u d a r e .  II
(3:1.27)
This is only a forceful extension of the author’ s view (widely 
shared in Indian philosophies) that everything that is seen is 
in the seer:
Like th e  essen ce  in  th e  su b s ta n c e , y a t h a  r a s a b  p a d a - a r t b e s u .
L ike th e  frag ran ce  in  th e  flo w er, y a t b a  ta ila m  t i l ' - a d i s u ,  I
L ike th e  oil in  th e  s e e d  -  so th e  id ea  k u s u m e s u  y a t b "  .a m o d a s .
O f w h a t is s e e n  is in  th e  seer. t a tb a  d r s ta r i d r s y a - d b ib .  II
(3:1.43)
And the mind, and its behaviour, are complex and rich;
As w a te r  d isp lay s  itse lf  rich ly  d b a r a - k a n  -d n n i - p h e n a - s r lr .
In  c u rre n t, w av e , foam  a n d  sp ra y , y a t b a  s a m la k s y a t e .'  m b b a s a b ,  I
So d o e s  th e  m in d  e x h ib it ta tb a  v ic i t r a -v ib b a v a
A s tra n g e , .sp lendid  d iv e rs ity . n a n a t”  . ey a it i b i  c e ta s a b -  II
(3:110.48)
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(This is incidentally one of the many interesting fluid-flow 
metaphors in the book: one personal reason for its attraction 
to a fluid dynamicist like me!) Here is a hint of what is called 
‘emergentism’ (i.e. the notion that structures may emerge in 
a system without the intervention of an external agency); the 
water of course is only inert atoms, but out of it emerges a 
great variety of striking phenomena.
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Consciousness
Let us briefly consider the book’s view of consciousness, which 
is seen as characterizing all life, including insects, trees etc. 
(6p :10 .23). C on sciousn ess is of course cen tral to its 
philosophical discourse, and references to it are so numerous 
throughout the book that an attempt to summarise all of them 
in a short talk would be hopeless. In general, much of this 
would not be unfamiliar to followers of advaitic philosophy. 
I shall therefore confine myself here to quoting below a few 
verses that are intended to capture what appear to me to be 
somewhat unusual views, and ones that may resonate with a 
scientific view of the world.
In the first place the physical w orld, the m ind and 
consciousness are declared to be different spaces (this verse 
is from a dialogue between Sarasvati and a Princess Lila):
G rac io u s  lady , p lea se  u n d e rs ta n d : c it t ' - a k a s a m , c id - a k a s a r h .
T h e re  is p hysica l sp ace , th e r e 's  m en ta l sp ace , a k a sa r i i  c a  t r t iv a k a m ;  i
A nd , m o re  te n u o u s  th a n  e ith e r  o f th e m , d v a b h y a it i  s u n v a - ta r a i f i  v id d h i
T h e re  is th e  th ird  sp ace  of c o n sc io u sn ess . c id - a k a s a m ,  V ar -a n a n e !  II
(3:17.10)
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C onsistent with the autiior’ s atomism , this ‘ space’ of 
consciousness is also seen in atomic terms (reductionism again!):
W ith in  th e  a to m s of co n sc io u sn ess  lie 
P a rtic le s  o f a l l  e x p erien ce ,
E ven  as in  ta ste  o f h o n ey  lie
All r ich es  of flow er, fru it an d  leaf.
c id - a n d r .a n t a t e  sa n ti
s a m a g r a -a n u b b a v a - a n a v a h ,  I 
y a t h a  m a d h u - r a s a s y a .a n ta b
p u s p a - p a t r a - p b a la - s r iy a h .  11 
(3:81.35)
Particles of all experience! It is almost as if the author was 
saying that experience could be quantized, digitally stored! If 
he were here with us today, he would be talking about (if I 
may invent the word) ‘cognons’ !
Emergentism?
How then do we explain the relation of the universe to this 
atomistic consciousness? The answer is suggested through 
analogies;
T he u n iv e rs e  re s ts  pe rv asiv e ly  
In th e  sp ace  o f co n sc io u sn ess . 
L ike e m p tin e ss  in  sk y , g u s t in  vi>ind. 
A nd  lik e  flu id ity  in  w a ter.
v is v - a k a s a m  d d - a k a s e
v is v a g -  v isran  tim  .a g a ta m  I
s p a n d o  d r a v a tv a m  sC m yatvani. 
a n i l e . ' m b h a s i  k b e  y a t h a .  11
(6u:103.73)
(Note that drava in Sanskrit is both fluid  and flowing.) The 
author is again getting very close here to em ergent 
phenomena, and it appears as if he would be very comfortable 
with this modern notion, as this verse indicates:
T he s p ac e  of con .sciousness d o e s n ’t d iffer 
F rom  tl\e  u n iv e rs e  a t any  tim e;
T he  tw o  a re  lik e  ga les  an d  w in d  —
T w o fo rm s o f th e  se lf-sam e  th ing .
ja g a c .c in .n a b b a s d s .t a s m a n .
n a  k a d a - c a n a  b h in n a ta ;  1 
e k a m .e v a  d v a y o  lu p a i ii
p a v a n a -s p a n d a y o x .iv a .  11 
(6u:103.77)
Ind eed , he suggests that consciousness and apparent 
understanding appear ‘spontaneously’ — by their own nature
— the same way that eddies appear in fluid motion:
From  it a r ise s , by  itse lf, sam udeti svatas.tasm at
A form  o f so m e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  kala  kalana-rupin i I
Just as th e  s tre ak  of a  w h irlp o o l d o e s  jalad .avarta-lekh'.eva
From  th e  flu id  th ro b  of w a ter. spbura\.jalatav” .odita. II
(6p:9.3)
There is only consciousness, and what we see are merely its 
vibrations:
The so le  s tu ff of th e  w ho le  u n iv e rse  ekam  vastu jagat sarvairi
Is c o n sc io u sn ess , as w a te r is o f th e  seas ; cin.m attam  var.iva.am budhih;]
A nd it v ib ra te s  th ro u g h  th e  in te llec t tad.eva spandate dhibhih
As w a t e r  p o u n d s  t h r o u g h  o c e a n - w a v e s .  suddha-var.iva vicibhih  I!
(6p:101,54)
W hirlpools, eddies, gusts in wind: these are recurring 
metaphors throughout the book, as the author speaks of the 
beauty of vortices {sa lil'-avarta-su ndari, 4:47.41) and the 
inherent restlessness of wind {spand'.aika-dharm avan  vato, 
4:36.21). It is hard to avoid the im pression that these 
phenomena — so easily visible to the naked eye, so accessible 
to common everyday experience — fascinated the author, 
precisely because he had to connect them with his belief in 
the atomistic nature of the universe.
And he finally offers us his version of an astonishing hypothesis 
(with apologies to Crick 1994):
T he in e r t  is n o t in  any  w ay  jadyarh prtbak  kincid.
D istin c t from  th e  in te llig en t; 3Sfi na.api ca cetanam ; I
T h e re  is e ssen tia lly  no  d iffe ren ce  na.atra b h ed o  .sti sarg -adau
B etw een  all o f  c rea tio n , all th a t ex ists. sam atw ake na ca. II
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Conclusion
This discussion has been brief; its purpose is to provide the 
reader with a glimpse of a view of life and nature that, in the 
large, recognizes that they may often be harsh, but that 
advocates hard work, action, self-control and discipline, and 
an overall sense of joy and good cheer, because the notion of
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fate is absurd, and the past can be defeated. There is also a 
commitment to atomism, in that life is seen as made up of 
atoms — but possibly endowed with memory or some special 
ingredient. But out of these atoms arise complex phenomena, 
like eddy, wave, foam and spray on water; and the author of 
the Yoga-Vasistha would not at all be disturbed by the notion 
that consciousness emerges in some similar way from those 
atoms, without being forced by something beyond them.
Notes
H e re ,  a n d  th r o u g h o u t  th e  p a p e r ,  a re la tiv e ly  fre e  tr a n s la t io n  o f th e  S a n s k rit  is 
p r e s e n te d  a lo n g  w ith  th e  o rig in a l te x t ,  so  th a t  th e  r e a d e r  c an  m a k e  h is  o w n  
v a lu a t io n  o f th e  V a s is th a  v iew . R e fe ren c e s  a c c o m p a n y in g  th e  q u o ta t io n  a re  g iv e n  
in  th e  fo rm  b o o k : c a n to .v e r s e ;  6p  a n d  6u  r e fe r  to  th e  p Q r v a - a r d h a  ( ‘e a r lie r  h a l f ’ ) 
a n d  u t t a r a - a r d h a  ( ‘l a te r  h a l f ’ ) o f th e  s ix th  b o o k .
1. All w e a lth , d o m in io n  an d  p le a su re  -
A nd  lib e ra tio n , e v e r la s tin g  —
A re th e  fru its  o f th a t m agical tree  
K n o w n  as R easo n , R aghava!
2. Such  is th e  n a tu re  of h u m a n  effort
T ha t a  m a n  w h o  so c o n d u c ts  h is  
affairs
D oes n o t f in d  h is  e ffo rts  w a s te d  -  
N o t ev e r , n o  m a tte r  w h o  h e  is.
3. Fate h a s  b e e n  in v e n te d  b y  fools
W ho s in k  in to  ru in ,  o b sesse d  by it; 
W h ereas  th e  w ise , b y  m an ly  effort, 
A tta in  th e  m o s t ex a lted  he igh ts .
4. T he e n lig h te n ed  m a n  w h o ’s b usy
in  th e  w o rld ,
A nd  th e  e n lig h te n e d  m an  w ho
d w e lls  in  a fo res t — 
Both o f th em  a re  — w ith o u t a d o u b t — 
E qual: th e y  re ach  th e  sam e  goal 
in d eed .
ra jy a n i s a m p a d a h  s p h a r a  -
b h o g o  m o k s a s .c a  s a s v a la h  -  I 
v ic a r a - k a lp a  - v r k s a s y a
p h a la n y  .e t a n i ,  R a g h a v a !  II
s v a - r u p a m  p a u r u s a s y '  .aifad.
e v a m  v y a v a h a r a n .n a r a h ,  
y a t i  n is p h a la -y a t n a t v a m  
n a  k a d a - c a n a  k a s - c a n a .
m u d b a ih  p r a k a lp i t a m  d a iv arh  — 
t a t - p a r a s . t e  k s a y a m  g a t a h ;  
p r a jn a s .tu  p a u r u s a - a r t h e n a  
p a d a m .u t ta m a ta r i i  g a ta h
v y a v a h a r ip r a b u d d h d  y ah ,
p i a b u d d h o  y o  v a n e  s th ita h ,  
d v a v .e t a u  s u s a m a u  n u n a m  







5. Soul filled  w ith  th e  th o u g h t ‘The Real b h a v a -a d v a it a m .u p a s r i t y a ,
is n o t d u a l’ ; s a t ta -  d v a i t a - in a y  - a t m a k a h  — 1
E m brace  th e  th o u g h t th a t B eing  is k a r m a - a d v a i t a m .a n a d r t v a
n o n -d u a l; d v a i t a - a d v a i t a - m a v o  b h a v a .  II
But re jec t th e  th o u g h t th a t A ction  is (5;17.29)
n o t d u a l —
A nd be full o f b o th  d u a l a n d  n o n -d u a l!
6. At th e  g a te  to F ree d o m , th e y  say , m o k s a - d v a r e  d v a r a -p a la s .
S tand  th e se  fo u r  m ig h ty  g u a rd s : c a tv a r a h  p a r i - k i i  t it a h ;  I
D iscip lin e , a n a ly sis , g o o d  c h ee r, s a m o  v ic a r a h  s a m to s a s .
A nd , fo u r th ly , w i s e  co m p a n y . c a tu r th a rii s a d h u - s a n g a m a h . l  I
(2;11,59)
7. As G e ll-M a n n  h a s  d e s c r ib e d  it, th e  d o c tr in e  o f e m e rg e n t is m  is th a t  ‘w e  d o  n o t
n e e d  s o m e t h i n g  e l s e  in  o rd e r  to  g e t  s o m e t h i n g  e l s e ’ (M o rg a n  1996: 213 -4 ); 
a n d  h e  a d d e d ,  in te r e s t in g ly ,  ‘th e re  a re  lo ts  a n d  lo ts  o f e d d ie s  in  th a t  p r o c e s s ’ 
w h ic h  le a d s  to  ‘m a n y  v io la tio n s  o f th a t  t e n d e n c y ’ o f th e  u n iv e rs e  to  w in d  
d o w n  th e rm o d y n a m ic a lly .
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The elusive self In the spatio-temporal net
SHOBINI L RAO
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__________________________________ Bangalore, India
Abstract
Consciousness is multidimensional. Its dimensions are life, awareness, 
continuity, unity and sense of self Memory enables the continuity of 
conscious experience. The combination of episodic memory with that of 
working memory and current sensory experience gives the continuity o f the 
past with the present. Prospective memory extends the continuum to the 
future. There is a continuous construction wherein the momentary present 
becomes the remembered present, which is integrated with the past, and 
projections are made about the future. This gives continuity to consciousness.
The tools for the construction are the executive functions o f the brain, 
which are predominantly mediated by the prefrontal areas. Cognitive 
functions such as set shifting, inhibition o f prepotent responses, goal- 
setting and problem-solving choose the relevant experiences from  
immediate and recent/remote past and combine it with the current 
present to form continuous consciousness.
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It is hypothesized that though this construction is present throughout 
waking experience, there has to he a distinction between the past, the 
present and the future. Without this distinction o f time, consciousness 
luould have no anchor in the time continuum. The result would he 
disorientation of time, which is seen in dementia. In order to maintain 
the distinction in time a sense of self is maintained. The sense of self is 
an epiphenomenon of the construction of consciousness.
The proof for this is that whenever the content or the process of 
integration is faulty the sense of self is distorted. Impairments of the 
contents of integration such as memory and the processes of integration 
such as executive fimctions are associated with ahnonnalities of behaviour. 
Abnormalities o f behaviour are accompanied by distortions in the sense 
o f self as seen in different mental illnesses. Severe damage to memory or 
executive functions or both is associated with a loss o f the sense of self 
as seen in dementia.
Conversely, voluntary cessation of the process of construction as in 
meditation is associated with the temporary cessation o f the sense of 
self. The continuous process o f integration of experience from different 
time domains gives the flow or stream of consciousness or the wave 
upon wave of thought in the mind. This is accompanied by a sense of 
self. Cessation of this construction can be associated with brain damage 
or not. Associated with brain damage, cessation is permanent and is 
accompanied by a permanent loss of the sense of self. Cessation with an 
intact brain is accompanied by temporary cessation and by temporary 
cessation of the sense o f self This temporary cessation is the Samadhi, 
described wherein the knower, knowledge and the process o f knowing 
are not separate, for construction has ceased.
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The self is close yet far. It is an essential part of our being but is 
difficult to define. It is dynamic and changeable, yet quiet and 
stable. Self is the essence of our being. What is this being and What 
is this self? Are the tiuo identical or different? Is the self the body, 
intellect, mind or knowledge? The answer seems to be that the 
self is each of these and all of these. Again the self is the 
background to our experience, quiet, unchanging, observant; a 
spectator of the drama of experience. The self is also dynamic 
and ever changing. Awake or asleep; thoughtful or agitated; 
angry or happy; the self is multifaceted and shining in 
kaleidoscopic colours.
The Advaita philosophy of the Hindu tradition has an answer to 
the seeming confusion. Sri Ramana Maharshi distinguishes 
between the I thought and the I-I thought in Upadesha Saram 
(Natarajan 1984). The former is a reflection of our being, while 
the latter is described as the spring from which thoughts arise. 
The Bhagavad Gita describes the quiescent, unchanging and 
therefore permanent self as the true state of our being. The 
changing, thereby impermanent self is defined as the ego or 
Ahamkara. According to this treatise, the Ego or Ahamkara; the 
Mind or Manas; the Intellect or Buddhi; are the three sense organs 
of knowledge (Swami Chidbhavananda 1970). Stated differently, 
the ego, mind and intellect enable knowledge, while the traditional 
sense organs of eye, ear, nose, skin and tongue enable perception.
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Distinction between ttie two selves
There are two selves. The Self as being and the Self as the means 
of knowledge. Proof for the existence of the two selves is in the 
three states of consciousness. These are the states of Waking, 
Dreaming and Deep Sleep or Dreamless Sleep. These three states 
are termed Tripura (three cities). The self as 'being' is present in 
all the three states. The evidence offered is that a sense of 
continuity of oneself upon awakening from deep sleep. The self 
as the means of knowledge i.e. the Ego or Ahamkara is present 
only during Waking and Dreaming but absent during Dreamless 
Sleep (Swami Ramanananda Saraswathi 1962).
Brain bases of the difference
The Brain bases of these three states are also different. Waking is 
accompanied by global, coherent activation of Thalamocortical 
Systems. The brain stem reticular activating system, as well as 
the glutamatergic, noradrenergic, cholinergic, GABAergic 
neurotransmitter neurons are active. These project in a parallel 
widespread manner to the Hippocampus and the Neocortex. 
They provide a state-dependent rhythmic input which activates 
the cortex. It promotes activity within the Gamma and Theta 
frequencies, providing a temporal organisation for coherent 
discharge in spatially distributed, yet functionally linked cortical 
neurons. The rich variety of waking experience and consciousness
ensues. The REM sleep or the Dreaming State has active 
glutamatergic and cholinergic neurons. Noradrenergic neurons 
are off. The brain state changes. Sensory transmission and motor 
output are blocked. Prefrontal cortical regions are relatively 
inactive. The sensory-motor, association and memory circuits 
v/ithin the thalamocortical and limbic systems are active. Therefore 
there is no input into the system or output from it. The prefrontal 
cortex being inactive, episodic and working memories which 
could have catalogued the ongoing events also do not occur. 
Global activation during dreaming provides a replay of waking 
material from recent and long term memory stores. This provides 
a process for formation and consolidation of old and new 
associations.
The dreamless state or slow-wave sleep is characterised by the 
attenuation of both the brain stem reticular activating system and 
the thalamus. However the brain is not inactive or totally 
unresponsive. There is activation in limited primary and secondary 
sensory regions of the cerebral cortex giving rise to limited 
imagery and thought processes. These are less organised and less 
vivid and have less emotional content than in the dreams of the 
REM sleep (Jones 1998).
The dream and dreamless stages of sleep have been studied 
using Positron Emission Tomography. Relative changes in blood 
flow to the different regions of the brain are tracked to find the 
regions of the brain which are active or inactive during particular 
brain states. This is possible in the normal brain. Dreamless sleep 
is characterised by deactivations or decreases in the pons and 
mesencephalon, cerebellum, thalami, basal ganglia, basal 
forebrain/hypothalamus, prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate 
cortex, precuneus and in the mesial aspect of the temporal lobes. 
Dreaming or REM sleep is characterised by activations present in 
the pons, thalami, the limbic areas of amygdala, hippocampus, 
anterior cingulate, and the posterior cortices of the temporo- 
occipital cortices. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, parietal 
cortex, and the posterior cingulate cortex, as well as the precuneus 
are significantly deactivated (Maquet 2000).
Differences in brain activity between waking, dreaming, and 
dreamless sleep signify the rain bases of the three states of 
consciousiiess. The Self as being pervades these three states. The
262 Shobini L Rao
brain bases of Self or Ego as a means for knowledge would be 
described in the following account. Henceforth the term Self 
would refer to the Ego or Ahamkara.
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Need for the self
Self is omnipresent in our experiences. It is present in the 
perception of the external environment by the senses, internal 
sensations arising from the body, memories, feelings, thought 
manipulations which lead to understanding, and in speech. This 
ubiquitous presence of the self suggests that it serves an important 
function. The self being an attribute of the body and the mind/ 
psyche, the function that it serves would be psychobiological. 
The need for self as an attribute of the body is easily appreciated. 
The physical world in which our body exists has spatial 
coordinates such as up-down, and right-left in which the body 
has to move. Therefore the body, to navigate in a spatially 
complex environment among other objects and people, requires a 
referent. The individual's body becomes a referent for space. 
Spatial divisions are understood with reference to one's own 
body as the referent.
The body would have sufficed and a separate tag of "self" would 
not have been necessary but for the need to represent the body in 
the mind. A Self may not have been necessary if there had not 
been one more dimension to the physical world, that is time or 
the temporal dimension. The external physical world changes in 
space and time. The spatio temporal changes have to be perceived 
by the sense organs, abstracted or encoded and consolidated by 
the mind and responded to by the motor systems. A common 
referent is required for coordination among these three systems 
which appears to be the self.
Utility of the self
The mind exists as a continuity, as a "stream of consciousness". 
Experiences of the body are divided by time and space because 
of the constraints of the physical world. Experiences of the body 
represented in the mind, manipulated by the mind as well as 
influenced by the mind seem a continuous flow throughout our
waking period. The continuity is maintained because of Self as 
the common referent to spatial and temporal divisions.
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Nature of the mind
Mind is not a monolith or an entity, but an active process which 
is being constantly constructed. The mind enables an existence 
connected to, yet outside of the physical world. The ongoing 
sensory experiences occur as spatio temporal events. These events 
occur in ensembles again connected by space or time. The 
learning of these associations or connections between events and 
their storage are essential for giving continuity to experience.
Sensory experiences and memories are the chief contents of the 
mind. The contents of the mind are constantly changing and are 
being manipulated upon. The contents are manipulated or acted 
upon by the Tools of the mind. The tools are mechanisms by 
which the contents are chosen, altered, embellished, anticipated, 
learnt, stored or acted upon. Attention and Motivation choose 
the contents; emotions embellish the contents; planning anticipates 
the contents; working memory and organisational strategies 
influence how the contents are learnt and stored. Action plans 
determine how the current contents are acted upon to obtain new 
contents. The tools can be classified into those that are necessary 
for acquiring information from the environment, necessary for 
associating and storing the information, and functions for 
manipulating the information to form newer combinations.
Mechanisms to acquire information
The process of sensation, perception and attention are the means 
of acquiring information from the environment. Modality specific 
sensory cortices mediate the process of analysing the basic features 
of the physical stimulus. Tlie sensory association cortices, together 
with the posterior polymodal cortices mediate the process of 
perception. Perception is a cascading process wherein the 
elementary features of the stimulus are built up to a complex 
percept through several levels of computations extending from 
the primary sensory cortex to the polymodal associahon cortices. 
The elementary features of the stimulus can have spatial and 
temporal divisions.
Attention amplifies the processing mediating perception through 
a mechanism known as re-entrant processing. The posterior 
attention networks mediate in sensory perception. These networks 
are located in the parietal areas for visuo-spatial attenhon and in 
the temporal lobes for auditory attention. The anterior attention 
system located in the anterior cingulate and the prefrontal areas 
mediate sustenance, focussing and division of attention; as well 
as attention for action.
The elusive self in the spatio-temporal net 265
Mechanisms to store information
The information acquired is grouped and linked to chunk it into 
smaller bits. The process of grouping and linking is an essential 
process to manage information, termed as the process of 
association. Association can be between elements separated by 
space, by time or by both. The information so associated and 
grouped is consolidated by transferring it to long-term memory. 
The hippocampus and the associated structures of the limbic 
system such as the parahippocampal gyrus are essential for 
association and consolidation. Items which have entered the long 
term memory are stored as patterns of reverberating neuronal 
circuits (Hebbian model) and as changes in the proteins in the 
nerve cells. The storage occurs widely in the heteromodal 
association cortices.
Mechanisms to manipulate information
The information acquired is modified by what is stored. That 
which is stored is in turn modified by what is acquired. This 
interplay between acquisition and storage requires mechanisms 
known broadly as executive functions. Working memory or the 
capacity to store and manipulate information on line, fluency or 
the capacity to generate new concepts, planning or the capacity 
to look ahead, response inhibition wherein highly practised or 
prepotent responses are inhibited, set shifting or the capacity to 
shift from one mental set to another, error detection, self 
monitoring, organisation and formation of strategies, and 
abstraction, are executive functions. As the name suggests these 
functions are involved in goal-directed behaviour. Executive 
functions are the tools of the mind and are mediated by the
prefrontal areas. The basal ganglia and the cerebellum also have 
a role in their mediation (Joseph 1996).
Working memory can store temporarily incoming information, 
combine different parts of the incoming information, and combine 
the incoming information with that recalled from long-term 
memory (Baddeley 1986). Thus working memory brings the past 
into the present, also termed as the "remembered present". 
Further it stores perceptual/mnemonic contingencies for a brief 
period to enable the preparation of action plans. Specialised cells 
are present in the prefrontal cortex of the monkey which fire 
during this delay period (Fuster 2000). The manner of grouping 
information through associations is based on spatial and temporal 
contiguities. Organisational strategies influence associations and 
groupings, thereby improving the storage and recall. Accuracy of 
recall and acquisition is controlled by self monitoring and error 
detection. Lack of these lead to confabulation.
Initiation of motor acts is mediated by the anterior cingulate and 
supplementary motor areas. Inhibition of prepotent motor acts or 
highly practised responses are mediated by the orbitofrontal 
cortex. Initiation of new responses and inhibition of highly 
practised responses form the building locks of volitional processes 
or will. The ability to shift from one mental set to another, be it a 
perceptual, conceptual or motor set is another aspect of the 
volitional process which is mediated by the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex. Intentionality requires the maintenance of a motor plan or 
motor memory to subserve an action plan. This is the short-term 
attentive set which anticipates a motor response and prepares for 
it. It is also called as "memory for the future" or "look forward in 
time". The attention set and working memory are the means to 
manage "Cross Temporal Contingencies", a process wherein 
present action is dependent on a past contingency, i.e. working 
memory. Future action is determined by the present contingency
i.e. attention set. Thereby a seamless integration takes place 
between the past, present and the future (Fuster 2000).
The energy and direction for behaviour come from motives, 
habits and emotions. Biological motives such as hunger and 
thirst mediated by the subcortical structures drive behaviour. 
Habits, be they motor patterns, mood states, or thoughts give 
direction to behaviour. Subcortical structures in the basal ganglia.
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the cortical premotor and prefrontal areas mediate habitual motor 
patterns and thoughts. The right hemisphere mediates mood 
states. Emotions which can suddenly initiate behaviour have 
both cortical and subcortical centres. The hypothalamus in the 
subcortex is the highest centre for autonomic activations. The 
amygdala in the limbic system and the orbitofrontal cortex are 
the cortical centres for emotional processing.
The different centres which mediate the different functions detailed 
above do not function in isolation. There are two-way cortico- 
cortical connections, both intra-hemispheric and inter-hemispheric; 
as well as cortico-subcortical connections which modulate the 
functioning of any area through activities arising elsewhere. The 
influences can be inhibitory or excitatory.
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Fragmentation and reconstitution of information
The brain has specialised processors in the form of areas and 
networks for the multitude of psychological processes. Information 
is processed in its constituent elements in the appropriate centres 
for sensory perception and rebuilt into a composite whole using 
the tools of executive functions and stored as memories. 
Information processing proceeds by this ongoing fragmentation 
into constituent elements and rebuilding of the composite whole.
The chief divisors for fragmentation are those of space and time. 
Sensations and memories which are the contents of mind are 
subject to this space-time divisions. Space-time divisions seem 
essential for dividing the enormous amount of information 
impinging on the brain into manageable levels. Division into 
spatial and temporal elements would necessarily require a 
recombination into spatio-temporal wholes.
Centres for spatial processing
The centres for spatial processing extend from the posterior to 
the anterior cortex.Visual spatial stimuli are processed in the 
occipital, parietal and temporal cortices. The "where" pathway 
which encodes location of the stimuli extends from the occipital 
cortex to the parietal cortex on the dorsolateral surface (Mishkirl
and Ungerleider 1982). The parietal cortex computes figure- 
ground relationships as well as other bases for complex visuo 
spatial perception. The Parietal cortex is connected to the 
hippocampus and feeds spatial information to the hippocampus. 
The hippocampus constructs a spatial map of the environment. 
The parieto-hippocampal system mediates the construction of 
the spatial map (Kandel et al 2000). Short-term memory for 
location information as well as manipulation of this information 
is mediated by the visual working memory located in the right 
prefrontal and parietal cortices (Fuster 1997). Damage to the 
hippocampus disturbs maze learning in rats. The right 
hippocampal damage in humans leads to poor learning and 
consolidation of visual material (Milner 1971). Right hippocampus 
damage also leads to deficits in the transpositions between 
egocentric and allocentric space. Right dorsolateral prefrontal 
deficits are associated with disturbances in working memory for 
locations (Jonides el al 1993).
Tlie essential nature of spatial processing is that spatial coordinates 
are snapshots in instants of time. It follows that the spatial 
dimension is independent of the temporal dimension. In right- 
handed individuals the right hemisphere or non-dominant 
hemisphere specialises for time-independent processes. Allocation 
of spatial attention, construction of spatial maps, visual spatial 
perception and construction, and processing of emotions, all of 
which require simultaneous or time-independent processing, seem 
to be lateralised to the right hemisphere.
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Centres for temporal processing
The temporal dimension unfolds across successive points and is 
not instantaneous. The major function which requires passage of 
time to unfold itself is language. Spoken, written or aurally 
comprehended speech unfolds over time. Language is mediated 
largely by the left hemisphere. The left hemisphere has been 
termed the time-dependent processor.
The prefrontal cortex and the cerebellum are important centres 
for the processing of time. The cerebellum computes divisions of 
time in the milliseconds to seconds range. The prefrontal areas 
compute divisions of time in the seconds range (Mangels et al
1998). The prefrontal areas which specialise for working memory 
mediate in temporal processing. The central executive of the 
working memory system integrates information which is currently 
available with items from long-term memory. Working memory 
therefore integrates the present with the past in a smooth flow 
termed as the "remembered present" (Fuster 2000). Planning 
functions and prospective memory are again mediated by the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Joseph 1996). Planning function 
elaborates on the present to set goals for the future. Prospective 
memory or the memory for future goals helps to enact the plans. 
This combination of the present with prospective memory extends 
the present into the future or telescopes the future into the 
present. The ability to implement future plans through motor 
responses is mediated by the attention set. It is a short-term 
attention set which anticipates a motor response and prepares for 
it. This is also called "look forward in time" or memory for the 
future (Fuster 2000). Integration of information occurs across the 
three dimensions of time, i.e. past, present and the future. This is 
predominantly achieved by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
with contribution by the basal ganglia and the cerebellum. The 
point to note is that separate brain areas process spatial and 
temporal dimensions of information.
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Interconnections between centres for temporal 
end spatial processing
Anatomical interconnections between brain areas support 
interaction between these two dimensions. The hippocampus 
wherein spatial maps of the environment are constructed is 
connected to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, wherein the 
temporal integration takes place. The connection is through the 
medial prefrontal cortex. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is 
indirectly linked to the limbic regions of the parahippocampal 
gyrus through connections with the anterior and posterior 
cingulate regions. There are also sparse but- direct connections 
between the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the limbic regions 
of the entorhinal cortex, subiculum and hippocampus. The 
functional significance of these direct and indirect connections is 
hypothesized to be maintaining contextual information on a 
moment-by-moment basis. At the level of the local areas, 
interdigitation is present between the prefrontal and parietal
neurons. Axon terminals from labelled neurons in the lateral 
prefrontal and the posterior parietal heteromodal regions converge 
in fifteen different cortical regions of the primate brain. There is 
interdigitation of inputs from the prefrontal and posterior parietal 
regions (Kaufer and Lewis 1999).
The prefrontal cortex which is the centre for processing the 
temporal dimension and the parietal cortex which is the centre 
for processing the spatial dimension are thus interconnected at 
the wide area network and local area network levels. The two 
areas are connected through long fibres enabling mutual transfer 
of information. This in turn translates as spatio-temporal 
integration of ongoing experience. The modular interdigitation 
from the parietal areas specialised for spatial encoding and the 
prefrontal areas specialised for temporal encoding suggest that 
even at the level of local area networking, spatio temporal 
integration occurs.
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Candidates for the brain basis for self
The brain constructs the mind through its interactions with the 
environment. Distinct areas of the brain mediate the contents of 
the mind (perception and memories), tools of the mind (attention, 
executive functions), and energisers of the behaviour (motives, 
habits and emotions). The brain basis of Self is however elusive. 
The sense of Self is present whenever the cortical networks are 
active as in waking and dreaming. It is absent when the cortical 
networks are disengaged from the subcortical arousal systems as 
in dreamless sleep.
The verbal interpreter in the left hemisphere is a possible candidate 
for the Self. The ongoing experience is transmitted to the left 
hemisphere where language areas are located. The language 
areas give a verbal narration of the experience whether cognitive 
or emotional. There is a constant running narrative of our actions, 
emotions, thoughts and dreams. "It is the glue that keeps our 
story unified and creates our sense of being an unified, rational 
agent. It brings to our bag of individual instincts the illusion that 
we are something other than what we are," The self is inherent to 
this verbal interpretation and not outside of it. Self is the by­
product of inserting an interpreter into a functioning brain. Self
is the answer to the question posed by the interpreter as to who 
is posing the questions (Gazzaniga 1998). The limitation of the 
theory is that it restricts Self to language. Aphasic patients who 
have language impairment do not suffer from deranged or loss 
of selfliood. The self seems to reside in as well as out of the 
domain of language.
Another theory localises the self to the confluence regions of the 
heteromodal association cortex. The process of binding the internal 
and external experiences together with the intentional and motoric 
processes is hypothesised to be its location. The anatomical basis 
of this idenhfication is described as follows: The cingulofrontal 
(networks between prefrontal and cingulate cortices) and parieto 
temporal (networks between parietal and temporal cortices) bind 
the internal features of self with the external features of self. The 
purpose is to utilise the different motor and cognitive systems to 
implement the intentions of self. The confluence regions are 
critical for decision making in relation to the internal/external 
and motivational parameters of mental activity for processing 
self-significant information. Another brain area closely associated 
with the sense of self is the right hemisphere. The awareness and 
image of self, and the relation of self, visuospatially and 
psychologically, to the environment are altered by lesions to the 
right hemisphere (Vogt and Devinsky 2000).
A close examination of the above hypotheses show that the self is 
resident or associated with each of these and is present outside of 
each of these processes. The very existence of three different 
hypotheses localising the Self to different centres in the brain 
using three different processes upholds this statement. The self is 
unified by language-based interpretation, it resides in physical 
awareness, and in intentional motor plans for internal/external 
environmental contingencies. Where then is the Self?
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Elusive self caught in the spatio-temporal net
The answer to the question, "where is the Self in the Brain?", 
may be examined by asking a counter question "when is the Self 
absent?"
1. The first candidate is Dreamless Sleep, which is not associated 
with the Self or 'V thought, as there is no recollection of the 
T' thought during dreamless sleep.
2. The second process, wherein the self is absent, is during 
sudden and intense emotion, be it positive or negative. 
Emotion is a sudden and unexpected energisation of 
behaviour. The terms -  fit of rage, seized by fright, ecstasy of 
joy -  suggest the suddenness and intensity of the experience. 
The moment of emotion is defined by the present. There is 
no past or future to it. The moment or moments of intense 
emotion are not accompanied by a sense of Self. Recollection 
of the emotion is accompanied by Self.
3. Self is absent during intense sensation such as intense pain 
or ecstatic pleasure.
The above three processes have one thing in common. The mind 
is not being constructed as thoughts are absent. Further, these 
processes are involuntary.
There is yet another process which is voluntary during which the 
Self is absent. This is the process of Samadhi. Samadhi is a state of 
mental quietitude wherein the mind is quiet as there is absence 
of thoughts. The mind is systematically dismantled by stopping 
the thought processes. The Llpadesa sarnm describes this state of 
lack of thought as associated with the loss of Self or the absence 
of the "M " thought. There is dissolution of the Self as Ego or 
Ahamkara. The perfect stillness of mind (Manolaya) or destruction 
of the mind (Manonasa) is achieved by absence of thoughts which 
in turn is associated with a loss of Selfhood (Natarajan 1984). In 
fact, monients of intense sensations and intense emotions 
described previously do not have thoughts. The absence of Self 
herein is termed as "Sahaja Samadhi” in Tripura Rahasya (Swami 
Sri Ramananda Saraswathi 1962). Sahaja Samadhi is fleeting, 
while practised Samadhi lasts for a longer time.
The essence of the evidence is that self is present wherever 
thoughts are present. Thoughts are a loose term for the contents 
and tools of the mind described previously. Therefore wherever 
and whenever the tools of the mind are constructing or 
manipulating the contents leading to thoughts. Self is present. It 
was seen earlier that the construction of the mind, i.e. the 
contents being acquired and manipulated upon by the tools (i.e.
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formation of thoughts) require divisions into space and time, as 
well as integration of space and time. It was also seen that the 
Self is present when thoughts are present and Self is absent when 
thoughts are absent. Thoughts are dependent on divisions of 
time and space as well integration of time and space. Therefore 
Self which is closely associated with thoughts appears to manifest 
when space-time divisions and space-time integrations are made. 
The self resides in the space-time net.
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Neural plasticity and Yoga
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Abstract
Neural plasticity is a general term referring to the ability of neurons to 
alter their structure and functions, in response to internal and external 
stimidi. The process is life-long, though differences occur with the phase 
of development (i.e., infancy, childhood, adidthood). Yoga is an ancient 
Indian science and way of life, which has been described, in traditional 
texts as a systematic method o f mind control. Current scientific research 
has not shown structural changes in the brain related to yoga. However, 
present research suggests that yoga practice modidates brain fimctioning 
in different ways and at different levels. Electrophysiological studies of 
the electroencephalogram (EEC) and evoked potentials have shown that 
experienced yoga practitioners differ from novices to yoga, in their 
activity pattern. More recently, changes in neural function during yoga 
practice have been demonstrated by using positron emission tomography 
(PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). These 
studies have demonstrated characteristic changes in brain function 
during the practice compared to a 'control' state. Apart from these
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direct lueasureiucnts of brain activity, differences between xjoga and 
non-yoga practitioners can be inferred based on their performance in 
tests for perception, memory, responses to laboratory stressors, and 
other functions. These effects of yoga practice may also explain certain 
benefits of yoga practice in the rehabilitation of persoits with impaired 
physical or mental functioning. Hence when the inner experiences 
related to yoga practice are repeated over time, there appear to be 
definite changes in neural functioning which can be used to influence 
health, performance, rehabilitation, and possibly to bring about a 
conscious evolution o f the personality.
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Neural plasticity is a general term, referring to the ability of 
neurons to alter their structure and function in response to 
internal and external stimuli. This is a continuous, life-long 
process, though the magnitude of change possible is maximum 
during the critical period of development. In humans this period 
is the last trimester of intrauterine development and the first two 
years after birth.
Yoga is an ancient Indian science and way of life, which provides 
a systematic method of mind control. In the Bhagawad Gita it is 
said "Samathvam yoga uchyathe" (Yoga is Equilibrium) and the 
sage, Patanjali (approximately 300 B.C.) said "Yogah citta vritti 
nirodhaha -  Patanjali Yoga Sutra (PYS) 1:2" (through Yoga one can 
remove modifications of the mind). Hence it is evident that the 
practice of yoga works on, and through the mind. It was also 
said by Patanjali: "Etena bhutendriyesu dharma laksanaavastha- 
parinama vyakhyatah -  (PYS) 111:13" (these transformations of the 
mind are reflected in the quality, tendencies and behaviour- 
patterns at the structural as well as the functional levels of Man's 
being). Hence, with the background of these descriptions in 
ancient texts which suggest that considerable change does occur 
in brain structure and function following yoga practice, the 
present paper attempts to determine the evidence for change in 
brain structure and (or) function related to the practice of yoga.
Any review of scientific studies on yoga includes the earliest 
experim ents on specific techniques at Kaivalyadhama, 
Maharashtra (Kuvalayananda 1925), followed by investigations 
of exceptional feats performed by yogis (Brosse 1946; Anand et al 
1961a), and the relatively large number of studies on the effects
of Transcendental Meditation, beginning with the epoch-making 
studies of Keith Wallace and others (Wallace 1970; Wallace et al 
1971). Most of these studies describe 'state' or 'acute' effects of 
yoga practice and involve assessments made before, during, and 
after a session of yoga practice. In order to understand the long­
term impact of practising yoga on neural plasticity, two 
approaches are followed. These are: (i) comparing long-term 
practitioners with those who have no experience of yoga, and (ii) 
following up yoga practitioners longitudinally, from having 'no 
experience' of yoga, till they have practised yoga for a period of 
time. Both approaches have their own advantages and drawbacks, 
which will be described below.
In the first approach (i.e., comparing long-term practitioners with 
those who are novices to yoga), many of the early studies 
investigated extraordinary abilities and feats of experienced yogis.
For example, some studies investigated abilities of yogis to alter 
their metabolism at will, so that the yogi could stay in an airtight 
chamber even after a lit candle went out, apparently due to lack 
of oxygen (Anand et al 1961b). Other studies investigated unusual 
examples of voluntary control over 'involuntary' functions, such 
as the heartbeat (Anand and Chhina 1961; Kothari et al 1973) or 
the surface temperature (Benson et al 1982).
A more specific neurophysiological study, showed that in four 
experienced meditators and in two other yogis, whose pain 
threshold was elevated believed to be related to their practice of 
yoga, there was an absence of desynchronization of the 
electroencephalogram (EEG) even when the subjects were 
practising meditation (Anand et al 1961b). These results suggest 
that experienced meditators are able to 'shut out' external stimuli 
at will.
The main drawback of making inferences based on the studies 
cited above, is that all the subjects were experienced yoga 
practitioners, who were spending a significant amount of time in 
their practice and were also otherwise leading lives of austerity 
and seclusion. For example, subjects who were able to alter their 
surface temperature at will, were monks practising Tibetan 
Buddhist Meditation and living at the foothills of the Himalayas 
(Benson et al 1982). In all these cases the unusual lifestyle of the
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subjects might itself have caused changes in brain structure and 
function, without taking into account the effect of yoga prachce. 
This drawback is in part overcome by studying practitioners of 
Transcendental Meditation, who live an ordinary lifestyle.
On the whole, the most characteristic electrophysiological change 
in long-term practitioners of Transcendental Meditation, is an 
increase in EEC coherence. Coherence is a mathematical quantity 
which measures the 'sameness' of the phases of the EEC within a 
specified frequency band, at different locations on the scalp (e.g., 
the frontal and occipital regions, or over the left and right 
hemispheres). In general, long-term meditators show an increase 
in the coherence within alpha and theta bands over symmetrical 
sites on the left and right side of the scalp (Banquet 1973). This 
suggests an increase in the long-range orderliness of the brain.
However, even these studies on TM practitioners versus non­
practitioners have a serious drawback in that subjects of both 
groups are influenced by a wide range of factors (including 
meditation), which could influence neural plasticity. To some 
extent, these intra-individual differences can be taken care of by 
longitudinally monitoring subjects before and after their initiation 
to yoga. Even observations in such cases are liable to be 
'contaminated' by other life events and the normal process of 
aging and development. There is also no ideal control for such a 
study.
Most studies of longitudinal follow-up of subjects after learning 
yoga have demonstrated changes in prowess in performing 
certain tasks of perception and motor skills. For example, it has 
been shown that the practice of yoga improves performance in 
various tasks for motor skills (Pelletier 1974; Telles et al 1993; 
Manjunath and Telles 1999; Dash and Telles 1999, 2001), visual 
perception (Brown et al 1984; Ramana Vani et al 1997; Telles et al 
1997), spatial memory (Naveen et al 1997), and in specific tasks 
for planning (Manjunath and Telles 2001). The latter was especially 
interesting, since a positron emission tomography (PET) study 
(Herzog et al 1990-91), as well as a more recent functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study done by us (Khushu et 
al 2000), demonstrated an increase in frontal blood flow during 
meditation. Since planning is a function of the pre-frontal region, 
it may be inferred that meditation practice over a period of time
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may facilitate pre-frontal function. A single electrophysiological 
study of middle latency auditory evoked potentials (EP) 
demonstrated that 18 months of yoga breathing (pranayama) 
practice, brought about changes in the neural pathway at the 
baseline, with better function (evidenced by reduced latency of 
tl'ke corresponding EP component) at mesencephalic-diencephalic 
levels (Telles et al 1992).
Hence in summary, there is some scientific evidence of changes 
in the brain with yoga. These changes include increase in prowess 
to perform skilled motor tasks, better perceptual sensitivity, 
improved performance in 'higher brain functions' such as memory 
or planning, and in special cases, ability to regulate involuntary 
functions voluntarily. Some of the studies also suggested changes 
at specific levels, for example the pre-frontal cortex and the 
mesencephalic-diencephalic region.
In addition to these studies which have demonstrated changes in 
(the brains of) persons practising yoga, it has also been shown 
that practising meditation may create a change in the 
'consciousness field', so that persons at a distance are seemingly 
inexplicably influenced by it (Orme-Johnson et al 1982). Hence 
there is evidence for considerable change in the brain with yoga 
practice. Finally it is interesting to note that our preliminary 
studies have demonstrated that this possibility for change persists 
through different phases of life, from intrauterine development 
(Narendran 1991), through childhood (Naveen et al 1997; Telles et 
al 1992), adulthood (Ramana Vani et al 1997; Manjunath and 
Telles 2001), and even for the promotion of positive mental 
health in a geriatric population (Manjunath and Telles 2000).
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Neuro-endocrinology and consciousness
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Abstract
The presentation comprises (a) a concise revieiu of the current knowledge 
on neuro-biological substrate of consciousness, (b) neuro-endocrine 
correlates o f different states of consciousness, (c) the subjective and 
objective correlates o f 'Dhyana' practice in physiological and neuro­
endocrine terms, and (d) a concluding conceptualisation. My presentation 
draws heavily from my own experience as a practitioner of 'Dhyana- 
sampradayas' for the last three decades.
Introduction
G ra m m a tic a lly  'C o n sc io u sn e ss ' is the n o u n  form  o f the ad jective  
'C o n s c io u s ' (T h e O xfo rd  D ictio n ary  of C u rre n t E n g lish  (ed .) 
1 9 9 6 ) -  m e a n in g  a w a k e  a n d  a w a re  of o n e 's  su rro u n d in g s  and  
id en tity . E v e n  this e le m e n ta ry  d efin ition  of co n scio u sn ess  b rin gs
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to sh a rp  focu s the u n re so lv a b le  coniindnim  of the s u b je c tiv e -  
ob jective d ich o to m y  of life. S id e -s te p p in g  the rela ted  s e m a n tics  
an d  p o le m ics , I shall p ro ce e d  w ith  th e s im p le , co n v e n ie n t, y e t  
in e sca p a b le  a ssu m p tio n  th a t c o n sc io u sn e ss  is o v e rw h e lm in g ly  a 
su b jective p h e n o m e n o n  an d  an y  a tte m p t to s tu d y  an d  u n d e rs ta n d  
it b y m e th o d s  an d  co n ce p ts  of o b jectiv e  scien tific  in q u iry  ca n  at 
b est y ield  on ly  p a rtia l su ccess .
In this p re se n ta tio n , 1 shall b riefly  o u tlin e  in g e n e ra l te rm s  the  
a v ailab le  facts  of th e b io lo g y  of c o n sc io u sn e ss  u n d e r tw o  b ro a d  
c a t e g o r i s a t i o n s :  (a )  th e  n e u r o - a n a t o m i c a l  s u b s t r a t e  o f  
co n sc io u sn e ss , an d  (b) its n e u ro -e n d o crin o lo g y . In the final p a rt  
o f this p re se n ta tio n , I shall d w ell in so m e  d eta il on  th e n a tu re  of 
so m e  fo rm s of co n scio u sn e ss  in clu d in g  the tra n sce n d in g  an d  
t r a n s f o r m in g  m y s tic a l  s ta te s .  T h e s e  a re  e x p e r ie n c e d  a n d  
d o c u m e n te d  b y  relig io u s p ro p h e ts , se e rs , g ifted  artis ts  an d  p o e ts  
of tra n s -c u ltu ra l ap p e a l as w ell as scien tists  w ith  a n  o v e r-a rch in g  
in tu itiv e  p e rce p tio n  of tru th . E v e n  th e c o m m o n  g a rd e n  v a r ie ty  of 
o rd in a ry  m o rta ls  like m e , on  ra re  o c c a sio n s , tra n sie n tly  stu m b le s  
on  s im ilar o v e rw h e lm in g  an d  e x p a n d e d  fo rm s of co n sc io u sn e ss .
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The Neuro-anatomical substrate of 
consciousness
D u rin g  the p a s t d e ca d e , w h ich  w a s  d e cla re d  the d e ca d e  of the  
b rain , th ere  h a s  b e e n  a sn o w b a llin g  scien tific  e x c ite m e n t a b o u t  
c o n sc io u sn e s s  a n d  its n e u ro lo g ica l c o rre la te s . T e ch n o lo g ica l  
in n o v a tio n s  like P E T  a n d  fu n ctio n al N M R  im a g in g  (D e C e rta in e s  
et al 1 9 9 2 ), w h ich  m a d e  it p ossib le  to  im a g e  the fu n ctio n a l 
a n a to m y  of th e h u m a n  b rain , h a v e  p la y e d  a p iv o ta l role in the  
gen esis  of th is e x c ite m e n t. T od ay  w e m a p  w ith  g re a t p re cisio n  
th e m e ta b o lica lly  ac tiv e  an d  in a ctiv e  re g io n s  of the b ra in  in 
v a rio u s  s ta te s  of co n scio u sn e ss  (B elliveau  et al 1 9 9 1 ), like sleep , 
w a k e fu ln e s s , d re a m in g  as  w e ll a s  d iffe re n t a ffe c tiv e  a n d  
b e h a v io ra l s ta te s . M o re o v e r, w e  ca n  n o w  m a p  the a re a  of the  
b ra in  in v o lv e d  a c tiv e ly  in  d iv e rs e  sp e c ia lise d  fu n ctio n s  of 
h eig h ten ed  co n sc io u s  sta tes  su ch  as in te llectu al a c tiv ity  an d  
a e sth e tic  p u rsu its .
C u rio u sly , the ab o v e  d e v e lo p m e n ts  h a v e  th ro w n  u p  as m a n y  
q u estion s a b o u t the fu n ctio n in g  of th e b rain  as th ey  h a v e  h elp ed
to answer! For example, such imaging studies have shown that 
not only movements of, say, for example, of the thumb, but also 
the mere 'thought' of it, 'light up' the cortical part of the brain 
that represents it, indicating increased blood supply and metabolic 
activity in the area. While in the first case, we can rationalise and 
understand that afferent impulses from the moving thumb may 
have caused the concomitant circulatory and metabolic 
perturbations in the representative cortical area, it remains to be 
explained how the mere 'thought' of moving the thumb brings 
about the same change, and also which part of the neuro-axis is 
responsible for the mysterious volition and initiation of this 
phenomenon!
Addressing such enigmatic questions posed by state-of-art 
neurobiology is central to the understanding of consciousness 
because it involves, in the ultimate analysis, solving so 'subjective' 
a riddle as 'volition'. Volition, quintessentially, is an act of 
consciousness and Free Will! Implicit in the idea of free and 
willing consciousness is the notion of 'self, the 'me' -  the sensing, 
feeling, moving 'me' -  the sum and substance of our individual 
existence -  the consciousness that is 'me' -  the Jeevatma that is me. 
Here we have already reached the conundrum I referred to ...! but 
more of it later.
I learned as a medical student that the various sensory and motor 
tracts that course up and down the spinal cord and brain stem to 
reach into and out of our cortical Homunculus, send innumerable 
collaterals into the central core of grey matter. Tl'iis mass of grey 
matter comprises billions of intricately interconnected neurons, 
extending all along the neuro-axis. They communicate to and from 
within our neo-cortex through reverberating bio-electric circuitry 
of unimaginable complexity and this may be the anatomical 
substrate of our conscious mind. This evocative concept was very 
appealing to my imagiiiation then and is so even today.
Tlie neuro-anatomist tells us today that there are several structures 
belonging to this long stretch of grey substance which, in 
consonance with the neo-cortex and thalamus, are involved in 
the elaboration of consciousness (Steriade et al 1990; Singer 1998; 
Steriade 2000). Such structures include the reticular formation of 
the brain stem and the important sub-cortical aggregations of 
neurons like the thalamus, the striatum, amygdala, the
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hippocampus and other parts of the limbic brain. They are linked 
interactively to the phylogenetically recent and more massive 
body of nerve cells organised on the surface of the brain called 
the neo-cortex. These two large bodies of nerve cells involving an 
estimated 100 billion neurons and their intricate bio-electric 
interconnections through several trillions of synapses, harbour 
the mystery of our consciousness; the consciousness that perceives, 
emotes and acts out Life in our mortal coil.
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Neuro-endocrinology and consciousness
As an undergraduate I was taught that the physical paradigm of 
brain activity is electrical impulse formation and transmission 
along the axo-dendritic circuitry to integrate spatially and 
temporarily discrete events in the nervous system. Over the course 
of the last four decades there has been a change in the 
conceptualisation of brain activity. Today the brain can be 
considered as a huge multi-humoral organ that self-generates and 
self-integrates throughout life with the mediation of an incredibly 
large number of chemical signals. These chemical signals and 
related excitation, inhibition or modulation, maturation, organelle 
formation, and even proliferation of nerve cells happen along and 
across membrane-bound subcellular and transcelluar 
compartments, tunnels and roadways (Ingber 1998). The building 
materials used to fabricate these nano-structures are bio-molecules 
of varying size, composition and structure held together by the so- 
called weak interactions or by dynamic states of equilibrated 
reactions between mechano-molecules. The chemical bases of the 
electrical fluxes and action potentials unique to the nervous tissue 
are ionic fluxes incidental to the complexly interacting 
macromolecular medley along and neuronal membranes.
Highly specific 'configurational' and 'equilibria' shifts can be 
engendered in the subcellular and transcellular molecular flux 
that is neural activity, by a large number of evolutionarily 
fashioned regulatory molecules, elaborated by cells of neuro­
ectodermal derivation, and delivered discreetly or diffusely on 
predetermined loci of neurons in the brain. Such evolutionarily 
fashioned regulatory molecules acting on the brain, I believe, can 
be called neuro-hormones.
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Neuro-hormones and their complex system of heterogenous 
receptors play a pivotal role in the anatomical growth and 
development, functional maturation, electrical activation, and 
bio-energisation of the brain. They also fashion the myriads of 
oscillating neurocircuitry, which are the neurostructural correlates 
of behaviour (Fluckiger et al 1985; Harris-Warrick ct al 1991; 
Marder el al 1996; Marder 1998). I shall illustrate these with some 
examples.
Thyroxine, an iodothyronine chemically fashioned in the 
primordial sea, acts in concert with its complex receptor system 
as well as the enzymes that regulate its achvation in situ, and 
plays a pivotal role in the growth and maturation of the human 
brain early in life (Marcos et al 1985; Kochupillai and 
Ramalingaswami 1986). Its deficiency or defective action results 
in stunted dendritic elaboration, dysregulated programming of 
cell death, defective myelination and deficient expression of 
adrenergic receptors in the developing brain (Smith et al 1985). 
The result is a meek and retarded individual with constricted 
awareness and compromised content of consciousness with poorly 
energised mind, flatness of affect, deficient drive and depressive 
frame of mind (Querido 1986).
The female steroidal hormone estrogen, in concert with the 
neuro-peptide oxytocin sculpts the feminine consciousness by 
acting on specialised receptor systems for the respective hormones 
that get expressed on appropriately interacting neuronal pools 
situated in the prefrontal, olfactory and limbic cortex as well as 
sub-cortical nuclei such as nuclei acumbans to elaborate the 
joyous and selfless love of mothering (Carter et al 1992; Carter 
and Getz 1993; Gimpil and Fahrenhdz 2001)! In lower mammals 
like rodents, oxytocin, along with estrogen, elaborates behavioural 
traits like pair-bonding, monogamy, parental care and other 
affiliative behaviour, which are perhaps phylogenetic fore-runners 
of established human behavioural traits that form the basis of 
family life and related life-affirming social impulses of Hoino- 
Sapiens-Sapiens. There is emerging evidence pointing to the role 
of prolactin -  a peptide hormone secreted by the pituitary gland
-  Lti the elaboration of positive emotions like love as well as 
transcendental states of consciousness. Interestingly, an important 
neuro-anatomical substrate involved in such life-affirming 
behavioral traits among lower animals is the mesolimbic
dopaminergic reward areas. In this context, it is pertinent to 
quote a recent report related to autism, a congenital human 
behavioural defect characterised by poor or absent social skills 
due to abnormalities in oxytocin and arginine vasopressin activity 
related to elaboration of neuronal circuitry relevant to social 
behaviour (Frith et al 1991, 1993; Gimpil and Fahrenhdz 2001).
A pivotal neuro-endocrine system that has been recognised as 
being important in the elaboration of consciousness is that of 
aminergic neurons. A technical breakthrough made it possible to 
map intra-neuronal bioamines in the sixties. Studies using this 
technique revealed that such neurons, mainly situated in the 
brain stem, send extensively branching terminals to most sub- 
cortical regions relevant in the elaboration of conscious states 
and complex motivated behaviour (Austin 1999). Aminergic 
neurons, a total estimated one million in number, spread out to 
an average of 500,000 nerve terminals per neuron to reach out 
and exert their influence on billions of neurons in svib-cortical 
and cortical structures. These are perhaps the most important 
neuro-endocrine structures relevant to the elaboration of human 
consciousness.
Tliere are three major bio-amines of neuro-biological importance -  
dopamine, nor-epinephrine and serotonin. The dopaminergic 
system of aminergic neurons have two major components, the 
dorsal (caudate and putamen) and the ventral (the ventral 
legmentum). The ventral system send most of its afferent fibres to 
the nucleus accumbans and the perfrontal and cingulate regions -  
all important structures involved in the elaboration of conscious 
attention, quick activation of complex and patterned motor activity 
and goal-directed behaviour. Animals with activated dopaminergic 
pathways are extroverted, energised and aggressive. In man, drug- 
induced stimulation of the dopaminergic system makes individuals 
optimistic, energetic, aggressive and extroverted with an 
overpowering sense of "feeling good". However, most such drugs 
are addictive and their action is transient.
The noradrenergic (NE) and serotoninergic systems also project 
to important sub-cortical and cortical regions relevant in the 
elaboration of conscious states (Austin 1999). The two major 
collections of NE neurons are (1) in the locus cerulius and (2) 
central paragiganto cellular nucleus of medulla. (To this important
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part we shall return presently.) The NE system is also involved in 
the elaboration of visuo-motor and spatial reflexes and data 
processing. They also mediate 'pain'-related behavioural states, 
besides subserving vital instinctive functions of major survival 
value, for example, cardio-respiratory regulation. The serotonin 
system, mainly centred in the Raphe nuclei of the brain stem, 
influences, through its aminergic projection, such important 
structures relevant to conscious behaviour as the thalamus, septal 
region, the CA cells of the hippocampus, the frontal lobe, as well 
as the lower brain stem. It plays an important role in visual 
perception, association and interpretation and is also involved in 
the elaboration of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, social 
behaviovir, as well as psychic response to pain and stress.
Thus the complex and extensively branching aminergic neuro­
endocrine systems play cardinal roles in the elaboration of the 
phenomenon of consciousness in all its varied and complex 
manifestation.
There is an incredibly large number of neuropeptides (Harris- 
Warrick and Marder 1991) involved in modulating and fine- 
tuning neural activities in different regions of the brain, relevant 
to the phenomena of consciousness. For example, the peptide 
cholecystokinin (CCK) can be immvmo-chemically demonstrated 
all over the neo-cortex as well as in several sub-cortical neuronal 
structures. It is supposed to play an excitatory neuro-modulatory 
role in concert with other neuro-transmitters like dopamine, 
acetylcholine etc. in the elaboration of neural activity relevant to 
conscious states (Austin 1999). The number of other such neuro­
active peptides in the brain is too large to permit inclusion in the 
present paper.
288 N Kochupillai
Biological correlates of Dhyana
The transcending direct awareness that impelled Adi Shankara to 
proclaim -  Bralmui Sah/am, faged Midya, Jeevo Brahniairliimpamli! was 
perhaps an eruptive expansion of consciousness.... An experience 
so overpowering in its visual clarity and so compelling as an 
emotive experience of “Truth that is Beauty" that he revived and 
recreated the revelatory experience in the sublime poetry of 
'Soundaryalahari' using mystical mind-body imagery and metaphor.
Transcending poesy transports mortal beings to immortal 
experience! The American poet A E Houseman describes several 
bodily experiences that such poetry evokes in him. As a clinical 
endocrinologist, I would characterise those bodily experience as 
essentially neuro-endocrine. The poetry-induced mind-body 
experience described by Houseman is not unique to him. Anyone 
who shared the riveting experience of aesthetic beauty with 
gifted poets would bear out the truth in Houseman's description. 
Many Sanskrit words used in my mother tongue Malayalam 
accurately describe them. Words like Anandashru, Romanchain, 
Gadgadmn, Nirvrithi etc. accurately describe those psycho-physical 
experiences.
Every bodily experience, sensory or motor, have neuro-anatomical 
localisation. Most of the physical experiences described by 
Houseman can be referred to neural activity at the level of the 
brain stem. However, the accompanying psychic experience of a 
sense of "joyous liberation" has its origin at a higher level, 
perhaps involving complex circuitry linking several cortical and 
sub-cortical structures. Also, perhaps, it is the neural influence 
originating from these areas that funnel down to the brain stem 
nuclei to bring about the physical effects of the psychic experience 
described.
There are no human data obtained by modern imaging techniques 
to locate the neuro-anatomical substrate of the higher psychic 
experiences referred to above. However, there are reported 
meditative states which qualitatively reproduce similar experience. 
In a recent monograph on Zen and the Brain published by the MIT 
press (Austin 1999) the clinical neurologist James Austin 
categorises several graded stages of meditative depths and 
intensity. According to that grading, the above described psychic 
experience would fall under stages V, VI A, and VI B. As 
documented by Austin, these stages of meditative depth bring 
about a state of mental calm and peace, feeling of joy, all- 
encompassing love and happiness. They are always transient. In 
the higher stages, there can be a profoundly blissful sense of 
enchantment, rapture, and ecstasy associated with such changes 
in one nature as reinforced positive emotions. As one progresses 
further to higher states (VII, VIII, and IX) one's self awareness 
(bound self) tends to progressively decline and disappear, and a 
sense of detachment from cravings and aversions dominates;
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there is progressive transformation of a quasi-permanent or 
permanent type in one's emotive nature with the enli’ghtened 
aw^areness of awakened consciousness, characterized by selfless 
love and compassion {a \a Mother Theresa), an inexpressible 
sense of joyous purity of being without any subject-object 
dichotomy -  perhaps a state of transcendental communion with 
the Universal Spirit. Austin abstracted his concept of meditational 
staging from the Zen tradition.
Sage Pathanjali (2nd/3rd century BC) (Swami Vivekananda 1999) 
is the enunciator of the yoga tradition of meditative practice 
through his Yogasutra. According to Pathanjali, there are three 
broad meditative states: They are, in order of progressive 
attainment, (a) Dhyam, (b) Dharana, and (c) Samadlii. Through 
these progressive stages the sadhaka extinguishes Chitta Vritti or 
the 'activities' of the conscious mind. What are the Vrittis of our 
mind? According to Pathanjali there are five types of Vrittis. They 
are (a) Pramam, (b) Viparyaya, (c) Vikalpa, (d) Nidra, and finally
(e) Suiriti. Praiiiana Vrithi has three subtypes namely: 
(i) Prathi/nkslw, i.e direct sensory awareness, (ii) Anumana i.e. 
inferential awareness, and (iii) Agaiiia i.e. awareness of revealed 
knowledge. These three sub-types together account for the 
awareness content of our conscious mind. The second Viparyaya 
Vritti refers to the illusory content of our consciousness. The 
classic example in this regard is the serpent-rope paradigm. The 
third category Vikalpa Vritti refers to the delusions that infest our 
consciousness. The fourth category refers to the state of sleep. We 
all know sleep; but many of us do not recognize it as an activity 
of our conscious state. But, interestingly, it is recognized as an 
active state of consciousness by both Patanjali and modern 
science! And finally the fifth Vritti of Smriti, which is the memory 
traces that lurk around in our conscious mind. All the five Vrittis 
defined by Patanjali comprehensively cover the totality of the 
content of our conscious mind.
After defining the Chitta Vrithis which the sadhaka should try to 
eliminate, Pathanjali systematically dealt out his prescriptions to 
achieve the same. The prescription is a six-fold plan of action -  
collectively named Tapas -  The steps of Tapas are: (a) Yauia, 
(b) Niyania, (c) Asana, (d) Pranayama, (e) Prathyahara, and
(f) Saiimdhi.
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These six-fold psycho-physical and spiritual disciplines of Tnpns, 
when practiced with Shrnddha, will enable the sndhaka to 
experience the pure, transparent, and transcendent state of 
Consciousness. Tnpas, Patanjali says, would cleanse our 
consciousness of all its Vritiis, which are the dust-haze of aeons 
and years of experiential assault {pmrabdlia) through phylogeny 
and ontogeny, responsible for our cloudy, murky, distorted 
consciousness filled with Vritti...........
......... But, can we experience the pure, transcendent form of
Chitta, the Cliitta resplendent in Truth and Beauty; the "Sat Chit 
Ananda"? By following the prescription of Patanjali, I believe it is 
possible; may be for a few exceptional ones among us!
Of the six- fold practice prescribed by Patanjali, Yama and Niijama 
are well-known tenets of psycho-physical and spiritual disciplines 
prescribed for spiritual pursuit by most religions. Asanas, which 
are dynamic and static focussing and posturing of our mind and 
body are designed to promote elaborate, intricate and complete 
mind-body, awareness as enunicated in ‘Hatha-yoga Pradeepika' 
(Singh 1991). Interpreted in anatomical and physiological terms, 
these esoteric practices, turn out to be the most complete and 
comprehensive set of psycho-physical practices, scientifically 
designed to forge our mind and body into a mutually re­
discovering, re-inforcing and re-invigorating experiential Gestalt. 
But the real practice that kindles our fire and enlighten our 
Conscious Being is Pranayaina. The Sanskrit word Prana cannot 
be translated. To my mind it represents a comprehensive concept 
of an energising-integrating current that weaves life out of Pmkriti. 
It is there in the air currents of our breath, as also in the flux of 
bio-electricity through the myriads of axons and dendrites of 
billions of nerve cells that energise and integrate our being. It is 
there in the energetics of the millions of equilibrated bio-chemical 
reactions integrated within and across cell barriers, tissues and 
organ systems to engender the marvellous phenomenon called 
'Life'. The word Franayama perhaps means the ebb and flow of 
this life-giving current. To me, it has been a matter of abiding 
curiosity to understand the meaning of Pranayaina.
How can one reconcile the apparent incompatibility between the 
over-arching concept of Prana on the one hand and the mundane 
act of breathing and related exercise that the word Pranayama has 
come to represent in popular parlance on the other?
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One can readily concede that breathing is an all important 
activity that sustain life: However, how can that fact, per se, give 
Pra)inyaiiin the mystical power that it is supposed to bestow on its 
practitioner? While oxygen intake and CO, expulsion are central 
to the physiology of respiration, it is important to realise that 
there is another equally vital neuro-endocrine dimension to that 
physiology -  the rhythmic respiratory drive that originates in the 
cardio-respiratory centre of the brain stem reticular formation. 
We have already learned the key role played by brain stem 
reticular formation and the related aminergic influence that 
emanates upward from it to impinge on all the important cortical 
and sub-cortical neural formations that form the anatomical 
substrate of man's conscious mind. These facts clearly establish a 
link between breathing and consciousness. I have already referred 
to the current knowledge that focusing awareness and attention 
(consciousness) on any bodily activity enhances blood supply 
and metabolic activity in the corresponding part of the brain that 
represents/controls that organ/activity. On the basis of these 
observahons, it can be deduced that rhythmic breathing (and its 
variants) with full and focused awareness of the process 
{Pranayama) cannot but neuro-biologically influence the brain 
stem reticular formation and therefore the whole brain activity 
gestalt known as consciousness. In what manner Pranayama can 
influence consciousness is well-documented by sages and seers, 
poets and mystics from their personal experience. The various 
techniques used to effectively focus attention and awareness in 
the breathing process are also well documented in our tradition. 
The incredible psycho-spiritual transformations that long practice 
of 'Pranayama and Dhyana can engender in our being is celebrated 
in our cultural and religious lore.... in our music and in our 
poetry. The mystical Meera and her love songs of transcendence, 
the spiritually overpowering resonance of Andal's Vellai Vilichank 
(Padmanabhan 2000) the cerebrally compelling insights of 
Patanjali's Yoga Siitra (Swami Vivekananda 1999), the Prema of 
Human Hridaya in Narada Bhakti Sutra (Swami Sidhinathananda 
1985) the spiritually intoxicating brew of Goswami Tulsi Das' 
Ram Rasayan, the transporting quality of Tyagaraja's Swara-raga- 
sudha, the soul stirring poesy of Sufi Sants, the "Whistling, love- 
stirring breeze" in the soul of St. John of the Cross (Kavanaugh 
and Rodriguez 1996) .... the list goes on and on through the 
history of human experience to vouch for the Transcending Truth 
revealed in mystically expanding Human Consciousness!!
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Genes and brain circuits
OBAID SIDDIQI 
National Centre for Biological Sciences 
Bangalore, India
Abstract
The success of the genome project in elucidating the order o f 3050 
tnillion base pairs in human DNA is a remarkable event. It give us 
direct access to the entire set of specifications contained in our genetic 
material. In the following pages I argue that, in order to understand 
what genes have to do with brain and behaviour, the sequence of bases 
in the genome is important but not enough.
Introduction
In a s e m in a r on  co n scio u sn e ss  an d  g e n etics  on e n:\ight b e g in  b y  
d e cla rin g  o n e 's  m e ta p h y sica l p re d ile ctio n s . I a m  n o t g o in g  to  sa y  
v e ry  m u ch  ab o u t co n scio u sn e ss  an d  e v e n  less a b o u t m e ta p h y sics .  
I b elieve  th a t co n scio u sn e ss  is in th e h e a d  b o th  as a m a tte r  of fact 
an d  in a d e e p e r scien h fic  sen se . B rain  is th e o rg a n , w h ich  can
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transact information on a scale necessary for sentience and 
cognition, not heart or liver. So far as we know, living organisms 
are the only objects in the universe which contain an internal 
description of themselves. This description enables organisms to 
develop and evolve and, in general, exhibit properties which set 
them apart from inanimate objects. Knowledge of the genome 
sequence gives us direct access to the internal description of an 
organism. This is quite remarkable and makes one wonder what 
genomes have to say about brain and behaviour.
DNA does not directly determine the final properties of animals 
and plants, their phenotype. It does so through a host of other 
molecules, some large and complex, others simple. The organised 
ensemble of structures and activities at different levels of 
complexity, gives to biology its charming variety, biochemistry 
and biophysics at the molecular level, cell types and organ 
systems at an intermediate level and whole organisms and their 
communities at higher levels. Progress in molecular biology of 
genes has greatly illuminated our understanding of all levels of 
biology. But it does not exhaust any one of these. Sensory and 
cognitive biology, for instance, is now on much securer 
foundations but our understanding of affective functions, pain, 
pleasure, motivation or sleep is not so satisfactory.









Are 30,000 genes enough?
The important function of DNA, apart from duplicating itself, is 
to preserve and convey genetic information. It does so through 
an intermediary molecule RNA to make proteins. RNA and 
protein are at the centre of other activities. You might ask, are 
30,000 genes in humans enough to generate our unusual 
properties. Genomic analysis provides us with useful insights
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Figure 1. Proteins performing different biochemical functions in humans. 
The num bers in parenthesis indicate proportions in a sample of 2700  
proteins.
into such questions. The human genome contains 30,000 protein- 
coding genes; flies and worms have 15,000 and 10,000 respectively. 
Does this mean we are only two or three times as complex as flies 
or worms? Clearly not. The mammalian brain has a hundred 
billion (10”) neurons, the flies have a few hundred thousand (10-̂ ) 
and the lowly worm C. elegans only 300. The difference between 
the three species is not in their DNA content but in the proteins 
they make. Our own 30,000 genes probably make between 150,000 
and 250,000 different proteins. The genes and proteins work in 
combinatorial subsets in different tissues, not one at a time. Thirty 
thousand is, therefore, a very large number. In principle, 
combinations of genes can generate phenotypes exceeding the 
number of atoms in the universe.
Table 2. Expansion of protein families in humans compared to 
the fruit fly D rosophila. Numbers show multiplication of 
proteins in different functional classes.
Regulators of development 5.6 X
Immune response 3.8 X
Signalling 2.48 X
Adhesion 2.5 X
Cell death 2.7 X
Cytoskeleton 2.7 X
Neuron structure and function 1.4 X
Comparative genomics tells us how evolution of complexity has 
proceeded. Simple bacteria make a few thousand proteins, 
which take care of essential biochemistry. The advanced enkaryotic 
cell needs a few thousand more for added housekeeping functions. 
The evolution of multicellular animals and plants was 
accompanied with a massive increase in the number of proteins 
and their families. Most of this expansion in protein families has 
to do with regulation of development, specially of brain structure 
and function. The uniqueness of higher mammals lies not so 
much in their genes but in the enormous redundancy of their 
proteins. About 99.8% of our genome is identical with that of the 
chimpanzees. The differences, genetically speaking, reside in a 
few hundred genes.
Table 3. Shared protein functions in humans and fruit flies.
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Neural structure and function 72%
Regulators of development 42%
Immune response 10%
Genetics of neural connections
In order to understand the development of brain connections, 
we need to know how neuronal genes work. This is the subject of 
a relatively recent field of research called neurogenetics. At the
elementary level, genes specify proteins essential for neural 
functions: the generation of electrical signals. The basic hardware 
of nerve cells, sensory receptors, membrane channels, synaptic 
proteins and other molecules, which transduce and amplify 
signals appeared early in evolution and have been conserved. 
Other conserved genes control the number and diversity of 
neuronal types and the formation of nerve connections. Yet other 
genes regulate migration of neurons and axonal pathfinding. 
Axons grow by traversing short segments bounded by landmarks. 
Molecular cues guide the growing axons, enabling them to make 
turning decisions at choice points. Netrins are diffusable proteins 
that provide attractive cues, ephrins cause repulsion, semaphorins 
drive axons to fasciculate. The overall organization of the brain is 
similarly regulated by genes. Homologous neurons in different 
species can often be recognized. They preserve their transmitters 
and connectivity. Occasionally entire neural circuits are preserved 
across phyla. The neural circuits tend to be generalists. The 
network, with appropriate modulation, can reconfigure itself to 
acquire new functions. All told, there are more than a thousand 
proteins regulating neurons and their connectivity.
But genes do not specify brain circuits in the same straightforward 
way that they specify sequences of amino acids in a protein. 
They work in a highly interactive fashion to bring about an 
overall pattern that is relatively invariant. This pattern exhibits a 
remarkable degree of flexibility. Although early stages in brain 
development are independent of actual neural funchon, the 
formation of final connections and their maintenance is critically 
dependent on correlated patterns of electrical activity. Genetic 
regulation of brain is not strictly deterministic. It is stochastic, 
nonlinear and probabilistic, and strongly influenced by 
environment and experience.
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Genes and behaviour
Is there a direct correlation between single genes and behavioural 
traits? The answer is sometimes yes and sometimes no. It is 
claimed that traits such as intelligence, aggression, criminality, 
homosexuality, feminine intuition, musicality and mathematical 
ability have a strong genetic basis. These same traits also have an 
important experiential component. Behavioural traits depend
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upon interactions between environmental factors and multiple 
genes called quantitative trait loci (QTL). Separation of the 
environmental and genetic components of behaviour by 
conventional genetic methods is not easy. Most of the information 
about heritability of behaviour comes from statistical studies on 
twins and adopted children. These studies are sometimes 
controversial. The conclusions reached by the investigators are 
influenced by the methods of investigation they choose and their 
philosophical bias, not an uncommon phenomenon in science. 
Refined methods for studying QTLs by means of single nucleotide 
polymorphism (SNP) are now available, which should greatly 
improve the state of knowledee in this area.
F ig u r e  2. H e r ita b ility  o f  b eh a v io ra l tra its  in h u m a n s  b ase d  on tw in  s tu d ies . 
A d a p tiv e  g e n e tic  v a ria n c e (S j) ;V a ria tio n  a ttr ib u ta b le  to  sh a red  e n v iro n m e n t(□ ) ;  
V aria tion  d u e  to  u n sh a re d  e n v iro n m e n t(B ) .
Evolution of human brain
It is often argued that no amount of tinkering with the brain or 
its molecular hardware is going to tell us much about 
consciousness, which is a part of a larger cosmic force accessible 
to introspection and intuition alone. I will leave this argument
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aside and conclude with a remark about the evolution of the 
human brain.
It seems to have taken a bit over two million years for the brain 
to evolve from early primates to modern humans. Most of it 
happened in a sudden spurt of change. The causes of this spurt 
are not known. About 100,000 years ago mankind spread from its 
original habitat in sub-Saharan Africa to the rest of the world. It 
is unlikely that our brain genes have changed much in this 
period. The change that has occurred is not so much genetic as 
cultural and social. The results of human genome analysis 
reinforce this conclusion. To borrow the words of Svante Paabo, 
the man who sequenced Neanderthal DNA:
10
0.1
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Figure 3. Evolution of brain capacity in vertebrates. N ote the sudden  
spurt of increase in this capacity in prim ates in the last few million 
years.
“It is a delusion to think that genomics in isolation will ever tell 
us what it means to be human. To work towards that lofty goal 
we need an approach that includes cognitive sciences, primatology, 
social sciences and humanities. With the availability of the human 
genome sequence, genetics is in a position to play a prominent 
part in this endeavour."
Consciousness-elusive or 
can one grasp It?
B RAMAMURTHI 
V. H. S Medical Centre, Chennai, india
Abstract
'Elusive' refers to a substance or an object that at one time appears 
within one's grasp and at other times, unreachable. Consciousness 
seems to be a similar entity, eluding the grasp of scientists and 
philosophers and the public. The primary reason is that different people 
define consciousness in different luays and then proceed to deal with it, 
their ideas being often at variance with others interested in the same 
subject. The biologists' or the neuroscientists' vieios are specific and are 
that consciousness is based on some sort of neural activity. There are 
others who combine self-awareness and aimreness with consciousness, 
thus denying the existence of consciousness in most animals and 
plants. There are others who hold that consciousness is an entity that is 
different from the neural basis and it is consciousness that activates the 
mind. Philosophers suggest that consciousness pervades the whole 
universe and can be found in animate and inanimate objects, only 
varying in the degree of its intensity. Thus the difficulties in grasping 
consciousness are obvious.
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This paper discusses the different approaches to consciousness, the 
scientific, the philosophers' and the lay public's. It also suggests that 
people discussing consciousness should start by defining what they 
mean by consciousness. This will make mutual dialogue easier. In 
addition, the paper deals with the state of super consciousness where the 
human brain is able to reach heights of performance not ordinarily 
available to lay humans. The change in brain function and structure 
that makes such a supernatural state possible makes fascinating study 
and is a goal for neuroscientists of the future.
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]. Consciousness
The study of consciousness has three aspects:
(1) To understand the basic mechanisms of consciousness 
and mentation;
(2) To verify the existence of the state of superconsciovisness 
and then understand and explain the phenomenon;
(3) And most important, to prove the benefits of the daily 
practice of meditation undertaken over the years; to 
establish how it benefits an individual's bodily health, 
improves his efficiency and induces mental equanimity;
The third one is as important as the others. It is easier to do and 
will benefit a large number of people of the world.
Consciousness and all other aspects of thought, mentation and 
the state of superconsciousness have interested Indians for many 
centuries and they have made great contributions to this science, 
that have stood the test of time and of scientific study.
The Western interest in this problem is about two or three 
centuries old and has become more intense in the last fifty years. 
Tl-ie approaches, the definitions, and the language used to describe 
the problems of consciousness differ widely between the East 
and the West. It appears that Western scientists have a problem 
in defining consciousness and one sees different interpretations 
of this entity. Consciousness. They are mixing up consciousness, 
mentation, awareness, self awareness etc. and often use these 
terms interchangeably. This makes scienhfic study difficult. The
Indian view, which I will deal with later, seems to be more 
realistic and intellectually satisfying and more amenable to proper 
scientific study.
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2. Western concepts of consciousness
Some of the definitions used by Western scientists interested in 
the study of consciousness are mentioned below and you would 
see the difficulty.
"The most elusive and inescapable of all phenomena is 
consciousness, our immediate subjective awareness of the world 
and ourselves" (John Morgan, science writer). Here consciousness, 
awareness of environment and self awareness are clubbed together.
Consciousness, according to Francis Crick and Christof Koch, is 
really synonymous with awareness and all forms of awareness, 
external and subjective.The mechanism is one that combines 
attention with short-term memory and they suggest that self- 
awareness may be unique to humans. If consciousness and self- 
awareness are the same, then according to Crick, only humans 
who have self-awareness have consciousness!! Is this tenable?
Antonio Damassio: "A theory of consciousness must show how 
each of us acquires a sense of self, it must take into account not 
only the brain but the whole body" (nearer to our ayurvedic 
concepts). He further adds "a neural model of consciousness will 
probably have to be supplemented by cognitive and social 
theories?" Here also consciousness and self-awareness are clubbed 
together. Is this the sort of consciousness that we plan to discuss?
"Consciousness is a common biological phenomenon occurring 
not only in humans, but in many other animals -  and certainly 
all the primates". (Flanagan in his book, Conscio^isness reconsidered, 
1992). Does this mean anhnals below the level o f the primates have no 
consciousness -  are they unconscious??!!
Consciousness is the supreme level of mental reflection of objective 
reality, inherent in man exclusively, by virtue of his sociohistoric 
essence (Petrowsky and Yaroshewsky, 1987). This definition implies 
that all other beings have no consciousness.
There are also statements like "Consciousness is the general 
master of psychological functions, improperly identified with 
some mental functions (most often with attention or thinking)" 
and "for scientific psychologi/, consciousness is complete fiction."
What do we know about consciousness? It is the name that we 
apply to the condition of ourselves that we experience and report 
for most of the day. We realize that there are serious difficulties 
in specifying the use of the word. In saying that one is conscious, 
one means awake and aware and open to receiving and giving 
out information (Young 1979).
William James, the philosopher, stated that the "stream of 
consciousness" is a river, forever flowing through a man's 
conscious waking hours. This metaphor may be poetic but is 
confusing.
When we wake up we are still the same person as before. So, if 
consciousness and mind can come and go it is very difficult to 
see how they can be the carriers of our character and individuality.
But why is there so much confusion around the definition of 
consciousness? Part of the reason is the unfortiinate use of a single 
word to signify something that has so many different facets. Dictionaries 
define consciousness as "awareness of one's own existence, 
sensations, thoughts, surroundings," or "the contents of mind," 
or "consciousness of wrongdoing," or "the collection of one's 
thoughts at a given moment," or a host of other meanings. "So 
what are people talking about when they talk about 
consciousness?" asks Antonio Damassio, maturing in his views.
"An intelligent conversation about consciousness cannot take 
place clearly without first announcing which phenomenon is 
being discussed. The need for sharp distinctions is even more 
important for those actually investigating these phenomena. 
Consciousness is not conscience, nor is it merely the contents of 
the mind. Consciousness is the biological phenomenon that permits us 
to survey the contents of our minds: our feelings, thoughts and 
knowledge. Consciousness is not the feelings themselves, nor is it 
merely the accumulated thoughts and knowledge. It is an 
elaborate rite of passage into these feelings, these thoughts and 
this knowledge -  into everything that makes us human!!"
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These are a few examples to show that western scientists do not 
differentiate between consciousness, awareness, and self- 
awareness.
2,1 Consciousness: Is it semantics or only an abstract 
concept?
There is another viewpoint to be considered. Are we just using a 
word (consciousness) which has in reality no existence and has 
come down in time by the use of language? Wittgenstein 
mentioned that language always gets coloured by the social 
culture of the people using it.
Is there really an entity like consciousness or does it indicate a 
basket where many ideas are mixed up? If so what are we 
investigating?
Is consciousness a word we have given for a certain state of 
function? If so, Jww can science be expected to clarify abstract entities? 
Is it a will o' the wisp?
3. Other views on consciousness. The biologist’s 
definition of consciousness
"Consciousness is the ability to react to environment."
In evolution, it is seen that the capacity to interact with 
environment is inherent in the smallest of living organisms, 
including unicellular organisms and viruses. As evolution 
advances, the capacity to perceive and store information and 
react to the environment increases, by the development of a 
nervous system. From these levels, the nervous system has 
become bigger and better organized in the higher animals, ending 
up with this magnificent organ that we all possess and with 
which we are trying to investigate our own brain powers.
Neurobiologists define the term consciousness as the ability of 
the organism to respond purposefully to changes in the 
environment, and thus consciousness is a basic function of life at 
all levels of evolution.
306 B Ramamurthi
In ancient Hindu writings on medicine, great importance has 
been given to tiie term consciousness. In Oiaraka Samhitha, Sareera 
Stham  (Suthra 16), it is observed "Man is said to be the sum of 
the six elements, namely ether and the four other proto-elements, 
the sixth being the element of consciousness". By some the conscious 
element alone is said to constitute Man.
This definition of consciousness is quite satisfactory to biological 
scientists including medical scientists. Doctors assessing the higher 
neurological functions of the patient call the patient 'conscious', 
if he reacts in some form or other to environmental stimuli, and 
based on the varying types of reaction have graded the levels of 
"consciousness", e.g. the Glasgow Coma Scale.
Under the above definition one can certainly say that animals, 
plants and other living organisms exhibit consciousness.
3.1 Awareness o f oneself and the environment
This takes us one step higher in the evolutionary scale. While there 
is no doubt that human beings are aware of themselves and their 
surroundings, are all living beings aware of their "self"? This self- 
awareness, if present, is not obvious to us in the lower forms of 
life, but perhaps in the higher levels of the animal kingdom, with a 
well-developed nervous system, this is likely to be present.
The biologist's concept of consciousness being different from the 
popular concept of "awareness" is well demonstrated below. 
The understanding of the doctor and the patient of what is 
implied by the term "consciousness" (specially in the East) 
varies, the patient or his relatives having a different concept of 
the word "unconsciousness".
In India, if you ask a patient who had a head injury, "How long 
were you unconscious"? he may reply "for about fifteen days". 
Unless you understand what he means, you may assume that he 
had a severe head injury and had suffered from prolonged loss of 
consciousness. But actually this is not so. What the patient means 
is that he was "not aware" for fifteen days and not 'unconscious' 
in the neurological sense. This means that he knew what was 
happening, was able to drink and eat and respond appropriately 
at the moment, but cannot remember any of these responses, i.e.
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that he was not "aware” for those days. Thus though the patient 
was conscious according to the biologists, according to his own 
concept the patient was "not aware".
3.2 Collective consciousness
Going lower down the scale, do insects have awareness of 
themselves and others of their own kind? If we look at a colony 
of ants, they seerr\ to be as well organized as human society. 
Similar is the behaviour of bees. Is it possible that such insects, 
have, in addition to individual consciousness, a collective 
consciousness also? Going further down, does the plant kingdom 
have awareness? Do they communicate with each other in ways 
unknown to us?
3.3 Consciousness a t the cellular and subcellular levels
The human brain has 1000 million cells. Is consciousness a 
function of the whole brain or does each neuron possess 
consciousness? Similarly do other living cells possess a modicum 
of consciousness so that they may react meaningfully to changes 
in their environment?
The DNA helix acts as a guide and blueprint for every 
development in the foetus and in the adult body. There are 
protein molecules that may attach themselves to the DNA 
molecule and prevent and modify its actions. Has the DNA any 
consciousness of what it is doing when it acts as a blueprint or, 
do the protein molecules possess consciousness when they attach 
themselves to the DNA and alter its working? How and why do 
they perform this function?
3.4 Consciousness a t the subatomic level
Does the biologists' definition cover all objects in existence? 
Does a nonliving thing like a stone have consciousness? 
Apparently not, from the point of view of our perception.
The physicists have shown clearly that a stone is made up of 
large molecules and atoms with enormous space in between 
them, and that these molecules and atoms are in constant motion 
and reacting with each other, obeying certain laws, i.e. reacting to
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their own environment; In other words they are "conscious" 
according to our definition, though the stone itself is not conscious. 
Can there be a very low level of consciousness in the stone which 
we are not able to perceive or measure with our available means? 
Here the definition of the word "consciousness" has undergone a 
complete change and has no reference to the concept of biological 
scientists. Particle physicists trying to understand the smallest 
particles have described it as a matter energy continuum operating 
on the principle of uncertainty and probability. Observation of 
matter at isuch smallest subatomic levels convinces physicists 
that at such levels, energy-matter follow the same laws that are 
present in the largest objects all over the Universe.
3.5 Consciousness is a universai phenomenon present 
everywhere, from the smallest to the biggest objects In 
the Universe
All matter/energy in the universe is subject to some sort of law 
or control and the response to this control or law may be 
conceived as "consciousness". Under this concept, all objects in 
the universe including those on this planet Earth, manifest some 
level or other of this force "consciousness", depending on the 
m atter constituting them. Thus the m anifestation of 
"consciousness" is maximum in the higher "evolved" beings 
rather than in those at the lower level.
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3.6 "Time-space-consclousness" hypothesis (R K Mudgal, 
India)
R K Mudgal of the Institute of Science and Religion has suggested 
that all objects in this Universe are part of a graph bound by a 
parameter of time on one side and that of space on the other; and 
there is another parameter in the third dimension, viz., 
"Consciousness". The inherent property of all objects (described 
as goal in religion), is to cross the time-space barrier and reach 
the ultimate of infinite consciousness.
The Time-Space-Consciousness hypothesis states that everything 
in existence anywhere is moving through time and space towards 
infinite consciousness. This necessitates another postulate that 
"Consciousness is a fundamental of the most basic subatomic 
particle/wave and its primary property is manifestation".
“Manifestation at the atomic level may be correlated to the 
probability factor in the behaviour of the particle/wave function 
in quantum mechanics. There is evidence in the evolution of 
complex molecular systems that statistical probability of combining 
with other atoms has always moved in the right direction. The 
Nobel Prize physicists Yang and Lee, along with Madame Wu at 
the Brookhaven National Laboratory, USA, have proved nearly a 
decade ago that radioactive cobalt has the ability to distinguish 
right from left and in emission of its electrons, appears capable of 
making a choice between the two directions.
Belgian Nobel Laureate, Ilya Prigogine, while applying the 
principles of physics to chemistry and progressing from the study 
of how molecules interact to why they do it, proved that in certain 
chemical reactions substances develop in complexity by interacting 
with their surroundings. At the animate level, this manifestation is 
illustrated at every step in Darwin's theory of evolution.
"Consciousness in the atomic, molecular and inanimate systems 
appears dormant/unmanifested to us" not because it is not there 
or its quality at these levels is any different, but because of the 
limitations of the constituent body and also our capacity to see it 
in that perspective in the given system.
"How could consciousness be working through any given body or 
system in relation to its environment? Possibly by resonance with 
the Infinite Consciousness and also with other constituent bodies/ 
systems at higher, lower or the same level of consciousness. Our 
noetic science will have to advance a little further to explain the 
details; but telepathic communication, pre-cognition, retro-cognition, 
clairvoyant perception, channeling etc. should not appear so strange 
for the human system in advanced stages of consciousness"
4. Neuroscience and consciousness
The neuroscientist's view of consciousness and brain is presented 
by Prof. P N Tandon, President of the National Brain Research 
Centre. To preserve continuity in this paper I would mention a 
few salient ideas.
For many centuries, the Western world believed that the mind is 
an immaterial substance which somehow acted upon the body
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and the brain and made people conscious. This view was 
reinforced by Rene Descartes who emphasized the duality of the 
mind and brain. However, things changed rapidly in the 20“' 
century. We are told that as early as 250 BC, Hippocrates said 
that the brain is a messenger to consciousness. He described the 
activities of the brain and proposed that all sensations, emotions 
and other mental functions arise from the brain.
After this, there was no special study till, in the 18th Century, 
Descartes localized consciousness to the pineal region. In the 
present century, vigorous work was initiated in the 
neurophysiology of consciousness with the discovery of the brain 
stem reticular system and its role in maintaining alertness in 
animals. In the humans, injury to the brainstem, induced 
unconsciousness. As neurosurgery advanced it became evident 
that removal of large areas of the cortex in human patients did 
not induce unconsciousness. Hence, Wilder Penfield (1975) of 
Montreal, after extensive studies conducted on human brains 
during surgery under local anaesthesia, proposed that the centre 
of consciousness is in the centrencephalon, in an area above the 
upper brain stem, where all the tracts converge and he called 
these areas the highest brain centres. "The integration within the 
central nervous system which makes consciousness possible did 
not take place in the cerebral cortex but below the cortex and 
above the midbrain in the centrencephalic structures".
It is strange that after decades of observations on the living human 
brain, Penfield reverted to a dual theory after his retirement. Sir 
John Eccles did the same. Perhaps, as one grows old one gives up 
science and takes to philosophy i.e. from neurology to neurosophy 
(Penfield 1975). "For my own part, after years of striving to 
explain the mind on the basis of brain-action alone, I have come to 
the conclusion that it is simpler (and far easier to be logical) if one 
adopts the hypothesis that our being does consist of two fimdamental 
elements. If that is true, it could still be true that energy required 
comes to the mind during waking hours through the highest 
brain-mechanism". (What does this mean?)
Young (1979), in Programs of the Brain, after asking, "Is the mind a 
single entity"? replies that the entity we refer to as the mind is 
perhaps that part of the brain's functional organization of which 
we are conscious and concludes that the whole system is controlled
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by one central reticular system and produces in each of us a 
single stream of consciousness.
Consciousness, as an entity: Is it localized to any part of the brain? 
It is apparent that the higher brain stem centres are essential for 
the maintenance of a conscious state. Proceeding to further 
stages like awareness and mentation, are these abilities localized 
in some areas of the brain or are they a total function o f all the 
neurons of the brain? As awareness, self-awareness and other 
mental faculties are seen more in humans with large frontal and 
temporal lobes, and are much less manifest in less developed 
brains, there is no doubt that the later additions to the brain form 
an important substratum for mental activities.
One also has to consider the view expressed by Sir Charles 
Symmonds, neurologist, London. "Consciousness is not an 
unvarying independent entity. Consciousness is a varying quantity, 
that is, we are from moment to moment differently conscious. We 
do not really suppose there is one fixed seat of consciousness."
Symmonds suggested that consciousness and mentation extend down 
to the lower forms of life as well. This was contrary to the views 
expressed by most of the neuroscientists of the day. As Christianity 
teaches that animals have no soul, many of these scientists 
confused soul with consciousness and denied consciousness to 
the lower forms of life! Symmonds also asked, how low in the 
evolutionary scale can we detect mentation, by observation of 
behaviour? He quoted an instance where ants were able to mine 
a tunnel under the rails, when they found that wagons crushed 
them while they crossed the top of the rails. Hence ants contain 
a prototype of the anatomical substrata of the mind. Lower 
animals manifest behaviour that shows that they have powers of 
reasoning.
Further progress took place by the study of electrical activity of 
the brain during sleeping, dreaming and wakefulness and it was 
found that a human can control his brain waves. Young (1979), in 
Programs o f the Brain: "People can learn to produce at will, bursts 
of the particular type of electrical activity known as alpha waves. 
These bvirsts can be made to be long or short, and so serve 
(within limits) as elements of the Morse code. The subject can thus 
send out messages from his brain without speaking."
312 B Ramamurthi
Apart from neurophysiologists, inathemnticinns got interested in the 
problem of consciousness.
Kurt Godel (of the 'Incompleteness Theorem'). "In the future it 
would be deemed a great oddity that 20th century scientists had 
discovered the elementary physical particles but had failed even 
to consider the possibility of elementary psychic factors". "There 
exists a world of concepts to which humans have access by 
intuition".
Roger Penrose suggests an important role for quantum mechanics 
in the determination of consciousness. "No deterministic rule-based 
system, like classical physics, computer science or neuroscience, 
can account for the mind's creative powers and ability to ascertain 
the truth". Roger Penrose takes consciousness to the micro levels. 
He suggests that consciousness and intelligence are not 
computable, and we have to apply the quantum theory to 
explain these entities. He feels that it is the indeterminate 
functioning of the dendrites and neural nodules that determine 
consciousness and also proposes that each one of these areas 
have their own consciousness.
The question posed by Damassio is interesting and challenging. 
The body and the brain are public, exposed, external objective 
entities. The mind is a private hidden subjective entity. "When 
and where then does the dependence of a first person mind on a third 
person body occur precisely?"
Neural Darwinism was suggested by Gerald M Edelman. "Our 
sense of awareness stems from a process called neural Darwinism, 
in which groups of neurons compete with one another to create 
an effective representation of the World." (Bright Air Brilliant 
Fire 1992). This was described by Crick et al as obscure jargon.
Toamassio Poggio of MIT thinks that mechanisms that bind 
together groups of firing neurons responding to various stimuli, 
combined with the brain's ability to change its circuitry frequently 
may form the basis of consciousness. The binding together of 
groups of neurons may be due to synchrony of firing or 
oscillations.
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Baars (1988) proposes that consciousness is the result of a global 
workspace in the brain that distributes information to the huge 
number of parallel unconscious processors that form the rest of 
the brain. He treats the brain as a large group of separable, very 
specialized systems that are unconscious much of the time that 
they operate. At least some of these processes can, one by one, 
become conscious, and the successive outputs of these processes 
constitute conscious experience.
Baars (1988) also cites evidence from biofeedback studies which 
show that a degree of voluntary control can be gained over virtually 
any neural event.
While vigorous efforts are being made to understand and study 
consciousness, there are skeptics.
"Conducting an investigation with the very instrument that is being 
investigated makes the definition and approach difficult" are the views 
of some philosophers.
"Neuroscience is still not complete and hence may not be able explain 
all mental phenomena". Further progress in neuroscience will 
make this easier. This view is held by the majority of people 
working on consciousness. It is difficult to see how to study 
consciousness in a way that would completely separate it from 
other mental phenomena with which it so frequently occurs.
There are others who feel that the human brain is not capable of 
understanding its own functioning of consciousness. Colin McGinn 
(Rutgers University) opines.’ Human brains have limitations. Just as 
rats and monkeys cannot even conceive of quantum mechanics, 
so we humans may be prohibited from understanding certain 
aspects of existence such as the relationship between mind and 
matter. Consciousness, in other words, will forever remain beyond 
human understanding.
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5. The Indian approach
Compared to the Western concepts of mind and consciousness, 
the Indian approach appeals more to reason and scientific analysis. 
While in the West, all mental functions are included under the
one word "mind" (which often included the soul), India has 
always looked at mentation as a many-layered entity.
The basic level is consciousness, known as pragna or chethana. 
On this base, the sensory and motor systems {the gnanendriyas 
and the karmendriyas) create the mind {manas, chittham), which 
responds to the impulses from the senses (iiidriyas). The response 
could be positive or negative, leading to attraction {raga) or 
repulsion {divesha). These build up emotions and create enjoyment 
(siikham) and distress [dukkham) and resulting in desire {kama), 
anger (kwdha), avarice (lobha) and hatred (dwesha). All these are 
still at the mind level (manas) and the whole system is included 
in the indriyas. "I am the mind among the indriyas" says Lord Krishna 
in the Bhagawat Geetha.
Above this mind or manas or chitta, operates intelligence (biiddhi) 
which is capable of discrimination and also capable of imposing 
its decisions on the mind. Above this level is the feeling of "F'ness 
or self-awareness [Ahamkara). This "F'ness leads to the feeling of 
possession, "mine" {mamatha) the sense of ownership of the whole 
body and of all the mental activities including all emotions.
It has been often stressed in Indian thought, that the senses, the 
mind, the intellect and "T'ness are all material and subject to 
growth and destruction. There was never any confusion with the 
soul or the athma which is immaterial and all pervasive and does 
not influence the material mind and body, except to act as a 
witness (saakshi).
It is a pity that for two centuries, the Europeans did not care to 
study the Indian concepts of the mind and the body, even though 
they were ruling us. If that had been done, Renes Descartes 
would not have created the dual mind-body problem nor would 
have made the now popularised statement, Cognito, ergo sum. 
(/ think: therefore I am.) He would have said "I am: therefore I think" 
and neuroscience or European philosophy perhaps would not 
have lost almost a century in their investigation of the mind.
The Indian concepts presented above closely fit in with our 
present knowledge of neuroanatomy or physiology. Consciousness 
{pragna or chethana) resides in the upper brainstem area called 
higher brain centre by Penfield (1975). Injury or disease of this
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area leads to disturbance of consciousness, leading to coma 
{achetham, moorcha).
The senses and the sensorimotor system and emotions all included 
in the word "nmnas'' reside in the limbic system and in the 
sensorimotor cortical and subcortical levels. These centres present 
in many lower species, gradually assume more complexity in the 
apes and finally in the humans.
Discrimination or buddhi is a later addition in evolution, as the 
frontal lobes enlarged and reached the maximum development in 
the humans. Discrimination, sense of right and wrong, moral and 
ethical values and conscience all constituted intellect known as 
buddhi, manisha, dhee, or imthi in India. The frontal lobes (intellect) 
are capable of influencing the lower levels of the nervous system,
i.e. the mind {chittha or nmnas), but are often unable to do so. In 
spite of their massive size, the frontal lobes are unable to control 
the powerful limbic system and the hypothalamus, and thus arise 
the problems facing the human race.
The sense of "F'ness and 'mine'ness is in the temporal lobes. 
Neurologists have often seen disturbance of the I and mine 
feeling in temporal lobe epilepsy. Temporal lobe dysfunction 
may also enlarge the sense of 'self-awareness' to make one feel 
differently towards one's surroundings -  a feeling of universal 
awareness for a few seconds (transcendence). All of us know 
and can easily experience that our 'self' can stand back and 
watch the constant roving of the 'mind' and for most of us, 
however much we may try, our mind or thoughts drag us along 
their own path.
When we observe two- or three-year old children, we see that, 
up to a certain age, they identify themselves with their name. 
They will say it is "Vivek's toy", "Vivek's mother", "Vivek is 
hurt" etc.
Only at about the age of 3 or more, when the temporal lobe 
develops, they talk about "my toy", "my mother" or "I'am hurt". 
It is clear now that the Indian (Hindu) concept of consciousness 
and mentation was appropriate and realistic and today's 
physiology confirms these levels.
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5.1 The four states o f consciousness
Another important aspect of the Indian view of consciousness 
has to be considered. Our rishis, after keen observation and 
study, have suggested that consciousness is a varying entity at 
different times and in different individuals and beings. They 
have classified consciousness into four states.
Awake state (jagratha)
Dream state (siuapna)
Deep sleep state {sushwpti) and
Fourth state {thuriya avastha) (discussed in the next 
section).
Many philosophical and metaphysical comments and observations 
have been raised and answered in India from ancient times 
while discussing the relationship of the individual with the first 
three states (wakefulness, dreaming and deep sleep) of 
consciousness. Chethana, chittham , biiddhi and ahankara 
(consciousness, mind, intellect and "I"ness); where are these 
faculties during sleeping and dreaming? Where is the I feeling or 
the doer {karlha) feeling during these states? What provides the 
continuity when you wake up after a dream or sleep? The great 
philosophers of India have based their arguments on the 
relationship of the states of consciousness to the individual to 
prove the existence of the athma or the soul. But, this will take us 
into deep waters and we should leave it to the wisdom of the 
philosophers. According to Indian thought, a continuous thread 
of consciousness exists through all the three states.
5.2 Importance o f sleep research^
In a study of consciousness, sleep research should be included to 
verify ideas expressed in Indian philosophy about sleep. How 
do, "awake-consciousness" and "asleep-consciousness", vary 
physiologically, biochemically and electrographically? Sleep and 
dreams are facets of consciousness and their study can reveal 
clues.
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6. Superconsciousness or the fourth State:
(The Thuriya avastha)
6.1 Introduction: some western views
Quoting Gordon R Taylor (1979), the Zen Buddhist teacher 
Suzuki describes "the void experience". "All things have the 
character of emptiness. They have no beginning, no end, they are 
faultless and not faultless, not perfect and not imperfect. Therefore,
O Sanputra, here in this emptiness there is no form, no perception, 
no name, no concepts, no knowledge. No eye, no ear, no nose, no 
tongue, no body, no mind. No form, no sound, no smell, no taste, 
no touch, no objects.... There is no knowledge, no ignorance, no 
destruction of ignorance... There is no decay nor death" And he 
concludes with an unambiguous statement: "When the 
impediments of consciousness are annihilated, then he becomes 
free of all fear, is beyond the reach of change, enjoying final 
Nirvana. After describing all this, Taylor concludes; "He is, in 
short, a vevetnbld". What an unfortunate conchision without realising 
the supreme powers of the mind and brain at this state of Yoga.
Taylor in his book also mentions the experience of the great 
psychologist William James, who after taking nitrous oxide and 
having a luminous experience, wrote: "One conclusion was forced 
upon my mind at that time, and my impression of its truth has 
ever since remained unshaken. It is that our normal waking 
consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of 
screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. 
We may go through life without suspecting their existence; but 
apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all 
their completeness, definite types of mentality which probably 
somewhere have their field of application and adaptation. No 
account o f the Universe in its totality can be final which leaves these 
other forms o f consciousness quite disregarded".
Does the mind have undiscovered powers? Taylor asks, "Has the 
mind powers not recognized by ortiiodox science such as the 
powers of telepathy or of foreseeing the future?". If it does, it 
becomes definite that science needs some new postulates.
Our seers have written, taught and shown that apart from the 
three levels of consciousness (awake, dreaming and asleep).
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there is another level of consciousness which transcends the state 
of self-awareness leading to universal awareness.
Self-awareness present in all of us limits our awareness and 
interests to our mind, body and the sense experience of everyday 
life. According to our rishis, self-awareness and thought processes 
are neither the finality of mental power nor of human 
development. Self-awareness should widen into universal 
awareness and this is possible for every one by practice. This is not 
magic or mumbo jumbo as mistaken by the West, but something 
that can be experienced by everyone.
6.2 What is this state?
In this state, thoughts cease to exist and later mind (manas) in the 
Indian sense stops functioning. At this stage, there is a feeling of 
"just being" {sath), all pervading "knowledge" (chith) and great 
happiness or bliss (ananda) . They tell us that it is the final goal 
and final duty of every human being to realize and experience 
this state, for his own good and the good of all beings {sarva 
bhootha hithey rathaha).
Having said this, our rishis have also indicated many paths that 
one may take to achieve the thought-free state (Pathanjali) the 
most important being that of yoga.
The definition of yoga begins thus: Yogaha chitha vritthi nirodhaha: 
"Yoga is the control of mind waves". This definition is followed 
by two pithy statements.
1. In this stage of control, the individual resides in his own 
self,
2. Thndha dhristuhu swaroopey avasthanani
3. In other states, the individual identifies himself with his 
mind waves. Vrithi saroopyam itharathra.
In other words, the mind is not you: Your true self will be 
experienced when you control the mind by yoga.
Then Pathanjali teaches us the various steps that will lead to the 
thought free state; beginning with self control (yama and niyama), 
postures (asanas), breath control (pranayama) and futher stages of
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meditation, withdrawal from sense objects (pralhyahara), 
concentration {dhaarana) and finally deep meditation (samnadhi).
This sounds fine, but this is an individual's inner experience, and what 
can lue scientists do who have to observe, measure and compare?
The answer is that apart from the inner bliss experienced by the 
yogi, there are bodily changes that can be measured, lowering of 
blood pressure, pulse rate, respiration, body temperature, 
metabolism, changes in biogenic amines in the urine, electrical 
and magnetic changes in the brain or other new observable 
parameters. (Such investigations have been done already by 




Pathanjali also asserts that when a person reaches the thought- 
free or superconscious state, he develops certain extraordinary 
powers (siddhis). He can transcend time and space, can make 
himself very heavy or very light etc. Is this possible and if so 
how are we to investigate and prove these assertions?
It is our prime duty, as Indians, the proud inheritors of such a 
tradition and knowledge, to find out by all possible means 
whether these are all true. While we cannot measure inner 
experience, luckily neuroscience and other sciences have advanced 
so much that we can record changes occurring in the body and 
the brain in the yogic states.
What are the systems involved? What are the energies involved? 
As drugs also can cause a feeling of bliss, is the whole process a 
voluntarily controlled modulation of neurochemical processes in 
the nervous system? We can also seek to find out if the human 
brain is capable of producing distant effects (telepathy, 
telecommunication, clairvoyance etc). If so, on what basis? 
Physical or physiological? As Penrose has suggested, if it is all 
quantum mechanics in the axonal or dendritic junctions then we 
have to seek the help o f Indian mathematicians.
Present day neurophysiology stops after describing thinking 
processes as the highest level of the functions of the brain. The
complicated structure o f the brain, the extravagant abundance of neural 
and glial elements in the brain, the infinite possibilities of synaptic 
junctions and synaptic transmission -  all these point to the definite 
possibility o f a much greater level o f performance and achievement for 
the human brain than has been apparent so far.
In recent decades, n^any frontiers are being crossed in the field of 
science. A similar breakthrough is essential in neurosciences to 
discover the untapped energy of the brain. Nezu paradigms are needed.
6.4 Beyond logic and reason
Our study and research must go beyond the boundaries fixed by 
our preconception that thought is the ultimate of brain function 
and it has no further capability. This concept has been ingrained 
in us by our scientific upbringing based on theories of logic and 
reason and limited by Cartesian-Newtonian models of ourselves, 
our earth and the universe.
In recent years our colleagues, the physicists, faced with the 
problem of trying to understand the nature and movement of 
subatomic particles found that logic and reason on which classical 
physics was based did not take them forward and different 
models and concepts had to be adopted to explain these 
phenomena. Thus started the concepts of "uncertainty principle", 
"illogical computing" etc. Many of you know that the great 
teachers of Zen Buddhism make every effort to break down the 
bondage of logic and reason from the mind of the aspirant, by giving 
them "koans" to meditate upon. Koans are impossible 
conundrums and powers of the brain beyond reason or intellect 
are needed to solve them. As these teachers are able to transcend 
intellect and reason, it is obvious that the human brain has 
powers greater than we credit it with.
6.5 Search beyond classical boundaries
As neurophysiologists interested in consciousness it will be a 
pity if we stay with classical physics and impose a boundary on 
the powers of the brain, which according to Eastern seers are far 
beyond what we imagine. It may be stressed here that this is not 
mere speculation but a real experience -  a state experienced by many 
rishis in India, China and Japan, the whole of the Orient.
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6.6 Possible neurophysiology
In the yogic state, the aspirant attempts to keep out all sensory 
impulses entering his consciousness including the internal 
sensations from the body.
An organism is protected from the continuous onslaught of 
sensory impulses, through numerous inhibitory mechanisms 
present at all levels throughout the sensory system. These 
mechanisms often operate unconsciously. This inhibition can also 
be selective as in a mother sleeping in a busy railway station 
responding only to her infant's crying. Cannot these inhibitory 
mechanisms be activated whenever we want, i.e. "at will"? This 
is what the yogi does. Neural inhibition is the basis of the science of 
Yoga and the yogi must be achieving it by using a central 
inhibitory mechanism. Or does the inhibition occurs globally 
throughout the brain and the nervous system?
6.7 Inhibit and Ignore
Can we train our will to ignore these stimuli when the stimulus 
is strong (even painful) or when the stimulus is of a pleasurable 
nature? "Yes, we can; by practice" says the science of Yoga. With 
practice, even nociceptive stimuli can be prevented not only from 
reaching consciousness, but also from causing limbic or autonomic 
responses, usual concomitants of painful stimuli.
It is clear that higher cortical areas can exert control over incomiiig 
impulses. This control occurs at many inhibitory levels and not only 
in the reticular system. If there is too much suppression of rehcular 
mechanisms, sleep may be induced. The reticular system has to be 
involved in a major way in deep meditation for such intense 
inhibitory control of impulses to be possible without causing sleep.
6.8 Thuriya is not a sleep state
In the yogic state of deep meditation, therefore, there is a complete 
inhibition of the entry of sensory impulses into the brain. During 
this practice, as less and less sensory impulses reach the brain, 
sleep often supervenes automatically for a few minutes, but the 
yogi has to get over this tendency gradually; deep meditation is 
not a "sleep state".
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As the meditator is gradually controlling his thoughts he may 
adopt either of two techniques. One is to suppress actively the 
thoughts that arise and concentrate only on one thought. The 
other technique is to allow whatever thoughts arise to flow 
through the mind, without in anyway controlling them. "To 
stand back and observe". In course of time, the extraneous 
thoughts die down and only one thought is left. After some more 
practice, even this one thought dies down and the yogi reaches 
the thoughtless state. “Standing back" is the essence o f Buddhist 
Vipassana meditation.
This is also mentioned in the Bhagavad Geetha, "Gunah Guneshu 
Varthanthey Iti Mathva Na Sajjathe". Realising that natural elements 
like mental waves and disturbances reside in the nature of our 
body, the wise man does not get attached (he stands back).
V\lhere do thoughts arise? Some conjecture is permissible here. It is 
possible that de novo thoughts, conceptual thoughts, and thoughts 
that arise without sensory stimulation occur through mechanisms 
in the frontal lobes and the associated cortex. Conceptual nonverbal 
thoughts may arise from the athalamic areas of the cortex.
As mentioned earlier, the feeling of "I" and "mine" possibly 
reside in the temporal lobe as deduced from a study of patients 
with temporal lobe epilepsy.
While thoughts are events that take place in the frontal and 
associated cortex, the ability to stand back and observe these 
events probably resides in the temporal lobes which are well 
developed in humans. Thus we are able to be observers or 
"Sakshi" to our mind's activities.
I have talked only of anatomical sites. Surely there would be the 
involvement of as yet undetected neiiromessenger systems involved 
in the process.
What happens in the "thought-free state"? Obviously brain activity 
does not stop. In the "thought-free state", we are told that the 
brain stops bothering with ordinary things and becomes engrossed 
in consciousness. "The brain silent and motionless trafficks with 
the imponderable" as Sir Geoffry Jefferson, the great British 
Neurosurgeon put it so aptly some years ago.
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The brain isolates itself from "unnecessary" activities, and 
develops its power to comprehend "consciousness" and tries to 
go beyond time and space and beyond the boundaries of logic 
and reason and this is the Thuriya or the Fourth State.
6.9 Suggestions for research
Our research into consciousness has perforce to be many-sided and 
scientists other than biologists have also to be involved vigorously. 
Some suggestions are given here from the neurobiology angle.
6.10 Temporal lobe studies
Penfield called the temporal lobe cortex the interpretative cortex 
and assigned functions, viz. to interpret the relationship of the 
individual to his immediate environment and to bring back 
strips of past experience. Except for the areas concerned with 
speech and hearing, the anterior (front) portion of the temporal 
lobe appears to have no function. The first 5 cm of the front of 
either lobe can be excised without causing any obvious disability 
to the person. Then what is its function?
Bilateral temporal lobe removal, if it involves the medial structures 
like the sulcus or the hippocampus leads to loss of ability to store 
memories. Bilateral anterior temporal lobe removal leaving the 
medial structures on one side has been done in epileptic patients. 
Did these people lose their sense of self-awareness? Then where 
does self-awareness arise? The temporal lobes are not 'centres' 
but must be an integrating field where impulses from the frontal 
or other lobes as well the midline brain structures are modified 
and integrated to create self-awareness.
The one-and-a-half to two-year-old child is not self-aware, but, 
within a year, self-awareness sets in. What are the circuits that 
are completed, or that mature during this period in the temporal 
lobe that create self-awareness?
6.11 The study can be many-fold
1. Clinical, psychological and other studies of patients with 
temporal lobe epilepsy in whom self-awareness is 
disturbed.
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2. Electrographic and other studies during surgery on such 
patients and a study of the pathological specimens 
removed if any.
3. Study of head injured patients with unilateral and 
bilateral temporal lobe contusions. Does any interference 
with self-awareness occur in any of these patients? If 
there is, the clinical findings can be correlated with the 
CT, MRI and EEG findings.
4. Study of the neural circuits with cytoarchitectonics in 
temporal lobes of children up to the age of 4 in autopsy 
specimens.
5. Study of specially the temporal lobe activity in persons 
who are meditating.
6. And other ideas. (Let us sit down and think).
These will require a midticentric study spread over a few years, 
done under rigorous scientific scrutiny.
6.12 Study o f neurochemistry
The key role played by neurochemicals and neuromessengers in 
brain function is becoming clear. Hence, while studying the 
effects of meditahon, neurochemical changes have to be taken 
into consideration. When synaptic inhibition occurs at all levels, 
what happens to the various neuropeptides? Is their production 
reduced and stopped or do they accumulate in large quantities 
and cause so far unthought of changes in brain chemistry, leading 
to the brain acquiring extra ordinary powers? Do these chemical 
changes get reflected as energy changes that may explain the 
powers exhibited by the yogins. What is this energy, something 
that we know about already or something that will have to be 
discovered?
It is strange that neuropeptides present in the brain and the 
nervous system are also seen in organs like lungs, the intestines, 
the liver and the pancreas. This would imply a global chemical 
control system of the whole body by the brain, apart from its 
instantaneous neural and longtime endocrine control. (Here we 
are approaching the Ayurvedic concept of global control.) During the 
yogic state, it is quite possible that the yogi modifies the chemicals 
not only in the brain but also throughout the body.
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It should be possible to find out or infer these chemical changes 
by examining the urine, saliva, sweat and skin reactions, and 
using other noninvasive techniques available in the present day.
6.13 Right and left brain
The different fimctions and capacities of the two halves of the brain 
have been studied and there can be left or right brain dominance in 
men and women. It is also possible that the dominance varies in the 
same person at different times. (Chandrasekar doing mathematics 
and his listening to and playing music.) Such left and right half 
changes need to be studied in the yogic state.
Logic and reason which ordinarily limit human brain function by 
the dominant left hemisphere have to be overcome to reach the 
thought free state (Zen teachers have been practicing this). In 
India, illogical processes, beyond reason have been mentioned in 
the Tharka Sasthras . This is not a recent western discovery. If 
logic and reason reside in the left hemisphere, is it easier for 
people with right brain dominance, to practise yoga?
6.14 Women and yoga
Practising higher yogic states has not been encouraged in women 
by our ancient rishis, though great yoginis are mentioned in the 
literature. One reason given was the burden of menstruation and 
child-bearing borne by women, which may make higher yogic 
states harmful to them during their reproductive age. Many 
women have right brain dominance and go beyond reason and 
logic in reaching conclusions, often by intuition. Would yoga be 
easier for them provided we eliminate any possible harm that 
may come from marked endocrine fluctuations?
6.15 Mental disorders
The study of schizophrenia by modern techniques may lead to 
some answer to the problem of consciousness. In these patients, 
there are divided personalities, each one self-aware and aware of 
■ the other personality. Where do these two units of self-awareness 
exist and how do they reach each other? A study may give some 
clue to understanding consciousness.
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In obsessive compulsive neuroses, thought processes endlessly go 
round and round the patient's mind and make life miserable. In 
such cases, in the sixties and seventies, we performed bilateral 
anterior cingulumotomy with good benefit. In some cases, we 
had to combine it with a basofrontal tractotomy. These operations 
are performed nowadays in selected centres. These results may 
imply that one of the tracts involved in transmission of thought 
is the anterior cingulum. We also know that in frontal tumours, if 
the cingulum is involved, thought processes go awry. Hence, a 
study of the cingulum bundle may help. But how do we study 
this in a yogi?
6.16 Glial cells
Nature has provided a very large number of glial cells, almost 
equal in number to the neurons. For performing only a "glue 
function", is such abundance necessary? Recently we have come 
to know glial cells have a reciprocal metabolic relationship with 
neuronal cells. But the question is: Do they provide a type of 
energy or a communication system different from that of the 
neurons, i.e. apart from the electrochemical system? Does this 
system, dormant in the normal human being get activated by 
higher yogic practice to produce what we now call extraordinary 
or supernatural powers? These are some indications for future 
research.
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7. The training of “Yogonauts”
It is important that we decide on the future priorities for research 
in consciousness. Indian scientists may pursue the same path 
followed by the West and try to localise various functions of 
consciousness in the networks of the brain (refer earlier). This 
would be useful and also keep our young researchers in the 
forefront of such research. However the more important direction is 
for India to concentrate research into meditation and the thought-free 
state, or superconsiousness or the Thuriya state. Our country is 
particulary suited for such research because of our background 
of knowledge of yoga and tantric sciences for over two thousand 
years. Only a few scientists outside India are really interested in 
this phenomenon of the thought-free state. In fact, some of them 
have dismissed the thought-free state as a vegetable state, without
realising the great potentialities of the yogic state for the future of 
mankind. Hence research into Yoga and meditation and the 
thought-free state must be given top priority. Yeoman work was 
done in this field by scientists at the All India Institute of Medical 
Sciences, like Dr. B K Anand and Dr. Chinnha and others and by 
Dr. Desiraju at NIMHANS. Dr. Karan Singh, when he was the 
Health Minister, took a keen interest in the subject and encouraged 
research. The problem facing Indian scientists at this moment is 
the lack o f the appropriate latest sophisticated equipment like 
magnetoencephalogram. EEG though useful is too crude a tool for 
research in yoga. We need to measure the various energy changes 
in the brain by other possible means. The most difficult part of this 
research is to get subjects who practise yoga. They are few and often 
do not come forward to submit themselves to study. Others do 
come but often prove to be fakes. There is only one way of 
approaching this problem. Just like astronauts were trained for space 
flight, the NBRC and the Ministry of Education must have a scheme of 
selecting about 50 interested young men to practise yoga from their 
early teens. The selection must be made carefully, bearing in mind 
the background of the individual, his intellectual level, his health 
and his determination to pursue the yoga course. They must 
observe the rules of training {Yama and Niyama), prescribed for 
yoga students in India from time immemorial. This will not be 
difficult, as even today a majority of Indians follow these rules of 
restraint. Selected young men must be offered a substantial 
monthly scholarship and placed under good yoga teachers. They 
will continue their normal education simultaneously. All the 
parameters of mental and physical health and yogic achievements 
can be measured every 3 months and the changes noted, as they 
continue to mature in yogic practices. Many of them may fail to 
fulfill the goal, but at least about 10 may be available in the end 
for study. With more finance, more people can be chosen. One 
could have a pilot programme and depending on its success, the 
scheme can be enlarged.
We cannot excel in physical prowess (see our Olympics results) 
but we certainly can win the intellectual race (witness the Indian 
Brain Power all over the world). The one area in which India can 
really contribute to the world's knowledge and happiness, is in 
the research into yoga and the understanding of the various 
energies released in the thought-free state (Pathanjali Yoga Suthra). 
This will also be in tune with the progress in other fields in other
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countries. No doubt, new energy forms will be discovered in the 
new millennium and we should not miss the one area in which 
we can excel. We cannot allow the West once again to steal our 
glory.
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Abstract
Descent via modification is the hallmark o f evolutionary change. It is 
believed to come about by means o f natural selection, a theory first put 
forward by Darwin and 'Wallace. Taken together with the modern 
picture o f genes and heredity, this would seem to imply that to the 
extent that the properties o f plants and animals are moulded by natural 
selection, to that extent they must be based on heritable properties, in 
other ivords, on their genetic makeup. Thus, assuming that our behaviour 
is a product o f natural selection, there would be a genetic basis for 
behaviour (the term taken to include social behaviour). To what extent 
is the supposed genetic basis merely a necessary pre-requisite for the 
appearance of behaviour and to what extent is it, in explanatory terms, 
both necessary and sufficient? In the latter situation one might speak of 
genes for' behaviour. This essay considers whether it is justified to 
speak of genes determining behavioural traits or social behaviour. That 
genetic influences on social behaviour exist is a fact. The degree to 
ivhich genetic inputs have been selected for as mediators o f social
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behaviour, as opposed to being merehj facilitntors (that were selected for 
other reasons), remains iinknoum. But the influences of genes and 
environment on the phenotype in general, not just on behaviour, are 
complex and interacting. This makes it difficult to thitjk of a purely 
genetic component to social behaviour.
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Introduction
If one were to list the basic principles that underlie all of biology, 
they would be three in number: (a) Evolution by natural selection 
(Darwin and Wallace), (b) Mendelian Genetics (Mendel; 
rediscovered by de Vries, Correns and Tscherniak) and (c) the 
structure of DNA, the genetic code and ongoing advances in our 
understanding of the regulation of gene expression (Watson and 
Crick, Brenner, Nirenberg, Khorana, Jacob, Monod and a host of 
others). These three principles are integrated as follows. DNA, 
which is a gigantic molecule consisting of a pair of chemical 
strings, is the carrier of hereditary information. The information 
is in the form of a code; three successive bases or Tetters' of the 
DNA molecule stand for a particular amino acid 'message' (or 
convey the information that a contiguous string of messages is 
beginning or ending). Other DNA sequences bind proteins, or 
take up specific three-dimensional shapes, and thereby increase 
or decrease the probability that a particular stretch of encoded 
information gets decoded. The information contained in DNA is 
passed down from parents to offspring through a sequence of 
events that can be described mathematically by Mendel's laws. 
Finally, natural selection decides which sequences of DNA, or 
which genes, spread through a population and which are weeded 
out. To understand this all-important final step, one needs to 
know a bit more about what constitutes a living organism.
A short description of a plant or animal would be to say that it 
consists of a set of traits: a certain form, a certain size, a certain 
colour, a certain set of specialised hssues, a certain mode of 
development, a particular means of reproduction, and so on. 
Taken together, the traits are said to constitute a phenotype. 
Strikingly, a very large fraction of the phenotype -  indeed, almost 
every aspect of the phenotype - can be correlated, at least in part, 
to the presence or absence of a particular protein or set of proteins.
For example, consider ovalbumin (egg-white), haemoglobin (the 
oxygen transporter in blood), myosin (responsible for muscle 
contraction and therefore also movement in general), antibody 
molecules (the body's defenses against foreign proteins and 
infections in general), collagen (the building block of tendons, 
bones and cartilage) and growth hormone (the regulator of bone 
growth). Each of these embodies an identifiable trait; all are 
proteins. Every protein can be defined by a sequence of amino 
acids, which in turn is specified by a sequence of 3-letter messages 
or 'codons' in the DNA. The traits that characterize an organism 
are intimately bound up with the proteins that make up that 
organism. It follows that the ability of an animal to survive and 
to reproduce successfully must also depend on the proteins that 
it is made of. The concept of fitness is central to the Darwinian 
picture of evolution. Fitness, also known as reproductive fitness, 
is the universal currency in which evoluhonary transactions take 
place. The fitness of an individual is roughly equal to the number 
of offspring that it has, relative to the number of offspring born 
to the average member of its own species. What we have said so 
far shows that fitness must be correlated with the spectrum of 
proteins possessed by an individual. But the spectrum of proteins 
depends on the DNA sequences, or genes, in that individual. 
This is why the end result of natural selection ('survival of the 
fittest') is that some genes spread through a population whereas 
others are weeded out.
Natural selection acts on the phenotype and so on the spectrum 
of proteins in an individual. Genes that spread encode proteins 
that are better than average at doing their job; genes that are 
weeded out encode proteins that are worse than average. It is 
worth noting that in this formulation one speaks of genes and 
not individuals. This might appear strange. After all, it is the 
individual that reproduces. However, the process of sexual 
reproduction brings together and shuffles genes quite efficiently. 
Because of this, it is just as meaningful to speak of genes as the 
'real' players in the evolutionary process, as the entities that 
'actually' evolve, as it is to think about evolution in terms of 
plants and animals. The two views are equivalent. If one adopts 
this new and somewhat unusual point of view - that of thinking 
of evolution in terms of genes rather than in terms of plants or 
animals -, one can think of individual organisms as the vehicles
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(in Dawkins's phrase) used by genes to n\ove from one generation 
to another. The visible manifestation of natural selection is that 
living creatures appear to be products of exquisite design: the 
traits that they possess are said to be adapted to the particular 
environments that they live in and to the life-styles that they 
display (the traits themselves are referred to as adaptations). This 
outcome is a consequence of two processes. One, there is a 
tendency on the part of 'good' genes to spread; and two, 'bad' 
genes tend to be weeded out. As used here, 'good' and 'bad' are 
relative terms. They refer to the relative number of copies of a 
particular gene in a population, meaning relative to the total 
number of copies of itself plus all other exiting alternatives to 
itself. Alternatively, one can think of 'good' or 'bad' as being 
reflected in the reproductive fitness of one individual relative to 
another. Because fitness is a relative concept, any trait which 
increases the fitness of an individual, or of a gene, automatically 
decreases the fitness of all others that lack that particular trait. 
There is one aspect of the phenotype that we have ignored in this 
discussion, namely behaviour. Suckling in an infant, exploring 
the environment, communicating with others, foraging for food, 
defending oneself against a predator, searching for a mate, 
reproducing and taking care of the young, are all examples of 
different kinds of behaviour. Each of them serves as an example 
of a trait exhibited to different extents, or in different ways, by 
the members of a species. Do these differences have anything to 
do with proteins? In a trivial sense, they obviously do. Anything 
which involves movement must depend (as far as we know) on 
the action of contractile proteins such as actin and myosin. 
Anything which involves sensing must be mediated by the action 
of sensory proteins such as the receptors for vision in the eye, for 
touch in the skin or for taste on the tongue. Anything which 
involves sensation and feelings must be the result of electrical 
activity in the nervous system, which depends on the properties 
of special proteins that enable nerve cells to transmit electrical 
impulses in an all-or-none fashion. In short, proteins are required 
for behaviour as much as they are required for form, shape, size 
and colour. Therefore, it would seem quite reasonable to speak of 
behaviour having a genetic basis and, by extension, of behaviour 
evolving by natural selection. Indeed, there are sound 
experimental grounds for believing that many aspects of 
behaviour are adaptive. Having come this far, one might think of 
carrying on with this way of thinking to include social behaviour
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as well. A trivial extension might be all that is needed in order to 
speak of genes for social behaviour and of the evolution of social 
behaviour. But, as we shall see, there is a problem in trying to 
think about the evolution of social behaviour via natural selection.
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Social behaviour: The problem of altruism
E O Wilson has described a society as "A group of individuals 
belonging to the same species ancl organized in a co-operative 
manner". He goes on to add that "the bond of the society is 
simply and solely communication". In turn, communication is 
defined as "Action on the part of one organism (or cell) that 
alters the ... pattern of behaviour in another organism (or cell) in 
an adaptive fashion". In short, A and B are said to members of a 
society if they belong to the same species and co-operate with 
each other by making use of signals to communicate with one 
another. A signals to B in order to convey some information. 
Upon receiving the information, B responds in a manner that is 
typical (even if only in a probabilistic sense) for the signal and 
for the context within which it was communicated. Here 'context' 
encompasses the phenotypes of the sender and receiver and their 
social, biological and physical environments. The behavioural 
response of B to A's signal is adaptive, implying that whatever B 
does is, in an evolutionary sense, beneficial. But, in the first 
instance, the benefit is to A. Here is the crux of the problem. Why 
should B do something which, in a marmer of speaking, helps A? 
Even worse, why should B do something that guarantees, as it 
does ipso facto, a lowering of its own reproductive fitness relative 
to that of A? And most importantly, assuming that B's behaviour 
had a genetic basis, how could the associated genes spread 
through the population - given that they were harming their own 
interests, so to speak?
The puzzle sketched above is the apparent paradox of altruism, 
posed in an extremely truncated form. There are well-documented 
cases in which the paradox seems to apply. Instances of social 
behaviour in which an individual appears to behave altruistically 
towards another, meaning that it seems to forsake its own genetic 
fitness in order to ensure the genetic fitness of another individual, 
are legion. The classic case is a whole range of traits exhibited by 
individuals belonging to the worker castes in the social insects.
For example, honeybee workers are sterile individuals, neuters. 
They spend their lives taking care of the nest, gathering food, 
fighting off predators and tending to the queen, all the while 
abstaining from reproduction. Their behaviour appears to be 
innate, as opposed to being learnt: nests founded by single 
queens, with the workers having no opportunity of learning 
from other workers, testify to this. Therefore, the behaviour is 
inherited and quite plausibly gene-based. But in that case, given 
that the workers have no offspring to pass on the behaviour to, 
how could it have evolved? (There is little doubt that the altruistic 
behaviour displayed by social insects is a product of evolution; 
the ancestors of these insects led solitary lives, with altruism not 
being called for.) The paradox of altruism is exhibited in an 
enormous range of organisms from amoebae to vertebrates. In 
the cellular slime mould Dictyostelium, single, free-living, 
amoebae graze a patch of soil that contains bacteria, their normal 
food. When all the bacteria in a given area are used up, the 
amoebae signal to each other by means of a chemical attractant 
that makes them aggregate. Having done so, the amoebae within 
an aggregate, which were until then more or less identical in 
form and behaviour, start exhibiting a division of labour; they 
proceed to differentiate. A minority die and pile up, one above 
the other, to form a rigid support and the rest turn into spores. 
The spore mass, which is capable of surviving long periods of 
starvation, forms a ball that rests on top of the stalk-like rigid 
support. It appears that the sole purpose of the amoebae that go 
into forming the stalk is to see that the spores are positioned at a 
height - a location that aids in their dispersal, with luck to some 
place where food might be available. At an other extreme, 
Thomson's or Grant's gazelles that sight a predator (say a pack of 
wild dogs) start to run in a conspicuous, stiff-legged, jumping 
gait with raised tails. This form of locomotion is known as 
stotting, Stotting is an example of an alarm signal. In a typical 
alarm signal, the signaller gives the impression of putting himself 
or herself at risk while at the same time trying to ensure the 
escape of others by warning them. As in the case of the 
Dictyostelid amoebae, one sees here a form of social behaviour 
that appears to be altruistic and, in an evolutionary sense, self­
destructive. Wliat might explain the origin of altruistic behaviour?
Before considering the alternatives that have been put forward, 
we need to get a seemingly facile explanation out of the way. The
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explanation is that what is being recognised as an altruistic act is 
indeed so, but is it for the 'good of the group' or the 'good of the 
species' that the act is being performed. 'Good of the species' 
arguments are superfically attractive. But they flounder on a 
very serious objection. The objection is that it is individuals that 
are born, reproduce and die, and moreover do so at rates that far 
exceed those of groups. Therefore, if something that is 
advantageous to the group is disadvantageous to the individual, 
it is most unlikely that it will spread. The reason for saying so is 
that the harm caused to the individual will weed it out more 
rapidly than the good caused to the group will enable it to 
spread. To put the argument the other way round, traits that 
benefit groups but extract a cost from individuals will always be 
counteracted - successfully counteracted - by traits that benefit 
the individual even if they disfavour the group. In the case of the 
slime mould amoebae, a variant amoeba that decides never to 
form part of the stalk, but invariably to form a spore, is guaranteed 
to improve its chances of passing down genes to the next 
generation. This holds true even though the resulting shorter 
stalk may mean a lowered probability of successful dispersal and 
so a smaller chance of reproduction for all spores. In the case of 
the honey bee workers, a genetically variant worker that managed 
to prevent its ovaries from degenerating and so kept alive its 
chances of reproduction (assuming she could get away with it) 
would be counted a success relative to the other workers. Again, 
this would be true even if she lowered the overall productivity of 
the hive by acting in this fashion. In the gazelles, presumably a 
confirmed non-stotter would never draw the attention of a 
predator to itself and so would improve its own chances of 
survival. In contrast to 'altruistic' behaviour, behaviour of this 
sort is referred to as 'selfish'. When exhibited by a selfish 
individual who is the lone deviant in a group of altruists, it is 
also referred to as 'cheating'.
Before proceeding further, let us summarise the argument so far. 
In principle, social behaviour can have a genetic basis. But social 
behaviour often implies cooperation, at times leading to altruism. 
And between two genes whose possession leads to different 
degrees of altruism, the one that is correlated with the greater 
degree of altruism must always suffer relative to the other. 
Logically, the situation should regress to one of maximum 
individual selfishness and zero altruism. Given that instances of
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apparently altruistic behaviour abound, one is left with two 
choices. Either there is an entirely different (non-genetic, or only 
partly genetic) explanation possible for altruistic social behaviour, 
or there is some way that social systems can guard against 
cheaters and so foster altruism.
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Inclusive fitness
In a pair of seminal papers published in 1964, W D Hamilton 
indicated a possible route out of the paradox of altruism. The 
solution that he proposed had been anticipated by both R A Fisher 
and J B S Haldane, two of the founders of mathematical 
evolutionary theory. Neither of them developed the idea as fully 
as Hamilton did. Haldane's formulation has a well-known 
anecdotal version. The story goes that while walking along the 
bank of a canal with a friend, Haldane said that he would be 
willing to dive into the canal, and in the process risk certain death, 
if by doing so he could guarantee the survival of more than two of 
his brothers, or more than eight of his first cousins, and so on. As 
explained in a more sophisticated formulation by Hamilton, the 
reasoning goes as follows. Assume that the performance of an 
altruistic act confers a benefit b  on the receiver while extracting a 
cost c  from the performer. As always in evolution, costs and 
benefits are measured in units of reproductive fitness. Suppose the 
performer and the recipient are related by a factor r  (roughly 
speaking, r  is the fraction of their genes that they share because 
they can trace a part of their descent from the same set of common 
ancestors). It is easy to see that the altruistic act is at the same time 
advantageous - to the recipient - and detrimental - to the doer. If 
one looks at the genes in the performer, their reproductive success 
is harmed by the performance of the altruistic act; this is by the 
very definition of 'altruism'. Now, assume that the performance of 
an altruistic act is correlated with the presence of a particular gene
-  in other words, assume that there is a genetic basis for altruism. 
Then, if ris not zero, there is a finite probability that the very same 
gene or set of genes is also present in the recipient But, again by 
definition, the reproductive prospects of these genes have improved 
when looked at from the viewpoint of the recipient of the altruistic 
act. What might be the net consequence of the simultaneous 
advantage and disadvantage?
Hamilton pointed out that under certain circumstances there could 
be a net advantage to the genes that were correlated with the 
performance of the trait. Such would be the case whenever the 
benefit to the recepient, b, was greater than the cost to the 
performer, c, after devaluing the benefit by an appropriate factor to 
take into account the fact that the recipient is not genetically 
identical to the donor. In fact the factor of devaluation is just the 
co-efficient of relatedness, r. The mathematical requirement for an 
altruistic trait to spread can be expressed very simply in the form
b. r >  c  or b >  d r
(> stands for 'greater than'). Siblings share half of their genes on 
average and first cousins share one-eighth of their genes
on average (r = 1/8), which explains how Haldane made his 
suicidal offer on the canal bank. Hamilton coined the term 
inclusive fitness to take into account both the direct component 
of fitness, as measured by number of offspring, and the indirect 
component of fitness, as measured by number of offspring born 
to relatives, the second number being devalued by the coefficient 
of relatedness. An altruistic act can result in an increase in the 
performer's inclusive fitness if the loss in the direct component is 
more than made up by a gain in the indirect component. The 
problem of altruism appeared to have been solved by adopting a 
gene's eye view of evolution.
But a number of conditions need to be satisfied before one can 
judge whether Hamilton's formulation works in any given 
situation. Firstly, the behaviour in question must have an innate 
component: different versions of the behaviour must reflect, at 
least to some extent, different genetic constitutions. Secondly, 
individuals must be capable of recognising those with whom 
they share genes by common descent -  their relatives. Thirdly, 
and crucially, the values of benefit {b), cost (c) and relatedness (/) 
must be measurable and must satisfy the relation b .r  > c. What 
are the facts?
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Testing Hamilton’s formulation
Studies hinting that there might be a role for genes in the 
performance of various behaviours have a long tradition. In the
sen se  of th ere b ein g  an  in stin ctiv e  a sp e c t to  b eh av io u r, th ey  go  
b a ck  all the w a y  to D a rw in 's  T he expressions o f emotions in man and  
anim als, a b ook  th at w a s  p u b lish ed  in 18 7 7 , w ell b efo re  the  
red isco v e ry  of M en d el's  law s. Today, the genetic basis of b eh av io u r
-  or, m o re  accu rate ly , the g en etic  b asis  of d ifferences in b e h a v io u r
-  is a w ell-estab lish ed  field. A  h u g e  n u m b e r of ca se s  are  k n o w n  
in w h ich  g en e tic  v a ria tio n , m o s t co m m o n ly  ca u sed  b y  m u ta tio n , 
is corre la ted  w ith  b eh av iou ral varia tio n . In som e cases the findings  
are  s trik in g . T h e tra it o f 'w a ltz in g ' in  m ice  ca rrie s  w ith  it a h ost 
of b e h a v io u rs . T h ese  in clu d e  sh a k in g  th e h e a d , c irclin g  ra p id ly  
a n d  b e in g  irritab le. W altzer m ice  b reed  tru e ; cro sse s  w ith  n o n ­
w a ltz in g  in bred  m ice  lead  to the co n clu sio n  th at w a ltz in g  is d u e  
to a s im p le  gen etic  ch a n g e . In te ch n ica l la n g u a g e , th e w a ltz in g  
tra it  exh ib its  a se g re g a tio n  p a tte rn  ch a ra cte ris tic  of a sim p le  
M e n d e l ia n  lo c u s .  M o r e  a s to n is h in g  a r e  th e  f in d in g s  of  
R o th e n b u h le r w ith  h o n ey b ees. A m e rica n  foulb rood  is a b a cteriu m  
th a t in fects  h o n ey b ee  la rv a e  a n d  kills the p u p a e  a fte r th e larv al 
cells  h a v e  b een  c a p p e d . R o th e n b u h le r foun d  th at so m e  h ives  
w e re  re s is ta n t to  w h a t w a s  o th e rw ise  a v iru le n t e p id e m ic  ca u se d  
b y th e b a cte riu m . C arefu l te s ts  u n c o v e re d  th e b asis of this 
re s is ta n ce . T h e w o rk e rs  in th e re sista n t co lo n ies  exh ib ited  an  
u n u su a l fo rm  of 'h y g ie n ic ' b e h a v io u r th at in v o lv ed  u n ca p p in g  a 
h iv e  c o n ta in in g  a d ead  p u p a  an d  then  re m o v in g  the co rp se . 
R e m a rk a b ly , b o th  u n c a p p in g  an d  re m o v a l se g re g a te d  as single  
M en d elian  recessives (recessive  m e a n s  th at the n o rm a l u n h yg ien ic  
tra its  w e re  e x p ressed  in the offspring  of m atin g s b etw een  h ygien ic  
a n d  u n h y g ie n ic  s tra in s).
A s  it h a p p e n s , th ese  ca se s  are  e x ce p tio n s . T he ru le  is th a t the  
g e n e tics  o f b e h a v io u r is, firstly, e x tre m e ly  c o m p le x , d e p e n d in g  
n o t o n ly  on  m a n y  loci (i.e ., o n  a larg e  n u m b e r of g en es) b u t also  
o n  the o v erall g en etic  'b a ck g ro u n d ' an d  en viro n m en tal in flu ences, 
in clu d in g  th o se  of the socia l e n v iro n m e n t. Second ly, b e h a v io u r is 
so  s tro n g ly  o v e rla id  b y  learn in g  th at the g en etic  b asis  m a y  b e  
triv ia l. It m a y  a m o u n t to  little m o re  th an  sa y in g  th at a  cre a tu re  
n e e d s  to  b e a liv e  b efore it ca n  see , so  th at an y  g en e  th at is 
e sse n tia l for life ca n  b e th o u g h t of as  a g en e  'fo r ' seein g .
E v e n  if v a ria tio n s  in  a tra it  a re  in flu en ced  b y  m a n y  gen es, it is 
p o ssib le  to m a k e  an  estim a te  of the e x te n t to w h ich  the v a ria tio n  
is d u e  to g e n e tic  effects a n d  th e e x te n t to w h ich  it is d u e  to 
e v e ry th in g  else. In o rd e r to  d o  so  o n e n eed s carefu l o b serv atio n
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and experimentation. Here 'everything else' includes effects due 
to the environment as such as well as effects caused by interactions 
between genes and the environment. An example may help. 
Suppose two inbred strains of mice are being compared with 
regard to an aspect of social behaviour, say a tendency on their 
part to forage in pairs. The first strain may be more social than 
the second at low temperatures, less social at high temperatures 
and, at any temperature, display more variability than the second. 
Evidently part of the difference between the strains could be 
caused by innate factors (genes), part by the manner-in which 
genes are expressed in particular environments, and a residual 
effect may be attributed to a 'pure' environmental effect. 
Disentangling these is difficult. Further, as will be illustrated 
later, even seemingly innate causes may be strongly dependent 
on the environment. But, in theory, if the separation is possible, 
one can make an estimate of how much genetic factors influence 
behaviour. The estimate depends on something called heritability. 
Loosely speaking, heritability is a measure of the extent to which 
variations in a trait can be ascribed to genetic causes.
More precisely, heritability in the narrow sense (h^) expresses the 
relative extent to which something called the additive genetic 
variance contributes to the overall variance in a trait. Additive 
genetic variance reflects (again, speaking loosely) the extent to 
which the resemblance between parents and offspring is due to 
shared genes. Therefore, it plays a central role in both heredity 
and evolution by natural selection.
What are the observed values of h^? Obviously, the answer 
depends on the .trait under examination. For example, much 
work has gone into studying so-called 'open-field' behaviour 
exhibited by mice. An example of open-field behaviour would be 
the level of physical activity in the open. Such behaviours have 
been monitored using a whole range of techniques. These include 
family studies (which are focused on extents of resemblance as a 
function of degrees of relatedness), comparisons within and 
between inbred strain, matings carried out in various combinations 
between genetically marked stocks and attempts at selection. 
Overall, they yield a narrow-sense heritability estimate of about 
0.25 for a variety of 'open-field' behaviours exhibited by mice 
raised for 30 generations. How about human data? Here one 
runs into the obvious problem that controlled breeding
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experiments are impossible. The best one can do is to measure 
correlations between relatives under various circumstances. A 
favourite method of researchers is to compare monozygotic 
('identical') twins, who share all their genes in common, when 
they are raised together (i.e., supposedly in the same environment) 
or raised apart (i.e., very likely in different environments). Roughly 
speaking, resemblances that persist even when the twins are 
raised apart hint at a significant genetic component to the trait 
under study. Extensive as the studies are, it turns out that in most 
instances the best outcome that one can hope for is an estimate, 
not of the narrow-sense heritability h^, but of something quite 
different, known as heritability in the broad sense and symbolised 
by hg. The difference between the two is that besides reflecting 
the additive component of genetic variance as does, also 
includes that part of the variance that is due to gene-gene 
interactions. A typical consequence of a gene-gene interaction 
would be that the effect of one gene would be modified by the 
presence or absence of a quite different gene -  in the jargon, by 
the presence of a gene at another locus. Such interactions are 
transitory in the sense that they depend on the co-existence of 
both genes in the same individual. The co-existence stops once 
gene combinations are broken up in the course of the inevitable 
shuffling of genes that accompanies meiosis, the central element 
in sexual reproduction. Therefore overestimates the extent of 
variation that is, evolutionarily speaking, significant in the sense 
that it is available for selection . If the behavioural trait under 
study is influenced by a number of genes acting more or less 
independently (the 'beans in a bag' model of population genetics), 
the overestimate may be negligible. On the other hand, where 
gene interactions are significant for defining the trait in question, 
the overestimate can be serious. Keeping this caveat in mind, we 
note that known data typically yield estimates of for 
behavioural traits of about 0.5. Thus, in the sense of providing 
the raw material on which evolution by natural selection can act, 
significant genetic influence on behaviour is, to put it colloquially, 
unlikely to exceed 50%. And that goes for social behaviour as 
well.
In the light of this observation, what is the current status of 
Hamilton's explanation for the evolution of social behaviour in 
terms of inclusive fitness? The best answer at the moment is that 
social groups, whether of amoebae or insects, do not appear to be
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characterized by especially high levels of ger\etic relatedness (r in 
the earlier notation). Therefore Hamilton's condition b .r  > c  
would seem to require testing more in terms of the associated 
benefits and costs of altruistic behaviour, b and c, rather than in 
terms of r. This is quite difficult, because both measurements 
require long-term observations in the field combined with close 
monitoring.
There is an alternative mode! to explain cooperative social 
behaviour that has been put forward by Trivers. It goes by the 
name of reciprocal altruism. In brief, Trivers's hypothesis states 
that an altruistic act by one individual towards another can be 
favoured by natural selection even ivhen the two individuals are 
unrelated. This can happen so long as there is a reasonable 
expectation on the part of the first individual that the second 
individual will reciprocate in the future by behaving altruistically 
towards it. Clearly, reciprocal altruism depends more on the 
ability of individuals to sense, remember and plan for the future 
than on the actions of genes per se. As with Hamilton's principle, 
it remains to be seen to what extent the Trivers hypothesis is a 
generally valid explanation for the evolution of social behaviour.
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Why behaviour is only loosely linked to genes
Why is it that genetic explanations for social behaviour have 
proven elusive? One reason has been already stated, namely the 
difficulty of measuring benefits and costs of behavioural acts. 
Besides that, two additional reasons make it difficult to analyse 
the genetics of social behaviour. Firstly, learning is an important 
component of what shapes, not just human beings, but also all 
animals that have nervous systems and brains. Genes play a part 
in how the network of nerve cells and their connections develop 
during embryonic, fetal and even post-natal life. In this manner 
genetic information helps in the construction of brains. Having 
done so, genes sit back, as it were, and permit our sensory, 
associational and motor neurons to interact with the external 
world and be shaped by their experience while doing so. Thus, 
behavioural differences between individuals are to a large extent 
the outcome of interactions between nerve cells and the 
environment; for all practical purposes they are de-linked from 
genetic differences. Avital and Jablonka have recently amassed a
huge amount of evidence to show just how important learning, 
especially social learning, can be in shaping behaviour.
There is a second reason why the role of additive genetic variation 
gets downplayed in accounting for differences in behaviour: 
subtle interactions between genes and the environment confound 
the issue. The nature of these interactions often leaves genetic 
factors and environmental factors entangled to such an extent 
that separating them can become practically impossible. On 
occasion it turns out that what appears to be a single genetic 
effect has in fact a strong environmental component. Designing 
the right experiment even to show that the two are entangled, let 
alone to disentangle them, can be a formidable task.
Here is an example from the work of Wood and colleagues. 
Experiments were carried out to mimic certain aspects of 
schizophrenia in rats. The aim was to examine to what extent 
genetic and environmental factors contributed to the behavioural 
symptoms characteristic of schizophrenia, in the animal model at 
any rate. Rats carrying lesions in a region of the brain known as 
the ventral hippocampus are known to display some of these 
symptoms, in particular post-pubertal locomotor hyperactivity. 
The symptoms differ between different inbred strains of rats, 
thereby hinting at an underlying genetic basis. Neonatally caused 
lesions in the ventral hippocampus showed that a particular 
strain of inbred rats, the Fisher strain, is extremely sensitive to a 
lesion. Hyperlocomotion can be readily induced in Fisher rats by 
the drug amphetamine. However, the amphetamine effect is 
absent in another inbred strain of rats, the Lewis strain. Clearly, 
the behaviour is specific to the strain of rat. An obvious hypothesis 
might be that generations of inbreeding have resulted in the 
accumulation of different sets of genes in the two strains, with 
the different sets being responsible for the different behaviours. 
An elegant experiment showed that the inference was mistaken. 
Newly born Fisher and Lewis rat pups were allowed to be cross­
fostered by females of the other strain and the ventral 
hippocampus was lesioned after some days. When monitored 
much later, it was found that the amphetamine-induced behaviour 
was affected by the strain of the foster-mother (the dam) raising 
the pup, rather than that of the pup itself. In short, rather than 
being due to differences in the genetic composition of the two 
strains themselves, the behavioural difference appeared to be
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more due to differences in early environmental influences -  here, 
the environment referring to that contributed by the mother 
while nurturing her pup. The findings leave open the question of 
the extent to which the differences in maternal behaviour can be 
attributed to genetic factors (and raises the intriguing possibility 
of an infinite regress). But they make it clear that as far as rats 
with a lesion in the ventral hippocampus are concerned, 
differences in amphetamine-induced hyperlocomotory behaviour 
in later life are more on account of differences in early 
environmental variables than in genetic differences between the 
Fisher and Lewis strains. The more general implication is, of 
course, that while analysing behaviour, it is difficult to draw a 
distinction between purely genetic and purely environmental 
influences.
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Conclusion
In all higher animals, behaviour -  including social behaviour -  is 
among the traits under the control of the neuromuscular system. 
Behaviour depends on a great many inputs. Among the most 
important of them are (a) the set of genes that define the protein 
constitution of the individual animal, (b) the nervous system of 
the animal and (c) the environment of the animal including 
nurture and social interactions. All three inputs can be used as a 
’part of the explanatory framework for describing and attempting 
to understand behaviour at various levels. At the genetic level, 
Hamilton's theory of inclusive fitness provides a potentially 
attractive explanation for social behaviour; but it remains fully to 
be tested. When one considers the problem of social behaviour in 
general, it appears that genetic inputs are inextricably entangled 
with other inputs. These, broadly speaking, derive both from 
other genes and from the environment. The prudent inference to 
draw would be that genes and gene products merely enable 
behaviour to occur. But, exceptional cases apart, they do not in 
any meaningful sense cause it, much less programme or direct it.
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The biology of laughter
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Abstract
Laughter is a reflex action ivhich, in humans, could be derived from 
higher level cognitive processes. Although laughter is a familiar 
behaviour, there has been very little research on its biology. This paper 
luill summarize existing theories about the evolution o f laughter and its 
social significance. It will also investigate the pathology o f laughter, as 
well as the types of experiments and observations underway to study its 
context.
Is la u g h te r a u n iq u e ly  h u m a n  p h e n o m e n o n ?  Is it in d ica tiv e  of a 
h ig h e r level of co g n itio n  an d  co n sc io u sn e ss?  W h a t is k n o w n  
ab o u t th e an a to m y , n e u ro -c ircu itry , e th o lo g y  a n d  p a th o lo g y  of 
la u g h te r?  T his p a p e r w ill p re se n t so m e  re ce n t w o rk  on  the  
b io lo g y  of la u g h te r  a n d  w ill a tte m p t to  p la ce  th is b e h a v io u r in a 
fu n ctio n al an d  e v o lu tio n a ry  co n te x t.
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The Scottish anatomist and surgeon, Sir Charles Bell, author of 
Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression (1806), and best known for 
the discovery of niotor and sensory functions of nerves, claimed 
that the "Creator had endowed the human face with unique 
muscles that allowed man to express his unique emotions which 
reflected his unique moral nature". Such "anatomical chauvinism" 
(Ekman, 1998 in afterword to 3rd edition of Darwin, 1872) 
disturbed Charles Darwin and he is even believed to have 
written his seminal The Expression of the Emotions in Man and 
Animals (1872) to challenge Bell's claims. In this book Darwin 
attempted to find parallels between human and animal 
expressions and analysed their similarities and differences. Darwin 
was particularly intrigued by the possibility that humans 
throughout the world, although not in contact with each other, 
could recognise and respond to particular facial expressions in 
the same way. He had photographs of humans with various 
expressions sent to missionaries and explorers in remote places 
with specific instructions to show these to isolated peoples and 
gauge their reactions or to ask them to identify what those 
expressions meant. Darwin was helped in his study of human 
facial expressions by Guillaume-Benjamin Duchenne de Boulogne, 
a French anatomist who would collect severed heads from the 
guillotine during the French Revolution to study their anatomy 
and who wrote an important book Mecanisme de la Physionomie 
Humaine {The Mechanism of Human Facial Expression) in 1862. In 
this book Duchenne reproduced several photographs of a human 
subject who had facial palsy due to which his facial expressions 
as stimulated by the galvanic devices in use during that period 
could be very precisely restricted to the movements of a few 
muscles. Ducherme was thus able to discover the exact number 
of muscles involved in the human smile (which he recorded as 
22), and as a tribute to his work, psychologists today categorise 
smiles as being of the Duchenne or non-Duchenne type.
Among animals, only man's closest living relative, the chimpanzee, 
is believed to produce a vocalisation that is similar to human 
laughter. Even in human laughter there are apparently some 
laugh utterances that are forbidden, eg. ha-ho-ha-ho-ha is 
forbidden as is he-ho-he-ho-he, while repeated utterances of 
some syllables such as ha-ha-ho-ho-he, ho-ha-ha-ha-ha or ha-ha- 
ha are permissible (Provine 2000). This may have to do with the 
basic neuro-musculature involved in laugh production which
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precludes certain utterances. Another fundamental difference 
between chimpanzee and human laughter is that chimpanzee 
"laughter" sounds are separated, onset to onset, by about 120 ms, 
while those of humans are separated by 210 ms (Provine 2000). 
This is because chimpanzees vocalise during both inhalation and 
exhalation while human laughter occurs by the syncopation of a 
single exhalation. This means that humans have much more 
control over laughter vocalisation than chimpanzees. This led 
Provine (2000) to suggest that the bottleneck in the evolution of 
ape speech probably lies more in the domain of sound production 
than in cognition and symbolic capacity. Provine therefore 
proposed the Bipedal Theory of Speech according to which the 
evolution of bipedalism set the stage for the emergence of speech 
by freeing the thorax of the mechanical demands of quadrupedal 
locomotion and loosening the coupling between breathing and 
vocalising; however, the evolution of bipedalism was a necessary, 
though insufficient, condition for the evolution of speech in 
primates.
Is laughter influenced by social relationships or gender? In a 
preliminary examination of dyadic interactions, both male and 
female audiences laughed much less when the speaker was a 
female while male and female audiences laughed the same 
amount as the speaker did when the speaker was a male. The 
evidence seems to indicate that females were the leading laughers 
while males were the one who got the most laughter in response 
(Provine 2000). There also appear to be many social uses of 
laughter, e.g. deflection of anger by appeasement, strengthening 
of social bonds, and assertion of power.
Laughter can be generated by the sensation of tickling. 
Chimpanzees also produce laughter-like sounds and smiles on 
being tickled and the cutaneous areas that can evoke the 
appropriate "laughter" on being stimulated appear to be the 
same areas that humans find ticklish. This was known and 
described by Darwin in 1872. However, an important point is 
that one cannot tickle oneself to laughter. The fact that one 
cannot self-tickle is specifically related to the recognition of 
whether the ticklish stimuli are self-generated was revealed by 
an interesting set of experiments conducted by Weiskrantz and 
Blakemore using tickling machines (Weiskrantz et al 1971; 
Blakemore et al 1998). These scientists found that a human's
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inability to self-tickle is due to the neurological cancellation of 
the sensory consequence of self-produced movements. When 
robotic tickling machines were designed such that there was a 
delay of at least l/5th of a second between the human subject 
moving a joystick and the receipt of a tickle, only then did the 
subject feel ticklish. This indicates that a minimum delay of 1/5 s 
between the movement generating the tickle and the receipt of 
the tickle was required to prevent self-recognition.
To define an act as funny if it evokes laughter appears to be 
circular. However, it is acknowledged that the cognitive abilities 
of individuals determine the levels of humour that can be 
appreciated. The phenomenon of laughter is now being used in 
psychological tests to determine the theory of mind (TOM) 
capabilities of individuals. For example, people with various 
types of disorders of empathy, autism and schizophrenia, may 
appreciate visual cartoon-level humour but cannot appreciate 
higher levels of humour that require "mentalising" (Corcoran et 
al 1997). Individuals with Asperger's syndrome (a disorder of 
empathy) can neither appreciate metaphor nor understand subtle 
humour, but tend to take words at their literal meaning. Thus 
individuals with impaired social skills owing to impaired psycho­
neurology tend to fail on laughter scores. Children also experience 
an ontogeny of humour appreciation. Younger children respond 
to visual cartoon humour or slapstick comedy while older children 
begin to find more complex humour also funny. Adults can 
appreciate satire, rhetoric, black comedy and farce. Laughter is 
therefore used as a litmus test for some higher-level cognitive 
functions.
There is a taxonomy of laughter pathologies which has helped to 
determine the neurological circuitry that produces laughter. 
Gelastic seizures or laughter seizures are typical of hypothalamic 
harmatomas (Sturm et nl 2000) and are the equivalent of 
neurological storms in the brain that occur during epileptic 
seizures. Laughter also occurs as a result of trigeminal neurinomas 
and damage to the right frontal lobe (Bhatjiwale et al 1996). 
Removal of such tumours often causes a subsidence of the 
laughter symptoms. Certain genetic disorders, e.g. Angelman's 
syndrome which is due to a maternally expressed imprinted 
gene mapping on to chromosome 15qll-13, have laughter as a 
symptom (Albrecht et al 1997). This is why children with
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Angelman's syndrome are often characterized as "happy" 
children. The various pathologies of laughter have resulted in the 
suggestion that laughter is caused by a neuroanatomical circuit 
that includes the anterior cingulate gyrus, the caudal 
hypothalamus, the temporal amygdala and the pontomedullary 
centre (Mendez et al 1999). Laughter can also be contagious and 
sometimes pathologically so. This may even include elements of 
hysteria, as was described in a set of schools in Tanzania where 
so-called laughter epidemics broke out resulting in temporary 
school closure (Provine 1996).
Coherence, incongruity and the element of surprise are necessary 
ingredients for laughter in a subject with normal or non-impaired 
cognitive functions. Therefore the presence of an anomaly in an 
unfolding scenario or situation is essential in the anatomy of 
humour. Ramachandran (Ramachandran 1998) proposed the False 
Alarm Theory of Laughter based on experience of patients with 
pain asymbolia. In this condition, a patient will claim that he 
feels pinpricks but that it no longer hurts; such patients may 
even start giggling or laughing when pricked with a pin. The 
insular cortex normally receives sensory input including pain 
from the skin and viscera and sends the output to the limbic 
systems such as the cingulate system which will then initiate a 
strong aversive reaction such as withdrawal of the hand from the 
pinprick. However, according to the False Alarm Theory, if the 
neurological damage were to disconnect the insular cortex from 
the cingulate gyrus, one part of the brain, i.e. the insular cortex, 
would be telling the brain that there was pain while the other 
part of the brain, i.e. the cingulate gyrus, would be reporting that 
there was nothing wrong owing to the discontinuity in the 
complete circuit. This perception of an anomaly would then end 
in laughter as a result of the two key ingredients of the laughter 
circuit being present, i.e. threat followed by deflation. 
Ramachandran (1998) therefore proposed that the only way to 
resolve this paradox is to laugh. This may then therefore also 
explain why laughter occurs on tickling as in this situation also 
there is only mock threat. This could be why babies only respond 
with laughter or smiling when tickled by known people, especially 
their, mothers, but should a stranger perform the same tickling 
actioiV, which should stimulate the same sensory neurons, the 
result! is usually tears rather than laughter.
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In conclusion, laughter appears to be largely an involuntary 
action that can be evoked as a result of both lower and higher 
level cognitive processes. Although man appears to be uniquely 
capable of laughter in response to incongruous or anomalous 
situations, laughter-like sounds and laughter-like responses to 
tickling are also produced by chimpanzees. Recent experimental 
work has indicated that chimpanzees do have theory of mind as 
they appear to know the mental states of other chimpanzees 
(Hare et al 2001). Theory of mind appears to be a necessary 
requirement for humour appreciation. Are chimpanzees then 
merely constrained by vocalisation abilities in communicating 
higher level cognitive processes? The chimpanzee "smile" which 
is often given in "appeasement" sequences is thought to be 
derived from a threat grimace which has lost its aggressive 
content (Provine 2000). Much more research on chimpanzees and 
related higher apes obviously needs to be conducted to understand 
their levels of cognition and consciousness.
Is Koestler (1964) right then when he claimed that for the 
emergence of Homo ridens (laughing man), "...a  level of evolution 
had to be reached where reasoning had gained a certain degree 
of autonomy from the 'blind' urges of emotion ....Only at this 
stage of 'cortical emancipation' could man perceive his own 
emotions as redundant, and make the smiling admission 'I have 
been fooled'."
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Attribution and intentionality in wild 
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Abstract
Empirical and observational studies of animal consciousness will tndy 
benefit if different manifestations of consciousness can be defined 
fimctionally; this becomes particularly important because, in animals, 
consciousness has to manifest itself as behaviour, behaviour that can 
be unambiguously ascribed to an effect o f being conscious. Two 
proposed functional definitions of consciousness include perceptual 
consciousness (the state or faculty of being mentally conscious of 
anything) and reflective consciousness (the recognition by the thinking 
subject o f its own actions and mental states). Current thinking holds 
that certain nonlniman primates may indeed be perceptually conscious, 
at least on occasions, but are unlikely to be reflectively so. An 
important functional manifestation of perceptual consciousness is 
attribution. To attribute beliefs, knowledge and emotions to both 
oneself and to others is to have what has been termed a theory of 
mind. Social primates appear to be knowledgeable about one another's 
behaviour to different extents. But do they know as much about one
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another's beliefs and intentions? Are they adept at recognising the 
similarities and differences between their own and others' states of 
mind? Attribution of mental states to other individuals could manifest 
itself in diverse situations as, for example, when individual animals 
closely observe the actions o f others, when they interact competitively, 
or when they deceive each other in the social sphere. Such behavioural 
constructs need to be analysed carefully in order to ascertain whether 
true higher-order intentionality can indeed be invoked as underlying 
mechanisms governing these acts. This paper will examine the possible 
cognitive bases o f social knowledge and tactical deception, processes 
that appear to be integral to the development and maintenance of social 
relationships in wild bonnet macaques (Macaca radiata), a primate 
species endemic to peninsular India.
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Evolution of the primate mind: Are primates 
conscious?
Empirical studies on the cognitive abilities of nonhun^an primates 
and their underlying mechanisms developed primarily because 
we assume that their minds are most like our own and because 
of our belief that an understanding of nonhuman primate minds 
may eventually allow us to trace the evolutionary routes to the 
complexities of the present-day human mind.
A feature that seems ubiquitous to most palaeotropical primates 
including the great apes and humans is the presence of a social 
matrix in which individuals seem to spend most of their lives. 
Extensive social interactions between individuals of different 
ages, sexes, dominance ranks and kinship are thus typical of 
many of these societies (for reviews, see Smuts et al 1987). The 
development and maintenance of such complex social 
relationships -  each different in its own way -  is believed to have 
placed unusual demands and selected for enhanced cognitive 
abilities in individuals living in such societies (Humphrey 1976; 
see also Chance and Mead 1953; Jolly 1966). If this is true and if 
indeed there has been a general increase in social complexity -  in 
at least some of its dimensions -  during the course of primate 
evolution, does this provide at least indirect evidence that there 
has been a progressive evolution of the primate mind, culminating 
in the human mind, as well?
Although there is now increasing belief that primate minds can 
be rather complex, the question of whether nonhuman primates 
can be considered truly conscious continues to be a contentious 
one. Related to this problem is perhaps one of the most difficult 
aspects of studying consciousness -  that of providing an objective 
scientific definition of the phenomenon. This definition obviously 
has to be functional in order that it can be dissected out 
analytically. And it becomes an even greater problem when 
studying nonhuman primates -  because consciousness then has 
to manifest itself in behaviour -  behaviour that can be 
unambiguously ascribed to being an effect of being conscious.
Two functional definitions of consciousness that have been proposed 
are perceptual consciousness, the state or faculty of being mentally 
conscious of anything, and reflective consciousness, the recognition by 
the thinking subject of its own actions and mental states (Griffin 
1992). Thus, if an animal were perceptually conscious, it would be 
able to exist in certain mental states -  it might, for example, believe, 
think, or remember. If, in addition, it were reflectively conscious, it 
would be aware of its own mental states -  whether they are beliefs, 
thoughts, or memories. Current thinking holds that some of the 
higher primates may indeed be perceptually conscious, but are 
extremely unlikely to be reflectively so. The principal reason for this 
bias against the belief that primates can reflect on their thoughts and 
actions may, however, largely be methodological: people can tell us 
what they are aware of, monkeys cannot.
Intentionality and attribution
Functionally, an elegant theoretical framework to investigate 
higher cognitive processes in nonhuman primates in terms of 
mentalistic notions is that of Dennett's intentional stance (Dennett 
1987, 1988). Thus, if one assumes that primates are intentional 
systems capable of mental states like beliefs, desires and emotions, 
different levels of intentionality can be clearly postulated:
Zero-order: An individual has no beliefs or desires at all. All 
behavioural actions are thus instinctive, invariably evoked in 
response to specific stimuli.
First-order: An individual has beliefs or desires, but no beliefs 
about beliefs. An actor may, therefore, intentionally generate
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behavioural acts but it need not necessarily have any conception 
of the audience's mental states.
Second-order: Some conception exists about both one's own and 
other individuals' states of mind. An individual may thus behave 
in a particular way because it wants others to believe in something.
Third-order. At this level, an individual may want others to 
believe that it itself has a particular belief or is in a specific 
emotional state.
Higher-order intentionality (including second- and third-order 
levels) is interesting because it requires the ability to represent 
simultaneously two different states of mind -  that of the actor 
and of the audience. To do this, an individual must recognise, for 
example, that it has knowledge, others have knowledge, and that 
there may be a discrepancy between them -  or, for that matter, 
between any of the intentional states held by these two minds. 
Unfortunately, very few studies -  either in the wild or in captivity
-  have so far extensively tested for these alternative capacities of 
intentionality in primates.
It is clear from this discussion that a very important functional 
manifestation of higher-order intentionality, and therefore of 
perceptual consciousness, is attribution, whereby an individual is 
capable of attributing thoughts, emotions and desires to another 
individual (see also Cheney and Seyfarth 1990). Primates are 
evidently knowledgeable about each other's behaviour, to the 
extent that they can often predict and act upon this knowledge 
even before a behavioural interaction has occurred (Sinha 1998). 
But do primates know as much about each other's beliefs, 
emotions and intentions? To attribute beliefs, knowledge and 
emotions to both oneself and to others is to have a theory of mind 
(Premack and Woodruff 1978). And if indeed primates are able to 
attribute mental states to one another, are they capable of 
recognising the similarity and differences between their own and 
others' states of mind?
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A hard problem!
Perhaps the most difficult problem in understanding cognitive 
processes in non-verbal subjects -  be they pre-verbal human 
infants or truly non-verbal primates -  is the question of whether 
an individual is discriminating between others' states of mind or 
simply reacting to differences in their behaviour patterns. While 
it is evident that true mind-reading can only be achieved through 
some form of behavioural analysis and can, therefore, perhaps be 
considered a sub-category of behaviour-reading (Whiten 1993, 
1996), it becomes important in certain situations, as, for example, 
in the analysis of deceptive interactions, to differentiate between 
actual behaviour analysis and the more cognitively sophisticated 
(as well as evolutionarily advanced?) mentalism. Although many 
philosophers of mind have argued that these two processes 
represent mutually exclusive phenomena (for example, Fodor 
1968), it can be better argued and examples provided from 
human cognitive processes to demonstrate that they represent 
two positions on a possible continuum (see also Whiten 1994).
A theoretical concept of how mental states could be considered 
as intervening variables, facilitating the recognition of a number 
of otherwise complex stimulus-response links (each of which 
could independently form the basis of a behaviour-reading 
process) has been elegantly proposed by Whiten (1993, 1996). 
Drawing from an earlier concept in psychology, it suggests that 
any number of observable conditions could lead an individual to 
recognise a certain specific mental state in another individual, 
and once this state has been attributed, to predict a definable 
number of behavioural outcomes depending on the ambient 
situation. A crucial advantage of this model is that the coding of 
each of these intervening variables (or the so-called mental 
states) would be more 'economic of representational resources' 
(Whiten 1996) than would be the multitude of the stimulus- 
response links that each now represents. Tliis is particularly true 
for mental states which are achievable by very many different 
conditions and which can, in turn, affect a number of different 
outcomes. Mind-reading or the recognition of mental states, by 
such a definition, could thus constitute a more neurologically 
economic strategy than would a multitude of independent 
stimulus-response pathways that represent behaviour-reading. 
Note also that, according to this concept, mentalism arises
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gradually from behaviour analysis -  if the ir\tervening variable 
mediates the recognition of and response to only a single stimulus- 
response link, it is virtually indistinguishable from behaviour- 
reading.
Yet another line of evidence that can potentially argue for 
mentalism as an underlying cognitive process rather than simple 
behaviour analysis, at least in certain situations, is that of 
projection of experience (Povinelli et al 1992a; succinctly reviewed 
in Whiten 1996). This has stemmed from studies on role reversal 
in cooperative tasks in v '̂hich an individual primate was first 
trained to perform a definite task to aid another individual in 
reaching a desired goal following which it was asked to take on 
the role of the other individual. These experiments have suggested 
that the great apes, notably chimpanzees, are able to master new 
roles with ease and perform novel tasks perhaps because they 
can attribute beliefs and desires to one another; their performance 
cannot be explained by simple learning of the behaviour of their 
partner before role reversal. Macaques, on the other hand, appear 
to lack empathy and have to learn their new roles afresh.
A philosophical assumption that seems to be implicit in all 
discussions over whether individual primates are able to recognise 
mental states or simply perform behaviour analysis is that principles 
of parsimony are violated when mind-reading is invoked in non­
verbal nonhuman primates. Such an assumption perhaps owes its 
origin to the subtle influences that Biblical tradition and Cartesian 
philosophy seem to have had on Western scientific ideology, 
which has, often implicitly, valued the inherent superiority of man 
over all other forms of life. Although outside the scope of this 
paper, it is important to stress here that it is perhaps now hme to 
re-evaluate such an assumption, and concepts such as that of 
mental states as economical intervening variables, discussed above, 
are important steps in this direction (see also Bennett 1991).
In the remaining section of the paper, the possible cognitive 
mechanisms involved in two complex social processes displayed 
by wild bonnet macaques -  social knowledge and tactical 
deception -  will be analysed. Particular attempts will be made to 
explore the conceptual contribution that attribution of mental 
states as well as orders of intentionality could offer towards an 
understanding of these mechanisms.
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Bonnet macaques -  The species and the troops
The bonnet macaque {Macaca radiata), a cercopithecine primate 
endemic to peninsular India, usually lives in multi-male, bisexual 
troops of about 15 to 60 individuals (Sinlia 2001). Females of this 
species, almost as a rule, remain in their natal group throughout 
their lives, and during adulthood, form strong, linear dominance 
hierarchies v îth daughters occupying dominance ranks just below 
those of their mothers. Adult females develop strong social bonds 
and display extensive allogrooming and other affiliative behaviour 
towards one another. Juvenile and adult males, on the other hand, 
usually emigrate from their natal troops, but bonnet macaque 
males appear to be unique in being rather unpredictable in this 
regard, some individuals even staying back to become the most 
dominant males in their respective natal troops. Adult males form 
unstable dominance hierarchies through direct aggression and 
coalitions, and, unusually for most cercopithecines, exhibit extensive 
affiliative interactions with one another (Sinha 2001).
Our insights into the social knowledge underlying decision­
making processes in bonnet macaques come from a three-year 
study (from 1993 to 1996) on a wild troop inhabiting dry 
deciduous scrubland and mixed forests around Bangalore in 
southern India. During the course of this study, the troop had 44- 
52 individuals, including 8-11 adult males, 11 adult females, and 
22-30 juveniles and infants. Data on tactical deception are derived 
from observations on this troop as well as from a second troop, 
occupying an adjacent, partially overlapping home range during 
the same study period; this troop consisted of 30-35 individuals 
with 5-7 adult males, 10 adult females, and 15-20 juveniles and 
infants. In addition, tactical deception was also studied in a third 
troop inhabiting the Bannerghata National Park near Bangalore; 
this troop, consisting of 3-4 adult males, 6 adult females, 8 
subadult males, and 8-14 juveniles and infants, was studied for a 
period of about 12 months during 1999-2000.
Data on social knowledge and tactical deception were obtained 
by behavioural observations on all individually identified adult 
and subadult animals in the respective study troops; each 
sampling day usually consisted of 10 hours of observation, from 
0800-1800 hours. The sampling methods used included focal 
animal sampling with samples of 15 minutes duration each on an
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individual chosen random ly without replacen\ent and 
opportunistic sequence sampling of rare behavioural events and 
social interactions involving more than two individuals. The 
results reported here are based on approximately 1800 hours of 
observation on the three troops, sampling effort being comparable 
across all adult and subadult individuals in all these troops. All 
instances of tactical deception were categorised and analysed 
according to Byrne and Whiten (1990) with certain modifications 
(Sinha and Datta-Roy, in press).
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Social knowledge
A very important component of social cognition is the social 
knowledge that individual primates might possess with regard 
to certain attributes of other individuals that they regularly 
interact with within their social group. In addition to the obvious 
recognition of each animal as a distinct individual, the possible 
attributes that such knowledge might encompass could include 
their dominance ranks and affiliative relationships -  factors that 
seem to influence much of the social behaviour observed in 
primate societies.
In bormet macaques, a frequent triadic interaction -  displacement 
of one member of an allogrooming dyad by a third, more 
dominant, female -  provided evidence that adult females seem 
to be aware of the social attractiveness of other individuals, as 
measured by the allogrooming received by them from all other 
adult females in the troop (Sinha 1998). That individual females 
might also know the relative dominance ranks of their troop 
members was revealed by the typical patterns of agonistic 
behaviour and allogrooming choices that followed such complex 
interactions. They also appear to be able to evaluate their own 
individual positions in the rank hierarchy and in the affiliative 
networks that prevailed within the troop. Logistic regression 
models, constructed to unravel the possible domains of an 
individual's knowledge system that might critically influence 
social decision-making, showed that the nature of a macaque's 
social knowledge is egotistical -  in that other individuals are 
evaluated relative to oneself, integrative -  in that information 
about all other interactants are used simultaneously, and 
hierarchical -  in the ability to preferentially utilise certain
categories of knowledge for the storage of related information 
from other domains (Sinha 1998).
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Mental representation o f individual attributes
What is noteworthy is that individual macaques seem to be 
knowledgeable about the general social attractiveness of particular 
individuals in terms of the allogrooming that they receive, rather 
than remember specific pair-wise affiliative relationships, and 
use this information when making certain behavioural decisions 
during social interactions (Sinha 1998). Since, as mentioned earlier, 
they also know the relative dominance rank of each adult female 
in the troop, this seems to constitute a clear example of recognition 
of individuality and individual attributes by these animals. 
Furthermore, the decision to retreat or not to during triadic 
interactions also depends on the absolute position of the actor in 
the dominance hierarchy -  the more subordinate an individual 
the more likely she is to retreat. Clearly then, each bonnet 
macaque female has knowledge of some of her own individual 
attributes as well.
Although all of these must obviously call for some form of fairly 
sophisticated mental representation of particular individuals 
associated with their specific properties, including themselves, what 
remains unclear is how exactly such information is categorised and 
coded for in the non-verbal cognitive architecttire of the macaque 
mind. It is also important to note that the bonnet macaque's 
knowledge system is integrative in nature -  each female takes into 
consideration attributes of the two individuals that she is 
simultaneously interacting with and behaves appropriately given 
the relative strengths of these properties. A female is thus more 
likely to retreat during a triadic interaction if the approaching 
female is increasingly dominant and her own allogrooming 
companion increasingly subordinate (Sinha 1998). Whatever, 
therefore, may be the stored imagery of the individual attributes of 
the two females she is interacting with, it is possible for her to access 
both these sources and integrate them when making a decision.
Attribution o f motives
During allogrooming supplants, when a dominant individual 
approaches the two members of a grooming dyad, the more
subordinate of the two females is most likely to retreat, even 
before the approaching female actually reaches them (Sinha 
1998). The dominant member of the dyad, however, sometimes 
retreats if her grooming partner is very socially attractive on 
absolute terms -  these females, therefore, behave as if they 
'believe' that the approaching individual is targeting their 
subordinate, but usually more socially attractive, companion 
(Sinha 1998).
The hypothesis that these particular females acted on the basis of 
a valid belief system comes from supporting observations of 
other triadic interactions when a grooming supplant did not 
actually occur. During certain such incidents, the approaching 
individuals were most likely to display aggression and chase 
away the more subordinate of the two individuals, while on 
other occasions, if they did not demonstrate any aggression, they 
almost invariably preferred to groom the more dominant member 
of the dyad (Sinha 1998). Why then occasionally did the more 
dominant member of the allogrooming dyad retreat?
It would appear that this decision was taken on the belief that a 
highly socially attractive individual is more likely, in general, to 
be the preferred target for affiliative interactions, even if she 
holds a relatively low position in the dominance hierarchy. The 
nature of this belief and the attribution of a corresponding 
motive to the approaching individual also seem to be rather 
natural since bonnet macaque females evaluate social 
attractiveness of an individual on the basis of the levels of 
allogrooming received and the consistency with which such 
grooming is received from other females in the troop (Sinha 
1998).
Projection o f experience?
It should be noted that this particular belief system is, in some 
sense, erroneous -  given the actvial choices that the troop females 
made in their display of aggression and grooming preferences. 
Thus, since in the instances when an actual grooming supplant 
did not occur and the approaching female preferred the dominant 
member of the allogrooming dyad as a grooming companion, 
why, in other instances, did the latter occasionally retreat when 
she was with a socially attractive subordinate?
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One possible solution to this apparent contradiction may lie in 
the relative frequencies with which dyadic and triadic interactions 
occurred in the study troop. Triadic allogrooming sessions, where 
an approaching dominant individual groomed the dominant 
member of a grooming dyad in preference to the subordiiiate 
one, were relatively rare (Sinha 1998). In contrast, dyadic grooming 
was much more frequent, and females in the study troop were 
also much more likely to groom relatively more subordinate 
individuals during these dyadic sessions (Sinha 1996). In addition, 
subordinate females also tended to be more social attractive than 
their dominant counterparts. It is therefore possible that most 
females never received an opportunity to learn that they might 
be preferred as grooming companions by more dominant 
individuals during triadic supplants, and were, therefore, more 
likely to be guided by the belief system described above in their 
responses to the approaches made by these females. Interestingly, 
it is possible that the origin of this particular belief system could 
lie in their past experience with dyadic grooming sessions when 
these females could have observed a preferential grooming of 
relatively more subordinate individuals.
What is noteworthy here is that individual females seem to 
exhibit this erroneous behaviour during triadic allogrooming 
supplants even though on several occasions they themselves had 
preferentially allogroomed the dominant member of a grooming 
pair after approaching such dyads. Could this be considered a 
failure, in some sense, to project their own past experiences, and 
thus to adopt different, but suitable, behavioural strategies under 
changing situations? In other words, is it possible that a bonnet 
macaque female, as the dominant member of a grooming pair, is 
unable to attribute the correct motive to an approaching individual 
although she herself has experienced that particular motive 
earlier as an approaching individual? If this is indeed true, 
bonnet macaques are similar to rhesus macaques, which were 
unable to empathise with and understand the motivations of 
their partners in a laboratory cooperative task althovigh they 
themselves had taken up similar roles earlier (Povinelli et al 
1992b); successful role reversal in these experiments was 
necessarily accompanied by fresh trial-and-error learning.
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Tactical deception
Human-like deception requires that an individual who signals 
information create a false belief in another individual, the 
audience. Tlie signaler thus needs to recognise that the audience's 
mind can be in a state of knowledge that is different from one's 
own and that it is possible to alter and hence, control others' 
mental states without necessarily changing one's own. Such 
manipulations are usually tactical in that they involve the use of 
acts from the normal repertoire of the actor in situations where 
they are likely to be misinterpreted by the audience -  leading to 
some tangible benefit for the actor with or without some 
corresponding cost to the audience (Whiten and Byrne 1988; 
Byrne and Whiten 1990).
All such acts of tactical deception are thus functional, and most 
cases of deception documented in primates can be included in 
this category. But is primate deception truly intentional, 
attributable to a theory of mind (see Byrne and Whiten 1991 for a 
succinct discussion)? Does the deceiver actually attempt to alter 
the beliefs of another individual when it actively suppresses 
some information or signals false information to the other? Or, 
has experience simply taught the deceiver the use of certain 
behavioural strategies in particular situations, leading to 
predictable responses from the audience and thus allowing the 
actor to achieve a desired goal?
Mind-reoding or behaviour-reading?
The overwhelming majority of records of social interactions that 
could be potentially considered deceptive, obtained from the 
three study troops of bonnet macaques provide clear evidence 
for tactical deception over other competing explanations (Sinha 
1999; Sinha and Datta-Roy, in press; see also Byrne and Whiten 
1990). It is also noteworthy that individuals in all the troops 
exhibited comparable levels of deception although the three 
troops differed widely with regard to the social situations in 
which tactical deception was displayed as well as in the categories 
of deceptive acts commonly used by the resident individuals.
A striking feature of the deception displayed by bonnet macaques 
is the remarkable individual variation in the performance of
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these acts (Sinha 1999). Certain individuals thus exhibited 
deceptive acts with very high frequency and at levels significantly 
greater than that shown by other individuals within the troop; 
moreover, such deceptive abilities appeared to be independent of 
age categories and dominance ranks (Sinha and Datta-Roy, in 
press). The fact that certain individuals are more adept at 
deception than are others and that the ability to deceive is 
independent of other individual attributes is an indication that 
many of these acts could involve mentalism on the part of the 
actor rather than simple behaviour analysis. An alternative 
explanation could, of course, be that these particular individuals 
are good social learners and, therefore, more efficient behaviour 
analysts. This seems unlikely since it would require complex 
behavioural contingencies (of the kind displayed during tactical 
deception) to occur with high probabilities for individuals to 
learn their associations successfully; such contingencies, however, 
appear to be relatively rare (Sinha and Datta-Roy, in press).
If macaques are indeed better social learners than mentalists 
while complex social situations where deceptive behaviour could 
be learnt are rare, it might be predicted that individuals who 
exhibit high levels of deception should perform the same acts 
repeatedly. However, in all the troops, there was a significant 
positive correlation between the frequency of deceptive acts and 
the functional categories to which these acts belonged (Sinha and 
Datta-Roy, in press); in other words, individuals who deceived 
more did so in many more different ways! Surely, it is more 
parsimonious to assume that these individuals are better cheaters 
who perhaps have greater insights into the power of manipulative 
behaviour than do other individuals.
Moreover, certain rare acts of tactical deception displayed by the 
study individuals were extremely complex and involved several 
categories of deceptive acts juxtaposed together and performed 
in rapid succession to achieve one particular desired goal (Sinlia 
1999; Sinlia and Datta-Roy, in press). It is extremely improbable 
that these individuals had experienced an earlier identical 
behavioural contingency for them to learn all the constituent 
deceptive acts.
If the argument put forward regarding the involvement of the 
mind in at least some of the acts of tactical deception practised
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by bonnet macaques can be accepted, it would seem logical that 
such manipulation must necessarily involve at least second-order 
intentionality. This would mean, in simple terms, that an individual 
performs a deceptive act in order to change the belief system of 
the audience -  and then takes advantage of the false belief that has 
been generated to achieve a particular personal goal.
Visual perspective-faking
Several events of deception by three individuals in two different 
troops involved acts of physical concealment in which the actor 
either simply hid from the target behind some physical object or 
performed a behaviour surreptitiously behind a barrier, 
occasionally leaning out to inspect whether the target individual 
was still present (Sinha and Datta-Roy, in press). Since all these 
individuals repeatedly performed this exercise -  in different 
contexts and using different objects or barriers to hide behind -  
these acts would appear to represent a genuine tactic and were 
possibly not simply events coincident by chance.
This kind of visual perspective-taking, estimating what would be 
visible from another individual's point of view, has earlier been 
seen in other primates, notably chimpanzees and baboons (Whiten 
and Byrne 1988). Although such an ability to recognise and 
utilise the geometric perspective of another individual has been 
equated to being able to represent correctly another individual's 
mental representation, there have also been dissenting views on 
such an identity (for a detailed discussion, see Whiten 1991).
'Intention to deceive' as an intervening variable?
Another characteristic feature of the tactical deception exhibited by 
bonnet macaques was that individuals did not invariably use deceptive 
strategies in apparently identical situations, a result not expected if 
these acts were being performed in response to certain behavioural 
contingencies (Sinha and Datta-Roy, in press). What could not be 
easily ruled out, of course, is that there were subtle differences in 
these apparently identical situations -  and these may have triggered 
off the decephve acts in some of them but not in others.
A related finding to this form of volitional control of deception 
was that of some individual adult males who changed their
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repertoire of deceptive acts following changes in the social 
environment. This happened when two particular males emigrated 
out of one troop and joined a neighbouring one; following this 
movement, they exhibited very different categories of deceptive 
acts. A major difference that these individuals faced in the two 
situations was that of their dominance ranks, which fell drastically 
once they had joined the new troop. It is, therefore, entirely 
possible that the perception of their specific positions in the rank 
hierarchy in the respective troops as well as the changing demands 
of the new social milieu may have triggered on a completely 
different repertoire of deceptive acts in the two males.
It is perhaps possible to model a complex set of stimulus-response 
links in the different social situations outlined above, leading to 
differential responses in terms of the deceptive acts displayed by 
specific individuals. It might, however, be more parsimonious to 
consider 'intention to deceive' as an intervening variable in these 
different situations, as outlined by Whiten (1996). This would 
mean that a variety of perceptual changes under different social 
conditions would be translated into either the presence or absence 
of potentially deceptive acts or into different forms of deceptive 
acts, all of these mediated by an intention or lack thereof to 
deceive. In addition to simplifying a possibly complex web of 
conditional stimulus-response chains, such an intervening variable 
would also be compatible with the notion of second-order 
intentionality underlying deception, outlined above.
An incomplete theory o f mind?
Subordinate adult bonnet macaque males often give out loud 
predator alarm calls when they are chased by more dominant 
males -  even if there are no predators in the immediate vicinity. 
An extremely intriguing variant of this deceptive act was observed 
in one of the study troops. A victim of aggression emitted a false 
predator alarm call on being chased, but continued to give this 
call even as he descended from the tree and continued to walk 
peacefully on the ground -  behaviour that would never have 
been performed if there was truly a predator around (see also 
Cheney and Seyfarth 1990 for a comparable incident).
Deceiving individuals thus occasionally exhibit behavioural 
components that are not compatible with their own apparent
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'belief' system, as communicated to others. An important point 
here is that notwithstanding its incompleteness, such a belief 
system must have been generated to alter the belief state of the 
audience -  a return to second-order intentionality. What is also 
noteworthy is that the aggressor did not appear to have read the 
internal inconsistency of the deceptive act; this may have been 
due to his own theory of mind -  or perhaps, a hypothesis of 
mind -  being similarly incomplete (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990).
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Summary
Cercopithecine or Old World monkey societies are typically 
characterised by social relationships established between 
individuals belonging to different age cohorts, dominance ranks 
and kinship groups. Given the unique nature of each and every 
relationship that individuals need to develop and maintain, it is 
perhaps not surprising that bonnet macaques may be inherently 
capable of solving many complex social problems. These monkeys 
may, for example, observe the social interactions of other 
individuals in the troop and acquire knowledge of different 
attributes of these individuals, thus aiding their own decision­
making during complex social interactions. Many individuals are 
also potentially capable of developing strategies of tactical 
deception; these strategies not only encompass different categories 
of deceptive acts but are also employed in a variety of social 
situations, including agonistic interactions and competition over 
food, allogrooming companions and sexual partners.
Underlying these complex social strategies may be the ability of 
individual macaques to form rudimentary mental representations 
of their social interactants and their various attributes, including 
their relative dominance ranks and social attractiveness. 
Interestingly, an earlier study that documented an elaborate 
example of tool manufacture and use by a bonnet macaque, 
indicated the possibility that the individual was able to perceive 
the underlying causality of its actions and also form a mental 
model of the tool to which it could repeatedly refer (Sinha 1997). 
The cognitive ability to form mental representations could thus 
underlie the bonnet macaque's interactions with both the 
mechanical as well as the social components of its immediate 
environment.
Analyses of the decision-making processes that bonnet macaques 
employ during social interactions indicate that individuals appear 
to attribute distinct motives to other individuals, a clear example 
of second-order intentionality. Moreover, several acts of tactical 
deception provide evidence that the macaques are capable of 
attributing visual perspectives to another individual, thus being 
able to perceive what would be visible from that particular 
individual's point of view. This arguably constitutes another way 
in which a monkey is able to comprehend another monkey's 
mental representation of the world -  again a prime cognitive 
candidate for second-order intentionality.
Bonnet macaques, it can be argued, may thus have some degree 
of comprehension of the mental world of other individuals and 
are able to attribute distinct individuality to each other, including 
themselves. But does this imply that they have a theory of mind? 
It has been discussed above that, during social interactions, 
individuals may fail to project their own experiences onto others 
and are thus often unable to correctly predict the true motives of 
other individuals. Moreover, even in instances of tactical deception 
where the macaques communicate their apparent 'beliefs' to 
others, they exhibit behavioural components incompatible with 
their own beliefs. Extensive observational studies on the study 
troops have also so far failed to turn up any clear evidence for 
unambiguous third-order intentionality, which could be 
considered evidence for a true theory of mind. In conclusion, 
therefore, even if bonnet macaques do have a rudimentary 
hypothesis of mind, it is a construct incomplete in many ways, 
some of which have been outlined here and some that still 
remain to be uncovered.
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Abstract
The paper deals with the issue o f Self-Consciousness and how it 
grows in a child from birth, reaching the adult level at the age o f five 
years.
New research has shown that Self-Consciouness and Other- 
Consciousness develop together. One cannot develop without the other. 
A rudimentary awareness o f Self and its similarity with the Self of 
others, is in fact present from birth. This may have a basis in the mirror 
neurones present in the premotor cortex which fire similarly when a 
particular action is executed by the individual or is observed, when 
performed by others. By the age of one, the baby and. the adults around 
her can point to things and get each other to act on them. This way the 
baby and the adults develop some joint attitudes to the world. In 
another six months the baby learns that besides having joint attitudes 
she and the adults may in fact have different attitudes also. The adults 
may not want the baby to do certain things she likes, while they may
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want her to do certain things she does not like. By the age of two, the 
baby becomes truly empathic, caring for the pain experienced by others 
and trying to alleviate it in ways she is capable of. By the age of three, 
she learns that luhat she sees may not in fact be visible to others. By the 
age o f four she learns that she and others may have different thoughts 
and beliefs about the same thing. It is at this age that she becomes 
capable of deception. By the age of five, she understands that some 
events not only happened in the past but actually happened to her and 
might not have happened to others. Now she can be truly 
autobiographical when telling stories about events. Now she is truly 
Self-Conscious.
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1. Introduction
Study of the phenomenon of consciousness is becoming 
increasingly popular amongst psychologists these days. This was 
not always so; for a long time the field was dominated by 
behavioural psychologists who, following the fashions in the 
natural sciences, believed that what could not be directly observed 
and measured could not be 'scientific'. Therefore, in their opinion, 
what happened within the black box -  the brain, could not be the 
subject of scientific inquiry. They concentrated on 'objective' 
measurement of the behavioural expressions of mental 
phenomena. The recent interest in consciousness also appears to 
be influenced by the advances in the natural sciences. The 
inspiration comes from the physicists, who having tested the 
success of the counter-intuitive principles of quantum mechanics 
have started invading the field of consciousness studies (Penrose 
and Stuart 1995). New developments in the fields of neuroanatomy 
and neurophysiology have also been a source of inspiration.
Psychologists look at Consciousness functionally. They study 
what on commonsense basis are taken to be the attributes of a 
conscious person, for example (a) awareness of the outside 
world, (b) reflective thought, (c) conscious feelings, (d) memory 
and recall, (e) self-awareness, and (f) intentionality . They are not 
greatly bothered by the hard problem posed by Chalmers (1995) 
and consider consciousness and awareness to be synonymous .
2. The science of developmental psychology
It does not require too much sophistication to understand that 
awareness grows or evolves, as the newborn becomes an adult 
human being. There are a variety of folk views about the level of 
awareness a newborn has and how it grows into the awareness 
in an adult. Some believe that the baby's mind is a tabula rasa 
(Locke 1959) on which inscription of life experiences is necessary 
to lead towards the formation of a fully conscious adult. Others 
have the romantic notion that babies are intuitive and not rational. 
Freud believed that they are driven by passions. Others like the 
romantic poet Word worth (Williams 1943) think that they have 
some special kind of knowledge just because they are so ignorant.
The new science of developmental psychology has for the first 
time given us an understanding of how babies' minds work and 
how consciousness grows in the next few years to make them 
think, feel and behave as adults. Jean Piaget who systematically 
observed his own children as they grew, may be considered to be 
the father of developmental psychology but most advances have 
occurred in the last 30 years. This has been made possible by two 
new technological developments. One technology which has 
helped is the video camera which faithfully records what babies 
do, records which can be seen again and again by scientists other 
than the original observer thus removing the bias from the 
observation. Ingenious techniques have been developed to find 
out what babies think, feel and believe. For example, babies are 
shown two pictures and the camera records which picture they 
look at longer. Do they look longer at lines or dots, at familiar 
faces or unfamiliar ones, happy or sad faces and so on. Pacifiers 
have been used to start off the video cameras so that we can find 
out what the babies actually prefer to see!
The other technology is the computer. Computers not only help 
in analysing massive amounts of data but also provide for 
understanding mental functions. Research (Gopnik et al 2001) has 
shown the following:
1. Unlike what Locke said, babies come equipped with 
sophisticated programmes to understand the world.
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2. The programmes are not static. Babies have the capacity to 
rewrite old programmes and evolve new programmes as they 
grow. In this they are totally different from computers.
3. The brain hardware passes through a long period of 
immaturity before reaching its adult structure and functions 
and it is this immaturity which allows the human brain to be 
flexible, sensitive and plastic, deeply influenced by events in 
the outer world. The brain has the capacity to absorb culture 
and adapt to its mores.
4. In their efforts to learn, babies think, draw conclusions, make 
predictions, look for explanations and even do experiments. 
Adult scientists take advantage of this natural human capacity. 
As the above mentioned authors say, "It is not children who 
are little scientists but scientists who are big children".
The science of developmental psychology has given us rich and 
breathtaking information about how the various consciousness 
functions grow but for our discussion here we shall examine the 
growth of just one of these functions, perhaps the most human of 
them all. We shall see how the babies become self-conscious and 
conscious about other human beings.
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The growth of self- and other-consciousness
What has come out of so many sophisticated observations and 
experiments is that the two, self-consciousness and other- 
consciousness grow together, as if hand in hand. This is what we 
have learnt:
1. At birth the babies can decipher human faces and sounds as 
different from other visual and auditory stimuli. Within a 
few days of birth, they can distinguish a familiar face from a 
non-familiar one, their mother's voice from that of others. 
They can recognize even smells; they turn towards a pad 
kept close to their mother's body and away from that kept 
near someone else (Mcfarlane 1975; Field et al 1984)! Very 
early they can distinguish a human movement from a random 
one. Before the baby is nine months old, before she can walk 
or talk, she can distinguish facial expressions of emotions, an
angry face or a sad face. She can also attach the right sound 
to the right picture. If you play a recording of a happy or a 
sad song, the baby will look and laugh at the appropriate 
face.
2. Do babies have a conception of what being human means? It 
appears that they do. Meltzoff and Moore (1994) showed that 
if you stick out your tongue at a one-month old baby it sticks 
out its tongue at you. Later they showed that this was an 
innate ability and that a very newborn baby would do the 
same.
It may appear to be an insignificant finding but on deeper 
thought it is indeed quite an amazing phenomenon. Babies 
have never seen their own face but they can be aware of their 
tongues kinesthetically. However, what they are seeing (the 
experimenter sticking out his tongue) is visual! Sticking out 
its own tongue in response means that the baby is aware of 
the similarity between others and itself - that the red thing 
coming out of a round face in front is the same as a similar 
organ in its own mouth. This goes against the conclusion 
reached by the philosopher Merleau Ponty (1962) who 
believed that the sensori-motor equivalence between one's 
kinesthetic sensations and the visual sensations has to be 
established first and then between self and others. The 
research also shows that right from the beginning there is an 
embryonic sense of Self and its separation from the Self of 
others. Otherwise, imitation would not occur. This exciting 
finding is made even more exciting by the findings of the 
neuro-physiologists that in the premotor area of the cortex of 
the higher primates including human beings, there are what 
are known as mirror neurones (Gallese and Goldman 1998) 
which bombard in the same fashion when they execute a 
goal directed action or observe it being performed by another 
person. This means that right from the beginning, mechanisms 
are available, which help one recognise the intentional 
meaning of other's actions. Further, this happens by direct 
matching and not through an inferential route. One does not 
have to watch someone else's action, then make a comparable 
gesture and then infer that the two are similar.
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To summarise, a sense of Self and a sense of others is present 
right from birth. A sense of similarity of the two is also 
present. A sense of separateness of the two is also present. 
This understanding is the basis of empathy though still at a 
rudimentary stage. This has led many phenomenologists to 
believe that human individual consciousness is formed in a 
dynamic interaction of the self and others and is therefore 
inherently intersubjective. This intersubjectivity is the basis 
of empathy and empathy is the precondition for the science 
of consciousness (Thompson 2001).
3. At about the age of one year, this diad of baby-adult imitating 
each other expands to include things and becomes a triad. As 
babies are able to reach out and crawl, objects -  toys, keys, 
rattles, telephones, which were so far subjects of fascinated 
gaze become objects of desire and danger. But other people 
form an interesting part of the relationship between the baby 
and these objects.
Babies start pointing at things as well as looking at things 
pointed out by adults. Pointing, like imitation, implies a 
deep understating of Self and others. Pointing at things 
repeatedly and then repeatedly looking at Mummy's face 
implies that at some level the baby thinks that the other 
person should look at the something she is looking at. The 
opposite is also true. Looking at things pointed out by the 
adults indicates the same kind of communion.
One-year olds not only look at things but also start noticing 
the mother's expression. If she smiles, baby keeps moving 
towards the object; if she shows horror, the baby stops. The 
baby now knows that not only do adults show different 
emotions but also that they show different emotions for 
different things. By watching the adults, babies can figure 
out what to do with the objects. They copy with toy telephones 
what adults do with the real ones, not very well but they 
understand the principle (Gopnik et al 2001).
To summarise, one year old babies discover that they and the 
adults have joint attitudes to the world. Babies start using 
other people to figure out the world. In a simple way, they 
are already participating in culture.
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4. However, as they learn that they and the adults have some 
attitudes tov^ards things, they also learn that they may have 
different altitudes. What about china plates, electrical gadgets 
and so on. Baby wants them, others do not want the baby to 
have them. What about foods? Baby does not want to eat 
vegetables, adults want the baby to eat them. By the age of 
one and a half babies know that everything is not wonderful; 
there are often differences between their desires and dislikes 
and the desires and dislikes of the adults.
Interestingly, instead of being depressed by this discovery, 
the babies set out to experimentally determine what they 
share with adults and what they do not. This is at the age 
which is commonly referred to as the "terrible twos". Babies 
deliberately start doing things which annoy you, just to find 
out the limits to which they can go.
There is a positive side to their game. Imagine a situation 
when the mother is crying after a quarrel with the father. 
Baby is distressed by the mother's crying and tries to put 
band-aid to mother's lips, remembering that this is what she 
does when the baby cries. This is the start of real empathy. It 
demands knowing how people can feel distressed even when 
the baby itself is not so and caring enough to want to make 
them feel better.
5. By the age of three the baby starts learning that what it sees 
and what others see may not be the same. If you play a game 
with a two-year old, putting a screen between you and the 
baby and ask her to hide a toy, invariably she will put the toy 
on your side of the screen, believing that if she cannot see it, 
you will also not see it. But a three-year old will not put it on 
your side of the screen, because she knows that you might 
see what she cannot, and vice versa that she and you might 
have different perspectives about the same thing. By the age 
of three, the baby is already going beyond an egocentric 
understanding of other people.
6. So, by the age of three, children understand desire, perception 
and emotion but all these states are transparent states. There 
are other mental states like thoughts and beliefs which are 
different. Thoughts and beliefs are opaque; philosophers call
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them representational. They occur inside the mind and are not 
visible to others. Further, these can be correct on incorrect 
representations. Three-year olds cannot understand this, while 
a four year old can.
In a classic experiment, Wimmer and Perner (1983) showed a 
candy box to a 3-year old child and asked what it contained. 
"Candy", she said. The investigators had however tricked 
the child and had put pencils in the candy box. Now the box 
was opened and the child was allowed to see what it 
contained. "What does the box have?" asked the investigator. 
"Pencils", said the child correctly. "What will your friend 
(who does not know about the trick) think it has?" asked the 
investigators. "Pencils" said the three-year old. A three-year 
old does not know that the others may not know what she 
knows and hence can have a false belief. Four-year olds 
understand this and this is a profound difference. It is this 
which allows a four-year old to understand that others can 
be deceived. Two- or three-year olds can tell lies but they are 
transparent lies. Four-year old can lie intelligently. This is the 
age when the children start showing character. Four- and 
five-year olds understand that it is good to say 'nice' for a 
present they do not like!
7. The story of Self-Consciousness is complete by the age of 5 
years, when another profound change occurs. Children start 
understanding that not only have some events happened in 
the past but also that they occurred to them; that they may 
not have happened to others. Also, that other things may 
happen to others, which might not happen to themselves. 
That there is an internal 'T which is different from the 
internal T' of some one else and the memories of the two T's 
can be different. Only now can they tell stories in an 
autobiographical fashion. Only now do they start 
understanding that they have a mind and it is different from 
the minds of others.
Now the child has the Self-Consciousness of an adult.
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A supervenience tlieory of mind
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Abstract
Two extreme positions would, if true, block any significant dialogue 
between the neurosciences and many religious accounts o f the self. Strong 
forms of dualism -  at least those that make the mind a separate substance
-  remove mental phenomena forever from the realm of scientific study. 
On the other hand, eliminative materialism "explains" mental phenomena 
by making than nothing other than the underlying physical processes of 
which they are the product; it also resolves the debate with most of the 
metaphysical traditions by removing them altogether from the realm of 
plausible theories. For this reason, the present talk challenges the 
"Sufficiency Thesis," according to which neuroscientific explanations 
will finally be sufficient to fidly explain human behaviour
Once these two views have been dismissed, a wide range o f interesting 
possibilities remains. The article explores the various ways in which 
neuroscientific results and metaphysical interpretations contribute to 
an overall theory o f the person. Structural couplings of subjective
387
experience and thought to physical inputs are major determinants of 
mental experience; at the same time, the phenomena of reference and 
meaning, and the individual experience ofqualin (the subjective side of 
conscious experience) remain irreducible.
The paper advocates a supervenience theory, which holds that mental 
events are dependent on their physical substrata but not reducible to 
than. Challenging the determinism of "strong" supervenience, I defend a 
version of "soft” supervenience that allows for genuine mental causation; 
not all causes of human behaviour are purely neuronal causes. This view 
gives rise in turn to an emergentist theory of the person: menial 
phenomena resuUfrom an incredibly complex physical system, the brain, 
but represent a genuinely neiv causal and explanatory level within the 
world. Still, I remain a monist: there are many types of properties 
encountered in the world, although it is only the one nature which bears 
all these properties. The final position, emergentist monism, thus allows 
for diversity within the context of the one world. This vieiu is open at the 
top for metaphysical applications and interpretations, while retaining the 
close link to neuroscientific study and its residts. Many religious traditions 
offer an interpretation of the whole world based on a yet higher order of 
emergence, although the notion of God ivould clearly move beyond the 
natural order as a ivhole. Theism can therefore in principle supplement 
the natural scientific study of the world without negating it.
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Two extreme positions would, if true, block any significant dialogue 
between the neurosciences and many religious accounts of the self. 
Strong forms of dualism -  at least those that make the miiid a 
separate substance -  remove mental phenomena forever from the 
realm of scientific study. On the other hand, eliminative materialism 
"explains" mental phenomena by making them nothing other than 
the underlying physical processes of which they are the product; it 
also resolves the debate with most of the metaphysical traditions 
by removing them altogether from the realm of plausible theories. 
For this reason, the present talk challenges the "Sufficiency Thesis," 
according to which neuroscientific explanations will finally be 
sufficient to fully explain human behaviour.
Once these two views have been dismissed, a wide range of 
interesting possibilities remains. In what follows I would like to 
explore some of the ways in which neuroscientific results and 
metaphysical interpretations might contribute to an overall theory
of the person. Structural couplings of subjective experience and 
thought to physical inputs are major determinants of mental 
experience; at the same time, the phenomena of reference and 
meaning, and the individual experience of qualia (the subjective 
side of conscious experience) remain irreducible.
The paper advocates a supervenience theory, which holds that 
mental events are dependent on their physical substrata but not 
reducible to them. Challenging the determinism of "strong" 
supervenience, I defend a version of "soft" supervenience that 
allov^s for genuine mental causation; not all causes of human 
behaviour are purely neuronal causes. This view gives rise in 
turn to an emergentist theory of the person: mental phenomena 
result from an incredibly complex physical system, the brain, but 
represent a genuinely new causal and explanatory level within 
the world. Still, I remain a nionist: there are many types of 
properties encountered in the world, although it is only the one 
nature which bears all these properties. The final position, 
emergentist monism, thus allows for diversity within the context of 
the one world. This view is open at the top for metaphysical 
applications and interpretations, while retaining the close link to 
neuroscientific study and its results. Many religious traditions 
offer an interpretation of the whole world based on a yet higher 
order of emergence, although the notion of an ultimate reality 
would clearly move beyond the natural order as a whole.
The debate about neuroscience, psychology and mind presents 
one with a confusing clutter of possibilities. And yet in one sense 
one finds herself returning again and again to one basic choice. 
Many neuroscientists, but not all, maintain the Sufficiency Thesis. 
It is the view that in the future neuroscience will be sufficient to 
explain all that we know about the human person. This view 
contrasts with the Insufficiency Thesis, which predicts that 
neuroscience will not be sufficient to explain all we come to 
know about the human person. I defend the Insufficiency Thesis in 
what follows not because of blindness to the power of the 
neurosciences (far from it!), but because there are parts of what it 
is to be a person that lie in principle beyond their reach. This 
"something more" has been called variously consciousness 
(Chalmers, Nagel, Jackson, McGinn), original intentionality (Searle), 
or perhaps caring (Haugeland). What is intentionality, and why 
should it play an important role?
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Emergentist non-reductionism and mind
Study of the human person involves not only all the knowledge 
we can glean about the brain and its workings, but also study of 
the emergent level of thought, described and explained not only in 
terms o f its physical inputs and nature, but also in terms intrinsic to 
itself. But how are we to integrate these two levels, and what 
framework should we use? I suggest beginning with the notion 
of the human person as psychosomatic unity. Humans are both 
body and mind, and both in an interconnected manner. How does 
this work?
It is not difficult to describe what is normally connoted by the 
word "person." A person is one who is able to enter into human 
social interaction; praising your work colleague, planning your 
dinner party, carrying out your intention to graduate from 
university by next year, and being aware of (at least some) other 
humans as moral agents who have value and rights equal to 
your own. These are concepts of personhood that are basic to 
research in the social sciences (psychology, sociology, and cultural 
anthropology); they are reflected in the literature of all the 
world's cultures as well as in multiple religious traditions. Of 
course, there are many questions that still leave us unsure: when 
does personhood start? Does it demand a metaphysical basis, 
such as the introduction of the soul or person-substance? Does it 
develop and end gradually? Can it be effaced within a human 
being? Is it a legal or social fiction, or a metaphysical reality? 
Such broader philosophical questions are crucial to the complete 
definition of personhood and hence part of the discussion that 
neuroscientists and religious persons must have if they are to 
find any common ground at all.
Personhood is therefore a level of analysis that has no complete 
translation into a state of the body or brain -  no matter how 
complete our neuroscience might be. Of course, it presupposes 
such states; yet personhood represents an explanatory level that 
is distinct from explanations at the level of our "hardware." As 
Brian Cantwell Smith writes:
First, you and I do not exist in [physical explanations] -  qua 
people. We may be material, divine, social, embodied, whatever -  
but we don't figure as people in any physicist's equation. What we
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are -  or rather what our lives are, in this picture -  is a group of 
roughly aligned, not-terribly-well delineated, very slightly 
wiggling four-dimensional worms or noodles: massively longer 
temporally than spatially. We care tremendously about these 
noodles. But physics does not: it does nothing to identify them, 
either as personal, or as unitary, or as distinct from the boundless 
number of other worms that could be inscribed on the physical 
plenum... (Cantwell Smith unpublished, p. 3).
The languages of physics and of personhood only partly overlap; 
one cannot do justice to the one using only the tools of the other. 
To give a purely physics-based account of the person is like saying 
that, because an academic society cannot survive without being 
financially viable (e.g., receiving income from some source), it just 
is the economic unit which economists describe in terms of income 
and expenditures. The confusion, one might say, is a confusion of 
necessary and sufficient conditions. A living body and a functioning 
brain are necessary conditions for personhood, yet the wide 
discrepancy in the "logic" of the vocabularies suggests that they 
are not sufficient conditions. Personhood is not fully translatable 
into "lower-level" terms; persons experience causal and 
phenomenological properties {qualia) that are uniquely personal.
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Emergentist supervenience
I will argue that the philosophical notion of supervenience is 
especially attrachve as a bridge framework when discussing 
neuroscience and the person. Simply put, supervenience grants 
the dependence of mental phenomena on physical phenomena 
while at the same time denying the reducibility of the mental to 
the physical. Note that supervenience is about properties or 
groups of phenomena, and not about relations between substances 
(and the ontology that supports them).
Supervenience might be defined as follows:
B-properties supervene on A-properties if no two possible 
situations are identical with respect to their A-properties 
while differing in their B-properties.
Early uses of the concept of supervenience described the way in 
which ethical judgments are dependent upon certain physical
states and yet are not reducible to them. The notion made its 
major entrance into the mind/body debate in the early arhcle 
"Mental Causation" by Donald Davidson. Davidson writes,
Although the position I describe denies there are psychophysical 
laws, it is consistent with the view that mental characteristics are 
in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical 
characteristics. Such supervenience might be taken to mean that 
there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but 
differing in some mental respects, or that an object cannot alter in 
some mental respects without altering in some physical respects. 
Dependence or supervenience of this kind does not entail 
reductibility [szc] through law or definition: if it did, we could 
reduce moral properties to descriptive [ones], and this there is 
good reason to believe cannot be done (Davidson 1980, p. 214).
What about the relationship of dependence between the mental 
and the physical? We might call those views strong supervenience 
in which the physical determines the mental in its emergence 
and in all its subsequent behaviour. Bruntrup writes of the strong 
supervenience relation, "Micro-properties determine completely 
the macro-properties (micro-determinism).... If mental properties 
are macro-properties in this sense, they care causally inefficacious 
qua mental properties" (Bruntrup 1998). In this construal of the 
physical/mental relationship, for example, one might hold that 
there are general physical laws such that, if they were known, the 
occurrence of any given mental event could be predicted from a 
thorough enough knowledge of the brain, its structure, and its 
past and present inputs.
There is a certain inherent tension in strong supervenience, however. 
As Jaegwon Kim, one of its best known (former) advocates, admits, 
"nonreductive materialism is not a stable position. There are pressures 
of various sorts that push it either in the direction of an outright 
eliminativism or in the direction of an explicit form of dualism" 
(Kim 1994; cf. the more recent treatment in Kim 2000). One of the 
reasons for this instability is that such a position appears to leave no 
room for genuine mental causes; all the determination of outcomes 
seems to flow from the bottom (the physical substratum), leaving no 
"room for play" for the mental actually to do anything. At worst, 
mental phenomena become mere epiphenomena; their reality is 
bought at the cost of causal impotence.
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So the question becomes: Can any framework that is consistent 
with what we know today about the brain, and with what we 
may reasonably be expected to come to know, also be consistent 
with a real causal influence of mental phenomena? Not only folk 
psychology, the common-sense way of speaking of human persons, 
depends on a successful theory of mental causation, but the 
viability of key beliefs in many of the world's religious traditions 
does as well. Strong supervenience theories might suggest how 
religious beliefs and experiences could arise. But however much 
the function of religious beliefs might be incorporated in such 
accounts, their truth could not be. There would be no place for 
religious insights as correct to alter behaviour, and definitely no 
role for any influence of a disembodied divine force on the 
world. The supervenience concept seemed to offer the sort of 
framework required for drawing the links between the brain 
sciences and the mental life that we experience. But strong 
supervenience conflicts both with folk psychology and with 
many religious truth claims.
Is it possible, then, to formulate a "weaker" version of the 
dependence relationship? Suppose we define weak supervenience 
as the view that, although physical structures and causes may 
determine the initial emergence of the mental, they do not fully 
or solely determine the outcome of the mental life subsequent to 
its emergence. This view amounts to a dependence on genesis, 
since it grants that the origins of mentality can be traced to the 
physical conditions without which there would be no mental 
phenomena. But it does not grant a full, bottom-up determination 
of the mental by the physical -  hence the "Insufficiency Thesis" 
defended above -  even though the degree of bottom-up influence 
will certainly far exceed our present knowledge. Weak 
supervenience thus retains the central tenet of supervenience 
theory: the mental is dependent on, yet not reducible to, the 
physical. One reason for choosing weak over strong supervenience 
is the belief in mental causation: there are genuine mental causes 
that are not themselves the product of physical causes. The 
causal history of the mental cannot be told in physical terms, and 
the outcome of mental events is not determined by phenomena 
at the physical level alone.
Weak supervenience is the stepping-off point for an emergentist 
theory of supervenience, and thus an emergentist theory of
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human personhood. The background for emergentist 
supervenience comes from the British Emergentists in the 1920s 
and '30s. As Jaegwon Kim notes, the early emergentists held 
"that the supervenient, or emergent, qualities necessarily manifest 
themselves when, and only when, appropriate conditions obtain 
at the more basic level; and some emergentists took great pains 
to emphasize that the phenomenon of emergence is consistent 
with determinism. But in spite of that, the emergents are not 
reducible, or rediictively explainable, in terms of their 'basal' 
conditions" (Kim 1993, p. 138).
A property is thus emergent only if laws cannot be formulated at 
the lower level that predict its occurrence and behaviour, say as a 
boundary condition of other well-established laws at that level. If 
for example we can relate the levels with the same bottom-up 
precision with which we can formulate the necessary physical 
conditions for the existence of conductivity or elasticity, then we 
do not have emergentist supervenience. A set of phenomena is 
designated as emergentist only when an exhaustive description 
of the underlying physical state of affairs, although necessary, is 
not sufficient for explaining the emergent properties. Thus an 
emergent condition seems to be implied in Leslie Brothers' (1997) 
explanation of human social behaviour in terms of "the 
representation of the generalized other" and the irreducible 
nature of first-person language -  assuming that she means these 
terms to refer to a genuinely psychological reality that is something 
more than, and not just a different manifestation of, the underlying 
physical realities. One would also need to use the language of 
emergence if qualia (human subjective experiences, such as seeing 
red or being in love) are, at least in part, self-explaining.
I believe that emergentist supervenience offers the philosophically 
most adequate framework for conceptualizing mental properties 
in human persons. Does emergentist supervenience also offer a 
view of the person that is more compatible with the religious 
traditions than strong supervenience as defined above? Could it 
offer a better bridge principle? Clearly the answer is yes. 
Presumably the religious traditions would have many more 
things to say about emergent properties and their source and 
ultimate purpose. They might also attempt to offer religiously 
based explanations of why the biological world could or would 
give rise to such emergent properties. Two caveats, however:
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when speaking in this way, the scholars of religion do not speak 
as scientists, and the status of such language vis-a-vis any presently 
available empirical verification should be made fully clear. Also, 
there is nothing in emergentist supervenience that requires a 
religious interpretation; it is not a form of natural theology. 
Emergentism is, in my view, a necessary condition for an adequate 
interpretation of the human person, but it is emphatically not a 
sufficient condition for a religious anthropology.
Coming from the viewpoint of science, one might worry that 
such a position closes off research and hence progress in 
neuroscience. Does it introduce a constraint on the work of 
empirical scientists? I would argue not. Emergentists may have 
an equally vivid interest in knowing more about actual brain 
functions and in seeing neural explanations extended as far as 
possible. It is just that they wager that the "as far as possible" 
does not extend as far as an exhaustive explanation of the mental
-  unless part of that explanation is given in irreducibly mental 
terms! Talk about the subjective experience of being in love or the 
sense of self-awareness is irreducibly mental; such phenomena 
exercise a type of causal influence of their own.
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Three types of supervenience
By exploring supervenience approaches that eschew both dualism 
and strong reductionism, this paper has focused on that range of 
positions that seek to do jushce both to neuroscience and to the 
human experience of personhood. Following contemporary usage, 
I have characterized these as the family of supervenience theories. 
We discovered, however, that some of the same tensions arise 
within this family as were present in the old dualism versus 
reductionism debate. Specifically, one either does or does not 
accept the Sufficiency Thesis, the view that the causal explanations 
of human behaviour will ultimately be given in neuroscientific 
terms.
Since both sides of this new debate accept the supervenience 
label, one might suppose that the ambiguity lies in the term 
itself. And indeed this is exactly right: one finds in the literature 
at least three different ways of characterizing the relation of the 
mental to the physical. All three presuppose that mental
phenomena represent levels of complexification that depend on
lower, more simple levels, yet that are in some sense not fully
reducible to those lower levels:
(1) The more complex level could be related to the lower level 
by a clear set of laws (call it noniological siipervenience). These 
are phenomena that are well understood scientifically in 
terms of the behaviour of the particles making up the physical 
system in question, although the supervenient properties 
cannot be fully expressed except at the level of the set of 
particles as a whole. Nomological supervenience is also 
visible in the work of R M Hare, who says explicitly that 
"supervenience brings with it the claim that there is some 
Taw' which binds what supervenes to what it supervenes 
upon." For Hare such laws are necessary conditions for 
supervenience; "what supervenience requires is that what 
supervenes is seen as an instance of some universal 
proposition linking it with what it supervenes upon" (Hare 
1984, p. 3).
(2) The higher level could have all of the attributes listed in (1), 
yet without the condition just expressed by Hare, which we 
might call the "nomological condition." This second position 
is best known in the guise of what Donald Davidson calls 
"anomalous monism." Davidson holds that "mental entities 
(particular time-space and space-bound objects and events) 
are physical entities, b u t... mental concepts are not reducible 
by definition or natural law to physical concepts" (Davidson 
1995, p. 3; cf. Davidson 1980). Davidson disputes the law- 
likeness of mental events; mental events are of a type different 
from physical events, although there is a token identity of 
every mental event with a physical event. Still, in other 
respects, his view stands fairly close to (1). Certainly he does 
not speak of mental phenomena as genuinely emergent. He 
insists only that at least one portion of the physical world 
does not admit of the kinds of causal explanation by means 
of natural laws that science has been successful in formulating 
in so many other areas. Yet no emergentist conclusions 
should be derived from this particular failure of law-like 
explanation, Davidson seems to say; the mental simply obeys 
different constraints than physical laws, such as the unique 
constraint of rationality.
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(3) The final type of supervenience is the one that I have been 
defending. It finds in mental phenomena and their 
dependence on the physical a supervenient relationship not 
unlike that accepted by the other positions. Yet it also finds 
grounds in the nature of this relationship to support the 
ontological hypothesis that mentality represents an emergent 
level. That is, without questioning the dependence on the 
physical, it understands mental properties to be different in 
kind from the properties that one observes at lov^er levels 
and to exercise a type of causal influence unique to this new 
emergent level.
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Emergentist monism
In closing, one might ask, "What does it all mean? What kind of 
ontological position do these emergent properties entail? Is it 
monism or property dualism or panpsychism?"
The ontological view that I defend might be called emergentist 
monism. Monism asserts that only one kind of thing exists. There 
are not two substances in the world with essentially different 
natures, such as the res cogitans and res extensa (thinking and 
extended substance) propounded by Descartes and the Cartesians. 
But unlike dual-aspect monism, which argues that the mental 
and the physical are two different ways to characterize the one 
"stuff," emergentist monism conceives the relationship between 
them as temporal and hierarchical.
In one sense, monism is a necessary assumption for those who 
wish to do science. For instance, we can (and must) assume that 
the total physical energy of the universe as a whole is conserved. 
No action that you perform, no thought that you think, can add 
to the total energy of the system without invalidating calculations 
based on physical laws. Incidentally, this is the problem with 
dualism, and with direct interventions into the world by a God 
who breaks natural laws: if a spiritual cause gives rise to a 
physical effect, it has brought about physical change without a 
physical cause or the expenditure of physical energy, and this 
fractures the natural order in a way that would make science 
impossible. There could be no scientific study of a world where 
cups spontaneously fly across the room and objects released from
your hand could go either up or down according to spiritual 
forces. Science does not need full determinism (see the next 
paragraph). But it does need the world to reflect at least patterns 
of probability over time.
(Note that monism is not only in the interests of science; one can 
also give metaphysical arguments in defence of monism. Monism 
makes the assertion that the world is one, that it constitutes a 
distinct order. Theistic metaphysicians, for example, speak of the 
universe as a whole as finite, in order to specify its single 
ontological status and to contrast it with a Creator whose nature 
is essentially infinite. Herein lies the importance of the phrase, 
"the unity of nature": in comparison to the Creator, all things in 
the universe share a common nature. Theologians have also 
argued that creatures can only exercise freedom within an ordered 
world that has an integrity and law-like structure of its own.)
I do not care if you want to think of this monism as a sort of 
materialism, but only if you mean by that that the "things" in the 
world-rocks and computers and persons -  are all made out of 
some material or other. What is crucial is that you develop theories 
which do justice to the specific qualities that we actually find 
associated with the various "things" in the world. For example, 
after Newton we thought that physics presupposed at least the 
possibility of a fully determinate, and determined, account of the 
world. But when we found out that microphysical or quantum 
events simply do not work this way, we developed an essentially 
stochastic or probability-based science to deal with them. Likewise, 
when scientists began to research chaotic "systems," or systems 
far from thermodynamic equilibrium, they discovered that they 
were essentially unpredictable (for finite agents). But science did 
not end; instead, a fascinating new science of chaotic systems has 
developed. An equally complex story would have to be told 
about the convertibility of matter and energy.
Now we come to a very complex object in the world: humans. 
With 10'“' neural connections, the brain is the most complex 
interconnected system we are aware of in the universe. This 
object has some very strange properties that we call "mental" 
properties-properties such as being afraid of a stock market 
crash, or wishing for universal peace, or believing in divine 
revelation. On the one hand, to suppose that these features will
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be fully understood in terms of physics as we now know it, is 
precisely that: a supposition, an assumption, a wager on a future 
outcome. A deep commitment to the study and understanding of 
the natural world (which I share with most of the contributors to 
this volume) does not necessitate taking a physicalist approach to 
the human person -  if by that one means that the actions of 
persons must be explained through a series of explanatory sciences 
reaching down (finally) to physics, or, more simply, that all 
causes are ultimately physical causes, (note that under this 
definition there could be both reductionist and nonreduchonist 
versions of physicalism.) On the other hand,/or both scientific and 
religions reasons, I do not therefore advocate introducing an occult 
entity, such as Descartes' soul substance, in order to explain the 
person. To say that the human person is a psychosomatic unity is 
to resist both positions. I instead say that the person is a complexly 
patterned entity within the world, one with diverse sets of 
naturally occurring properties, each of which needs to be 
understood by a science appropriate to its own level o f complexity. YJe 
need multiple layers of explanatory accounts because the human 
person is a physical, biological, psychological and (I believe also) 
spiritual reality, and because these aspects of its reality, though 
interdependent, are not mutually reducible. Call the existence of 
these multiple layers ontological pluralism, and call the need for 
multiple layers of explanation explanatory pluralism, and my 
thesis becomes clear: ontological pluralism begets explanatory 
pluralism. (Or, to put it differently: the best explanation for 
explanatory pluralism is ontological pluralism.)
In her essay (Russell et al 1999), Nancey Murphy draws on the 
work of Ian Barbour and Arthur Peacocke (1993,1999) in 
chronicling the multiple meanings of "reductionism." Given her 
definitions, note that an emergentist position rejects causal 
reductionism, since it accepts mental causes. It therefore rejects 
explanatory (theoretical, epistemological) reductionism, insofar 
as mental properties need to be explained using a theoretical 
structure appropriate to them. At first blush, emergentist monism 
may seem like a version of ontological or metaphysical 
reductionism, since it breaks with dualism and refuses to postulate 
non-physical entities such as souls. But emergentists must finally 
declare themselves opposed to reductionism even with respect to 
ontological (metaphysical) questions. For their central assertion 
is that the history of the universe is one of development and
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process. The one order exists at each stage in its history, but what 
it is that exists is not identical through time. Genuinely new 
properties emerge which are not reducible to what came before, 
although they are continuous with it.
What emerges in the human case is a particular psycho-somatic 
unity, an organism that can do things both mentally and physically. 
Although mental functions supervene upon a physiological basis, 
the two sets of attributes are interconnected and exhibit causal 
influences in both directions. We therefore need a science or 
mode of study that begins (as a science should) with a theoretical 
structure adequate to this level of complexity. To defend an 
emergentist account of the self is not to turn science into 
metaphysics. Instead, it is to acknowledge that the one natural 
world is vastly more complicated and more subtle than 
physicalism can ever grasp. You can wager that the real things 
that exist in the world are physical processes within organisms, 
and that everything else -  intentions, free will, ideas like justice 
or ultimate reality -  are "constructs," complicated manifestations 
of neural processes. But I am wagering on the other side. I wager 
that no level of explanation short of irreducibly psychological 
explanations will finally do an adequate job of accounting for the 
human person. And this means, I have argued, the real existence 
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Abstract
The way science has developed in the past four hundred years, it has 
become the traditional role o f physics to explain all natural phenomena 
at the most fundamental level. In this endeavour concepts like space, 
time, matter, mass, particle, radiation, wave, energy, causality draivn 
from everyday experience are suitably defined, quantified and 
incorporated into mathematical equations formidated to represent the 
underlying physical explanations. In these formulations, the guiding 
and restricting role o f laws o f nature discerned from varieties of 
experience are taken into account. Verification of the predictions and 
falsifications, the key factors in scientific methodology have been 
responsible for the successes achieved. It has happened in the history of 
science that many of these concepts originally derived from experience, 
have had to be radically modified and transformed and even transcended 
(going beyond limits of normal human experience) to explain neivly 
discovered phenomena, as well as those that defied explanation in the 
old framework, in the domain o f physical sciences themselves.
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The concepts of four dimensional space-time continuum, equivalence of 
mass and energy, the dependence of the rate of flow of time on the 
velocity of the moving frame of reference, the equivalence o f curvature 
o f space and mass, and o f force and acceleration which ivere all ushered 
in by the special and general theories of relativity and the concept of 
vacuum as the ultimate substratum that is the very source of all 
constituents and forces of nature as highlighted by quantum theory, are 
some of the typical examples of such transcendences in physics dictated 
by new experimental results. These aspects will be elaborated in this 
presentation with a view to emphasize that in the efforts to resolve the 
problems of Consciousness in terms of neuronal correlates and the 
associated physico-chemical processes, transcendences of some of the 
physical and biological concepts, may be required. In the same way as 
the 'spin' parameter o f individual particles (integral or half-integral of 
h) controls the behaviour o f large assemblies of these particles to obey 
either the Bose-Einstein or Fermi-Dirac Statistical distributions only, 
and also determine the very structure of elements in the periodic table 
and their properties, there may be very sensitive bio-parameters at the 
cell or sub-cell levels which may influence the group behaviour of 
bundles o f neurons that could lead to emergence of consciousness and 
its many ramifications.
404 B V Sreekantan
1. Introduction
The real and crucial problem of consciousness which has been 
outstanding and unexplained for several centuries, and which in 
recent years has been termed 'the hard problem of consciousness', 
is to explain the subjective experiences like cognition, recognition, 
feeling, sensation, thought, emotion etc. in terms of the physico­
chemical activities of the brain. Recent developments in the field 
of neurosciences have provided elaborate and minute details of 
these processes in the various cortices of the brain, in the hundreds 
of billions of neurons that spread out from the brain to the 
various organs of the body, in the sensors that interface with the 
external world, in the glial and other cells in the brain, in the 
bloodstream, in the endocrinal and immunological systems and 
so on. While a variety of techniques have contributed to the vast 
store of knowledge that has accumulated over the centuries, in 
recent decades employment of newer non-invasive techniques, 
like CATSCAN, PET, fNMR, magnetic encephalograph, lasers.
and computer-coupled micro-electrodes, have provided much 
higher spatial- and time-resolutions for mapping ongoing 
processes in different locations of the body. These processes 
themselves, being chemical, physical, electro-chemical, or electro­
magnetic, fall well within the framework of science and therefore 
of proper interpretation.
It has to be emphasized that all physical processes in nature are, in 
the final analysis, quantum processes. However, not all require the 
use of sophisticated quantum mechanical analysis and can be 
treated in the classical framework. The general rule in this regard 
is that if the 'action' involved in the process under consideration is 
large compared to the action defined by the Planck constant h, 
then classical approximation is adequate and works. There is, 
however, need for caution. There are many instances in which 
subtle influences of a quantum nature influence gross phenomena 
in a major way, especially if the macro-processes are the combined 
results of large assemblies of micro-quantum units.
In the history of life sciences, it has become clear that the detailed 
mode of functioning of many of the organs of human and animal 
bodies, like the heart, liver, lung, kidney and so on, can be fully 
explained in terms of physics and chemistry and there is no need 
to go beyond them either in terms of concepts or forces. In most 
of these cases, even classical physics and chemistry are adequate. 
However, when it comes to explaining the processes that go on in 
the brain and its accessories leading to consciousness, as hoped 
for by most scientists, it soon becomes apparent that normal 
concepts and procedures of explanation are hopelessly inadequate 
and that some kind of transcendences of these are absolutely 
essential. Such Transcendences (going beyond the limits of normal 
experience) have taken place several times in the past in the field 
of the physical sciences itself. The following are a few typical 
illustrations of such happenings.
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2. Space-time continuum
Space and Time are two important concepts drawn from our 
daily experience. These are very different kinds of experiences. 
In our minds, space is characterized by emptiness and as a 
plenum for matter to occupy. Time is something that flows
independent of us. In Newtonian dynamics, space and time are 
independent of each other. Time is universal and the rate of flow 
of time is the same everywhere and is independent of motion. All 
these ideas underwent a radical change, when Einstein introduced 
his special theory of relativity to explain the experimental fact 
that the velocity of light is independent of the motion of the 
source or observer as dictated by the famous experiments of 
Michelson and Morley. Einstein stated "we can do away with the 
ether; the velocity of light may be regarded as a constant of 
nature independent of the motion of the source or observer. But, 
we have to give up our conventional ideas of space and time". 
According to him, “the Laws of Science should be the same for 
all freely moving observers no matter what their speed". 
Formulating the special theory of relahvity he stated:
(i) There is no absolute time; space and time have to be fused 
into four-dimensional space-time continuum
(ii) Space contracts and time dilates in a moving medium -  the 
extent depends on the velocity
(iii) Idea of simultaneity has no longer any meaning.
Einstein's theory led to the very important consequence that 
Mass and Energy, two distinctly different concepts till then, were 
equivalent and related by the equation E=mc-.
Einstein went further and developed the general theory of 
relativity which had more drastic consequences. Space is no 
longer Euclidean, and space-time becomes increasingly curved 
in the presence of mass and energy. While in Newtonian theory, 
gravitation is a force, in Einstein's general theory the gravitational 
laws describe the relation between the mass of the gravitating 
body and the structure of the field around it. In fact mass itself 
can be looked upon as curvature of the space-time continuum.
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3. Action at a distance
Let us consider the case of Newtonian dynamics ushered in by 
Newton more than three hundred years ago. On the basis of 
observations on the motion of bodies on earth, he framed his 
famous laws of motion and extended them to explain the laws of 
planetary motion that had been enunciated by Kepler. According
to Newton, the force between the sun and the earth that kept the 
earth in its orbit was proportional to the product of their masses 
and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between 
them. However, he did not clarify how this gravitational force 
was transmitted between the two objects, which were so far 
away from each other. The basic concepts used in Newtonian 
dynamics, force, mass, and distance, were all familiar concepts 
and derived on the basis of everyday experience 
(anthropomorphic) of the common man in his daily transactions. 
There was a 'ring' of familiarity about them. However, there 
were aspects which created problems in fuller understanding. 
One, of course, was the source of this gravitational force and the 
other was the 'action at a distance'. Till then, the impression in 
the minds of common men was that for force to act, spatial 
contact between the two bodies involved was essential. Action at 
a distance meant, in this case, transmission of force without any 
physical matter between them. Newton was aware of this problem. 
He had no answer. He is reported to have said 'God only 
knows'!.
The same problem of action at a distance was encountered in the 
fields of electricity and magnetism, though in these cases the 
distances were of much smaller magnitude. Faraday introduced 
the idea of magnetic and electric fields, without specifying the 
physical contents of these fields. Subsequently, the vague concept 
of 'ether' was brought in to explain these various fields. Maxwell 
who developed the electro-magnetic theory tried hard to explain 
the propagation of electro-magnetic waves in terms of the elastic 
properties of the ether, but did not succeed. The concept of ether 
was later abandoned since it conflicted with experimental results 
on the velocity of propagation of light which had been identified 
as comprising electro-magnetic waves. It is interesting to point 
out here how sometimes the relation between cause and effect 
gets wrongly identified and misplaced. Maxwell thought that the 
elastic properties of the ether were somehow responsible for the 
propagation of electro-magnetic waves. Later theories showed 
that the elastic properties of any medium are the result of the 
electro-magnetic interactions of the constituents of the medium.
The action at a distance and the propagation of electro-magnetic 
waves could be tackled only in the framework of the new 
quantum field theories and relativity theories. These theories
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required a total transcendence in the old and familiar concepts of 
space, time, causality, force, particle, wave etc. This was much 
more radical and far-reaching in consequences than the paradigm 
shift that happened in just moving from a Geocentric to a 
Heliocentric system.
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4. Quantum tunneling
In the discovery of radioactivity, almost towards the end of the 
19th Century, something very strange had been observed -  
emission of a-particles from very heavy nuclei like uranium. To 
come out of the nucleus, the a-particle had to overcome a huge 
potential barrier. The particle did not have the energy to do this. 
Yet occasionally it did come out. There was no explanation in 
terms of the classical ideas. This is where the dualistic wave/ 
particle ideas of quantum mechanics which were just being 
developed came in handy. By treating the a-particle as a wave 
and solving the corresponding Schrodinger wave equation, the 
probability of finding the particle outside the nucleus w^s 
calculated and found to be finite. This meant essentially occasional 
penetration of the a-particle through the potential barrier. In this 
explanation one had to give up the conventional idea of the 
"trajectory" of the particle defining its precise location in space 
and time, at every instant.
What is interesting and intriguing is that the same physical 
entity, namely the a-particle is registered by the Geiger counter 
as a particle and it leaves the track of a  particle in a cloud 
chamber. But for understanding its penetration through the 
potential barrier, it has to be regarded as a wave. This wave/ 
particle duality has to be built into the explanation of the 
phenomenon. This duality has other ramifications too. Light 
which we considered as an electromagnetic wave also has this 
dual character. Depending on the experimental set up it can be 
seen as a wave or as a particle (photon). In phenomena like 
interference, diffraction or polarization, light behaves like a wave. 
In phenomena like the photoelectric effect, or the Compton 
effect, light behaves like a particle. The particular mode of light 
to be seen depends on the choice of the observer. This raises the 
question, how can objective reality become subject dependent? 
How can the same entity be an extended object like a wave and
an extremely compactified point-like object, a particle? Apart 
from the deep philosophical implications, such dual aspects as 
far as scientists are concerned, focus attention on the necessity of 
evolving a proper scientific framework in which such apparently 
contradictory features that go against common sense and 
experience are resolved.
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5. The Dirac sea: (The quantum mechanical 
vacuum)
When Dirac formulated the quantum mechanical equation for a 
relativistic electron, and solved it, he was surprised to find 
solutions that corresponded to both positive and negative energy 
states of the electron. The normal practice was to treat the 
negative energy solutions as 'unphysical' and just ignore them 
and consider only the positive energy solutions. Dirac just did 
not do that. He transcended the normal practice and tried to 
interpret the negative energy states in a bold unconventional 
way. He assumed that all the negative energy states of the 
electron, an infinite number of them, are completely filled in 
'empty space' in which we see the movement of the electrons 
which have positive energy states. If however one of the electrons 
in the negative energy states makes a spontaneous transition due 
to fluctuation to a positive energy state then a 'hole' is created in 
the sea of negative energy states and this 'hole' behaves like a 
particle of opposite charge, namely positive charge, and if the 
energy available due to fluctuation is sufficiently large, then 
there is manifestation of two particles -  an electron and a 
positron (as the hole is called). This pair creation happens more 
easily if a quantum of energy in the form of a photon is deposited 
into this Dirac vacuum or empty space. The positron is regarded 
as the 'anti-particle' of the electron. Right in the beginning, Dirac 
thought that this positively charged particle may be the proton 
itself which however has a mass widely different from that of the 
electron. Soon it became clear that, even for theoretical reasons, 
the particle has to be the positive counterpart of the electron 
itself. Around the same period, without being aware of these 
theoretical developments in England, Carl Anderson in USA, 
discovered in cosmic rays a particle which had a positive charge 
and the same mass as the electron. This is undoubtedly Dirac's 
positron. This whole development brought about awareness of
many new aspects of nature. One, of course, is the existence of 
the anti-particles, the other is the revolutionary idea of the Dirac 
vacuum as the plenum in which all the negative energy states are 
filled and with which we cannot normally interact, the third is 
that all other particles can have such seas of negative energy 
states with the possibility of anti-particles being produced under 
suitable conditions. Though many of these ideas of infinite 
negative energy states etc. have undergone transformation in 
later years, in terms of field theoretical concepts the substance of 
Dirac's idea of vacuum or empty space as the plenum from 
which all fundamental particles emerge under favourable 
conditions stands. Dirac says: "All matter is created out of some 
impereptible substratum -  Nothingness, unimaginable, and 
undetectable. But it is a peculiar nothingness out of which matter 
is created".
This new insight on empty space, the quantum vacuum or Dirac 
Sea has very significantly influenced subsequent developments 
in the field of elementary particle physics, cosmology, solid state 
physics etc. The creation and annihilation of particle-antiparticle 
pairs due to fluctuations in the Dirac Sea, a process that 
continuously goes on, opened up several interesting ways of 
understanding hitherto unexplained phenomena. How is the 
electrostatic force between the proton and the electron (for example 
in the hydrogen atom), negotiated though the empty space in 
between? The action at a distance problem that we raised earlier. 
This is now explained in terms of the exchange of virtual particles 
(virtual in the sense that they cannot be observed directly in any 
particle detectors) -  the pairs of electrons and positrons, and 
their annihilation products -  photons, being exchanged between 
the proton and the electron. This new concept of "exchange 
forces" in a sense replaced the old ideas of force drawn from 
daily experience. Is there evidence for such a phenomenon? Yes. 
This too was established, though indirectly through the detection 
of the altered radiation from the hydrogen atom itself. The 
electrons from the virtual pairs would move towards the positively 
charged proton and the positrons towards the electron of the 
atom. This would result in a reduction in the effective force 
between the proton and the electron., and would change the 
frequency of radiation emitted. In the case of other much shorter 
range nuclear forces the particles and anti-particles that were 
exchanged, were not the photons, but various other types of
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mesons of much heavier mass. The essentia) point to note is that 
there was a transcendence again in the very notion of force; and 
how it was negotiated.
In the field of cosmic ray studies (cosmic rays are very high 
energy particles that come from the depths of space), a very 
spectacular phenomenon is encountered. Occasionally more than 
a billion particles are incident almost simultaneously over tens of 
square kilometres at mountain altitude or sea level. These showers 
contain all kinds of fundamental particles -  electrons, positrons, 
photons, nucleons, anti-nucleons, hyperons etc. The most 
intriguing thing is that these billions of particles owe their origin 
to the incidence of just one kind of high energy particle at the top 
of the atmosphere. Where were these particles before they 
manifested? The answer is in the extended Dirac vacuum. The 
primary particle in its collision with an air nucleus, first produces 
a large number of secondaries which start moving down. The 
production of these mesons, nucleons etc. is essentially a mining 
out from the excited vacuum region of the collision, sufficient 
energy being put in by the collision process. Some of the 
secondaries spontaneously decay into other particles. The 
remaining suffer further collisions as they move down and 
repeat the same process and produce more secondaries and this 
cascade of nuclear interactions continues down the atmosphere. 
Among the decay products, there are high energy photons which 
create electron-positron pairs. These electrons and positrons 
radiate high energy photons which give rise to more pairs of 
electrons and positrons. It is this cascading in the atmosphere 
that results in the production of billions of particles, all culled out 
from their hide-out, the quantum mechanical vacuum. The 
phenomenon itself is a gross one with billions of particles that are 
sampled and recorded in instruments like scintillation counters, 
cloud chambers etc. But the entire process involving the creation 
of so many particles is quantum mechanical in nature. Such an 
outcome could never be explained in the classical framework. 
The phenomenon, when analysed in terms of high resolution 
timing devices, beautifully demonstrates some of the relativistic 
effects like time dilation, increase of mass with energy etc. The 
chief point to be noted is the dominant role of empty space or 
vacuum in the whole process, which would never have figured 
in any classical treatment of the problem.
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6. The spin parameter and its large scale 
influence
In addition to the mass and charge of the elementary particles, 
another important parameter that was first discovered in the 
analysis of the hyperfine structure of spectral lines emitted by 
excited atoms of elements is the spin parameter which again is a 
quantized parameter. The spin angular momentum in terms of 
{h/2jt) units can be half-integral, integral or 0 and not any other 
value. What is most interesting is that the particles with half­
integral spin electrons, protons etc. obey in large assemblies one 
kind of statistical behaviour (Fermi-Dirac distribution) and the 
integral spin particles obey quite a different stahstical behaviour 
(Bose-Einstein). These features have tremendous influence on 
certain gross phenomena involving these particles. In fact the 
structure and properties of elements in the periodic table depends 
on the half integral character of the spin of the electrons and the 
Pauli Exclusion Principle. The influence of such parameters on 
macroscopic effects can be seen from the following examples. It 
is known that 99.9% of all matter that we come across on the 
earth is just empty inside. You can ask the question then: If this is 
so, why does not my hand go through the table, for example? 
There is no classical way of understanding this. The explanation 
depends on the quantum mechanical exclusion principle. There 
is lot of excitement in astronomy nowadays regarding condensed 
objects like white dwarfs, neutron stars, black holes etc. The 
factors governing the very formation of these objects and their 
properties depend on the spin parameters of the electrons, the 
protons and the neutrons that constitute the hydrogen and other 
elements of the stars.
There is yet another principle, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, 
of tremendous importance in the quantum world, with major 
consequences in the everyday world that we are familiar with. 
The principle states that 'one carmot measure an object's position 
and momentum precisely and simultaneously'. A further 
elaboration of this principle that turned out to be significant was 
that it is not only a question of inability to measure, but also that 
these parameters do not have very precise values themselves; 
they fluctuate within the limits of the uncertainty principle -  
APAx> h^^^and AE-At where AP, Ax, AE, At are the
uncertainties in position, momentum, energy and time interval of
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action. This principle provides for departure in the sacrosanct 
principles of conservation of energy and of momentunn. There 
could be a departure in energy conservation by AE in a process 
which proceeds in time less than h/4;r.AE. In nature such 
allowances are made use of, for example, in spontaneous decays 
of some of the fundamental particles.
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7. Conclusions
From the few examples given above (and many more which we 
have not presented here), it becomes apparent that many of the 
simple concepts originally introduced into physical explanations 
like space, time, causality, force, energy etc. have had to undergo 
considerable modification in terms of their implications and 
some have even transcended into the realm beyond normal 
human experience. These changes were forced by the discovery 
of new experimental results. We may remind ourselves that in 
the framework of the special theory of relativity, space and time 
are fused into the space-time continuum; flow of time, spatial 
intervals and even mass became functions of velocity; mass and 
energy become equivalent. In the framework of general theory of 
relativity, space becomes non-Euclidean, curvature of space 
becomes equivalent of mass (one a geometrical property and the 
other a physical quantity). In the light of quantum mechanics, the 
wave-particle complimentarity has to be accepted and even 
vacuum, which was originally conceived in classical physics as 
empty space (absence of all matter and radiation) becomes the 
very source of all the fundamental particles -  the ultimate 
constituents of all matter, radiation and force. The concept of 
force gave way to exchange of virtual particles and anti-particles. 
The example we have given of a very high energy particle 
cascading through nuclear and electromagnetic forces into more 
than a billion particles of different properties is a clear illustration 
of the very dominant role that this so-called vacuum can play in 
creation, and in the destruction of matter and antimatter in 
extremely short intervals of time.
Though all this is in the realm of inanimate matter, it is equally 
relevant to animate matter as well, since the ultimate composition 
of animate matter is not different and has its origin in inanimate 
matter. In the development of organisms from the unicellular
amoeba to the multi-billion-celled man, evolution based on the 
cardinal principles of natural selection and survival of the fittest 
is a subsequent phase to cosmological evolution, perhaps, 
beginning with the Big Bang as most popularly believed in 
scientific circles. These cosmological and creation theories of the 
universe and its variety of constituents have brought about the 
recognition of one very fundamental fact that, in the ultimate 
analysis, all this has arisen out of one substratum, call it quantum 
mechanical vacuum or four-dimensional space-time continuum 
or something equivalent, and this substratum has come into 
existence endowed with very specific properties, now discerned 
by physicists. Not all the properties of this substratum are known 
yet. In addition, the laws of nature have to be what they are, and 
so also the constants of nature. This being the case at the most 
fi> Jamental levels of explanation, the possibility opens up that a 
similar situation may prevail in the living world also and 
explanations of fundamental questions like life, consciousness 
may in some sense be hidden in the as-yet unrecognised aspects 
of vacuum. In as much as the nuclear constituents throw up 
from the vacuum the virtual particles that mediate nuclear forces 
and the charged particles throw up the particles that mediate 
electromagnetic forces, it is conceivable that something similar 
may be happening during neuronal excitations, electronic 
tunneling from synapses, release of neurotransmitters etc. Since 
the consequence we are expecting from such processes is the 
emergence of consciotisness, clearly this has to be a kind of 
transcendence that leads to very different type of cause-effect 
relation. In this context one may point out the following example, 
in the familiar field of chemistry. The three elements Carbon, 
Nitrogen and Oxygen combine differently to produce alcohols, 
sugars and fatty acids whose properties are very different. What 
is different is only the physical spatial structure of each brought 
about by the electromagnetic forces mediated by the virtual 
particles created in the intermolecular spaces. While the individual 
molecules do not show distinct properties, in large assemblies 
these properties 'emerge'. The whole is more than its constituents!
It may also be appropriate to remind ourselves of the cascade 
phenomenon -  emergence of a billion particles through nuclear 
and electromagnetic cascades by the incidence of just one particle 
of very high energy -  creation, decay and annihilation of particles 
under the supreme role of the underlying vacuum.
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Abstract
Is consciousness an accident caused by random evolutionary processes? 
Or is it a fundamental property tMt emerges as a natural consequence 
of laws of nature? Are these laws of nature different from the laws of 
physics? Does 'information' play a more fundamental role than matter 
and energy when it comes to mind-body synthesis? A modest attempt 
will be made to address these difficult questions from a physicist's point 
of view.
Introduction
Most of the physicists today believe that we are very dose to a 
unified theory of matter (UTM) based on p-brane theory (a 
variant of String [0-brane] theory) (Sarkar 2001). This theory has 
been well-motivated by the successes (from micro-chips to
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satellites) and the difficulties (the presence of infinities) of 
Quantum Gauge Field Theories (QED, Electro-Weak theory, GUT 
and SUSY GUT etc.) most of which are based on solid 
experimental evidences (measuring Lande g-factor of electron up 
to 10 significant places, prediction of Z-boson etc.). This 'theory 
of everything' tells us that all carbon atoms (after they are born 
out of nucleo-synthesis in the core of stars) in this universe are 
the same in space and in time, and thus is unable to explain why 
the carbon atoms present in a lump of roughly three-pound of 
ordinary matter - the human brain -  give rise to such ineffable 
qualities as feeling, thought, purpose, awareness and freewill 
that are taken to be evidence for 'consciousness'!
Is Consciousness an accident caused by random evolutionary 
processes in the sense that it would not evolve again had the 
present universe to undergo a 'big-crunch' to start with another 
'big-bang'? NO! It is a fundamental property that emerges as a 
natural consequence of laws of nature. Are these laws of nature 
different from the laws of physics? Is there a way to expand the 
UTM to incorporate consciousness? In this paper I make an 
attempt to point out a possible direction for such an expansion to 
achieve a unified theory of matter and mind by considering 
'information' to be more fundamental than matter and energy.
Nature manifests itself not only at the gross level of phenomena 
(accessible to direct senses) but also at the subtle level of natural 
laws (accessible to 'refined' senses). Consciousness is the ability to 
access nature at both these levels. Hence everything in nature is 
conscious, but there is a hierarchy in the level of consciousness. 
Although animals, plants and few machines today can access the 
gross level of nature, access to the subtle level seems to be purely 
human. In this sense a layman is less conscious compared to a 
scientist or an artist. (Is it possible that a level of consciousness 
exists compared to which a scientist or an artist of today may 
appear a layman?) Once everything (both matter and mind) is 
reduced to information it is possible to define consciousness as the 
capability to process information. Because any form of our access to 
nature is based on processing information with varying degree of 
complexity. The words process and complexity will be defined in 
the following. Now I proceed to elaborate the claims (italicized 
above) but due to the constraint of printing-space I will be brief 
here and the details of this scheme will be given elsewhere.
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Matter
/\, Phenomena
Some animals like dogs (in listening to ultrasound) and bats (in 
sensing prey through echoes) are better equipped than humans 
when it comes to direct sense experiences. But unlike animals, 
humans have discovered methods to extend their sense 
experiences through amplification devices like telescopes, 
microscopes etc. The summary (Davies 1989) of such sense 
experiences (direct and extended) acquired over the last five 
hundred years (equivalent to one second in a time-scale where 
the age of the universe is equal to a year) is that our universe 
extends in size from that of an electron (10'’  ̂ cm as probed by 
LEP colliders at CERN, Geneva) to the size of galactic super­
clusters (10 “̂ cm as probed by high red-shift measurements). The 
theoretical possibility of Planck length (10'̂  ̂cm) allows for further 
extension.
Our grand universe extending over more than 60 orders of 
magnitude in space has been constantly changing over the last 12 
billion years! Living systems seem to have evolved out of non­
living systems, and Consciousness seems to have evolved out of 
living systems. Is the dramatic difference between animate and 
inanimate, conscious and unconscious simply a difference in 
their ability to process information? At the level of phenomena, 
nature is so vast and diverse compared to the size and 
comprehension of human beings that one wonders how the 
collective inquiring human minds over the centuries could at all 
fathom the unity behind this diversity. This simply testifies to the 
triumph of the human mind over the physical limitations of the 
body, and has been possible because the human mind is capable 
of reaching a synthesis (an advanced form of information 
processing) based on c-areful observations of diverse phenomena.
6. Inanimate
Manifold: Till Einstein, everybody thought 'absolute space' is the 
arena (mathematically, a manifold) on which things change with 
'absolute time'. In his special theory of relativity (STR), Einstein 
redefined the manifold to be flat space-time (3 + 1) by making
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both space and time relative with respect to inertial observers but 
keeping space-time (SpT) absolute. In his general theory of 
relativity (GTR), he propounded this manifold to be curved 
space-time that can act on matter unlike the flat space-time. 
Then the Quantum Theory (QT, the standard version, not the 
Bohmian one) pointed out this manifold to be an abstract 
mathematical space called Hilbert space since the space-time 
description of quantum processes is not available. Quantum 
Field Theory (QFT) that originated in a successful merge of QT 
and STR requires this manifold to be the Quantum Vacuum 
(QV). Unlike the ordinary vacuum, QV contains an infinite 
number of 'virtual' particles that give rise to all matter and 
interactions (Sreekantan 2001). Every quantum field has its own 
QV and a successful amalgamahon of QT and GTR (called 
Quantum Gravity, and yet to be achieved) may connect the 
curved space-time with the QV of gravitational field. Finally, 
String (or p-brane) theory demands all fundamental entities to be 
strings (or p-branes) in ten-dimensional space-time. This evolution 
in our understanding clearly shows the necessity and importance 
of a background manifold to formulate any scientific theory.
Basic constituents: Energy and matter were considered to be the 
two basic constituents of our universe till Einstein showed their 
equivalence through E=mc .̂ All forms of energy are inter­
convertible. Matter in all its forms (solid, liquid, gas and plasma) 
consists of atoms. The simplest of all atoms is the hydrogen atom 
that contains an electron and a proton. If one considers the (now 
outdated) Bohrian picture of the hydrogen atom being a miniature 
solar system where the electron revolves around the proton in 
circular orbits then one realizes that most of the hydrogen atom 
is empty space. This means that if one blows up the hydrogen 
atom in imagination such that both electron and proton acquire 
the size of a football each, they need to be separated by 100 km 
or more! Hence one would think that even if 99.99% of the 
hydrogen atom consists of vacuum, the point-like electron and 
proton are material particles. But this is not so.
Elementary particle physics tells us that all visible matter 
(composition of daric matter is not yet known for sure) in the 
universe is made of six leptons and six quarks along with their 
antiparticles. Although they are loosely called particles they are not 
like the ordinary particles we experience in daily life. A 'classical'
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particle is localized and impenetrable whereas a 'classical' wave can 
be extended from minus infinity to plus infinity in space and 
many wave modes can simultaneously occupy the same space 
(like inside the telephone cable). But with the advent of quantum 
mechanics this seemingly contradictory differences between particle 
and wave lost their sharpness in the quantum world. A quantum 
object can simultaneously 'be' a particle and a wave until a 
measurement is made on it. According to QFT all fundamental 
entities are quantum fields (not material in the conventional sense) 
that are neither particle nor wave in the classical sense.
Evolution: Despite various specializations, all physical sciences 
share a common goal: given the complete specification of a 
physical system at an initial time (called the initial conditions) 
how can one predict what it will be at a later time? To predict 
this accurately one needs the exact initial conditions and the laws 
that govern the evolution of the system (called the dynamical 
laws). Either the lack of exact specifications of initial conditions 
or the intractability of the huge number of equations (that 
express dynamical laws) can lead to a probabilistic description 
rather than a deterministic one. However, there are chaotic 
systems that can be deterministic yet unpredictable because of 
their extreme sensitivity to initial conditions. Apart from 
dynamical laws there are other laws like E=mc  ̂etc., which do not 
involve time explicitly. Could there be laws at the level of initial 
conditions that guide us to choose a particular set over another? 
A physical law is like the hidden thread (unity) of a garland with 
various flowers representing diverse natural phenomena. Its 
character seems to depend on characteristic scales (denoted by 
fundamental constants like Planck length, Planck's constant, and 
speed of light etc). Why should there be different set of laws at 
different scales? Most physicists believe that quantum mechanics 
is universal in the applicability of its laws such as Schrodinger's 
equation, and that the classicality of the everyday world is a 
limiting case. But there exists no consensus at present regarding 
the emergence of this limiting case.
Guiding principles: How does one formulate these physical laws? 
The principle of relativistic causality helps. Do physical laws 
change? Is there a unity behind the diversity of laws? Is it 
possible to understand nature without laws? The concept of 
symmetry (invariance) with its rigorous mathematical formulation
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and generalization has guided us in understanding the most 
fundamental of physical laws. Symmetry as a concept has helped 
mankind not only to define 'beauty' but also to express 'truth'. 
Physical laws try to quantify the truth that appears to be 'transient' 
at the level of phenomena but symmetry promotes that truth to 
the level of 'eternity'.
Interactions: The myriad mosaic of natural phenomena is possible 
because, not only does each fundamental entity evolve with 
time, but can also interact with the other basic constituents. All 
the physical interactions (known so far) can be put into four 
categories: (i) gravitational interaction (the force that holds the 
universe together), (ii) electromagnetic interaction (the force that 
holds the atom, and hence all of us), (iii) strong nuclear interaction 
(the force that holds the nucleus), and (iv) weak nuclear interaction 
(the force that causes radioactive decay). At present (ii) and (iv) 
are known (observationally) to be unified to a single force called 
Electro-Weak. Grand unified theories (GUT) and their extensions 
(SUSY GUT) for (ii), (iii) and (iv) do exist. Ongoing research aims 
to unify (i) with such theories.
According to QFT, the basic matter fields interact by exchanging 
messenger fields (technically called gauge fields) that define the 
most fundamental level of communication in nature. Both matter 
fields and gauge fields originate in the fluctuations of QV and in 
this sense everything in universe including consciousness is, in 
principle, reducible to QV and its fluctuations (Sreekantan 1999). 
Communication in nature can happen either via the local channel 
mediated by gauge fields or by the non-local EPR (Einstein et al 
1935) type channels (through entanglement) as was demonstrated 
by recent quatitum teleportation experiments.
Composite Systems: Till the importance of quantum entanglement 
was realized in recent times the whole was believed to be just the 
sum of parts. But the whole seems to be much more than just the 
sum of parts in the 'quantum' world as well as in complex 
classical systems. It makes quantum entanglement a very powerful 
resource that has been utilized in recent times for practical 
schemes like quantum teleportation, quantum cryptography and 
quantum computation. Quantum non-locality indicates that the 
universe may very well be holographic in the sense that the 
whole is reflected in each part.
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C. A n im ate
Manifold: Space-time (3 + 1) is the manifold for all biological 
functions at the phenomenal level that can be explained by 
classical physics. If one aims to have a quantum physical 
explanation of certain biological functions then the manifold has 
to be the Hilbert Space.
Basic constituent: Cells are the basic constituent of life although 
the relevant information seems to be coded at the sub-cell (genetic) 
level. Neurons (or micro-tubules and cyto-skeletons) could be the 
physical substratum of the brain depending on the classical (or 
quantum) viewpoint.
Evolution: Does biological evolution occur with respect to physical 
time? If yes, will physical laws suffice to study biological evolution 
in the sense they do in chemistry? If no, is the biological arrow of 
time different from the various arrows of physical time (say, 
cosmological or thermodynamical arrows of time)? Is there a 
need for biological laws apart from physical laws to understand 
the functioning of biological systems?
Guiding principles: Survivability is the guiding principle in 
biological systems. Organisms constantly adapt to one another 
through evolution, thus organizing themselves into a delicately 
tuned ecosystem. Intentionality may also play a very important 
role in the case of more complex bio-systems.
Interactions: Interactions occur by exchange of chemicals, electric 
signals, gestures, and language etc. at various levels depending 
upon the levels of complexity involved.
Composite systans: Composite systems are built out of the basic 
constituents retaining the relevant information in a holographic 
manner. The genetic information in the zygote is believed to 
contain all the details of the biology that comes up later when the 
individual grows up. The genes in a developing embryo organize 
themselves in one way to make a liver cell and in another way to 
make a muscle cell.
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D. Discussions
How 'material' is physical?: Anything that is physical need not be 
'material', in the sense we experience material things in everyday 
life. The concept of energy is physical but not material. Because 
nobody can experience energy directly, one can only experience 
the manifestations of energy through matter. Similarly the concept 
of a 'classical field' in physics is very abstract and can only be 
understood in terms of analogies. Still more abstract is the 
concept of a 'quantum field' because it cannot be understood in 
terms of any classical analogies. But at the same time it is a well- 
known fact in modern physics that all fundamental entities in the 
universe are quantum fields. Hence one has to abandon the 
prejudice that anything 'physical' has to be 'material'.
Is reductionism enough?: The reductionist approach; Observing a 
system with an increased resolution in search of its basic 
constituents has helped modern science to be tremendously 
successful. The success of modern science is the success of the 
experimental method that has reached extreme accuracy and 
reproducibility. But the inadequacy of reductionism in physical 
sciences becomes apparent in two cases; Emergent phenomena and 
quantum non-locality. Quantum non-locality implies a holographic 
universe that necessitates a holistic approach (Bohm and Hiley 
1993).
Though it is gratifying to discover that everything can be traced 
back to a small number of quantum fields and dynamical laws, it 
does not mean that we now understand the origin of earthquakes, 
weather variations, the growing of trees, the fluctuations of the 
stock-market, the population growth and the evolution of life. 
Because each of these processes refers to a system that is complex, 
in the sense that a great many independent agents are interacting 
with one another in a great many ways. These complex systems 
are adaptive and undergo spontaneous self-organization (essentially 
nonlinear) that makes them dynamic in a qualitatively different 
sense from static objects such as computer chips or snowflakes, 
which are merely complicated. Complexity deals with emergent 
phenomena. The concept of complexity is closely related to that of 
understanding, in so far as the latter is based upon the accuracy of 
model descriptions of the system obtained using condensed 
information about it (Badii and Politi 1997).
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In this sense there are three ultimate frontiers of modern physics; 
The very small, the very large and the very complex. Complex 
systems cease to be merely complicated when they display 
coherent behaviour involving collective organization of vast number 
of degrees of freedom. Wetness of water is a collective 
phenomenon because individual water molecules cannot be said 
to possess wetness. Lasers, superfluidity and superconductivity are a 
few of the spectacular examples of complexity in macroscopic 
systems, which cannot be understood in terms of the microscopic 
constituents alone. In every case, groups of entities seeking 
mutual accommodation and self-organization somehow manage 
to transcend their individuality in the sense that they acquire 
collective properties that they might never have possessed 
individually. In contrast to the linear, reductionist thinking, 
complexity involves nonlinearity and chaos and we are at present 
far from understanding complexity in inanimate processes, let 
alone that in living systems.
Emergence o f Life: Is life nothing more than a particularly 
complicated kind of carbon chemistry? Or is it something subtler 
than just putting together the chemical components? Do computer 
viruses have life in some fundamental sense or are they just 
pesky imitations of life? How does life emerge from the 
quadrillions of chemically reacting proteins, lipids, and nucleic 
acids that make up a living cell? Is it similar to the emergence of 
thought out of the billions of intercormected neurons that make 
up the brain? One hopes to find the answers to these questions 
once the dynamics of complexity in inanimate systems is well 
understood.
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Mind
A. Phenomena
The mind has three states: Awake, dreaming and dreamless 
sleep. The mind is capable of freewill, self-perception (reflective) 
and universal perception (perceptual) in its 'awake' state. Can it 
be trained to have all these three attributes in the states of 
dreaming and dreamless sleep? Can there be a fourth state of 
mind that transcends all the above three states? Where does the 
brain end and the mind begin? Due to its global nature, the mind
cannot lie in any particular portion of the brain. Does it lie 
everywhere in the brain? This would require non-local interactions 
among various components of the brain. If there were no such 
non-local communication, how does the mind emerge from the 
brain?
Can anybody think of anything that transcends space-time? Is 
the mind capable of thinking of something absolutely new that 
has not been experienced (directly or indirectly) by the body? 
Nobody can think of anything absolutely new. One can only think 
of new ways of arranging and/or connecting things that one has 
learnt. In this sense, intellect is constrained by reason whereas 
imagination is not. But imagination is not acceptable to intellect 
unless it is logically consistent with what is already known. 
Imagination helps to see a new connection but intellect makes 
sure that the new cormection is consistent with the old structure 
of knowledge. This is the way new structure in knowledge is 
born and this process of acquiring larger and larger structures 
(hence meaning or synthesis) is the learning process. Science is 
considered so reliable because it has a stringent methodology to 
check this consistency of imagination with old knowledge.
Can one aspire to study the mind using the methodology of 
(physical) sciences? Seeing the tremendous success of physical 
sciences in the external world, one would think its methodology 
would work for understanding the inner world. It is not obvious 
a priori why the QT should not work in this third ontology when 
it has worked so successfully with two different ontologies. We 
aim to understand nature at a level that transcends the inner and 
the outer worlds by synthesizing them into a more fundamental 
world of quantum information.
Manifold: A physical space-time description of mind is not possible 
because thoughts that constitute the mind are acausal: It does not 
take 8 minutes for me to think of the sun although when I look at 
the sun I see how it was 8 minutes ago. We will assume that it is 
possible to define an abstract manifold for the space of thoughts 
(say, T-space). An element of T-space is a thought-state (T-state) 
and the manifold allows for a continuous change from one T- 
state to another. I presume that T-space is identical with the mind 
but it need not be so if mind can exist in a thoughtless but awake 
state, often called turiya.
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Basic constituent: How does one define a T-state? This requires 
one to understand what is a 'thought'. A thought always begins 
as an idea (that could be based on self and universal perception) 
and then undergoes successive changes in the idea but roughly 
remains focused on a theme. Change from one theme to another 
is triggered by a new idea. Hence I would suggest that the basic 
constituent of a T-state is an idea. An idea is like a 'snapshot' of 
experience, complete with all sense data, whereas a thought (T- 
state) is like an ensemble (where each element is not an exact 
replica of the other but has to be very close copy to retain the 
focus on the theme) of such snapshots.
Evolution: There are two types of evolution in T-space. First, the 
way an ensemble of ideas evolves retaining a common theme to 
produce a thought. To concentrate means to linger the focus on 
that theme. This evolution seems to be nonlinear and non- 
deterministic. Hence the linear unitary evolution of QT may not 
suffice to quantify this and will be perhaps best described in 
terms of the mathematics of self-organization and far-from- 
equilibrium phenomena. (On the practical side the time-tested 
techniques of Yoga teach us how to linger the focus on a theme 
through the practice of dharana, dhyana and samadhi) The second 
type involves a change from one particular thought to another 
and this evolution could be linear and perhaps can be calculated 
through a probability-amplitude description in the line of QT. 
Given the complete description of a thought at any initial time, 
the refutability of any theory of mind amounts to checking how 
correctly it can predict the evolution of that thought at a later 
time.
Guiding principles: If the guiding principle for evolution in the 
biological world is survivability, in T-space it is happiness-ability. 
A constant pursuit of happiness (although its definition may 
vary from person to person) guides the change in a person's 
thoughts. Each and every activity (begins as mental but may or 
may not materialize) is directed to procure more and more 
happiness in terms of sensual pleasures of the body, emotional 
joys of the imagination and rational delights of the intellect.
Interactions: Can a thought (mind) interact with another thought 
(mind)? Can this interaction be similar to that between quantum 
fields? Perhaps yes, only if both thought and quantum fields can
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be reduced to the same basic entity. It will then be possible for 
thought (mind) to interact with matter. What will be the 
messenger that has to be exchanged between interacting minds 
or between interacting mind and matter? This ultimate level of 
communication has to be at the level of QV and hence it may 
amount to silence in terms of conventional languages. But can 
any receiver (either the human or any other mind or equipment) 
be made so sensitive as to work with this ultimate level of 
communication? Interaction with the environment is believed to 
decohere a quantum system that causes the emergence of 
classicality in the physical world. A completely isolated system 
remains quantum mechanical. Can a completely isolated mind 
exhibit quantum mechanical behaviour in the sense of 
superposition and entanglement?
Composite Systems: In the T-space, a thought is an ensemble of 
ideas and a mind-state is composed of thoughts. Behaviour, 
feeling and knowledge of self and universe are in principle 
reducible to composite subsets in the T-space.
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6. Discussions
Working definition o f consciousness
Consciousness (at the first level) is related to one's response to 
one's environment. This response consists of two parts: habit and 
learning. Once something is learnt and becomes a habit it seems 
to drop out of consciousness. Once riding a bicycle is learnt one 
can think of something else while riding the bicycle. But if the 
habit changes with time then it requires conscious attention. We 
have defined learning earlier as a process to determine the 
commensurability of a new experience with old knowledge. One 
has to leam anew each time there is a change in the environment. 
Hence consciousness is not the response to the envirormient but 
is the time of rate of change of the response i.e. C = dR/dt, 
where R = H + L.
The hierarchy in consciousness depends on the magnitude of this 
time derivative. Everything in the universe can be fit into a scale 
of consciousness with unconscious and super-conscious as the 
limit points. It is obvious that all animals show response to their
environment, so do some refrigerators, but there is a hierarchy in 
their response. Through the use of 'cresco-graph' and 'resonant 
cardiograph' of J C Bose one can observe the response of botanical 
as well as the inanimate world. We cannot conclude that a stone 
is unconscious just because we cannot communicate with it using 
our known means of communication. As technology progresses, 
we may be able to measure both its response function R and its 
time derivative. If this is the right definition, what can it tell us 
about the future evolution of humans? My guess is that we 
would evolve from conscious to superconscious in the sense that 
genes will evolve to store the cumulative learning of the human 
race.
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Emergence of consciousness
The first step in understanding consciousness consists of using 
the reductionist method to various attributes of consciousness. A 
major part of the studies done by psychologists (and their 
counterparts doing studies on animals) and neuro-biologists falls 
under this category. Such studies can provide knowledge about 
mind states (say M l, M2,...) but cannot explain the connection 
between these mind states and the corresponding brain states 
(say B l, B2, ...). Because this kind of dualistic model of Descartes 
would require to answer (a) where is the mind located in the 
brain, and (b) if my mind wants me to raise my finger, how does 
it manage to trigger the appropriate nerves and so on in order for 
that to happen without exerting any known forces of nature?
To find out how the mind actually works one needs to have a 
theory of mind, one that will relate the sequence of mental states 
M l, M2, M3,... by providing laws of change (dynamical laws for 
the two types of evolution discussed above) that encompass the 
mental realm, after the fashion of the theory of matter that 
applies to the physical realm, with its specific laws. Such a 
theory of mind is possible if we synthesize the results of studies 
on attributes of consciousness to define the exact nature of the 
manifold and the basic entities of the T-space (or Mind-Space). 
Once this is achieved, one can attempt to explain the emergence 
of consciousness taking clues from the complexity theory iri 
physical sciences. But such an extrapolation will only make sense 
provided both M-states and B-states can be reduced to something
fundamental that obeys the laws of complexity theory. We
propose in the next section that information is the right candidate
for such a reduction.
Role o f Indian philosophy (IP)
(1) Unlike the Cartesian dichotomy of mind and body some 
schools of IP like Vaisheshika and Yoga treat both mind and 
body in a unified manner. Since (Western) science is based on 
the Cartesian paradigm it cannot synthesize mind and body 
unless it takes the clue from oriental philosophies and then 
blends it with its own rigorous methodology.
(2) In terms of sense awareness, awake, dreaming and dreamless 
sleep states are often called conscious, sub-conscious and 
unconscious states. A great conceptual step taken by IP in this 
regard is to introduce a fourth state of mind called turiya that is 
defined to be none of the above but a combination of all of the 
above states. This state is claimed to be the superconscious 
state where one transcends the limitations of perceptions 
constrained by space-time (3 + 1). Patanjali has provided very 
scientific and step-by-step instructions to reach this fourth 
state through samyaim {dliaram, dhyam and sainadhi are different 
levels of samyaina). The scientific validity of this prescription 
can be easily checked by controlled experiments. Nobody can 
understand modern physics without going through the 
prerequisite mathematical training. It would be foolish for any 
intelligent layperson to doubt the truth of modem physics 
without first undergoing the necessary training. Similarly one 
should draw conclusions about yogic methods only after 
disciplined practice of the eight steps of yoga.
(3) IP can provide insights regarding the role of mind in obtaining 
happiness and thus a better understanding of mind itself. 
Happiness lies in what the mind perceives as pleasurable 
and hence the true essence of happiness lies in the mind and 
not in anything external. Once the body has experienced 
something, the mind is capable of recreating that experience 
in the absence of the actual conditions that gave rise to the 
experience in the first place. One can use this capacity of 
mind to create misery or ecstasy depending on one's ability to 
guide one's mind.
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(4) There is a concept of anahata nada (the primordial sound) in 
IP. Sometimes the possibility of having a universal language 
(like Sandhya bhasa etc.) to communicate with everything in 
the universe is also mentioned. Modem physics tells us that 
the only universal language is at the level of gauge bosons 
and QV. Is there any connection between these two? Can a 
(human) mind be trained to transmit and receive at the level 
of QV?
(5) It is said that whole body is in the mind whereas the whole 
mind is not in the body. How does the mind affect the body? 
If one believes in the answer given by IP then the results 
obtained in this regard by western psychology appear to be 
the tip of the iceberg only. Can science verify these oriental 
claims through stringently controlled experiments?
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Unification
Information
Information seems to be abstract and not real, in the sense that it 
lies inside our heads. But information cannot only exist outside 
the human brain (i.e. in a library, a CD, internet etc.) but can also 
be processed outside the human brain (i.e. by other animals, 
computers etc.). Imagine a book written in a dead language, 
which nobody today can decipher. Does it contain information? 
Yes. Information exists. It does not need to be perceived or 
understood to exist. It requires no intelligence to interpret it. In 
this sense information is as real as matter and energy when it 
comes to the internal structure of the universe (Stonier 1990). But 
what we assume here is that information is more fundamental than 
matter and energy because everything in the universe can 
ultimately be reduced to information.
Information is neither material nor non-material. Both quantum 
fields and thoughts can be reduced to information. If the human 
mind is not capable (by the methods known at present) of 
understanding this ultimate information, it is its own limitation. 
This may not remain so as time progresses. The whole of the 
physical world can be reduced to information (Roy Frieden 
1999). Is information classical or quantum? There are enough
indications from modern physics that although it can be classical 
at the everyday world level it is quantum at the most fundamental 
level. Quantum information may have the advantage of describing 
the fuzziness of our experiences.
Manifold: The manifold is an information field (I-field) for classical 
information (like that of Shannon or Fisher etc.). Hilbert space of 
QT is the manifold for studying quantum information. But if 
quantum information has to be given an ontological reality, it 
may be necessary for the manifold to be an extended Hilbert 
space.
Basic constituent: A bit or a qubit is the basic entity of information 
depending on whether it is treated as classical or quantum 
respectively. Information can be of two types: kinetic and 
structural, but they are interconvertible (Stonier 1990).
Evolution: All organized systems contain information and addition 
of information to a system manifests itself by causing the system 
to become more organized or reorganized. The laws for evolution 
of information are essentially laws of organization. Are these 
laws different from the physical laws? Is there an equivalent in 
the world of infor,mation of fundamental principles like the 
principle of least action in the physical world?
Guiding principles: Optimization seems to be the guiding principle 
in the world of information. What gives rise to structure in the 
information such that we acquire an understanding or meaning 
out of it? Is there a principle of least information to be satisfied 
by all feasible structures?
Interactions: Interaction at the level of information has to be the 
ultimate universal language. What could be that language? The 
only fundamental language known to us is that of the gauge 
fields that communicate at the level of QV. Could the gauge 
fields serve as quanta of information? How different is this 
language from conventional language? Can this help us to 
communicate with not only other creatures incapable of our 
conventional language but also the inanimate world? The time is 
not yet ripe to answer these questions.
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Composite systems: How can every composite system of information 
(like a gene or a galaxy) be expressed in terms of bits or qubits? 
Does the holographic principle also apply to information?
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Discussion: Consciousness and infornnation
There is no doubt that sooner or later all attributes of 
consciousness can be reduced to information. This is just a matter 
of time and progress in technology, and will complete the 
understanding of consciousness at the gross level of phenomena. 
It will also harbinger the understanding of consciousness at the 
subtle level of laws. The synthesis of the phenomenological 
studies of consciousness will be possible by treating information 
as the most basic ontological entity, which can unify mind and 
matter. The emergence of consciousness will be understood in 
terms of nonlinear, far-from-equilibrium complex processes that 
lead to spontaneous self-organization and adaptation of structures 
in the manifold of quantum information.
Consciousness will be seen as the ability to process quantum 
information in an effective way. Depending on the degree of 
complexity involved, processing will encompass activities starting 
from the way a planet knows which is the path of least action, to 
the way modern super-computers do simulations of reality, to 
the way a scientist makes a discovery or an artist traps beauty on 
a canvass through the nuances of truth. The limit points of 
unconscious and superconscious will correspond to the limiting 
cases of no-information processing and infinite-information 
processing respectively. Sub-conscious will be interpreted as 
partial information processing. Every entity in the universe has 
to take a decision at every moment of time for its existence 
although the word existence may mean different things to different 
entities. The chance for continuation of existence is enhanced if 
the best decision on the basis of available information is taken. 
This is a process of optimization and the more conscious an 
entity is, the greater its ability to optimize.
Limitations of understanding
Is there any fundamental principle (or theorem) that places a 
limit on the understanding of both mind and matter by reducing
them to information and then applying methodology of physical 
sciences to understand life and consciousness as emergent 
phenomena? Since this approach heavily relies on mathematics, 
the limitations of deductive logic as pointed out by Godel in his 
famous incompleteness theorem may indicate the first limit. The 
second constraint may come from QT if it turns out (after having 
rigorous information theoretic formulation of both matter and 
mind) that the information related to mind is complementary to 
the information found in matter. I personally feel that this is 
quite unlikely because 1 believe that information at the 
fundamental level carmot be dualistic.
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Conclusions
Unlike the Cartesian duality between mind and body, 
vmderstanding consciousness requires us to first to understand 
matter and mind in a unified way. This can be achieved by 
giving "information" the most primary status in the universe. 
Then a generalized theory of quantum information dynamics has 
to be formulated (see the table: The World Matrix, for a summary). 
The line of attack involves three steps: (1) understanding emergent 
phenomena and com plexity in inanimate systems, (2) 
understanding life as emergent phenomena, and (3) understanding 
consciousness as an emergent phenomenon. The attributes of 
consciousness can be understood only by a prudent application 
of both reductionism and holism. The emergence of consciousness 
can be understood as an emergent phenomenon in the sense of 
structural organizations in the manifold of information to yield 
feasible structures through which we attribute meaning and 
understanding to the world.
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Metaphysical implications of 
modern science
Extracts and summary
M G NARASIMHAN 
National Institute of Advanced Studies 
Bangalore, India
The panel was chaired by Prof. Wesley Wildman and the panelists 
were Professors N Kumar, M K Chandrashekaran, Srinivasa Rao, 
Jean Staune and Purushottama Bilimoria. The coordinator for the 
panel was Dr M G Narasimhan.
After the panelists were introduced by the coordinator, in his 
opening remarks Dr V\ l̂dman pointed out that the topic 'Science 
and Metaphysics' was very complicated and that it was important 
to know certain things. First, the two terms have been used to 
describe features of intellectual activity in the history of humanity, 
in very different ways in South Asian, West Asian, and East 
Asian traditions. This has contributed to confusion which could 
have been avoided. Second, there are many allegations that 
science and metaphysics are ill-suited for decent humans. The 
charge against science is that science's attempt to be objective is 
futile because scientific objectivity involves moral abandonment 
for the products of science. On the other hand, thex charge 
against metaphysics is that metaphysics is futile because it is
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incoherent, impossible and deranged. The nietaphysical charge is 
the one that sticks hardest and longest in the Western tradition 
giving rise to a number of disputes. It is a conflict of opinions, 
which have become unresolvable. This being the case, it is stated 
that it is better to stick to more tractable things like the sciences.
But, despite these problems. Prof Wildman expressed the view 
that in our time there is a possibility of a closer relationship 
between science and metaphysics. This can be in two ways. 
Metaphysics is capable of representing a world of values and 
perspectives on scientific activity that inhibits the tendency in 
scientific cultures to reduce reality to that which science can 
manage. Conversely, science produces boundary questions that 
cannot be answered within Science itself but demands reflection 
by careful intellectuals. He observed that this can be taken as the 
meaning of metaphysics here and pointed out that the panel 
would be looking at the second kind of implication, i.e., the 
implication from science to metaphysics, trying to learn from 
science what constrains speculative metaphysical construction 
which for itself aims at a wider and deeper understanding than 
science can produce on its own terms. Prof Wildman concluded 
his remarks by saying that the task of the panel would be to 
explore the deeper aspects of science and metaphysics so that 
they could be brought closer to each other.
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N Kumar*
Prof N Kumar, speaking on the topic, 'Self-consciousness: The 
First-Person Singularity ', argued that free-willed self- 
consciousness, being a 'private' phenomenon, may not interact 
with the will-free neuronal brain (which belonged to public 
domain) as this would violate the rules of procedure and 
behaviour that are valid in their own respective domains. Thus 
articulating the 'hard' problem. Prof Kumar, stated that this 
could be resolved only through 'reduction' of the two domains to 
the subliminal levels of detection through the agency of extreme 
sensitivity as is done in the case of determinable chaos.
Elaborating both the problems which he locates at the intersection 
of physics and metaphysics and possible solutions for it in his 
paper. Prof Kumar observes that the two domains of self­
consciousness and brain do interact with each other, despite the 
fact that there can be no pre-fixed 'Interaction' theorem between 
them. Presenting his arguments as a physicist. Prof Kumar 
observed that of the three ideas (which he regards as attractive) 
Reduction, Emergence and Intermediate Concepts, Reductionism 
is a reasonable principle as it is based on the experience of past 
centuries. He observe that even the property of Emergence is 
related to reduction as the emergent properties of self- 
consciousness or consciousness must be consistent with the laws 
of physics.
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M K Chandrashekaran*
Prof M K Chandrashekaran in his presentation dealt with the 
experiments he had conducted with human subjects (mainly his 
students in the Department of Behaviour and Physiology, School 
of Biological Sciences, Madurai Kamaraj University) concerning 
their response to various aspects of time consciousness under 
controlled conditions.
One of his most important findings was that under conditions of 
prolonged social isolation there would be expansion and 
contraction of the human consciousness of time.
Srinivasa Rao*
Following the two presentations made by a physicist and a 
biologist. Prof Srinivasa Rao, a philosopher, presented his 
viewpoint stating that in any discussion of the metaphysical 
implications of modern science, it is necessary to have clear 
understanding of the meaning of the term "metaphysics". After 
describing metaphysics as conceptual structure constructed on 
the basis of reason alone. Prof Rao emphasized the role of reason 
in science as well. Although this scientific reason is speculative in 
nature, it has to be combined with experiments, observation and 
experience in order to produce scientific knowledge.
Given the fact of this interaction. Prof Rao said that in recent 
times a situation has arisen when scientists (physicists, in 
particular) have been compelled to study consciousness (hither
to neglected as a metaphysical, unobservable entity) with as 
much seriousness any other physical phenomena.
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Jean Staune
In continuation with Prof Srinivasa Rao's presentation. Prof Jean 
Stavine, a philosopher from France, stated that in his talk he would 
deal with scientific discoveries of the previous century (the 20th 
Century, that is) specially those which are relevant for metaphysical 
questions. He began with a reference to quantum physics, as it 
was the most important development in 20th Century science. He 
said that in this connection he would refer to particle duality. In 
terms of its foundational character, a quantum entity exists in the 
kind of reality that is different from ordinary reality. So elementary 
particles are not as real as the thing (i.e., the object) that they form. 
This aspect of elementary particles is a very new and important 
aspect of the metaphysical view of discovery. To put it more 
provocatively, matter is not real matter, or completely material 
viewed from the common sense view of the term 'material'. Next, 
there is the phenomenon of non-locality, a very important aspect 
of quantum theory. It can be said that (in this context) the particle 
is only one single object, but the fact is that it has a completely 
separated level of reality, which means that one particle could be 
here and the other could be at a distance of 10 km. In view of this, 
it would make no sense to claim that there is no separation 
between the two particles in our level of reality. But at the other 
level of reality, at the quantum level, there is no meaning to the 
claim about the separation of the two particles. So, while one can 
speak about this experiment (in quantum theory) in many ways, 
the conclusion remains the same about the existence of another 
level of reality outside space, time and energy and matter. In 
addition, there are metaphysical questions, which arise from general 
relativity in astrophysics. General relativity shows that there is the 
activity of space and time, which, in turn, indicates the possibility 
of the beginning of space and the beginning of time.
In astrophysics the big bang theory indicates the need for another 
reality outside space and time. In addition to this, there is the 
anthropic principle which raises a huge metaphysical question 
which .implies the existence of parallel universes and indicates 
that only by chance are we in a humdrum universe. Now, about
the question of the existence of God or a Creator: the answer is 
not scientific. One can choose a universe with God or one can 
choose an infinite number of universes without any meaning or 
God. But presently this question of the meaning of the universe 
is a scientific question and shows that from a metaphysical point 
of view, it is a very novel question. Jacques Monod, for example, 
a Nobel Prize winner, who was also a deep atheist, argued that 
this question of meaning, the question of finality is absolutely 
outside science and that it had nothing to do with science. As it 
happens, ten years after the publication of Monod's "Chance and 
Necessity", science has in fact discovered (re-discovered, one 
might say) this question again but the answer, even if it is a 
personal answer, is yet to be discovered. The fact remains that 
the question of meaning (of these developments) is now a scientific 
question and that is something new. Again in the study of the 
evolution of life, the new paradigm is to challenge the Darwinian 
theory, i.e., not to challenge evolutionary theory per se, but to 
challenge the Darwinian explanation of evolution according to 
which evolution is just a matter of chance and a humdrum affair. 
Added to this, there are arguments to the effect that there is no 
meaning and purpose at all in evolution, that it is in fact a story 
of selfishness, that we are genetically controlled machines and 
that competition resulting in the elimination of the opponent is 
the main mechanism of achieving success in evolution. In order 
to challenge (and change this paradigm) Prof Staune said that 
there are three ways of thinking -  one could use the complexity 
theory, the idea of emergence of self-organisation, and the ideas 
of Michael Denton.
Prof Staune also stated that there is a paradox related to the 
existence of these new paradigms and that this paradox indicates 
that there is a cormection between the mind of a human and the 
structure of the universe. When for example, Einstein said that 
the most amazing thing about the universe was that we could 
understand it, he was referring exactly to this idea. In a way, 
when Einstein referred to the existence of God, he was referring 
to the fact that we can understand the universe. On the other 
hand, according to Prof Staune, one could say God exists and 
that there is a place for God because one carmot say that one can 
completely understand the universe and that herein lay the 
paradox. In view of this, he stated that the right task for 
metaphysics in the next century is to integrate, and to synthesize
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the two schools of thinking and only through this metaphysics 
can scientific progress be made.
Concluding his presentation. Prof Staune observed that we have 
achieved enough understanding of the universe to show that 
there is a connection between us and the origin of the universe. 
But, on the other hand, we also know that we do not know 
everything and this gives rise to the idea of incompleteness 
which Prof Staune has tried to develop. There is this idea given 
by the Vedas, the Bible, and the Quran, indicating that there is 
another level of reality, which is given to us (only) in revelation. 
This is an idea. Prof Staune observed which could be considered 
with more credibility. Quoting Arthur Eddington an astrophysicist, 
who says that "concerning the progress of science after 1927, 
after the rise of quantum mechanics a clever man can again 
believe in God", Prof Staune said that although this was meant to 
be a joke, it presented good news.
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Purushottama Bilimoria
In the final presentation of the panel. Prof Bilimoria, a philosopher, 
stated that he would restrict his presentation to three remarks 
and two illustrations. First, he referred to the fact that in the past 
metaphysics was considered to be the queen of sciences, especially 
as it had developed in medieval times. But later metaphysics 
became discontinuous with science and on the whole philosophy 
also did so. Second, metaphysics, while thought to be speculative 
(taken in a broader sense of speculative reason inclusive of the 
mystical, the faith-based and so on), has the critical function of 
providing what William Grace calls (in Science, Religion, and 
Naturalism) the "limit questions", questions which may not have 
been asked before, questions pushing perhaps boundaries in 
some directions. The third point is that metaphysics encompasses 
the teleological trajectories of the goal of organising, forging 
links, cross-threading, stitching parts to wholes between and 
across disparate disciplines and knowledge traditions. According 
to Prof Bilimoria, Immanuel Kant, the 18th century German 
Philosopher is said to have thrown a wet towel over metaphysics 
by grounding it in empirical synthetic a posteriori investigations 
as distinct from the a priori where the role of pure reason of 
scientific enquiry to be found. So, metaphysics from that point on
become marginalised if not found to be destructive with regard 
to pure and practical science. Even though in modern philosophy 
Kan would not dispense with these tropes his critique would still 
not be considered science as physics or Newtonian mechanics 
are thought to be. Prof Bilimoria observing that this is a 
discontinuous argument said that two consequences are entailed 
by it. As a result of this argument, one could say that either 
metaphysics has no relevance in the domain of science or its 
preserve is that of a discourse of critique as people like Habermas 
called it. In other words, it is as though metaphysics provides a 
second order language to supply questions for guiding distinctive 
enquiry within a scientific discipline and drawing them together 
into logical wholes and within this net raise non-reductive 
questions about the limitations as well as the possibilities in 
respect of what has emerged in that enquiry. So metaphysics is in 
a broader sense a meta language or a meta conceptual task 
providing certain questions that may not have been possible 
within that discipline itself. Prof Bilimoria referred to this as the 
limit question in his Sutra 2 as indicated by William Grace.
The example in this case is basically related to the suggestion 
that physics leads us to cosmology which is based in naturahstic 
presuppositions or naturalistic world view. Now it is possible, 
according to Prof Bilimoria, that the kinds of questions that one 
could ask in this context could come from not only physics itself 
but also from biology, or from religion or metaphysics and by 
that a certain kind of deconstruction could follow from naturalism. 
Two types of questions may arise from this situation. One of 
them could be called the last desk question -  questions which are 
passed on to the very last desk as in the case of bureaucracy, -  
well, if you are not able to answer it goes on to somebody else 
one such question that would arise here is about the very fact of 
existence and wholeness, perhaps even the persistence of the 
world or as Heidegger, drawing out limit question in Kant, put it 
brilliantly in one of his very influential works. What is metaphysics?, 
this way -  "why is there existence and not non-existence"? There 
may well be non-existence within existence where we have 
considered the extremities of the universe, of what lies beyond 
that if we have exhausted that existence by the way, we know 
that 30 percent of the physical universe is made up of matter of 
observable entities. Now as to what comprises the rest and what 
comprises the beyond, well the Buddhists had a very good
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answer -  nothingness, obviously. A further question -  whether 
existence sits in non-existence is an important metaphysical one. 
He said that he does not know how scientists would deal with 
questions of this kind because most physicists presuppose the 
question even before they have asked the question about the 
structure of things in this organization and so on the question 
whether non-existence exists would not make sense but it may be 
a question which may need to be asked at some point.
Second, transcendental deductions pushing theological boundaries 
through leaps of mystical faith or perhaps in the sense of 
speculative reason that was referred to earlier, raise questions 
which are related to the limits or end points of naturalism or 
even realism of certain kinds of descriptions. More because of 
certain discrepancies and inconsistencies, which have arisen in 
those world views, we may need to ask questions such as what 
there is not rather than what there is or questions such as what is 
possible further within the limits of reason so far as they are 
available. By asking these questions one is not necessarily 
pandering to the so-called ultimate questions in philosophical 
theology as the constraints are obvious. In addition to this, there 
is a question of meaning and questions about what is significant 
which we can derive from our investigation from our 
understanding of things as they are.
After presenting his observations on the role of metaphysics in 
providing the limit questions. Prof Bilimoria offered two 
illustrations, one related to consciousness and the other related to 
discussion about realism. One fact about consciousness generally 
overlooked is that consciousness does not present itself as an 
observable object, that is in the form of electrons, quartz, 
superstrings, or quantum and so on. It does not present itself 
even as a mathematical entity about which people have expressed 
a sense of mystery but which does not necessarily refer to 
anything mystical for that reason. So the first thing we have to 
acknowledge about consciousness is that it is present in our 
experience and that it is a subjective thing. The second point 
which needs to be stressed, is that consciousness exists in history 
which is presented as a loosely constituted continuum in the 
world. This history is the one shaped by human beings through 
various experiences, conscious, unconscious, individual and so 
on. Prof Chandel talked about Marx in this context but perhaps
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Hegel might have been a more appropriate candidate to talk 
about the history of consciousness as also the consciousness of 
history. In this regard, Kant, Hegel and Marx are considered to be 
the big boys of German philosophy and of course Hegel had a lot 
of influence on Marx and one could say that consciousness is not 
a piece of happening inside a hunk of meat or in a computer as 
some of the analogical models present. Consciousness in its 
relation to time becomes vertical when it is synchronic and 
horizontal when it is diachronic. History of consciousness is a 
very important aspect of the work of people like Duhem, Cassirer 
and certainly Heidegger and this attests to the transcendentality 
of consciousness, which does not mean that the transcendent is 
going beyond/outside the empirical but something which is 
constitutive of the world. Transcendentality of consciousness, in 
terms of its prioricity and constitutedness, that is, it being there 
before we arrive, is like language and it forms us in a way, that is, 
it also determines what we are and who we are (even after we 
have gone), after biology, genetics and neuroscience have 
completed their enquiries and so on. Consciousness grows in a 
way and does not remain the same, a 100 years later people 
might have a different sense of consciousness in terms of their 
experience, in terms of history -  this being the case how does one 
capture this sense of change or explain this in terms of an 
ideology -  transcendentality is a limit question here. Scientists 
are weak on history but they are worse on the historicity of 
consciousness -  some people locate consciousness outside the 
world and some inside the world. Both Prof Bilimoria thinks are 
wrong. Consciousness is neither inside nor outside -  rather it is a 
correlation between the noetic that we have experience of inside 
and noemic meanings, which are grounded in social life. The two 
forms of consciousness taken together in the world constitute 
transcendental subjectivity and this accounts for the unity of 
perception that classical phenomenology indicates in the thesis 
that consciousness constitutes. Whereas naturalism has insisted 
on the fact that the world produces consciousness, this is too one­
sided as consciousness has a quality of intentionality and there is 
no consciousness object without intentionality -  hence I would 
repeat the phenomenological thesis that consciousness constitutes 
the world as well. There is a correlative between the two and the 
Buddhists have a different way of putting it, dependent origination 
or Prathithya Samuthpada and so on.
Extracts and summary 445
446 M G Narasimhan
I
Concluding his presentation. Prof Bilimoria referred to the act of 
getting meaning, that is, obtaining coherence out of explanations 
that Prof Clayton had called insufficient, as the second example 
of his critique. The descriptions and explanations of phenomena 
require at times concepts, categories, binding structures and 
critiques that do not belong to the vocabulary, say of fundamental 
physics, especially if such phenomena involve complex 
arrangement of constituents .... Scientific theories themselves are 
complex noematic structures and these are related to theories of 
time, theories of measurement, logical or mathematical techniques, 
which are all theories. These theories belong to philosophy and 
metaphysics where they are scrutinised, chiselled, fine-tuned and 
so on. These are, in short, higher level idealisations of the 
everyday perceptual world of achievement, of historically 
developing thoughts agreed upon by the community of 
investigators and confirmed by successful predictions for all 
intents. These may not lead to the establishment of ultimate 
principles but lead by inference to the best explanation until 
falsified. The picture of correspondence to reality no longer fits 
this account and hence realism has to be critiqued especially, the 
realism that comes out of science as scientific realism, phrased on 
the boundaries of science. Prof Bilimoria at the end of his 
presentation observed that as a philosopher he could only point 
to the limit questions and place some bets on what is yonder, and 
unlike Pascal, was not afraid of losing the wager, come what 
may.
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Abstract
It is argued that the free-willed self-consciousness, belonging in the 
private-limited domain, may not interact with the will-free neuronal 
brain (the physical world whose domain is public limited), without 
causing serious violations o f the rides of procedure and behaviour that 
are valid in their respective domains. Resolution o f this 'hard' problem 
seems possible wherein these otherwise sensible violations are effectively 
reduced to the sub-liminal levels o f detection through the agency of 
extreme sensitivity, as in deterministic chaos. But, a deeper resolution 
may emerge through proper choice of an interaction mechanism that 
matches the two differently ruled motions smoothly, much as an idler 
meshes with two differently speeding toothed gears. This, however, calls 
for much deeper thought. Note that we are not concerned here with the 
problem o f provenance -  the origin of self-consciousness. The latter is 
simply taken as a given -  irreducible and non-negotiable. Our real 
concern here is with the question of how it may possibly interact 
commensurably with the physical world, namely the neuronal brain.
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1. The problem
Self-consciousness, with its indivisible integrity, belongs in the 
private domain. But, the neuronal brain, with all its divisible 
connplexity, is physical, and belongs naturally in the public 
domain. Different rules of behaviour and procedure operate in 
the two domains, e.g., self-consciousness is free-willed while the 
neuronal brain is will-free. Therefore, any interaction between 
the two will subtend violations that are inadmissible -  physically 
as well as logically. And yet, interact they must as all evidence on 
hand suggests. This then is the problem -  the 'hard' problem of 
self-consciousness that science (read physics) and metaphysics 
ultimately must address.
In order to see more clearly the nature of this problem, consider 
the following. Self-consciousness is a primary experience of my 
inner life that I can never ever begin to doubt. But, I know of this 
awareness-of-being-aware only introspectively, and self- 
referentially therefore. It is inalienable, indeed would have been 
incommunicable except for certain congruences of our behaviour 
and the commonality of our conditions. This act is responsible 
for the remarkable transference that I can attribute self- 
consciousness to others around me. In precise physics terminology, 
I should say that self-consciousness is not reducible to 'pointer 
readings'. Therefore, its domain is private-limited.
The brain, on the other hand, is a complex piece of physical 
hardware, or rather wetware -  a neural network. It is subject to 
the usual laboratory measurements, e.g., to Positron Emission 
Tomography (or, PET). We say that it is reducible to the 'pointer 
readings', accessible equally well to all: It is in the public domain. 
True, physics can and often does deal with unobservables (the 
quantum-mechanical wavefunction, for example), but then these 
are unobservable to all alike. Nothing personal about them. Now, 
and this is the crucial point, these two domains seem mutually 
exclusive in the strict sense that they cannot interact. Why? 
Because, interaction implies affecting something and being 
affected by that something in return. Thus, imagine our brain 
(the physical world) somehow affecting our self-consciousness. 
This effect will be processed by the latter according to its own 
domain-specific rules of behaviour and procedure. Now, when 
this self-consciousness subsequently reacts back on the physical
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brain, the received effect will carry the tell-tale marks of having 
been processed differently, i.e., by the free-willed self- 
consciousness, which as seen now from within the domain of the 
physical brain, will be in violation of the rules resident and valid 
therein. Such violations are, of course, inadmissible -  logically as 
well as physically. Hence the NO INTERACTION THEOREM, if 
you will! And yet, on all evidence present, interact they must (or 
why go through the bother of debating at all!). Hence the 
problem.
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2. Towards a possible solution
One can, of course, resolve the whole problem by a clever trick of 
pre-established coincidences, namely that while the self- 
consciousness is indeed free-willed, somehow by its very nature 
it wills (in its own domain) what the physical laws would 
demand in the physical domain (of the brain). But then, this will 
make the free-willed self-consciousness a concomitant of the 
physical brain, and, therefore, quite irrelevant to me. (This kind 
of freedom will be like the pure gauge freedom of classical 
electromagnetism. One can, however, pursue this line of thought 
further in the hope of finding a non-trivial interaction mechanism). 
We do not, however, pursue this any further here.
Another reasonable way out would be to appeal to what some 
earlier thinkers had very imaginatively referred to as the 'critically 
poised atoms' (which in the modern context may refer to the 
'sensitivity', characteristic of deterministic chaos) assumed to 
inhere in the complexity of the neuronal network of the brain. 
The idea would be that of (arbitrarily) small causes (originating 
in the self-willed self-consciousness) giving (arbitrarily) large 
effects (in the physical brain) quite out of proportion to the cause. 
These would then, because of the almost infinite sensitivity, be 
hardly traceable to the primary causes. Note that we are not 
talking here of deterministic chaos as somehow providing the 
free-will itself. It merely provides a mechanism for covering up 
the causal trace connecting the free-willed self-consciousness to 
the will-free brain, such that no sensible violations could be 
discerned.
And now, let us consider the subtle and the minute. The question 
fundamentally is whether or not we can have an interaction 
between two systems, with their own differently governing laws, 
without leading to inconsistencies, which are, of course, 
inadmissible. Similar question has been posed in a different 
context (of classical and quantum worlds in interaction) and 
solved by E.C.G. Sudarshan (1976) for a model. I think this line 
of thought needs to be pursued seriously.
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3. Some general remarks
And finally, let me briefly comment on the relevant and the 
attractive ideas of Reduction, Emergence and the Intermediate 
Concepts. Reductionism is a reasonable principle, firmly based 
on the experience of past centuries. In its unlimited form, its 
domain of validity includes all matter, living or dead, on all 
scales, inclusive of all hardware, wetware and even the 
software and the 'a-ware'. Best expressed by Feynman as,
"Everything is made of atoms. Everything that we do atoms do.
There is nothing that living things do that carmot be understood 
from the point of view that they are made of atoms acting 
according to the laws of physics". It was, therefore, not so 
astonishing after all when Francis Crick hypothesized that "Your 
joys and your sorrows ... your sense of personal identity ... are 
nothing but a pack of neurons", and went on to give the
coordinates of consciousness (or free will) in the anterior
cingulated sulcus (and not in the pineal gland that housed 
Descartes' Theatre). Underlying this reductionist approach, 
however, is the belief that somehow beyond a sufficient degree of 
complexity of the will-free matter (the neuronal brain), the free- 
willed self-consciousness arises as an Emergent Property -  that 
more is different! But, the point is that emergence and the 
emergent properties too must be consistent with the laws of 
physics (although not derivable from these laws, but so only in 
the sense that we may not even begin to think in that particular 
direction of all possible directions -  it may involve exhaustive 
search).
I think, as a matter of principle, reductionism underlies all 
scientific explanation. But, having re-assured oneself thus, one 
should move on and use the Intermediate Concepts in one's
professional researches -  concepts like valency, viscosity, fitness, 
adaptation, emergent properties and so on. They have great 
value. But, at the fundamental level, the issue at hand, namely 
that of the interaction between the free-willed self-consciousness 
with the will-free brain, must be addressed through reduction .
Finally, experimental facts from brain research (neuroscience), 
and the experiences gained from introspection and the various 
yogic practices must be critically assimilated. Thus, for example, 
it is important to note the elementary fact that anaesthesia causes 
loss of consciousness (and presumably of self-consciousness), but 
without causing cessation of all cortical activities. And when it 
finally wears off, the Self-Consciousness 're-boots' itself. Also, 
the possibility that the split-brain experiments (with the corpus 
callosum severed) may be pointing to two separate personalities 
(two distinct self-consciousnesses, if I may), which get 
synchronized on neuronal re-connection of the two separated 
hemispheres. If really so, then one sees the possibility of using 
the theory of synchronization and entrainment (well-known from 
the chaos theory) of two individual self-consciousnesses! Indeed, 
the split-brain experiment is perhaps already a demonstration in 
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Consciousness of passage of tinne 
in humans under prolonged 
social isolation
M K CHANDRASHEKARAN 
Jawaharlal Nehru Centre for Advanced Scientific Research
Bangalore, India
Thirteen human subjects, four females and nine males of between 
20 and 35 years age, were studied for the timing of their sleep/ 
wake cycles, rectal temperature profiles, mean intake, blood 
pressure, short-interval time estimation and alertness, in fifteen 
experiments lasting variously 21 to 43 days in social isolation in a 
specially built 'human isolation facility' of 25' x 25' dimensions. 
This facility was built in the Department of Animal Behaviour 
and Physiology, School of Biological Sciences, Madurai Kamaraj 
University with financial support from the Department of Science 
and Technology, Government of India under their IRHPA scheme. 
The facility was without windows and was well-insulated with 
two shells of walls with sand packed between them, which kept 
out environmental noise caused by moving vehicles as well as 
bird songs. Cool air was pumped into the facility by means of 
ducts fitted with sound muffles and the ambient was around 27“. 
A kitchenette, well-stocked refrigerator, toilette and bathroom 
were available within. The subjects communicated by means of 
written slips of paper for their needs, and indicated the nature of
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activity (go to sleep, wake up, toilet, bath, breakfast, lunch, 
supper, presumed 2-hourly BP measurements etc) by pressing 
appropriate buttons on a panel. The buttons, when pressed, 
activated the writing stylus of a 20-channel Esterline Angus 620 
X event recorder, which was placed in my office room. Each 
function was allotted a separate channel. The subjects carried on 
their body a compact 'Solicorder' with two channels, one 
monitoring the rectal temperature, and the other, wrist 
movements. The solicorder had an interface card which was 
replaced once a week and inserted into an Apple II computer 
and the two functions were printed out.
In common with findings made on humans in human isolation 
facilities in Germany, the USA, UK and Japan all our 13 human 
subjects underestimated the passage of time and sooner or later 
slid into a state called 'free-running'. They fell asleep later and 
later each subjective night (before which they switched lights off) 
and woke up later and later in their morning (when they switched 
lights on). In four of our marathon experiments which lasted 
between 39 and 43 days, the subjects underestimated hme so 
markedly that they began to remain awake 28 to 32 hours and 
then slept soundly for close to 16 hours. Such pronounced sleep/ 
wake cycles accounting for 48-hour cycles have been called 
circabidian cycles. The rectal temperature, on the other hand, as 
has been estabhshed, is more conservative and had 'circadian' 
periods of close to 24.5 hours. As a result internal desynchronization 
or dissociation resulted between the two physiological rhythms. I 
have reasons to believe that the time course of the rectal 
temperature is the expression of the biological clock to which, 
under natural conditions, the sleep/wake clock is coupled. 
Interestingly in all four experiments, a hitherto unreported positive 
correlation sleep and wakefulness could be established.
We also reported, for the first time, that the menstrual cycle in 
the human female is not coupled to the sleep/wake clock, for the 
two episodes of the menstrual cycle remained in all our female 
subjects 28 calendar days apart. Since the rectal temperature 
persisted with periods close to 24 hours it is difficult to rule out 
its involvement in timing the episodes of the menstrual cycle. 
One more interesting finding of Jurgen Aschoff, made in 1985, 
could be confirmed by us: that short-interval time estimation in 
humans in prolonged isolation is directly coupled to duration of
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wakefulness. The estimation of passage of 2-hour intervals 
contracted and expanded, like a time systole as a positive function 
of hours of wakefulness. The time interval sense was unrelated 
to rectal temperature cycle. Meal timing was also positively 
correlated to sleep/wake cycle and the subjects had only three 
main meals even in situations of circadian sleep/wakefulness. All 
these experiments were carried out by me mostly employing my 
students as my experimental subjects (who are also co-authors in 
research publications) between the years 1987 and 1996.
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Metaphysical implications of modern 
science: How and wtiy ttiey arise
SRINIVASA R A O  
Bangalore, India
I do not think that we can engage in any useful discussion of the 
metaphysical implications of modem science without first arriving 
at a clear understanding of what constitutes metaphysics. But the 
question "What is metaphysics?" is very hard to answer because 
it is itself a philosophical question to which there has never been 
a settled answer among the philosophers of any age or time. I 
think that this unsettled nature of the answer is due to interpreting 
the above question in a certain way. Nearly every philosopher 
who has asked and answered the question "What is metaphysics?" 
seems to have actually understood it as a slightly different 
question "What is metaphysics about?" That is, they all have 
tended to treat the question as one concerning the subject matter 
of metaphysics, as a question concerning the kinds of things or 
entities metaphysics deals with, and on this point of what 
metaphysics deals with there has been a very fundamental and 
also a deep divergence of views among the philosophers.
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But, if we ask a slightly different question like "What kind of an 
enterprise is metaphysics?" it appears to me that the same degree 
of divergence does not prevail anymore. To this new question, 
there are two answers. The first answer can be found in what the 
philosophers themselves have been saying about what kind of an 
enterprise metaphysics is. The second answer can be found by 
closely looking at the kinds of things the philosophers themselves 
have been doing when they are doing metaphysics. Now, can we 
really abstract something common to most of their sayings and 
doings, and take that as typically characterizing most or all of 
metaphysics? I think we can.
The metaphysical systems advocated by hvmdreds of philosophers 
may be radically divergent in their styles, subject matter and 
contents, but all these systems are nothing but conceptual 
structures built on the basis of reason alone. Now, for the 
purpose of this exposition, I shall be treating all conceptual 
structures built on the basis of, and also justified by, reason and 
reason alone as metaphysical structures. I shall also be treating 
all metaphysical structures and concepts as purely speculative in 
character. Here I mean by speculation any activity of thinking 
that fundamentally relies on reason alone. Once this is accepted, 
it is easy to see why there is no logically necessary role played by 
sense experience, observation or experimentation in the 
construction and development of any metaphysical system. Every 
metaphysical system embodies a conceptual structure involving 
certain specific logical possibilities that are justified only by an 
employment of rational argumentation. Philosophers build such 
speculative conceptual structures to explain in full all aspects of 
the universe of our experience. Such explanation is always in 
extremely general terms. That is, metaphysics is a very general, 
and also a completely conceptual, explanatory structure built as 
well as justified solely by speculative reason.
But, then, is not science also a very similar kind of general explanatory 
conceptual structure constructed by what is called scientific reason? 
If so, what exactly is the difference, if any, between science and 
metaphysics? In answer to this question we have to say that science 
differs from metaphysics in being a structure that is ultimately 
based on experience, observation and experiments and not based on 
speculative reason alone. Science is also built on the basis of 
speculative reason, but not just on that basis alone.
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Therefore I think that the point of contact between science and 
metaphysics is usually where speculative reason enters in a 
major way into the construction of a scientific conceptual structure. 
Although science is firmly based on experience, observation and 
experiments, it still sometimes has to resort to the kind of 
speculative reason that is characteristically employed in 
metaphysics. In many cases, the metaphysical aspects and 
implications of science seem to emerge at this point of the 
employment of speculative reason. The disagreements among 
scientists also arise at this point. It appears to me that there does 
not, and perhaps also cannot, exist any general or universal 
agreement among scientists as to the point at which speculative 
reason can be justifiably employed in the development of 
explanatory structures. Where exactly the line is to be drawn 
beyond which scientific reason may or may not be substituted by 
pure speculation has been a matter on which even very great 
scientists have had very firm, and often completely mutually 
opposed, views.
As far as my own understanding of the nature of scientific 
explanatory structures goes, the theorehcal reasoning of a scientist 
reaches a stage where most things fall into place very neatly and 
elegantly if and only if a certain entity is available as part of the 
structure, but such an entity is also clearly known to be not 
available. Then the scientist is encouraged to suppose, purely on 
logical and rational grounds, that such an vinknown entity exists. 
If this hypothesis about the existence of the unknown entity were 
not to be permissible and hence forbidden, the resulting 
explanatory structure would necessarily leave some crucial 
phenomena partially, explained or even totally unexplained. At 
this point, there are two choices for a scientist: (a) allowing a 
purely speculative entity as part of a more satisfying explanatory 
structure, or (b) remaining content with a less satisfactory 
explanatory structure. Whether a scientist accepts (a) or (b) 
depends very much upon the extent to which he/she is receptive 
to allowing a role for pure speculation in developing explanatory 
structures.
Usually, metaphysical issues arise in science at its frontiers where 
reason based on experience, observation and experiment reaches 
its limit long before it is able to achieve a relatively complete or 
satisfactory explanatory structure. At this point, further progress
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is possible only through pure speculation. Since pure speculation 
involves thinking in terms of only logical possibilities, it can 
naturally happen that several scientists entertain radically different 
logical possibilities and thus arrive at several well-rounded 
explanations that may well be incompatible with one another. 
The debates in which such explanations are criticized and justified 
are clearly metaphysical in character. Modern science has given 
rise to a number of such debates.
To end this presentation with just one example, we can look at 
physics which has been acknowledged for centuries as the science 
that exclusively deals with the nature of physical reality or 
matter as such. It had also been acknowledged for centuries that 
consciousness is completely different from physical reality and 
no physicist was in doubt about the natural irrelevance of the 
study of consciousness to any investigations into the nature of 
physical phenomena. But in recent times situations have arisen 
within physics that have compelled a complete reversal of the 
earlier view. A significant amount of discussion in modem physics 
today involves topics and ideas that would have been 
unhesitatingly dismissed as too speculative or metaphysical not 
very long ago.
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Science and religion 
Extracts and summary
B V SUBBARAYAPPA 
Indian Institute of World Culture 
Bangalore, India
The panel was chaired by Dr Raja Ramanna and the panelists 
were Prof G Padmanabhan, Dr Paul K Wason, Prof Philip 
Clayton and Dr J S Neki with Prof B V Subbarayappa as 
Coordinator.
At the outset Prof Subbarayappa introduced the chairman as 
well as the panelists and indicated that the main focus of this 
panel was whether science and religion would be complementary 
or contradictory in terms of scientific and religious attitudes. He 
also suggested that any reference to sensitive issues like the 
obscurantist or superstitious practices of religion or religions be 
avoided during discussions.
In his opening remarks. Dr Raja Ramanna stated that the 
participation of a number of intellectuals on a wide range of 
subjects at this conference during the three days was indeed 
inspiring. He desired that the question as to whether there was 
any contradiction between science and religion needed critical
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examination and hence the importance of this panel discussion. 
His introductory views were as follows.
India is a country of several religions. An important aspect of 
this milieu is an element of agnosticism, which has nevertheless 
found expression in an agreeable manner. The earliest 
compendium in Sanskrit, The Rigveda has expressed certain 
doubts about the origin of the universe in its Nasadiya sukta, 
which goes back to about 3500 years. Its translation in English 
rendered by A A Mac Donanel is as follows:
1. "There was not the non existent nor the existent then;
There was not the air nor the heaven which is beyond.
What did it contain? Where? In whose protection?
Was there water, unfathomable, profound?"
2. "Whence this creation has arisen; whether he founded it or 
Did not; he who is in the highest heaven is its 
Surveyor, he only knows, or else he knows not".
As you will observe, this hymn ends with the question: who 
knows? and it is a good question. Among the ancient religions, the 
Buddhists evaded this question, and Jainism which is noted for its 
logic similar to quantum logic did not believe in the existence of 
god. There are six systems of orthodox Indian thought including 
the Sankhya and the Vedanta. In the Sankhya system of the evolution 
of Prakndi, Purusa is inert and Prakruti is ever active, while 
Sankara's Advaita deals with Brahnmn, a Cosmic Principle in rather 
a complex manner. The Puranas contain a plethora of gods in a 
mythological setting, with no god-head as a unitary principle and 
although some of the gods are grotesque, they may be sjmbolic of 
varied divine dispensation. The epics, the Ramayana and the 
Mahabharata, despite some of their incongruities, have had a 
tremendous impact on the Indian masses.
As for the Indian scientific tradition, it needs to be recognized 
that mathematical thinking was vibrant., Aryabhata I (5 century 
A.D.) was a celebrated mathematician and astronomer. He gave 
a scientific explanation of the occurrence of an eclipse in terms of 
shadows of the earth and the moon. However, the mythological 
approach to the eclipses in terms of Rahu and Ketu was preferred, 
then as now.
460 B V Subbarayappa
In recent times, there have been scientific studies on human 
consciousness as well as on the mental states of religious or yogic 
excitation or meditation, and photographs of the brain in such 
states have been taken and studied. The general conclusion 
appears to be that there is a certain type of causation in the brain 
through meditation, with a whole series of reactions in the brain, 
leadirig to a religious feeling, which is rather curious. It is well 
known that sadhus or mendicants take in bhang etc. to get a 
divine-like feeling. In other words, it seems that brain can be set 
in order to get a religious feeling of god. In India many god- 
forms or idols are worshipped in the matrix of mythology and, 
according to some exponents, mythology might be important 
even for the study of consciousness.
In this conference, there have been references to various ideas, 
but no reference to St. Paul who was incessantly persecuting the 
Jews. But something happened to him on his way to Jericho city 
and this suddenly transformed him into a dedicated Christian. 
That sudden shocks can produce religions feelings have been 
experimented upon, as revealed in a recent article. Even 
mathematicians seem to undergo sudden brain excitement.
While many scientists have been endeavouring towards the 
material enrichment of society in several ways, there are also 
scientists and technologists who have been involved in the 
production of weapons of mass destruction.
Dr Ramarma posed the questions: Do we have to live with both 
science and religion? Or Do we live without them? He then 
called upon the panelists to present their views.
Abstracts from the presentations of the panelists are given below.
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G Padmanabhan
I was asked to speak on the human genome project in relation to 
its ethical values, and thought that this topic might not be out of 
place, and even be conceptually relevant to this panel discussion.
The genome project itself involves the sequence of four alphabets
-  ATGC -  in the DNA sequence and this is supposed to tell us
the arrangement of amino acids in it. Basically this is a reductionist 
concept of biochemical reactions and life-processes. The 
achievement of this sequence is no doubt a great landmark. 
However, certain ethical issues arise which deserve consideration. 
The knowledge of this sequence has several applications including 
diagnostics, development of new vaccines and gene therapy.
As for the diagnostic part, this tool is available to find out 
whether certain mutations cause certain types of diseases. The 
question is whether this knowledge should become private 
property, since, as an example, employers could demand a gene- 
map of an employee that would reveal his or her susceptibility 
towards a particular type of disease and the insurance company 
may also need this diagnosis to determine the quantum of 
premium etc.
For example, let us consider the case of breast cancer which is 
caused by a mutation in the gene BRCAI. If a young girl of 20 is 
told that she will get breast cancer at her age of forty, it would be 
a traumatic experience for her, although the gene that causes 
breast cancer has several other modifications about which we 
know very little at present. In any case the presence of the 
mutations would be hazardous but the absence of it can also be 
false assurance. In the West, it was earlier thought that a diagnosis 
of this type would be welcome, but it has not happened that way 
at all. The detechon of mutations would no doubt help pre-natal 
diagnosis and the termination of pregnancy, if any abnormalities 
are detected. But this has a very deep religious undertone, 
namely, whether the abortion is to be allowed or not. Another 
example is that there is a disease called thalassemia, which 
requires repeated blood transfusion as the red cells break down. 
To remove the accumulated iron toxicants, a chelator molecule is 
to be administered. This treatment is not only painful but also 
expensive; children sometimes die in their teens. The main 
question is whether a mother should go through this trauma or 
seek abortion. In a country like India where we have 
consanguineous marriages, the husband and the wife may not 
have the disease, but the offspring could get the disease. And 
such a situation could have been averted, if the marriage was 
prevented as a result of proper diagnosis.
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Let us take gene therapy. As a result of the human genome 
project, there will emerge a basket of new genes. Gene therapy 
involves the replacement of a defective gene by a normal one. 
Recently there have been successful clinical trials for rectifying 
genetic disorders at least in one or two cases. Let us hope that for 
the first time in human history, a permanent cure for genetic 
disorders has become available. However, several ethical issues 
raise their heads in this connection. There are two types of gene 
therapy: (i) somatic cells, and (ii) stem cells. A somatic cell is 
basically introduced into the liver, lung or kidney cell, whereas a 
stem cell is introduced into the zygote, that is, the first cell of the 
embryo produced by the combination of the sperm and the egg. 
The problem is that we do not yet know where the newly 
introduced gene will go and lodge itself. It is possible that the 
defective gene may continue to be present as such, while the 
introduced gene may lodge itself elsewhere. At the same time, it 
gets expressed and we get the protein which otherwise would be 
missing. But people are worried about the consequences of the 
gene lodging itself in a position which is not its normal place. 
The question is; Can this be done in an embryo? It is unethical 
and we should look into it in the light of the Dolly experiment. In 
this experiment both the donor and the recipient were female 
sheep, and the nucleus of an adult cell was taken out and placed 
in the egg cell of the other sheep. An embryo was formed and an 
infant sheep was born to a foster mother. As a biological event, 
scientists are excited about it. While any part of plant can give 
rise to new plant, any part of an animal cannot do so. But the 
Dolly experiment has demonstrated the possibility of an animal 
cell giving rise to another animal. Such a possibility shows that 
human beings can also be cloned, and it could become a new 
experiment in eugenics.
There is also talk of behavioral genes that can alter an individual's 
behaviour. The thought of combining this with the ability to 
clone animals and human beings, is viewed by some people as a 
deadly combination. However, the background ideas were simply 
to clone some useful portions in an animal, in the production of 
certain pharmaceuticals.
The present position is that one can clone one's own organs like 
the liver or kidney that can then be kept in a freezer and become 
available at the time of transplantation. The media, however.
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projects it in a different light, namely, a dead child could come 
back to life or a grandmother could clone herself. We should 
recognize that all of us have identical (99.9%) sequences with 
some minor difference called signatures. Genes are supposed to 
be transcribed or translated in the form of proteins; this is not an 
automatic process but is controlled by the environment. Some of 
the genes are either not expressed at all, or are over- or under­
expressed. It is some complement of a gene that is the most 
important aspect while the sequence of the gene is only secondary, 
and each has a different mosaic of proteins. If a grandmother 
could clone herself, the child may look like her, but the behaviour 
may be completely different.
The relation between gene expression and consciousness - a 
command centre in which free will arises and millions of thought 
processes take place -  is still not understood. Can gene expressions 
regulate these processes? We can generate music through an 
instrument like the Veena but if the wire snaps there will be no 
music. It is very difficult to say whether the musician generates 
the music or the instrument does. The genes and the elaborate 
neuronal network or the quantum physical principles may execute 
the commands. In any case, it is not clear how science can 
answer questions concerning the generation of free will or the 
way one can do whatever one likes. So far as consciousness or 
self-realization is concerned, it is not intractable at the personal 
level as evidenced by Shri Aurobindo, Vivekananda, Jesus Christ 
and the Buddha who had their own experiences. One can sit 
under a bodhi tree and still not have such an experience as the 
Buddha had.
Philosophy has an easy way of saying that consciousness does 
not die at all and once the body dies, consciousness merges with 
the cosmic one or transmigrates to another body. But, as a 
scientist I find it hard to understand the mode of this transmission. 
The genes, neural network and others can be conduits, but the 
question is: could they be the originators of consciousness and 
free will? It may be difficult for science to answer this question, 
and as a scientist I can say it carmot be established on the basis of 
our present knowledge.
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Paul K Wason*
On of the reasons I am pleased to be here is the opportunity to 
leam how scholars in India approach the relahonship between 
science and religion. In the network of people I usually work 
with, it is common to talk about the "dialogue between science 
and religion" or "the constructive engagement of science with 
religion." But these are shorthand terms, used for the purpose of 
quick summary. Many authors use the terms "religion" and 
"science" in a broad encompassing way and not as technical 
terms. However, sometimes this usage merely confuses things, 
for there really are various meanings for these words. Ulf Gorman, 
President of the European Society for the Study of Science and 
Theology explained to me, for example, that science and religion 
are not parallel concepts -  theology is more accurate.
In any case, if we are to develop the fullest possible xmderstanding 
of reality we should consider all these areas -  how science relates 
to metaphysics, to theology, to spirituality and to religious 
institutions and practices. A scientist might be motivated to 
believe something by the persuasiveness of the empirical evidence, 
and we might be motivated to believe certain things theologically 
through our spiritual experience. And both these points might 
well be describing the same person. But in the current world (in 
North America, anyway), the intellectual culture and popular 
culture have both pushed for a separation between these two 
'worlds' of scientific belief and religious or spiritual belief.
A very important motivation of the science -  religion dialogue 
has been to overcome this separation, and to do away with the 
antagonism that often goes with it. For example, the Center for 
Theology and the Natural Sciences (CTNS) in California has 
popularized the metaphor of bridge building.
, Much progress has been made in the science -  religion -  
spirituality dialogue over the past twenty years by scholars like 
Ian Barbour, Arthur Peacocke, John Polkinghome, Nancy Murphy, 
Phil Clayton and a great many others. And I think one reason we 
are seeing such a rapid growth in interest in science and religion 
is that persuasive answers are now being provided for the 
problems that have kept science and religion apart. Genuine 
progress is being made concerning how we might understand
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divine action in the world (in the world we know through 
science).
Yet as Wesley Wildman has pointed out, there needs to be more 
to it than this, and I .think there is far more potential to come 
from bringing science and religion together than we yet realize. 
My hope is that many seemingly intractable intellectual questions 
can eventually be answered by making use of the fuller view of 
reality by bringing science and spirituality together. For example, 
what is the human sense of intentionality and purpose? Is it real 
or just a mental construct, and if real, does it imply that there 
would be value in looking into a teleolnomic approach to the 
living word generally?
Even when there are no conflicts -  real or perceived -  between 
religion and science, efforts to bring them together creatively can 
have a great positive effect. The value is not just in overcoming 
barriers, but more positively in tlie creation of deeper understanding.
Finally, just a few points that need our consideration: Creative 
interaction between science and religion requires that we think 
across disciplinary boundaries and learn new fields of study. 
This is not as easy as it sounds. We need to be patient with one 
another. I have seen scientists who think they can solve all 
questions without troubling themselves to learn anything about 
religion and theology. Stephen Jay Gould wrote a whole book. 
Rocks of Ages, without engaging the literature of the field. Someone 
with a little more patience and humility might pause to learn 
something about a field before dismissing it as trivial.
We also need to remember that religion and science must maintain 
their own integrity. When religion insists on what science can or 
cannot discover -  as with the so-called creation science in the US
-  or vice versa, we lose an opportunity to learn more. It will not 
be possible for the whole to be greater than the parts, of when 
one part takes over the other.
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Philip Clayton
At the outset, I wondered whether there was any common 
ground for all the discussions on science and religion that took
place for the past three days or was there any way to present 
them in the form of a capsule. I think that while all the words 
were inadequate in one sense or the other, the word, 
complementarity, for science and religion would be significant. 
In physics, the complementarity of wave and particle, and Niel 
Bohr's principle are too complex. But the complementarity of 
science and religion perhaps means that both are necessary. In 
this respect, four aspects need to be considered;
The simple one is that science and religion are complementary in 
action and right actions are possible with the aid of both. For 
example, we are well aware of environmental degradation and 
we need right actions to have a pollution-free environment. For 
this purpose, we have to look into what may be called the 
"wisdom traction". As you are aware, we have the scientific 
capability to have genetics-based medicine, genetically modified 
food and the like. Science does not provide the wisdom to make 
the decision as to whether these are useful.
The second complementarity relates to the ways of knowing. 
There are multiple ways of knowing and to be tied to only one 
way of knowing is inadequate. There is the western view that all 
knowledge is scientific and sophisticated arguments have been 
advanced for this. In this respect the approaches of several 
names like Kant's Positivists and the like are mentioned. For the 
past three days there were talks on the involvement of the West 
in the non-scientific ways of knowing. The most disturbing talk 
was by Wesley Wildman who gave us reasons to worry about the 
non-scientific ways of knowing and these deserve careful 
consideration. In my opinion, the resources that this conference 
offered were the possibilities of tlie non-scientific ways of knowing, 
and to use them in our spiritual quest as well.
The third complementarity is ontological. There should be 
complementarity of science and religion in the realms of 
knowledge and this needs to be a type of both reality and 
ontological complementarity, of the finite world and the infinite 
ground, of the individual existence and the infinite sources. If we 
formulate thus the complementarity of reality, certain differences 
emerge. There are multiple interpretations of the Vedanta, between 
the East and the West. We need a simple way to understand it. 
There is a complementarity of science and meta-science or physics
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and metaphysics. Who knows whether the n:\eta-physical system 
could be the best, even though some meta-physical disagreements 
cannot be resolved. Still there is ground for thinking of the 
complimentarity of science and religion, for the sake of ethical 
living, for humility in the wake of scientific knowledge and 
technical power, for the sake of beauty and harmony and 
humanity completeness.
Quoting Wordsworth: 'For more deeply whose dwelling is the 
lights of setting suns and the round ocean and the living air and 
blue sky and in the mind of man', I suggest that we should 
discuss the complementarity of science and religion as implying 
that scientific resource should be checked by the intuition available 
to us, and religious truth and claims checked by scientific facts.
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J S Neki
I am a psychiatrist as well as a poet. My presentation would be a 
mixture of these two. In the Upanishadic story of Prince Svetaketu 
who after completing twelve years of study, narrated to his 
father that he had learnt several subjects including grammar, 
english, philosophy, mathematics, astronomy and astrology, 
geography etc., whereupon the father asked him whether he had 
learnt that by knowing which everything else could be known; 
but the prince replied to this in the negative. The prince was sent 
to a Rushi or a 'seer', one who does not pass through the stages of 
learning, but can directly 'see'; and that marks the difference 
between science and spirituality. In spirituality you see and in 
science you learn. It is often said that both science and religion 
seek truth, but it seems to me that science has access to factual 
data and we should distinguish between fact and truth. Facts can 
be valued through our senses but truth cannot always be and 
truth in religion is subjective for each person. A fact is emotionally 
cool but truth is emotionally warm and ethically pragmatic. One 
has to look at facts externally, but one has to look inwards for 
truth. One looks inside, looks into the consciousness, which is 
present in all living beings and everywhere. Can we draw a line 
between the living and nonliving beings? To me everything is life 
including earthquakes, cloud bursts, rain, dunes of a desert etc. 
Human consciousness arises through integration of trillions of 
molecules into a patterned weave of memories, a synthesis of
innumerable threads into a mother rug of ultra-dimensional 
perception. Even the entire universe may be integrating itself 
into a mega-consciousness which we commonly attribute to God.
Let me give an example of an accident in which my legs had 
been fractured. When I was convalescing in the hospital, I 
thought that my osteocells would move in the entire body and 
pick up calcium particles wherever they were and deposit them 
at the fractured place continuously till the fracture was healed. 
This could be the consciousness of the osteocells. It is significant 
to note that the fusion or the union of the sperm and the ovum 
forms the zygote and some of the cells in it become an eye and 
some others a toe, and the process is very exact. We do not know 
how they assume these forms. There is a statement that such 
things are coded only in genes, and one could say that this 
coding has been done (as also the de-coding) by consciousness, 
and that consciousness directs the genes which are responsible 
for coding.
It needs to be recogr\ized that science depends on sensory data. 
Let us consider what a frog's eye tells its brain. Let us suppose 
that a scientist has taken out the frog's eye along with the optic 
nerve and kept it alive by perfusion and encased this eye within 
a dark glove into which various kinds of stimuli can be introduced, 
small, big, coloured and so on, so that the cormected ophcal 
nerve could write the types of messages received. The 
experimentalist would think that there would be as many 
messages as the number of stimuli. There were different type of 
messages and it was believed that the responses were for survival 
purposes, leading to the conclusion that the eye also has 
consciousness. Now the question is: is there any other type of 
survival, a spiritual survival for which we have to look inwards? 
I have had experience in which there was no T  or 'me', but a 
commimion with the entire imiverse.
Religion has also predicaments with the social complexities, 
mythological explanation of the universe, rites and rituals, magical 
beliefs etc. However there is a spiritual aspect or mystical 
dimension of religion which it can offer to science. Science is now 
at its wit's end and it is at an edge where mysticism could 
provide answers to it. There is now a need for science and 
religion to come together and cross-fertilize each other. There is a
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view that mystical experiences do not tally with one another. A 
person or an object can be looked at from different angles and 
heights leading to different experiences, and be the same although 
they appear to be different. If in an aeroplane one goes up and 
looks through the window, the past, the present and the future 
will merge into the present. Likewise, if one goes up to a spiritual 
level beyond the different layers of consciousness, one experiences 
the transcendence level. Let me end my presentation with a 
poetic line: "Time past and time future allow but little 
consciousness, to be conscious is not to be in time."
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*Writeiips by these speakers are included in the proceedings
Science and religion
PAUL K WASON 
John Templeton Foundation, USA
One of the reasons I am pleased to be here is the opportunity to 
learn how scholars in India approach the relationship between 
science and religion. I have learned a great deal. Even more 
importantly I now have some connections to continue the process. 
I have been interested in how science and religion relate for more 
than 25 years (obviously I started very young). And I would like 
to share a few observations largely from a North American-UK 
context. This is not an overview but just some points to add.
1. How we use Words
In the network of people I usually work with, it is common to 
talk about the "dialogue between science and religion" or "the 
constructive engagement of science with religion." But these are 
shorthand terms. They are used for the purpose of quick summary. 
Many authors use the terms "religion" and "science" in a broad 
encompassing way and not as technical terms. However,
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sometimes this usage merely confuses things, for there really are 
varied meanings for these words.
I have the privilege of w^orking full time in this field and my title 
is Director of Science and Religion Programs. This was meant to 
cover anything having to do with religion, including theology, 
spirituality, personal practice, institutional religion and so on. 
Science is also meant broadly to encompass the social and 
behavioral sciences and not just the natural sciences.
Naturally there is value in using these words in different, and 
particularly in more precise ways. Ulf Gorman, President of the 
European Society for the Study of Science and Theology explained 
to me, for example, that science and religion are not parallel 
concepts -  theology is more accurate. They apparently had an 
extensive discussion about what to name the organization. (In 
fact, for sometime what I studied was science and theology, or 
even more specifically, biology and Christian theology.)
In any case, if we are to develop the fullest possible understanding 
of reality we should consider all these areas -  how science relates 
to metaphysics, to theology, to spirituality and to religious 
institutions and practices. Dwelling on definitions might seem a 
little tedious for a 15-minute presentation on a broad topic but 
based on some informal conversations in the past couple of days, 
I realize there could be much unnecessary misunderstanding 
otherwise.
472 Paul K Wason
2. Motivations: Wtiy care about science 
and religion?
My second point concerns motivations. I won't pretend to be a 
philosopher, especially not when there are so many trained 
philosophers listening to me, but I like the idea I have heard 
suggested that there is "no unmotivated belief" (and no 
unmotivated action either, for that matter).
A scientist might be motivated to believe something by the 
persuasiveness of the empirical evidence, and we might be 
motivated to believe certain things theologically through our 
spiritual experience. And these two points might well be
describing the same person. But in the current world (well, in 
North America, anyway), the intellectual culture and popular 
culture have both pushed for a separation between these two 
'worlds' of scientific belief and religious or spiritual belief.
A very important motivation for the science-religion dialogue 
has been to overcome this separation, and to do away with the 
antagonism that often goes with it. For example, the Center for 
Theology and the Natural Sciences (CTNS) in California has 
popularized the metaphor of bridge building.
I myself first became interested in order to overcome what I 
perceived as conflicts between biology and my Christian faith. I 
am often asked why we should care about bringing science and 
religion together, why such bridges are of any use. Here are a 
couple of reasons.
(i) There are people, even today, who still hold to the 19th 
Century idea that the world is a determined place, and that 
science has proven religion to be wrong or foolish. The field 
of science and religion seeks to overcome this notion.
(ii) I have conversations with people who will say, of course 
there are many areas where science and religion conflict, but 
when I ask "such as?" they can rarely give an example. And 
those who do come up with an answer, it is usually something 
like the Galileo affair that is far more complex than most 
people realize. In the case of Galileo, for example, there is 
good reason to believe it was not at all a matter of the 
Catholic Church against science. People who see this as a 
glaring example of conflict, are, to put it bluntly, simply 
ignorant of the debate.
Much progress has been made in the science-religion-spirituality 
dialogue over the past twenty years by scholars like Ian Barbour, 
Arthur Peacocke, John Polkinghorne, Nancey Murphy, Phil 
Clayton and a great many others. We have found time and again 
that when people claim there are conflicts; it really has more to 
do with their philosophical assumptions than with anything that 
deserves to be called science. Assumptions such as naturalism or 
materialism and not science itself are what conflict with most 
religious perspectives. Furthermore, science does not provide
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support for naturalism or materialism vs. such alternatives as 
theism. We need to unmask these damaging confusions.
And I think one reason we are seeing such a rapid growth in 
interest in science and religion is that persuasive answers are 
now being provided for the problems that have kept science and 
religion apart. Genuine progress is being made concerning how 
we might understand divine action in the world (in the world we 
know through science). Progress is being made in our 
understanding of historical episodes like that involving Galileo 
and what was really involved. And we have also identified some 
characteristic errors. (See the piece I wrote on this subject called 
"clearing the ground" at http://abacus.bales.edii/~jsmedley/phys228/ 
wason.html). When these errors are recognized a great many 
problems simply disappear.
Yet as Wesley Wildman has pointed out, there needs to be more 
to it than this, and I think there is far more potential to come 
from bringing science and religion together than we yet realize. 
My hope is that many seemingly intractable intellectual questions 
can eventually be answered by making use of the fuller view of 
reality we get by bringing science and spirituality together. For 
example, what of the human sense of intentionality and purpose? 
Is it real or a mental confusion, and if real does it imply that there 
would be value in looking into a teleolonomic approach to the 
living world generally?
Even when there are no conflicts -  real or perceived -  between 
religion and science, efforts to bring them together creatively can 
have a great positive effect. The value is not just in overcoming 
barriers, but more positively in the creation of deeper 
understanding. It is worth keeping in mind, all the same, how 
much of the literature in the science and religion dialogue in 
North America has been motivated by the desire to overcome 
obstacles -  including the view that science and religion are 
separate worlds and one is running over the other.
You may find this uninteresting. But if approached with different 
questions from different religions and sciences, there is far more 
potential, particularly as we contemplate certain important topics 
like meaning and purpose, virtues and values, the fundamental 
nature of reality, the nature of love and the nature of other
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spiritual matters like forgiver\ess, hope, joy, the origin, source 
and nature of the cosmos, and what it means to be human.
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3. Expanding the dialogue
If we are to take this expansive view, this idea of science and 
religion as going far beyond merely overcoming barriers (however 
important) I think we will benefit from a more world-wide 
network of scholarly interaction. Barriers and obstacles tend to 
be "local" to a specific context but a better understanding of love, 
of the nature of being human and many other questions are of 
universal importance.
4. Problems and needs
Finally, just a few simple and quick points about what are
needed, in my view:
❖ Creative interaction between science and religion requires 
that we think across disciplinary boundaries. It requires that 
we learn new fields of study. This is not as easy as it sounds.
❖ We need to be patient with one another. I have seen scientists 
who think they can solve all questions without troubling 
themselves to leam anything about religion and theology. 
Stephen Jay Gould, wrote a whole book Rocks o f Ages without 
engaging the literature of the field. This is a great problem. 
And someone with a little more patience and humility might 
pause to leam something about a field before dismissing it as 
trivial. On the other hand, we cannot be specialists, we cannot 
develop true expertise, in all the fields involved and I have 
seen people poorly treated because they didn't know all the 
details of the expert in every field. Patience and generosity.
❖ We also need to remember that religion and science must 
maintain their own integrity. When religion insists on what 
science can or cannot discover -  as with the so-called creation 
science in the US, or vice versa, we lose an opportunity to 
leam more. It will not be possible for the whole to be greater 
than the parts or when one part takes over the other.
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